04-15-2010, 10:06 PM
[quote name='Arun_S' date='14 April 2010 - 09:45 AM' timestamp='1271259438' post='105900']
As for CANDU in low burn mode, pls refer to
India Research Foundations:
[size="3"][url="http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf"]Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program: Arun Sharma[/url][/size]
I had envisioned it my assessment 4 years ago before Bharat Karnad sahib's latest magnum opus was published last year.
As regarding FMTC the pivitol issue is not just having low burn spent fuel but having reprocessed and extrated the WgPu in explicit pre-FMTC stockpile. No evidence that is happenign under MMS watch.
Secondly 200 fission warheads with their limited yield is equivalent to being "Half Pregnent" nuclear deterrence; IOW there is no such thing unless the yield of those 200 warheads is in "High Yield" class, or the number of warheads and delivery vehicles have to to be increased by ~ 3 to 4 times.
The current Indian deterrence based on puny delivery capability (as of now) is less then "Half Pregnent Detrrence" it deters nobody. Not even Terrorist Pakistan !
For Appendix pls see teh original PDF linked above
[/quote]
BK also says in the same book says the following
1. By 2010, sizeable nos. of A-II AND A-III will be available. I would make this 2012 taking into account our tendency to run behind schedule.
2. 2010 was the time frame for the 200+ number (again, make it 2012). He clearly indicated that this is an intermediate step in the deterrent development. The actual number aimed for in the long term is at least twice this according to BK
3. "Sizeable nos." still does not probably mean 200 or so. Our delivery capability will keep up with warhead numbers only if we induct MIRVs. For this another series of A-III and A-V tests will be reqd. This is especially true if we are constricted by lack of testing to limited yield warheads.
4. Even K Subrahmanyam regards MIRVs as an essential part of our doctrine.
5. BK also cites PKI saying our reprocessing rate has crossed a threshold that NPAs like ashley tellis thought was not possible. I also remember some years ago in a Frontline article about a strike at a kalpakkam reproc. facility : the unions were accusing the authorities of neglecting safety in their hurry to reprocess.
6. All this goes to show that NPAs for sure have no accurate idea of howmuch wpn. grd. fissile material we may have separated. They can only speculate. After all, in principle we have a capacity of >250tHM/year ~ 200-250 kg of WGPu/yr. Not all of this may have been used for WGPu itself.
7. Makes sense to manufacture large nos. of the corrected TN and put them atop MIRVs. When the opportunity arises, testing will then upgrade the deterrent from a minimum creduble one to a hefty one.
As for CANDU in low burn mode, pls refer to
India Research Foundations:
[size="3"][url="http://www.indiaresearch.org/Indo-USStrategicDeal.pdf"]Impact of Indo-US Agreement on Indian Strategic Weapon program: Arun Sharma[/url][/size]
I had envisioned it my assessment 4 years ago before Bharat Karnad sahib's latest magnum opus was published last year.
As regarding FMTC the pivitol issue is not just having low burn spent fuel but having reprocessed and extrated the WgPu in explicit pre-FMTC stockpile. No evidence that is happenign under MMS watch.
Secondly 200 fission warheads with their limited yield is equivalent to being "Half Pregnent" nuclear deterrence; IOW there is no such thing unless the yield of those 200 warheads is in "High Yield" class, or the number of warheads and delivery vehicles have to to be increased by ~ 3 to 4 times.
The current Indian deterrence based on puny delivery capability (as of now) is less then "Half Pregnent Detrrence" it deters nobody. Not even Terrorist Pakistan !
For Appendix pls see teh original PDF linked above
[/quote]
BK also says in the same book says the following
1. By 2010, sizeable nos. of A-II AND A-III will be available. I would make this 2012 taking into account our tendency to run behind schedule.
2. 2010 was the time frame for the 200+ number (again, make it 2012). He clearly indicated that this is an intermediate step in the deterrent development. The actual number aimed for in the long term is at least twice this according to BK
3. "Sizeable nos." still does not probably mean 200 or so. Our delivery capability will keep up with warhead numbers only if we induct MIRVs. For this another series of A-III and A-V tests will be reqd. This is especially true if we are constricted by lack of testing to limited yield warheads.
4. Even K Subrahmanyam regards MIRVs as an essential part of our doctrine.
5. BK also cites PKI saying our reprocessing rate has crossed a threshold that NPAs like ashley tellis thought was not possible. I also remember some years ago in a Frontline article about a strike at a kalpakkam reproc. facility : the unions were accusing the authorities of neglecting safety in their hurry to reprocess.
6. All this goes to show that NPAs for sure have no accurate idea of howmuch wpn. grd. fissile material we may have separated. They can only speculate. After all, in principle we have a capacity of >250tHM/year ~ 200-250 kg of WGPu/yr. Not all of this may have been used for WGPu itself.
7. Makes sense to manufacture large nos. of the corrected TN and put them atop MIRVs. When the opportunity arises, testing will then upgrade the deterrent from a minimum creduble one to a hefty one.