02-18-2005, 03:53 AM
A book review on declin eof British Military power in India fro the Telegraph, 18 Feb. 2005.
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<b>There is a consensus among practitioners of British history that Britain was on the path of terminal decline after 1900. In order to explain the descent of the British Empire from a global power to that of a secondary one, a host of economic, social and cultural factors have been cited by various scholars. </b>Anirudh Deshpande analyses the limits of British Indiaâs military strategy in the age of decline and its effect on the disintegration of the colonial state. His book is actually a revised version of his doctoral thesis.
<b>Deshpande claims that the roots of British imperial decline could be traced back to the late 19th century.</b> World War I exposed to the world the myth of British power. Brian Bond has shown how the economic decline of Britain reduced its military power in the continent. <b>Deshpande says that the rajâs armed forces remained backward because Delhi could not get any financial support from London. Though 35 per cent of the rajâs revenue was consumed by the armed forces, the military budget was still inadequate for capital investment. </b>
<b>Besides inadequate capital investment, the armed forces also suffered from a shortage of officers.</b> In the inter-war period, young Britons were not willing to join the army. And racism and insecurity prevented the British government from allowing a large number of Indians into the commissioned ranks.
The Indian army remained a regiment-centric and frontier-oriented force during World War II. <b>Deshpande asserts that the raj had to recruit the urban ânon-martialâ classes under the pressures of war. However, the failure of the colonial state to address their economic grievances resulted in discontent in the armed forces. These, in turn, had an effect on the freedom struggle, the net result being unplanned decolonization.</b>
<b>Deshpande asserts how faulty the British security policy was, which finally culminated in decolonization in 1947. </b>His claim that mass indiscipline, desertions and mutinies between 1940-45 threatened the Indian army cannot be sustained after analysing the court martial and war cabinet records. <b>Even during the Quit India movement, the Indian army stood firm by its white master. Only after 1945, when the sahibs failed to provide jobs for the demobilized sepoys did the latter turn ânationalistâ.</b>
Deshpande deserves credit for fusing the arrested development of the colonial military establishment with limitations of imperial grand strategy. He fills an important gap in the historiography of modern India.
KAUSHIK ROY
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->HOW TABLES GOT TURNEDÂ
<b>There is a consensus among practitioners of British history that Britain was on the path of terminal decline after 1900. In order to explain the descent of the British Empire from a global power to that of a secondary one, a host of economic, social and cultural factors have been cited by various scholars. </b>Anirudh Deshpande analyses the limits of British Indiaâs military strategy in the age of decline and its effect on the disintegration of the colonial state. His book is actually a revised version of his doctoral thesis.
<b>Deshpande claims that the roots of British imperial decline could be traced back to the late 19th century.</b> World War I exposed to the world the myth of British power. Brian Bond has shown how the economic decline of Britain reduced its military power in the continent. <b>Deshpande says that the rajâs armed forces remained backward because Delhi could not get any financial support from London. Though 35 per cent of the rajâs revenue was consumed by the armed forces, the military budget was still inadequate for capital investment. </b>
<b>Besides inadequate capital investment, the armed forces also suffered from a shortage of officers.</b> In the inter-war period, young Britons were not willing to join the army. And racism and insecurity prevented the British government from allowing a large number of Indians into the commissioned ranks.
The Indian army remained a regiment-centric and frontier-oriented force during World War II. <b>Deshpande asserts that the raj had to recruit the urban ânon-martialâ classes under the pressures of war. However, the failure of the colonial state to address their economic grievances resulted in discontent in the armed forces. These, in turn, had an effect on the freedom struggle, the net result being unplanned decolonization.</b>
<b>Deshpande asserts how faulty the British security policy was, which finally culminated in decolonization in 1947. </b>His claim that mass indiscipline, desertions and mutinies between 1940-45 threatened the Indian army cannot be sustained after analysing the court martial and war cabinet records. <b>Even during the Quit India movement, the Indian army stood firm by its white master. Only after 1945, when the sahibs failed to provide jobs for the demobilized sepoys did the latter turn ânationalistâ.</b>
Deshpande deserves credit for fusing the arrested development of the colonial military establishment with limitations of imperial grand strategy. He fills an important gap in the historiography of modern India.
KAUSHIK ROY
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