07-25-2009, 05:59 AM
John O'Sullivan
<b>America's Russian romance</b>
Central and Eastern Europeans fear Washington no longer loves them - and theyâre saying it out loud
John O'Sullivan
Prague â From Thursday's Globe and Mail Last updated on Thursday, Jul. 23, 2009 09:12AM EDT
This week's diplomatic foray into Ukraine and Georgia by U.S. Vice-President Joseph Biden has suddenly taken on the appearance of a fire-fighting expedition. And unless fires can be extinguished by bromides, there may soon be a conflagration.
Twenty-two distinguished Central and Eastern European political and intellectual leaders published an open letter last week to Mr. Biden's boss expressing their fear that America had lost interest in their region. The list of signatories brought together veteran anti-Communist dissidents such as Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa with post-Communist whiz kids such as former Polish president Alexander Kwasniewski and rising stars such as Alexander Vondra, the Czech Republic's deputy prime minister until the other day.
What unites such diverse figures is that they are America's best friends in Europe. Their countries are the firmest Atlanticists around, except for Britain and Portugal. Their attachment to the U.S. rests on solid foundations: gratitude for their rescue from Soviet domination in the Cold War; acute awareness that their independence relies on the protection of NATO; and belief that the West is united by a common democratic tradition.
Now they are worried that America no longer loves them in return. They fear that America's desire to âreset the buttonâ for better relations with Russia means their interests may be neglected by Washington. They perceive that U.S. foreign policy under President Barack Obama is more ârealistâ - interested in promoting America's national interest more than its principles - than under recent presidents. And they see evidence of both dangers in the way the West has tamely accepted Russia's successful aggression in Georgia.
It is not altogether new for Central and Eastern Europeans to feel they are neglected by the U.S. and Western Europe. What is unprecedented, as John Vinocur pointed out in the International Herald Tribune, is that they should express such feelings so openly, so strongly and so undiplomatically. Their description of current Russian policy - âit uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europeâ - is harsh. But there is a great deal of evidence to support it.
Which is exactly why the letter poses such a complicated dilemma for Washington. If its analysis is correct, then the U.S. can hardly place much trust in its new âresetâ Russian policy. So it can hardly agree wholeheartedly to the letter. Nor can it reject the letter out of hand, because it is signed by America's most distinguished European supporters.
Hence the assurances from Mr. Biden that America's new Russian policy will not come âat the expense of Ukraineâ (and, by extension, of other post-Communist countries) - indeed, it might even be to their benefit. In case they failed to see this, he gave this further assurance: âWe do not recognize anyone else's right to dictate to you or any other country what alliance you will seek to belong to or what relationships, bilateral relationships, you have.â
Such assurances would be more comforting to Central and Eastern Europe if Russia had not already violated such principles (and various international treaties) by invading Georgia and annexing two of its provinces - and done so with impunity and eventual Western acquiescence. What the restive Easterners want is closer integration with America so neither Russia nor other hostile powers will be tempted to future ârevisionism.â
And integration with Western Europe? One fascinating aspect of the letter is that, although it pays the usual tributes to the European Union, its signatories plainly see the Atlantic relationship as the primary one and NATO as the main vehicle for Western defence. They both call for better integration between Europe and America on defence and foreign policies and warn against the political tendencies, including anti-Americanism, that might cause a long-term transatlantic breach.
But there is one tinny note in the letter. Its signatories claim the contributions their countries make to NATO and the EU, though modest, are still significant in terms of their population and GDP. That is not, alas, true. Almost all European NATO members spend between 1 per cent and 2 per cent of GDP on defence. If they were to raise that to America's 3 per cent, Russia would soon abandon revisionism.
Still, this wake-up call to the West is at least a start.
John O'Sullivan is senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
<b>America's Russian romance</b>
Central and Eastern Europeans fear Washington no longer loves them - and theyâre saying it out loud
John O'Sullivan
Prague â From Thursday's Globe and Mail Last updated on Thursday, Jul. 23, 2009 09:12AM EDT
This week's diplomatic foray into Ukraine and Georgia by U.S. Vice-President Joseph Biden has suddenly taken on the appearance of a fire-fighting expedition. And unless fires can be extinguished by bromides, there may soon be a conflagration.
Twenty-two distinguished Central and Eastern European political and intellectual leaders published an open letter last week to Mr. Biden's boss expressing their fear that America had lost interest in their region. The list of signatories brought together veteran anti-Communist dissidents such as Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa with post-Communist whiz kids such as former Polish president Alexander Kwasniewski and rising stars such as Alexander Vondra, the Czech Republic's deputy prime minister until the other day.
What unites such diverse figures is that they are America's best friends in Europe. Their countries are the firmest Atlanticists around, except for Britain and Portugal. Their attachment to the U.S. rests on solid foundations: gratitude for their rescue from Soviet domination in the Cold War; acute awareness that their independence relies on the protection of NATO; and belief that the West is united by a common democratic tradition.
Now they are worried that America no longer loves them in return. They fear that America's desire to âreset the buttonâ for better relations with Russia means their interests may be neglected by Washington. They perceive that U.S. foreign policy under President Barack Obama is more ârealistâ - interested in promoting America's national interest more than its principles - than under recent presidents. And they see evidence of both dangers in the way the West has tamely accepted Russia's successful aggression in Georgia.
It is not altogether new for Central and Eastern Europeans to feel they are neglected by the U.S. and Western Europe. What is unprecedented, as John Vinocur pointed out in the International Herald Tribune, is that they should express such feelings so openly, so strongly and so undiplomatically. Their description of current Russian policy - âit uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europeâ - is harsh. But there is a great deal of evidence to support it.
Which is exactly why the letter poses such a complicated dilemma for Washington. If its analysis is correct, then the U.S. can hardly place much trust in its new âresetâ Russian policy. So it can hardly agree wholeheartedly to the letter. Nor can it reject the letter out of hand, because it is signed by America's most distinguished European supporters.
Hence the assurances from Mr. Biden that America's new Russian policy will not come âat the expense of Ukraineâ (and, by extension, of other post-Communist countries) - indeed, it might even be to their benefit. In case they failed to see this, he gave this further assurance: âWe do not recognize anyone else's right to dictate to you or any other country what alliance you will seek to belong to or what relationships, bilateral relationships, you have.â
Such assurances would be more comforting to Central and Eastern Europe if Russia had not already violated such principles (and various international treaties) by invading Georgia and annexing two of its provinces - and done so with impunity and eventual Western acquiescence. What the restive Easterners want is closer integration with America so neither Russia nor other hostile powers will be tempted to future ârevisionism.â
And integration with Western Europe? One fascinating aspect of the letter is that, although it pays the usual tributes to the European Union, its signatories plainly see the Atlantic relationship as the primary one and NATO as the main vehicle for Western defence. They both call for better integration between Europe and America on defence and foreign policies and warn against the political tendencies, including anti-Americanism, that might cause a long-term transatlantic breach.
But there is one tinny note in the letter. Its signatories claim the contributions their countries make to NATO and the EU, though modest, are still significant in terms of their population and GDP. That is not, alas, true. Almost all European NATO members spend between 1 per cent and 2 per cent of GDP on defence. If they were to raise that to America's 3 per cent, Russia would soon abandon revisionism.
Still, this wake-up call to the West is at least a start.
John O'Sullivan is senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.