My weekend work.....
While reading the numerous threads after K. Santhanamâs revelations, I came to some conclusions on the process by which Indian elite makes its policy decisions.
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Indian Strategic Elite and the Nuclear Question
Despite George Tanahamâs RAND report there is an Indian strategic elite consisting of: scientist-strategists, military- strategists, and civilian strategists. These three groups are responsible for charting the Indian nuclear strategy.
<b>Scientist-strategists</b> were the early pioneers, Scientists like Drs. H Bhabha, V. Sarabhai, H.N. Sethna, Raja Ramanna, M.R. Srinivasan, PK Iyengar were the well known proponents of this group of startegists. Being aware of the power of the atom they helped formulate the initial strategy. The main aims of the group are: acquire, demonstrate and retain the nuke capability.
<b>Military-strategists-</b> Some well known members are: K.K. Nayyar, Raja Menon, Brajesh Jyal, Gurmeet Kanwal. However the doyen of this group is Gen Sundarji. His principle contribution to the nuclear strategy was : Minimum credible deterrent based on Realist school of International Relations. It is based on proven warheads on proven delivery vehicles. When his strategy was formulated, only fission weapons were envisaged without further tests. His doctrine is contrary to the prevailing political view that nukes are symbolic weapons of power. A key component to the strategy is that the deterrent requires reliable delivery vehicles which are solely in DRDOâs purvey. The 1998 tests before the proofing of the required delivery vehicles was factor for later events. The main aims of this group are: acquire, proven weapons deployed in the forces.
<b>Civilian-strategists </b>â All members not belonging to above two types are included in this group. The civilian-strategists include four broad sub-divisions: <b>maximalists</b>-seek what ever the front ranking powers have (B. Karnad, B. Chellaney et al), <b>minimalists</b>- seek the bare minimum to maintain a nuclear deterrent based on a borderline pacifist world view (Dr. C. Rajamohan et al), <b>disarmament strategists</b>: some former Ministry of External Affairs officials, peace activists(Praful Bidwai et al) and chatterati (Achin Vanaik)- seek disarmament of India as first step of global disarmament ideally and together with others as a maximum position, and lastly <b>political-strategists</b>- seek to support the government stand and build support or consensus behind it. The principal doyen of this grouping is Dr. K. Subramanyam. The main aims of this group are: acquire, demonstrated weapons with out jeopardizing the international status of India. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 was a break with the civilian-strategists dogma. The 1974 PNE broke the consensus this group had built up and they quickly reacted to prevent the follow-thru of the test. Again the 1998 tests, broke the consensus that these groups re-forged after the 1974 PNE and caused great dissension. However this time this group was not able to reverse the situation due to the atmospherics in the neighborhood and the constant wars after the tests: Kargil, Operation Parakram and unrestricted terrorism from Pakistan and the unsettled borders with China.
<b>One common theme of all three groups(except the disarmament and chatterati groups) is that nuclear weapons are required only to deter China.</b> The crafting of the No First Use (NFU) doctrine is a clear indication of that. This doctrine clearly states that nukes will not be used on Pakistan unless in retaliation. <b>On all other issues( Force posture, Force composition, Nuclear doctrine, International treaty negotiations etc) these three groups dissent often vehemently.</b> The interaction between these groups can be seen by the opinion-editorials and speeches in the Indian news media.
<b>Consensus </b>
Even before Independence the scientist- strategists embarked on a program to acquire nuclear capability which received official approval of PM Nehru after Independence and were at the forefront of developing the strategy. <b>The consensus was to acquire all the technologies that are required to demonstrate nuclear capability in all aspects- electrical power and weapons without overt demonstration.</b> Until 1960s the emphasis was on the symbolic and prestige value of the nuclear technology and the pursuit of power reactors were an indication of that thinking. Weapons research wasnât pursued with any seriousness and people were content to give the impression that the acquisition was an easy task. The literature of the Fifties (Beaton, Maddox et al) seeks to address the question when will India test and it was a given that they would. After the twin blows from China of 1962 aggression and the first nuclear test in 1964, <b>the consensus shifted to seeking a nuclear umbrella from the West and failing that to retain a capability to acquire the technology by staying out of the NPT.</b> The 1971 victory and the creation of Bangladesh reduced the threat from Pakistan. However superpower interventions and inducements to PRC, forced the pace and resulted in 1974 PNE. <b>However again the consensus was that the technology would not be weaponized.</b>
Again the events in 1970s and 1980s overcame peaceful thinking- Pakistan acquisition of nuclear technology and weapons from Western Europe and China <b>forced the Indian decision. Again the acquisition was not demonstrated and led to instability.</b> In 1990s the CTBT, was forced and had India in its Entry-into-Force clause and there were repeated moves to break out: 1995 Rao, 1996 ABV and finally the political system decided to take the heat and sanctioned the 1998 tests during NDA government. The scientists chose the technologies to demonstrate and there was little input from other groups. <b>The tests broke the national consensus on retaining weapon capability without demonstration.</b> In addition the underperformance of the TN device did further damage to the consensus and <b>re-arranged the strategic elite in all the three segments</b>. Some of those who were scientist-strategists(officials) moved to the political-strategist spectrum and within the civilian-strategists spectrum the groups were further re-shuffled with the political-strategists managing to come to primacy. The important thing is the disarmament-strategists also coalesced into this latter group. In addition it put the rationale of Gen. Sunderjiâs doctrine of Minimum Nuclear Deterrent (MND), which was based on fission weapons, at risk by its underperformance and thus questioning the credibilty.
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While reading the numerous threads after K. Santhanamâs revelations, I came to some conclusions on the process by which Indian elite makes its policy decisions.
---------------------------
Indian Strategic Elite and the Nuclear Question
Despite George Tanahamâs RAND report there is an Indian strategic elite consisting of: scientist-strategists, military- strategists, and civilian strategists. These three groups are responsible for charting the Indian nuclear strategy.
<b>Scientist-strategists</b> were the early pioneers, Scientists like Drs. H Bhabha, V. Sarabhai, H.N. Sethna, Raja Ramanna, M.R. Srinivasan, PK Iyengar were the well known proponents of this group of startegists. Being aware of the power of the atom they helped formulate the initial strategy. The main aims of the group are: acquire, demonstrate and retain the nuke capability.
<b>Military-strategists-</b> Some well known members are: K.K. Nayyar, Raja Menon, Brajesh Jyal, Gurmeet Kanwal. However the doyen of this group is Gen Sundarji. His principle contribution to the nuclear strategy was : Minimum credible deterrent based on Realist school of International Relations. It is based on proven warheads on proven delivery vehicles. When his strategy was formulated, only fission weapons were envisaged without further tests. His doctrine is contrary to the prevailing political view that nukes are symbolic weapons of power. A key component to the strategy is that the deterrent requires reliable delivery vehicles which are solely in DRDOâs purvey. The 1998 tests before the proofing of the required delivery vehicles was factor for later events. The main aims of this group are: acquire, proven weapons deployed in the forces.
<b>Civilian-strategists </b>â All members not belonging to above two types are included in this group. The civilian-strategists include four broad sub-divisions: <b>maximalists</b>-seek what ever the front ranking powers have (B. Karnad, B. Chellaney et al), <b>minimalists</b>- seek the bare minimum to maintain a nuclear deterrent based on a borderline pacifist world view (Dr. C. Rajamohan et al), <b>disarmament strategists</b>: some former Ministry of External Affairs officials, peace activists(Praful Bidwai et al) and chatterati (Achin Vanaik)- seek disarmament of India as first step of global disarmament ideally and together with others as a maximum position, and lastly <b>political-strategists</b>- seek to support the government stand and build support or consensus behind it. The principal doyen of this grouping is Dr. K. Subramanyam. The main aims of this group are: acquire, demonstrated weapons with out jeopardizing the international status of India. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 was a break with the civilian-strategists dogma. The 1974 PNE broke the consensus this group had built up and they quickly reacted to prevent the follow-thru of the test. Again the 1998 tests, broke the consensus that these groups re-forged after the 1974 PNE and caused great dissension. However this time this group was not able to reverse the situation due to the atmospherics in the neighborhood and the constant wars after the tests: Kargil, Operation Parakram and unrestricted terrorism from Pakistan and the unsettled borders with China.
<b>One common theme of all three groups(except the disarmament and chatterati groups) is that nuclear weapons are required only to deter China.</b> The crafting of the No First Use (NFU) doctrine is a clear indication of that. This doctrine clearly states that nukes will not be used on Pakistan unless in retaliation. <b>On all other issues( Force posture, Force composition, Nuclear doctrine, International treaty negotiations etc) these three groups dissent often vehemently.</b> The interaction between these groups can be seen by the opinion-editorials and speeches in the Indian news media.
<b>Consensus </b>
Even before Independence the scientist- strategists embarked on a program to acquire nuclear capability which received official approval of PM Nehru after Independence and were at the forefront of developing the strategy. <b>The consensus was to acquire all the technologies that are required to demonstrate nuclear capability in all aspects- electrical power and weapons without overt demonstration.</b> Until 1960s the emphasis was on the symbolic and prestige value of the nuclear technology and the pursuit of power reactors were an indication of that thinking. Weapons research wasnât pursued with any seriousness and people were content to give the impression that the acquisition was an easy task. The literature of the Fifties (Beaton, Maddox et al) seeks to address the question when will India test and it was a given that they would. After the twin blows from China of 1962 aggression and the first nuclear test in 1964, <b>the consensus shifted to seeking a nuclear umbrella from the West and failing that to retain a capability to acquire the technology by staying out of the NPT.</b> The 1971 victory and the creation of Bangladesh reduced the threat from Pakistan. However superpower interventions and inducements to PRC, forced the pace and resulted in 1974 PNE. <b>However again the consensus was that the technology would not be weaponized.</b>
Again the events in 1970s and 1980s overcame peaceful thinking- Pakistan acquisition of nuclear technology and weapons from Western Europe and China <b>forced the Indian decision. Again the acquisition was not demonstrated and led to instability.</b> In 1990s the CTBT, was forced and had India in its Entry-into-Force clause and there were repeated moves to break out: 1995 Rao, 1996 ABV and finally the political system decided to take the heat and sanctioned the 1998 tests during NDA government. The scientists chose the technologies to demonstrate and there was little input from other groups. <b>The tests broke the national consensus on retaining weapon capability without demonstration.</b> In addition the underperformance of the TN device did further damage to the consensus and <b>re-arranged the strategic elite in all the three segments</b>. Some of those who were scientist-strategists(officials) moved to the political-strategist spectrum and within the civilian-strategists spectrum the groups were further re-shuffled with the political-strategists managing to come to primacy. The important thing is the disarmament-strategists also coalesced into this latter group. In addition it put the rationale of Gen. Sunderjiâs doctrine of Minimum Nuclear Deterrent (MND), which was based on fission weapons, at risk by its underperformance and thus questioning the credibilty.
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