09-23-2009, 03:08 AM
I think there is a scenario that can explain all these inconsistencies. It seems to me that neither GOI nor Santhanum are telling the complete truth. I think the S2 weapon was simply a debugged Pokhran 1 fission weapon of yield 12 kt. It worked fine. The S1 TN device had a boosted primary of 15 Kt and the second stage of 30 Kt. What happened was that only the boosted fission primary of the S1 device worked as Santhanum is saying . Thus the true values of the total yield S1+S2 was 15+12=27 kt which would then bring the total yield in line with the international estimate. Also such an estimate would bring it in line with it being only a factor of 3 greater than the Pokhran 1 8 kt yield (as claimed by Iyengar).
One can understand why GOI did not tell the truth. Why is Santhanum obfuscating? I think he is not telling the true yield because of official secrets act. Moreover the current standardized Indian military fission weapon is a 25 kt weapon. So it does not matter what the exact yield of S2 was.
This scenario also explains why there was no shaft damage in S1. The 15 kt boosted primary of the S1 device was not capable of damaging the shaft when placed at twice the depth of the S2 device. It would have taken the second stage to create a crater and damage the shaft as Santhanum is saying.
SOME FURTHER QUESTIONS
Why is India producing Tritium and why did Gen Malik want reassurance from scientists about the true yield of the TN device since the TN device has not been weaponized according to Santhanum? Why does Santhanum want at least 2 more tests?
The answers to these questions are as follows.
When BARC first designed the TN device in 1995 they were flying blind. It was a theoretical model with no constraints. BARC did not know the accuracy of the model. For example, BARC had no idea if the fusion stage would work at all or how much radioactivity would show. There was no constraint on the model.
After the 1998 S1 test the situation changed. BARC had answers to their questions. P K Iyengar suggested there was a < 10 % fusion yield from the second stage of the S1 device. The BARC weaponeers were able to compare their model predictions with the actual classified radiochemical data obtained by probing the explosion site. They tweaked their model to match the observed radioactivity. They then used that TN device model as input to a seismic code originally developed for Pokhran 1 to match the observed seismic disturbance seen at S1. They then used that same seismic code to model the seismic disturbance of the Bainbury explosion as suggested by Kakodkar. Thus the 1998 S1 explosion was used to constrain the original BARC TN device model. The BARC seismic code was constrained by using 3 data points, Pokhran1, the S1 and the Bainbury seismic data points.
There is some confidence that the BARC seismic code works since it has been checked thrice using Pokhran 1, S1 and the American Bainbury tests. The BARK TN device simulation code has been checked only once using the S1 explosion. This is the reason why Santhanum is asking for 2 tests so that the BARC TN simulation code can also be constrained using a minimum of 3 data points. That would greatly enhance confidence in the BARC TN device simulation code.
It is true that Indian military will not accept any unproven weapon and has accepted only the fission weapons. However, BARC has tweaked the unweaponised TN device using their improved TN simulation
code. I have no doubt that in extreme emergency such a weapon will be used to deter say China if it is found that fission weapons are not able to deter that country. This is the reason for Tritium production and for General Malik's question.
ONE FURTHER QUESTION
There still remains the question about the usefulness of the Pokhran 2 explosions. Were they useful. I think yes. It has enabled the weaponisation of the fission weapon. It has also greatly enhanced BARC's understanding of how a TN device works. It would be wonderful if BARC can test twice because then they can really trust their TN device simulation code.
I don't know if I am right. At least this is what I think.
One can understand why GOI did not tell the truth. Why is Santhanum obfuscating? I think he is not telling the true yield because of official secrets act. Moreover the current standardized Indian military fission weapon is a 25 kt weapon. So it does not matter what the exact yield of S2 was.
This scenario also explains why there was no shaft damage in S1. The 15 kt boosted primary of the S1 device was not capable of damaging the shaft when placed at twice the depth of the S2 device. It would have taken the second stage to create a crater and damage the shaft as Santhanum is saying.
SOME FURTHER QUESTIONS
Why is India producing Tritium and why did Gen Malik want reassurance from scientists about the true yield of the TN device since the TN device has not been weaponized according to Santhanum? Why does Santhanum want at least 2 more tests?
The answers to these questions are as follows.
When BARC first designed the TN device in 1995 they were flying blind. It was a theoretical model with no constraints. BARC did not know the accuracy of the model. For example, BARC had no idea if the fusion stage would work at all or how much radioactivity would show. There was no constraint on the model.
After the 1998 S1 test the situation changed. BARC had answers to their questions. P K Iyengar suggested there was a < 10 % fusion yield from the second stage of the S1 device. The BARC weaponeers were able to compare their model predictions with the actual classified radiochemical data obtained by probing the explosion site. They tweaked their model to match the observed radioactivity. They then used that TN device model as input to a seismic code originally developed for Pokhran 1 to match the observed seismic disturbance seen at S1. They then used that same seismic code to model the seismic disturbance of the Bainbury explosion as suggested by Kakodkar. Thus the 1998 S1 explosion was used to constrain the original BARC TN device model. The BARC seismic code was constrained by using 3 data points, Pokhran1, the S1 and the Bainbury seismic data points.
There is some confidence that the BARC seismic code works since it has been checked thrice using Pokhran 1, S1 and the American Bainbury tests. The BARK TN device simulation code has been checked only once using the S1 explosion. This is the reason why Santhanum is asking for 2 tests so that the BARC TN simulation code can also be constrained using a minimum of 3 data points. That would greatly enhance confidence in the BARC TN device simulation code.
It is true that Indian military will not accept any unproven weapon and has accepted only the fission weapons. However, BARC has tweaked the unweaponised TN device using their improved TN simulation
code. I have no doubt that in extreme emergency such a weapon will be used to deter say China if it is found that fission weapons are not able to deter that country. This is the reason for Tritium production and for General Malik's question.
ONE FURTHER QUESTION
There still remains the question about the usefulness of the Pokhran 2 explosions. Were they useful. I think yes. It has enabled the weaponisation of the fission weapon. It has also greatly enhanced BARC's understanding of how a TN device works. It would be wonderful if BARC can test twice because then they can really trust their TN device simulation code.
I don't know if I am right. At least this is what I think.