11-02-2009, 03:58 AM
Two posts about the "Sannyasi" rebellions:
<!--QuoteBegin-"brihaspati"+-->QUOTE("brihaspati")<!--QuoteEBegin-->Rahul M - ji,
Here are my thoughts on the "Sannyasi rebellion". I will divide this into two parts. Here is part one.
I will summarize these first in a sequence of points.
(1) Prior to Islamic invasions, conflicts between sects within "Hinduism" are not unknown, but they were not confrontations between organized military units specifically maintained under religious principles, on a permanent or semi-permanent basis
(2) Even if occasional "Hindu" kings assaulted temples/brahmins/religious sects, the latter dod not seem to have openly taken up militarily organizing themselves for defence on a permanent basis
(3) The Hindu religious sects began to organize themselves into relatively well-defined military units, specifically with the collapse of the "Hindu" kingdoms and arrival of Islamic armies and regimes, as well as Islamic proselytizers.
(4) The "Sannyasi" rebellion of Bengal and Bihar, in the early days of EIC diwani, was a combination of this tradition with genuine local and regional socio-economic grievances.
(5) This particular "Sannyasi rebellion" should however be seen as a five cornered struggle for survival and dominance. The five components are EIC and allied local elite, older elite displaced or marginalized by the EIC+allies, peasantry across communal lines, the Hindu Sannyasis/ascetics of military organization and traditions, the Islamic fakirs of military organization and traditions.
The most interesting aspect of the "Sannyasi rebellion" highlights two features that still concern us - (a) the loud representation of "Hindu" spiritual or ascetic organizations as purely non-violent social-workers only, and the demand that they remain so without any participation/role in national life and politics (b) the contrasting behaviour of ascetism in Islamism and Hinduism.
The myth about castes and caste roles are trashed in the many references to brahmins taking up arms or religious orders recruiting non-rahmins into positions of supremacy and turning to military organization or even acting as mercenaries. I will mention two of my favourites : first the case of Chach as described in Chachnama. He was a brahmin who killed the reigning king of Sind and married the widowed queen (who had apparently fallen in love with him before and was a Rajput princess) and carried on an active military campaign against his enemies. This was late 7th century. The second is the Chammak copper plate inscription of the Vakataka king Pravarasena II (c. 400 CE) granting a village to a thousand brahmins with the clause that the grant will remain permanently in force provide among other restrictions, they do not engage in "droha" against kingdom or wage war [samramam karvatam] or attack other villages. This implies that it was not unexpected of them to do so.
However this still does not prove the favourite demand of Thaparites that violent military conflicts were the norm between "sects" and there is almost no evidence for permanent organized military structures. Even in the well-publicized inscriptional and Virasaiva Channa-Basava Purana narrative - the conflict etween Saivite leader Ekantanda Ramayya and Jains at Ablur in Dharwar, Karnataka around 1160 CE., was an incidental attack after the Jains apparently reneged on their promise to convert the shrine into Saivite. Militancy alleged in Madhavacharya's account of Adi Shankara and Tantrik kapalikas led by Krakacha/Nityananda also does not seem to imply organized military structures. However Antarkar, Sri Balasastry Hardas, or Baldev Upadhyay date this narrative to a much later date - Mughal period, and therefore more representative of contemporary experience of militant asectic orders. Note also that the earlier (probably 14th century) narrative of Sankaravijaya by Anantaanadagiri omits the "military" part.
The armed conflicts in pre-Islamic India that brutalized religious orders were clearly, even if very rarely, only coming from kings themselves when circumstances were appropriate. The relatively few such episodes among non-Muslim kings show that the targeted religious orders were militarily defenceless and unable to protect themselves. The supposed impaling of 8000 ex-fellow religionists by the Pandya king converted to Saivism from Jainism under Nanasambandar could be an exaggeration ut still carry grains of reality. (Nilkantha Sastry). Kalhana and Jonaraja's Rajatarangini provides numerous examples of kings attacking brahmins but who typically retaliate not militarily but by "incantations and curses" or even "ritual suicide". This clearly shows a ideological response to kingly violence on religious orders and not violent and organized military resistance.Â
In an ironic and characteristic precedent relevant for modern India, sections of Indian non-Muslim elite in rashtryia power used foreign elements, especially Islamics in Kashmir - to increase their own military power or security (or some illusion about it) - and what appears to be an attempt at curbing the power of the indigenous religious orders, in this case the brahmins. This was what happened with Harsha (of Kashmir) and the Muslim convert Suhabhatta - advisor to Sultan Sikandar.
The first clear militarization of Hindu asetics took place after the Islamic conquests were the Nath/Kanphata Yogis - claiming descent from Gorakshanath. The claimed records appear in Nizamuddin Ahmad's Tabaqat-i-Akbari and Akbarnama. If we rely more on Abul Fazl, who refers to the conflicting groups as Gurs and Puris then this implies Giris and Puris - two of the Dasanami orders. The strange element in this story is the involvement of Mughals. According to Nizamuddin, since the "sannyasis" were outnumbered by the "Jogis", Akbar made up the numbers by disguising his own soldiers with ashes etc. We are not told whether these were "Hindu" soldiers. If they were Hindu then it provides an important clue to later collaboration and links with ruling powers and the militarization of ascetics.Â
The obvious development of such militarization over the course of the early Islamic conquests and Sultanate, when prior to Islamic invasions ruling regime attacks still did not develop such militancy - implies a clear change of rashtryia character. Previously the ascetics still felt ideologically powerful enough to be able to counter such attacks non-militarily, whereas post Islam - they felt they needed military organization to protect themselves. This also meant a much higher institutional and regime attack on them, physical and violent in nature and including non-rashtryia elements like the Muslim proselytizers. Increasing military conflicts between various sects or orders themselves means first that the ruling regime did not mediate and check disputes between such sects or probably even actively encouraged such disputes (like that in Akbar). Secondly that the natural societal processes that allowed these sects to survive non-violently, had been disrupted and they were then forced to fight for vastly reduced basic material resources. Unconfirmed narratives (Jadunath Sarkar's summary of Nirvani manuscripts) shows that they had begun also to fight Muslim rulers - as possibly between the Nirvanis and Aurangzeb, 1664.
JN.Farquhar's report of a narratives from the Saraswati order in Kashi, and the Giri order in Allahabad specifically refers to armed Islamic faqirs who participated in Islamic wars of conquest (this is definitely supported also by Islamic chroniclers themselves) but also in times of peace went aout looting and murdering Hindu sannyasis both for their possessions as well as their being Kaffirs. The narrative claims Akbar or Biral's tacit support of militarization under Madhusudana Saraswati whereby Madhusudana could recruit non-Brahmins into the orders specifically to build up an army. To a certain extent, this must be true as without tacit allowance by the Mughals such militarization could be dangerous in the heartlands of Islamic power. Akbar could have done this with the same shrewdness as the later British - encouraging and balancing both sides in a conflict between pre-existing groups (he definitely was interested in weakening the remnants of Turko-Afghans who were closely intetwined with the Islamic proselytizers then plaguing the country).Â
Thus these six military orders of the Dasanamis and main four military akhras of the Viashnavites (claiming descent from Ramanand, Madhava, Vishniswamin, Nimbarka) probably dated within the late Sultanate and early Mughal period to preserve their own physical and material survival.
I will continue onto part two. But another thought crossed my mind after writing this - is there a parallel now to what happnes with the Talebunnies? :mrgreen:<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
and
<!--QuoteBegin-"brihaspati"+-->QUOTE("brihaspati")<!--QuoteEBegin-->Part Two:
The collaborative and mercenary role that such ascetic armies egan to play in Mughal times first appears strongly in Dadu Panthis (descended from a militant wing of Ramananda's branch). Armed Dasanamis were firts recruited in this sect under the martial spirited Jait Sahib (1693-1732). By the second half of 18th century they had grown so powerful militarily that they were used by the Maharaja of Jaipur. Here we find the first ref of such groups also as "tax farmers" (1733). In 1793 a formal contract was signed by the Dadu Panthis and the state of Jaipur for provision of 5000 ascetic warriors for the defence of the state. Curiously, they also acted as mercenaries for the British in 1857. The same trend is seen also in the significant dates of militarization of the Sikh Khalsa. Guru Govind formally initiated the military side of Khalsa in 1699. This is the period in which Mughal taxation and accompanying Islamism of the post-Akbar emperors start increasing at an accelerating rate. Numerous reellions start happening -such as of the Jats in Agra around 1699, but the more significant ones belong to the genre of "warrior ascetics". These were the Satnamis of Narnaul in 1657, the wars waged by the former Vaisnava bairagi - Banda Bahadur until 1716. But Sikhs revived after the Maratha retreat at Panipat in 1761 when both Marathas and Mughals had bled to near extinction in the Punjab area.
During this period of breakdown of the Mughal authority, the ascetic-armies began to play an increasing role not only as defenders of temple or religious endowments but also provide security or military services and alliances with local elite and rulers. This would then typically involve also participation in financial transactions, tax-farming, and financial investments etc. Two famous commanders who represent this transition are Dasanami Nagas - Rajendra Giri Gosain (-1753), and Anupgiri aka Himmat Bahadur (1730-1804). These two, in succession, were influential supporters and protectors of Safdar Jung of Aoudh (Mughal wazir) and his successor Shujauddaulah. They were loyal against teh Hindu ruler of Benaras, Balwant Singh, and later helped the British against Shamsher Bahadur of Bundelkhand. Anupgiri is reported to have become the virtual ruler of these territories.
That the naga sannyasis also became mercenaries has been reported by Thomas Broughton in "Letters written in a Mahratta camp during the year 1809" (1813). Tod describes Damodara, the chief priest of the Nathdvara temple of the Vallabhacharyas in Mewar and says that the 30 year old was quite aristocratic/polished in demeanour, is a strict monogamist himself and enforcer of the same on the other priests. Most interestingly Tod reports that Krishna preferred to use the "lance" to stave off the greedy arm of the illustrious Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Bapoo Sindia (is this why Tod is so roundly trashed by Thaparites!!). Damodar moved at the head of 400 horse, "two standards of foot" and two "field pieces" of artillery. He rode good war-horses, wore a quilted "dugla" and was summoned "to the matins by the kettle drum instead of the bell and cymbal".
It is in this perspective that the "sannyasi rebellion" in the East should be explored. The three main refs for this are Hunter's "Annals of Rural Bengal" (1868), J.M.Ghosh's Sannyasi and Fakir raiders in Bengal (1930) and The Sannyasis in Mymensingh (1923).
In the first stage, we have Muslim Fakirs involved in violent conflicts when their rights to levy tribute on locals became jopardized. These are the Madaris claiming descent from a Syrian Sufi who alighted on India in the 15th century at Makanpur, UP where his mazar lies now. I typically find that the Sufi connection is consistently dropped when describing the leaders of these "glorious" fighters against the British in connection with the "sannyasi rebellion". Probably because of the Thaparite project to cleanup image and real role of Sufis and Sufi methodology of conversions in modern India. The confusion that the only contemporary extensive recorders of events from EIC in clubing together the "Hindu" and "Muslim" component together, at least partly lies in the exterior appearance and styles of the Madaris. The earliest description is found in the 17th century Dabistan-i-Mazharib by Muhsin Fani - who says that the Madaris sported external clothes, smeared ashes, and maintained "jata"'s like Hindu ascetics but they also sported black flags and black turans. They also sit around fire and drink "bhang" and they were reportedly scene in the "nude" in Kabul and Kashmir! (1843)
A faction of the Madaris were granted the right to collect contriutions from village heads and zamindars and other special privileges in a sanad by Shah Suja in 1629 (Ghosh). After EIC obtained diwani of the subah, in 1765, tax demands skyrocketed. This disruption of preexisting system with natural causes led to the disastrous famine of 1770 and compounded the problem. The zamindars and village heads were unable to cope with both the Fakir demand and EIC taxes and appealed for cancellation of both. EIC, of course did not budge on company demands ut decided to act against the Fakirs. The famous letter by the leader of the Fakirs, Majnu Shah to Rani Bhavani of Natore refers to the Brits putting 150 Fakirs to death "without cause" during their "pilgrimages through Bengal" in 1771. He admits that fakirs now "begged" in "groups" and not as separated individuals as was their tradition - a clear indication that were doing the "collections" as a coercive or military unit.
The second component is a separate involvement of the Dasanami naga warriors in the succession to the throne of Coch Bihar. Here the sannyasis, who had a base were typically against the Brits - and the interests of the common peasantry, and older elite landholders displaced by the EIC converged. These are the primary sources of the "Hindu" imagery of the rebellion and probably the core of Anandamath. Here the initial struggles started with the confrontations between the agents of EIC and unscrupulous characters like Reza Khan (no less unpleasant than the collaborators of Hastings though, like the Sinha brothers - any attribution to any BRFite if related, entirely unintended) . However, it is estimated that by the 1780's they had mostly left to participate in the Mahratha wars.
It is also possible, that the variosu monasteries and local sects of sannyasis had evolved into landowning and administering structures that came up to protect the countryside where urban based authority of the regional powers during the breaking up of Mughal authority had no reach. [a branch of my ancestors for example had to refortify a castle and keep mentioned in Bankim - as far as I have been told, as bands of Mughal soldiers and armed Faqirs constantly roamed about or looted and raped in the countryside - and this was close to the seat of power to the Mughal faujdar on the banks of Ganges! One ancestor had actually left the lands in charge of his guru and collected his soldiers into a "bairagi" unit to participate in the "rebellion" and specifically keep out the faqir marauders and company agents both. An indication of the complex set of religious and political/economic motivations.]
What is usually not mentioned is that conflicts actually occurred between the sannyasis and the faqirs (in 1777 in the Bogura district now in BD). It is only towards the late 1790's, when obviously the military campaigns were losing steam, and reduction of taxation had improved socio-economic conditions that we find direct evidence of collaboration between obviously dwindling numbers of faqirs and sannyasis. A Dasanami naga sannyasi gave statement to the effect that his band consisted of around 1000 people, with 400 Muslim faqirs, 100 Hindu sannyasis, 400 "sepoys", 20 bairagis and rest miscellaneous. (Ghosh).
The interesting features that still stand out are
(1) the unhesitating acceptance of women (yes even if of elite) in positions of leadership by the Hindu side of the armed campaign such as "Devi Chaudhurani"
(2) the preponderance of Hindu older elite in the confrontation against EIC compared to the more extensive Islamic landholders
(3) militancy and armed organization not found to be incompatible with being a Hindu "sannyasi"
(4) a possible clear distinction in origins and motivations between the sannyasis and the faqirs at least at the initial stages and collaboration only towards the last stage, with the sannyasis more leaning towards defence of local interests while faqirs leaning towards traditional "living off the land" as assured by Islamic regimes to them, etc.
(5)Â the reltiave insignificance of "class" and "caste" differences within the Hindu side when mobilizations were required.
All these must have held important lessons for the Brits. OT - but I know that certain important characterizations of identities were begun in the "rebellion" areas of North Bengal afterwards by the British - that was instrumental in communal politics of 20th century Bengal.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-"brihaspati"+-->QUOTE("brihaspati")<!--QuoteEBegin-->Rahul M - ji,
Here are my thoughts on the "Sannyasi rebellion". I will divide this into two parts. Here is part one.
I will summarize these first in a sequence of points.
(1) Prior to Islamic invasions, conflicts between sects within "Hinduism" are not unknown, but they were not confrontations between organized military units specifically maintained under religious principles, on a permanent or semi-permanent basis
(2) Even if occasional "Hindu" kings assaulted temples/brahmins/religious sects, the latter dod not seem to have openly taken up militarily organizing themselves for defence on a permanent basis
(3) The Hindu religious sects began to organize themselves into relatively well-defined military units, specifically with the collapse of the "Hindu" kingdoms and arrival of Islamic armies and regimes, as well as Islamic proselytizers.
(4) The "Sannyasi" rebellion of Bengal and Bihar, in the early days of EIC diwani, was a combination of this tradition with genuine local and regional socio-economic grievances.
(5) This particular "Sannyasi rebellion" should however be seen as a five cornered struggle for survival and dominance. The five components are EIC and allied local elite, older elite displaced or marginalized by the EIC+allies, peasantry across communal lines, the Hindu Sannyasis/ascetics of military organization and traditions, the Islamic fakirs of military organization and traditions.
The most interesting aspect of the "Sannyasi rebellion" highlights two features that still concern us - (a) the loud representation of "Hindu" spiritual or ascetic organizations as purely non-violent social-workers only, and the demand that they remain so without any participation/role in national life and politics (b) the contrasting behaviour of ascetism in Islamism and Hinduism.
The myth about castes and caste roles are trashed in the many references to brahmins taking up arms or religious orders recruiting non-rahmins into positions of supremacy and turning to military organization or even acting as mercenaries. I will mention two of my favourites : first the case of Chach as described in Chachnama. He was a brahmin who killed the reigning king of Sind and married the widowed queen (who had apparently fallen in love with him before and was a Rajput princess) and carried on an active military campaign against his enemies. This was late 7th century. The second is the Chammak copper plate inscription of the Vakataka king Pravarasena II (c. 400 CE) granting a village to a thousand brahmins with the clause that the grant will remain permanently in force provide among other restrictions, they do not engage in "droha" against kingdom or wage war [samramam karvatam] or attack other villages. This implies that it was not unexpected of them to do so.
However this still does not prove the favourite demand of Thaparites that violent military conflicts were the norm between "sects" and there is almost no evidence for permanent organized military structures. Even in the well-publicized inscriptional and Virasaiva Channa-Basava Purana narrative - the conflict etween Saivite leader Ekantanda Ramayya and Jains at Ablur in Dharwar, Karnataka around 1160 CE., was an incidental attack after the Jains apparently reneged on their promise to convert the shrine into Saivite. Militancy alleged in Madhavacharya's account of Adi Shankara and Tantrik kapalikas led by Krakacha/Nityananda also does not seem to imply organized military structures. However Antarkar, Sri Balasastry Hardas, or Baldev Upadhyay date this narrative to a much later date - Mughal period, and therefore more representative of contemporary experience of militant asectic orders. Note also that the earlier (probably 14th century) narrative of Sankaravijaya by Anantaanadagiri omits the "military" part.
The armed conflicts in pre-Islamic India that brutalized religious orders were clearly, even if very rarely, only coming from kings themselves when circumstances were appropriate. The relatively few such episodes among non-Muslim kings show that the targeted religious orders were militarily defenceless and unable to protect themselves. The supposed impaling of 8000 ex-fellow religionists by the Pandya king converted to Saivism from Jainism under Nanasambandar could be an exaggeration ut still carry grains of reality. (Nilkantha Sastry). Kalhana and Jonaraja's Rajatarangini provides numerous examples of kings attacking brahmins but who typically retaliate not militarily but by "incantations and curses" or even "ritual suicide". This clearly shows a ideological response to kingly violence on religious orders and not violent and organized military resistance.Â
In an ironic and characteristic precedent relevant for modern India, sections of Indian non-Muslim elite in rashtryia power used foreign elements, especially Islamics in Kashmir - to increase their own military power or security (or some illusion about it) - and what appears to be an attempt at curbing the power of the indigenous religious orders, in this case the brahmins. This was what happened with Harsha (of Kashmir) and the Muslim convert Suhabhatta - advisor to Sultan Sikandar.
The first clear militarization of Hindu asetics took place after the Islamic conquests were the Nath/Kanphata Yogis - claiming descent from Gorakshanath. The claimed records appear in Nizamuddin Ahmad's Tabaqat-i-Akbari and Akbarnama. If we rely more on Abul Fazl, who refers to the conflicting groups as Gurs and Puris then this implies Giris and Puris - two of the Dasanami orders. The strange element in this story is the involvement of Mughals. According to Nizamuddin, since the "sannyasis" were outnumbered by the "Jogis", Akbar made up the numbers by disguising his own soldiers with ashes etc. We are not told whether these were "Hindu" soldiers. If they were Hindu then it provides an important clue to later collaboration and links with ruling powers and the militarization of ascetics.Â
The obvious development of such militarization over the course of the early Islamic conquests and Sultanate, when prior to Islamic invasions ruling regime attacks still did not develop such militancy - implies a clear change of rashtryia character. Previously the ascetics still felt ideologically powerful enough to be able to counter such attacks non-militarily, whereas post Islam - they felt they needed military organization to protect themselves. This also meant a much higher institutional and regime attack on them, physical and violent in nature and including non-rashtryia elements like the Muslim proselytizers. Increasing military conflicts between various sects or orders themselves means first that the ruling regime did not mediate and check disputes between such sects or probably even actively encouraged such disputes (like that in Akbar). Secondly that the natural societal processes that allowed these sects to survive non-violently, had been disrupted and they were then forced to fight for vastly reduced basic material resources. Unconfirmed narratives (Jadunath Sarkar's summary of Nirvani manuscripts) shows that they had begun also to fight Muslim rulers - as possibly between the Nirvanis and Aurangzeb, 1664.
JN.Farquhar's report of a narratives from the Saraswati order in Kashi, and the Giri order in Allahabad specifically refers to armed Islamic faqirs who participated in Islamic wars of conquest (this is definitely supported also by Islamic chroniclers themselves) but also in times of peace went aout looting and murdering Hindu sannyasis both for their possessions as well as their being Kaffirs. The narrative claims Akbar or Biral's tacit support of militarization under Madhusudana Saraswati whereby Madhusudana could recruit non-Brahmins into the orders specifically to build up an army. To a certain extent, this must be true as without tacit allowance by the Mughals such militarization could be dangerous in the heartlands of Islamic power. Akbar could have done this with the same shrewdness as the later British - encouraging and balancing both sides in a conflict between pre-existing groups (he definitely was interested in weakening the remnants of Turko-Afghans who were closely intetwined with the Islamic proselytizers then plaguing the country).Â
Thus these six military orders of the Dasanamis and main four military akhras of the Viashnavites (claiming descent from Ramanand, Madhava, Vishniswamin, Nimbarka) probably dated within the late Sultanate and early Mughal period to preserve their own physical and material survival.
I will continue onto part two. But another thought crossed my mind after writing this - is there a parallel now to what happnes with the Talebunnies? :mrgreen:<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
and
<!--QuoteBegin-"brihaspati"+-->QUOTE("brihaspati")<!--QuoteEBegin-->Part Two:
The collaborative and mercenary role that such ascetic armies egan to play in Mughal times first appears strongly in Dadu Panthis (descended from a militant wing of Ramananda's branch). Armed Dasanamis were firts recruited in this sect under the martial spirited Jait Sahib (1693-1732). By the second half of 18th century they had grown so powerful militarily that they were used by the Maharaja of Jaipur. Here we find the first ref of such groups also as "tax farmers" (1733). In 1793 a formal contract was signed by the Dadu Panthis and the state of Jaipur for provision of 5000 ascetic warriors for the defence of the state. Curiously, they also acted as mercenaries for the British in 1857. The same trend is seen also in the significant dates of militarization of the Sikh Khalsa. Guru Govind formally initiated the military side of Khalsa in 1699. This is the period in which Mughal taxation and accompanying Islamism of the post-Akbar emperors start increasing at an accelerating rate. Numerous reellions start happening -such as of the Jats in Agra around 1699, but the more significant ones belong to the genre of "warrior ascetics". These were the Satnamis of Narnaul in 1657, the wars waged by the former Vaisnava bairagi - Banda Bahadur until 1716. But Sikhs revived after the Maratha retreat at Panipat in 1761 when both Marathas and Mughals had bled to near extinction in the Punjab area.
During this period of breakdown of the Mughal authority, the ascetic-armies began to play an increasing role not only as defenders of temple or religious endowments but also provide security or military services and alliances with local elite and rulers. This would then typically involve also participation in financial transactions, tax-farming, and financial investments etc. Two famous commanders who represent this transition are Dasanami Nagas - Rajendra Giri Gosain (-1753), and Anupgiri aka Himmat Bahadur (1730-1804). These two, in succession, were influential supporters and protectors of Safdar Jung of Aoudh (Mughal wazir) and his successor Shujauddaulah. They were loyal against teh Hindu ruler of Benaras, Balwant Singh, and later helped the British against Shamsher Bahadur of Bundelkhand. Anupgiri is reported to have become the virtual ruler of these territories.
That the naga sannyasis also became mercenaries has been reported by Thomas Broughton in "Letters written in a Mahratta camp during the year 1809" (1813). Tod describes Damodara, the chief priest of the Nathdvara temple of the Vallabhacharyas in Mewar and says that the 30 year old was quite aristocratic/polished in demeanour, is a strict monogamist himself and enforcer of the same on the other priests. Most interestingly Tod reports that Krishna preferred to use the "lance" to stave off the greedy arm of the illustrious Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Bapoo Sindia (is this why Tod is so roundly trashed by Thaparites!!). Damodar moved at the head of 400 horse, "two standards of foot" and two "field pieces" of artillery. He rode good war-horses, wore a quilted "dugla" and was summoned "to the matins by the kettle drum instead of the bell and cymbal".
It is in this perspective that the "sannyasi rebellion" in the East should be explored. The three main refs for this are Hunter's "Annals of Rural Bengal" (1868), J.M.Ghosh's Sannyasi and Fakir raiders in Bengal (1930) and The Sannyasis in Mymensingh (1923).
In the first stage, we have Muslim Fakirs involved in violent conflicts when their rights to levy tribute on locals became jopardized. These are the Madaris claiming descent from a Syrian Sufi who alighted on India in the 15th century at Makanpur, UP where his mazar lies now. I typically find that the Sufi connection is consistently dropped when describing the leaders of these "glorious" fighters against the British in connection with the "sannyasi rebellion". Probably because of the Thaparite project to cleanup image and real role of Sufis and Sufi methodology of conversions in modern India. The confusion that the only contemporary extensive recorders of events from EIC in clubing together the "Hindu" and "Muslim" component together, at least partly lies in the exterior appearance and styles of the Madaris. The earliest description is found in the 17th century Dabistan-i-Mazharib by Muhsin Fani - who says that the Madaris sported external clothes, smeared ashes, and maintained "jata"'s like Hindu ascetics but they also sported black flags and black turans. They also sit around fire and drink "bhang" and they were reportedly scene in the "nude" in Kabul and Kashmir! (1843)
A faction of the Madaris were granted the right to collect contriutions from village heads and zamindars and other special privileges in a sanad by Shah Suja in 1629 (Ghosh). After EIC obtained diwani of the subah, in 1765, tax demands skyrocketed. This disruption of preexisting system with natural causes led to the disastrous famine of 1770 and compounded the problem. The zamindars and village heads were unable to cope with both the Fakir demand and EIC taxes and appealed for cancellation of both. EIC, of course did not budge on company demands ut decided to act against the Fakirs. The famous letter by the leader of the Fakirs, Majnu Shah to Rani Bhavani of Natore refers to the Brits putting 150 Fakirs to death "without cause" during their "pilgrimages through Bengal" in 1771. He admits that fakirs now "begged" in "groups" and not as separated individuals as was their tradition - a clear indication that were doing the "collections" as a coercive or military unit.
The second component is a separate involvement of the Dasanami naga warriors in the succession to the throne of Coch Bihar. Here the sannyasis, who had a base were typically against the Brits - and the interests of the common peasantry, and older elite landholders displaced by the EIC converged. These are the primary sources of the "Hindu" imagery of the rebellion and probably the core of Anandamath. Here the initial struggles started with the confrontations between the agents of EIC and unscrupulous characters like Reza Khan (no less unpleasant than the collaborators of Hastings though, like the Sinha brothers - any attribution to any BRFite if related, entirely unintended) . However, it is estimated that by the 1780's they had mostly left to participate in the Mahratha wars.
It is also possible, that the variosu monasteries and local sects of sannyasis had evolved into landowning and administering structures that came up to protect the countryside where urban based authority of the regional powers during the breaking up of Mughal authority had no reach. [a branch of my ancestors for example had to refortify a castle and keep mentioned in Bankim - as far as I have been told, as bands of Mughal soldiers and armed Faqirs constantly roamed about or looted and raped in the countryside - and this was close to the seat of power to the Mughal faujdar on the banks of Ganges! One ancestor had actually left the lands in charge of his guru and collected his soldiers into a "bairagi" unit to participate in the "rebellion" and specifically keep out the faqir marauders and company agents both. An indication of the complex set of religious and political/economic motivations.]
What is usually not mentioned is that conflicts actually occurred between the sannyasis and the faqirs (in 1777 in the Bogura district now in BD). It is only towards the late 1790's, when obviously the military campaigns were losing steam, and reduction of taxation had improved socio-economic conditions that we find direct evidence of collaboration between obviously dwindling numbers of faqirs and sannyasis. A Dasanami naga sannyasi gave statement to the effect that his band consisted of around 1000 people, with 400 Muslim faqirs, 100 Hindu sannyasis, 400 "sepoys", 20 bairagis and rest miscellaneous. (Ghosh).
The interesting features that still stand out are
(1) the unhesitating acceptance of women (yes even if of elite) in positions of leadership by the Hindu side of the armed campaign such as "Devi Chaudhurani"
(2) the preponderance of Hindu older elite in the confrontation against EIC compared to the more extensive Islamic landholders
(3) militancy and armed organization not found to be incompatible with being a Hindu "sannyasi"
(4) a possible clear distinction in origins and motivations between the sannyasis and the faqirs at least at the initial stages and collaboration only towards the last stage, with the sannyasis more leaning towards defence of local interests while faqirs leaning towards traditional "living off the land" as assured by Islamic regimes to them, etc.
(5)Â the reltiave insignificance of "class" and "caste" differences within the Hindu side when mobilizations were required.
All these must have held important lessons for the Brits. OT - but I know that certain important characterizations of identities were begun in the "rebellion" areas of North Bengal afterwards by the British - that was instrumental in communal politics of 20th century Bengal.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->