My refined thoughts on Agni, Nuclear deterrence and geopolitics.
I have indicated the statements supported by DRDO or other press releases directly with (s) and indirectly or with extrapolation with (i). Unverified,(?).
Agni V, from the DRDO press releases will be the first IRBM (s) (a misnomer for an ICBM(i)) to carry MIRV (s) war heads. MIRV being progressively ported back to Agni iii by 2015(s). An MIRV missile with four 500kg warheads is one of the preferred configurations DRDO is working on(s). The current preferred weapon of choice at least as of 2006 was FBF with a yield of 250-300 kt(s) weighing close to a ton (s). Agni series payload capacities disclosed by DRDO are interesting in light of this disclosure(s). Agni III will be MIRV capable(s). Agni VI, all composite missile(s) will also be MIRV capable with a higher payload(i). The range of a ballistic missile increases disproportionately after the initial intercontinental velocities are reached in a test with moderate increases in fuel and weight, given that circumnavigation at 600km altitude is less constrained by gravity, air turbulence and air friction. Agni V with a "non-preferred" 500 kg war head can reach any corner of the globe(i). Agni VI(?) all-composite missile is merely an extension of the MIRV capability to the global theater.(i)
Shakti nuclear tests are designed to give India the ability to field sub-kiloton, fission, fusion boosted fission and thermonuclear warheads according to a statement made by the GOI on the floor of the house in 2000, two years after the test(s). The current preferred weapon of choice at least as of 2006 was FBF with a yield of 250-300 kt(s) weighing close to a ton(s). The FBF 250-300kt weapon is a reactor grade fuel weapon(?) (s). {Indian Defense Review 2002 on weapons available as presented by GOI in 2000 in the parliament}. India unlike the p5 has access to cheap tritium (s) which makes FBF the weapon of choice(i). The use of reactor grade fuel FBF as a weapon of choice is driven by the economics(i), extant supply of fissile material(s), extant enrichment constraints(s) and numerical sufficiency(s). U-233 bombs(s) as a future replacement candidate(i). The thermonuclear weapons on the other hand require significant investment in enrichment capacity which at present is tilted towards fueling our upcoming submarine fleet(i). MIRV warheads are presumably thermonuclear weapons based on the weight being quoted(i). A nuclear test to verify the designs is unlikely(s). The nuclear tests will have to wait until we have enough MIRV capable missiles in sufficient numbers(i)
The Indo-US civil nuclear deal was an attempt to emasculate the Indian deterrence by limiting tests(s). When the Americans realized their folly on emasculating India solely on the assumption that the thermonuclear tests failed and preventing future tests will cap Indian nuclear weapons they initiated the present series of ENR technology denial(s). Indian interest in ENR(s)(i) was one of the prime motivators in the nuclear deal in addition to fuel supply access(s). ENR civilian access is critical in reducing the lead time to a thorium economy(s). India has been largely unsuccessful in lobbying against the ENR technology denial regime, which is critical to our nuclear energy security and as opposed to nuclear strategic security(i). India has reconciled itself to ENR technology denial regime from the statements made by krishna menon in October(s). The ENR technology denial regime is an attempt to prevent the rise of an energy independent India by emasculating it's nuclear energy security by creating a saudi-us relationship between India and the NSG fuel supply members(i). India will be subject to nuclear fuel supply cutoffs(i). The ENR technology denial regime restricting ENR (i) is designed with an assumption that it will limit India to the India-China regional equation over the next decade(i). The G2 dependency of America might force India to project power globally and not just regionally(i). We cannot rule out the possibility of a repetition of the 1970's India China trade-off(i). A strategic response to this threat is the deployment of ICBM's which can target all corners of the globe with MIRV war heads(i). This preempts economic warfare through nuclear supply cutoffs(i). This could also be the only logical course on the table for India which has traditionally been reluctant to project power(i) to an overt military bully over the course of the next decade.
I have indicated the statements supported by DRDO or other press releases directly with (s) and indirectly or with extrapolation with (i). Unverified,(?).
Agni V, from the DRDO press releases will be the first IRBM (s) (a misnomer for an ICBM(i)) to carry MIRV (s) war heads. MIRV being progressively ported back to Agni iii by 2015(s). An MIRV missile with four 500kg warheads is one of the preferred configurations DRDO is working on(s). The current preferred weapon of choice at least as of 2006 was FBF with a yield of 250-300 kt(s) weighing close to a ton (s). Agni series payload capacities disclosed by DRDO are interesting in light of this disclosure(s). Agni III will be MIRV capable(s). Agni VI, all composite missile(s) will also be MIRV capable with a higher payload(i). The range of a ballistic missile increases disproportionately after the initial intercontinental velocities are reached in a test with moderate increases in fuel and weight, given that circumnavigation at 600km altitude is less constrained by gravity, air turbulence and air friction. Agni V with a "non-preferred" 500 kg war head can reach any corner of the globe(i). Agni VI(?) all-composite missile is merely an extension of the MIRV capability to the global theater.(i)
Shakti nuclear tests are designed to give India the ability to field sub-kiloton, fission, fusion boosted fission and thermonuclear warheads according to a statement made by the GOI on the floor of the house in 2000, two years after the test(s). The current preferred weapon of choice at least as of 2006 was FBF with a yield of 250-300 kt(s) weighing close to a ton(s). The FBF 250-300kt weapon is a reactor grade fuel weapon(?) (s). {Indian Defense Review 2002 on weapons available as presented by GOI in 2000 in the parliament}. India unlike the p5 has access to cheap tritium (s) which makes FBF the weapon of choice(i). The use of reactor grade fuel FBF as a weapon of choice is driven by the economics(i), extant supply of fissile material(s), extant enrichment constraints(s) and numerical sufficiency(s). U-233 bombs(s) as a future replacement candidate(i). The thermonuclear weapons on the other hand require significant investment in enrichment capacity which at present is tilted towards fueling our upcoming submarine fleet(i). MIRV warheads are presumably thermonuclear weapons based on the weight being quoted(i). A nuclear test to verify the designs is unlikely(s). The nuclear tests will have to wait until we have enough MIRV capable missiles in sufficient numbers(i)
The Indo-US civil nuclear deal was an attempt to emasculate the Indian deterrence by limiting tests(s). When the Americans realized their folly on emasculating India solely on the assumption that the thermonuclear tests failed and preventing future tests will cap Indian nuclear weapons they initiated the present series of ENR technology denial(s). Indian interest in ENR(s)(i) was one of the prime motivators in the nuclear deal in addition to fuel supply access(s). ENR civilian access is critical in reducing the lead time to a thorium economy(s). India has been largely unsuccessful in lobbying against the ENR technology denial regime, which is critical to our nuclear energy security and as opposed to nuclear strategic security(i). India has reconciled itself to ENR technology denial regime from the statements made by krishna menon in October(s). The ENR technology denial regime is an attempt to prevent the rise of an energy independent India by emasculating it's nuclear energy security by creating a saudi-us relationship between India and the NSG fuel supply members(i). India will be subject to nuclear fuel supply cutoffs(i). The ENR technology denial regime restricting ENR (i) is designed with an assumption that it will limit India to the India-China regional equation over the next decade(i). The G2 dependency of America might force India to project power globally and not just regionally(i). We cannot rule out the possibility of a repetition of the 1970's India China trade-off(i). A strategic response to this threat is the deployment of ICBM's which can target all corners of the globe with MIRV war heads(i). This preempts economic warfare through nuclear supply cutoffs(i). This could also be the only logical course on the table for India which has traditionally been reluctant to project power(i) to an overt military bully over the course of the next decade.