03-15-2005, 06:04 AM
http://www.indiareacts.com/archivedebates/....asp?recno=1097
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Blunderbuss, act III
How much more will Natwar Singh lose for India?
14 March 2005: There are limits to the bloodymindedness of Natwar Singhâs conduct of foreign policy. Against military opinion expressed within the government, and despite exhortations from other quarters, including this magazine, India pursued a policy of democracy-or-nothing in Nepal, on the adamancy of Natwar, and now, this has blown on our face.
Since he captured power in a coup, King Gyanendra had been suing for resuming Indian military assistance against the Maoist rebels, but these requests were repeatedly turned down, because India took a moral position for a return of democracy in Nepal. Moral positions are fine so long you have the power or levers to enforce them, and since the UK, with really nothing to lose, backed the Indian position, we were basking in the glory of straightening out Nepal. Or that is what we thought.
The US, for all its pro-democracy talk, was not willing to suspend such military assistance as it gives to Nepal against the insurgents, and China had held out assurances to King Gyanendra that it would veto any censure moves in the UN against the coup. Despite these early warnings of a possible derailment of Indiaâs pressure tactics on Nepal, we stepped on the gas, culminating with a wholly unnecessary admission by the foreign office spokesman that all military aid to the kingdom had been terminated.
Nepal is your immediate neighbour in the North East, not your enemy, and together with Bhutan, they provide buffers to China in Tibet. You may pressure such a neighbour in private, very privately, but you donât slap it around in public, if such slapping around gains you nothing but cheap publicity, and brings no extra credit to your democracy. To this day, there is no logical explanation for why India went public with terminating assistance to Nepal.
Not all, Nepalâs foreign minister, Ramesh Nath Pandey, waited two weeks and more, before last weekâs visit to India, for an audience with Natwar Singh, but Natwar wouldnât deign to see him. Ramesh Nath told our ambassador in Kathmandu that the Indian desire for a sixty-day fight to the finish with the Maoists was unrealistic because of the terrible state of Nepalâs civil-military interface, but a hundred days would give the king room to return some of the previous democracy. It took some convincing for the ambassador to get Ramesh Nath to New Delhi, but here, Natwar Singh introduced further conditions, demanding an end to the emergency, release of detained politicians, and bringing some of them into a council to fight the insurgents. In return, India would consider resuming military aid.
Natwar had to recommend the final position to the Union cabinet, whether or not to resume aid, and on Ramesh Nathâs return, one of the conditions was met, prominently, the release of jailed politicians. But Indian assistance didnât happen along, because as we published intelligence on Saturday (âPakistan to sell arms to Nepal against Maoists,â 12 March 2005), Ramesh Nath was on the line to the Pakistan foreign minister, Mehmud Ahmed Kasuri, requesting for emergency military assistance.
At our time of publishing the intelligence, Pakistan had not gone public with its aid offer to Nepal, but subsequently did, understanding its huge propaganda consequences against India and in its favour, as a friendly power in South Asia. Kasuriâs response to Ramesh Nathâs request, according to diplomatic sources, was warm, and almost enthusiastic. Nepal wanted eight military items on an emergency basis, including two hundred rocket launchers and two thousand automatic grenade launchers, and Pakistan readily accepted to supply them from its own army stocks, at a minimum forty per cent down payment. It said it would deliver the weapons free at Kathmandu, a small price to pay for showing down India.
Now Pakistani aid to Nepal has the Indian government in a panic. According to the papers, Natwar who is abroad is rushing back, and the whole recent relations with Nepal will be gone over. As face-saver, India will probably repeat its pious democratic exhortations to Nepal, but privately concede to the kingâs request for weapons. But any great advantages from this may not flow to India, because India has effectively lost its lever with Nepal. Earlier, Nepal was seeking alms at our table, but we were too haughty to pay heed, but with Pakistan intervening, India is being forced to be friendly again. The lever is lost in the sense that Nepal controls it now. It knows anything can be obtained from India by playing the Pakistan card, and this card will be used until it exhausts itself.
Nepalâs example is not the only one. During Rajiv Gandhiâs time, Myanmar sought Indian aid and infrastructure assistance, but we turned our nose up against its dictatorship. China quietly stepped in, to our subsequent mounting alarm, and all through the Eighties-Nineties, it rapidly expanded its presence, its businessmen capturing local trade, its trunk roads opening vast dark Burmese interiors, China controlled Burmese ports by virtue of expanding and upgrading them, and its crowning glory was to establish military outposts and listening stations in Burmese islands commanding a vast view of Indiaâs defence assets on the eastern seaboard. Only after the NDA came to power were vigorous attempts made to contain Chinese influence, and it is in exercise of this that the Burmese military junta has now cracked up against the North East insurgents holed up there.
The point is, you must have a realistic assessment of your power, reach, and quality of levers. Although India had advance warning of King Gyanendraâs coup, the warning even conveyed through this magazine, it could do little or nothing to prevent it. If India had put effective pressure on the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) to pressure the king against a coup, he may have held back, because without the RNAâs backing, he is powerless, but Natwar Singh and the Indian government trusted the diplomatic route, which failed them.
Once this failed, both parties should have understood the limits of diplomacy, and dealt with the emerging Nepal situation in more unconventional ways. But no, there was more of the same, a high moral principle of democracy was made, the roping in of Britain in this was trumped up as a great victory, and unbearable pressure was put on Nepal. To their eternal shame, some Indian commentators backed this exercise, losing sight of the real picture. But now that Nepal has countervailed with Pakistani aid, the whole Natwar Singh strategy has collapsed, and India is in a panic rush to save the situation. How long are we going to pay for the blunders of Natwar Singh?
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Blunderbuss, act III
How much more will Natwar Singh lose for India?
14 March 2005: There are limits to the bloodymindedness of Natwar Singhâs conduct of foreign policy. Against military opinion expressed within the government, and despite exhortations from other quarters, including this magazine, India pursued a policy of democracy-or-nothing in Nepal, on the adamancy of Natwar, and now, this has blown on our face.
Since he captured power in a coup, King Gyanendra had been suing for resuming Indian military assistance against the Maoist rebels, but these requests were repeatedly turned down, because India took a moral position for a return of democracy in Nepal. Moral positions are fine so long you have the power or levers to enforce them, and since the UK, with really nothing to lose, backed the Indian position, we were basking in the glory of straightening out Nepal. Or that is what we thought.
The US, for all its pro-democracy talk, was not willing to suspend such military assistance as it gives to Nepal against the insurgents, and China had held out assurances to King Gyanendra that it would veto any censure moves in the UN against the coup. Despite these early warnings of a possible derailment of Indiaâs pressure tactics on Nepal, we stepped on the gas, culminating with a wholly unnecessary admission by the foreign office spokesman that all military aid to the kingdom had been terminated.
Nepal is your immediate neighbour in the North East, not your enemy, and together with Bhutan, they provide buffers to China in Tibet. You may pressure such a neighbour in private, very privately, but you donât slap it around in public, if such slapping around gains you nothing but cheap publicity, and brings no extra credit to your democracy. To this day, there is no logical explanation for why India went public with terminating assistance to Nepal.
Not all, Nepalâs foreign minister, Ramesh Nath Pandey, waited two weeks and more, before last weekâs visit to India, for an audience with Natwar Singh, but Natwar wouldnât deign to see him. Ramesh Nath told our ambassador in Kathmandu that the Indian desire for a sixty-day fight to the finish with the Maoists was unrealistic because of the terrible state of Nepalâs civil-military interface, but a hundred days would give the king room to return some of the previous democracy. It took some convincing for the ambassador to get Ramesh Nath to New Delhi, but here, Natwar Singh introduced further conditions, demanding an end to the emergency, release of detained politicians, and bringing some of them into a council to fight the insurgents. In return, India would consider resuming military aid.
Natwar had to recommend the final position to the Union cabinet, whether or not to resume aid, and on Ramesh Nathâs return, one of the conditions was met, prominently, the release of jailed politicians. But Indian assistance didnât happen along, because as we published intelligence on Saturday (âPakistan to sell arms to Nepal against Maoists,â 12 March 2005), Ramesh Nath was on the line to the Pakistan foreign minister, Mehmud Ahmed Kasuri, requesting for emergency military assistance.
At our time of publishing the intelligence, Pakistan had not gone public with its aid offer to Nepal, but subsequently did, understanding its huge propaganda consequences against India and in its favour, as a friendly power in South Asia. Kasuriâs response to Ramesh Nathâs request, according to diplomatic sources, was warm, and almost enthusiastic. Nepal wanted eight military items on an emergency basis, including two hundred rocket launchers and two thousand automatic grenade launchers, and Pakistan readily accepted to supply them from its own army stocks, at a minimum forty per cent down payment. It said it would deliver the weapons free at Kathmandu, a small price to pay for showing down India.
Now Pakistani aid to Nepal has the Indian government in a panic. According to the papers, Natwar who is abroad is rushing back, and the whole recent relations with Nepal will be gone over. As face-saver, India will probably repeat its pious democratic exhortations to Nepal, but privately concede to the kingâs request for weapons. But any great advantages from this may not flow to India, because India has effectively lost its lever with Nepal. Earlier, Nepal was seeking alms at our table, but we were too haughty to pay heed, but with Pakistan intervening, India is being forced to be friendly again. The lever is lost in the sense that Nepal controls it now. It knows anything can be obtained from India by playing the Pakistan card, and this card will be used until it exhausts itself.
Nepalâs example is not the only one. During Rajiv Gandhiâs time, Myanmar sought Indian aid and infrastructure assistance, but we turned our nose up against its dictatorship. China quietly stepped in, to our subsequent mounting alarm, and all through the Eighties-Nineties, it rapidly expanded its presence, its businessmen capturing local trade, its trunk roads opening vast dark Burmese interiors, China controlled Burmese ports by virtue of expanding and upgrading them, and its crowning glory was to establish military outposts and listening stations in Burmese islands commanding a vast view of Indiaâs defence assets on the eastern seaboard. Only after the NDA came to power were vigorous attempts made to contain Chinese influence, and it is in exercise of this that the Burmese military junta has now cracked up against the North East insurgents holed up there.
The point is, you must have a realistic assessment of your power, reach, and quality of levers. Although India had advance warning of King Gyanendraâs coup, the warning even conveyed through this magazine, it could do little or nothing to prevent it. If India had put effective pressure on the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) to pressure the king against a coup, he may have held back, because without the RNAâs backing, he is powerless, but Natwar Singh and the Indian government trusted the diplomatic route, which failed them.
Once this failed, both parties should have understood the limits of diplomacy, and dealt with the emerging Nepal situation in more unconventional ways. But no, there was more of the same, a high moral principle of democracy was made, the roping in of Britain in this was trumped up as a great victory, and unbearable pressure was put on Nepal. To their eternal shame, some Indian commentators backed this exercise, losing sight of the real picture. But now that Nepal has countervailed with Pakistani aid, the whole Natwar Singh strategy has collapsed, and India is in a panic rush to save the situation. How long are we going to pay for the blunders of Natwar Singh?
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