01-25-2005, 02:32 AM
Nice discussion going here!
I have a question for people aquainted with vishiShtadvaita:
As I understand it, Narayana (nara+ayana = one who has its abode in all humans or Jivas), and Jivas are assumed to be simultaneously real in vishiShtadvaita. In advaita, the individual selves of Jivas, are held at a lower level of reality which can be subrated by a higher level of reality of say paramatman or narayana. But in advaita the lower levels of the self are given more and more unreality. Only the nirguna brahman is the truly real. All others are only appearances which may appear real temporarily under certain conditions, but can be shown to be unreal by a higher knowledge. And the 'self' is assumed to be unique, i.e. jivas' don't possess separate selves, the Self is one, jivas merely assume that they have separate selves due to ignorance.
If we take jiva (or nara) and narayana to be simultaneously real in equal measure, then there appears a problem. Who does the self (atma) of the jIva belong to? Does the individual self belong to the jiva or to the narayana? If the former, what is the need for a separate narayana, and if later what is the need for separate jivas? If the self belongs to jivas, then the collection of jivas is more like a bunch of flowers. The flowers provide the essential reality, not the 'bunch'. Using a term like 'bunch' is then a convenience, the 'bunch' doesn't possess individuality independent of the flowers. But if the narayana possesses reality independent of jivas, then narayana would simultaneously contain 'unity' in him as well as 'multiplicity'. Unity because he has an independent individuality, and multiplicity so as to be the self in all the jivas. In this sense narayana seems to contain within him the 'unity' of brahman as well as the 'multiplicity' of the world. Unless this grouping of 'unity' and 'multiplicity' in one being is explained further, term 'narayana' may merely stand for a convenient term to group two disparate concepts together without actually explaining how this comes about. It may then be called as using nomenclature to explain away a problem.
Its fundamentally a philosophical problem of relating 'many' to 'one'. It is not an easy one to solve. In advaita this is solved in a certain way by making the apparent reality of 'many' and 'one' mutually exclusive, depending upon the level of ignorance. In advaita an observer can't simultaneously claim that the 'many' (jivas) and the 'one' (brahman) are affirmed to be real simultaneously. This is ingenious, and works, although not completely satifactorily (It is easy to explain away all the problems by calling them 'unreal' or 'non-existent'. Nihilism or shunyavad does something similar). The superior reality of the 'one' over 'many' is expressed by the process of increasing knowledge (or decreasing ignorance). As the knowledge increases, the separatedness of the 'many' starts appearing unreal. Increasing knowledge gradually undoes the multiplicity, leaving only the unity, which cannot further be negated.
My knowledge of vishistadvaita is very limited, but just for the debate's sake, let me play devil's advocate and try to put the views of advaita and vishishtdvaita on the relationship between 'multiplicity' and 'unity, in a provocative and rather simplistic manner:
1. vishistadvaita 'solves' the problem of relating 'multiplicity' with 'unity' by means of 'nomenclature'. It seems to claim that merely using a term like 'narayana' explains away the fundamental problem.
2. advaita 'solves' the same problem by making 'unity and 'multiplicity' mutually unreal when seen from the perspective of any observer. An observer who sees the multiplicity can't simultaneously observe the unity and vice versa. This seems that a problem is being solved by merely classifying the problematic parts as 'unreal'.
I have a question for people aquainted with vishiShtadvaita:
As I understand it, Narayana (nara+ayana = one who has its abode in all humans or Jivas), and Jivas are assumed to be simultaneously real in vishiShtadvaita. In advaita, the individual selves of Jivas, are held at a lower level of reality which can be subrated by a higher level of reality of say paramatman or narayana. But in advaita the lower levels of the self are given more and more unreality. Only the nirguna brahman is the truly real. All others are only appearances which may appear real temporarily under certain conditions, but can be shown to be unreal by a higher knowledge. And the 'self' is assumed to be unique, i.e. jivas' don't possess separate selves, the Self is one, jivas merely assume that they have separate selves due to ignorance.
If we take jiva (or nara) and narayana to be simultaneously real in equal measure, then there appears a problem. Who does the self (atma) of the jIva belong to? Does the individual self belong to the jiva or to the narayana? If the former, what is the need for a separate narayana, and if later what is the need for separate jivas? If the self belongs to jivas, then the collection of jivas is more like a bunch of flowers. The flowers provide the essential reality, not the 'bunch'. Using a term like 'bunch' is then a convenience, the 'bunch' doesn't possess individuality independent of the flowers. But if the narayana possesses reality independent of jivas, then narayana would simultaneously contain 'unity' in him as well as 'multiplicity'. Unity because he has an independent individuality, and multiplicity so as to be the self in all the jivas. In this sense narayana seems to contain within him the 'unity' of brahman as well as the 'multiplicity' of the world. Unless this grouping of 'unity' and 'multiplicity' in one being is explained further, term 'narayana' may merely stand for a convenient term to group two disparate concepts together without actually explaining how this comes about. It may then be called as using nomenclature to explain away a problem.
Its fundamentally a philosophical problem of relating 'many' to 'one'. It is not an easy one to solve. In advaita this is solved in a certain way by making the apparent reality of 'many' and 'one' mutually exclusive, depending upon the level of ignorance. In advaita an observer can't simultaneously claim that the 'many' (jivas) and the 'one' (brahman) are affirmed to be real simultaneously. This is ingenious, and works, although not completely satifactorily (It is easy to explain away all the problems by calling them 'unreal' or 'non-existent'. Nihilism or shunyavad does something similar). The superior reality of the 'one' over 'many' is expressed by the process of increasing knowledge (or decreasing ignorance). As the knowledge increases, the separatedness of the 'many' starts appearing unreal. Increasing knowledge gradually undoes the multiplicity, leaving only the unity, which cannot further be negated.
My knowledge of vishistadvaita is very limited, but just for the debate's sake, let me play devil's advocate and try to put the views of advaita and vishishtdvaita on the relationship between 'multiplicity' and 'unity, in a provocative and rather simplistic manner:
1. vishistadvaita 'solves' the problem of relating 'multiplicity' with 'unity' by means of 'nomenclature'. It seems to claim that merely using a term like 'narayana' explains away the fundamental problem.
2. advaita 'solves' the same problem by making 'unity and 'multiplicity' mutually unreal when seen from the perspective of any observer. An observer who sees the multiplicity can't simultaneously observe the unity and vice versa. This seems that a problem is being solved by merely classifying the problematic parts as 'unreal'.