04-16-2005, 03:44 AM
VIEW: F-16s and Pakistani military strategy âAhmad Faruqui
It is unclear who will pay for the purchase of 100, let alone 200 F-16s. At $60 million a copy, a 100-aircraft shopping basket would run up a price tag of $6 billion. This rises to $12 billion for 200 aircraft. The mid-point of this range represents about 10 percent of Pakistanâs gross domestic product and is clearly beyond Pakistanâs financial reach
The debate continues to rage on whether a poor nation like Pakistan, where a third of the population lives in extreme poverty and more than half is illiterate, should be spending billions of dollars on sophisticated multi-role fighters like the F-16. This is a very important issue and the debate should continue not only in the media but also in universities and think tanks and ultimately in the National Assembly. The point that national security depends as much on softer factors such as social, economic and political development as on harder military factors cannot be over-emphasised.
However, there is another question that needs to be debated in parallel. It has to do with the role of F-16s in Pakistanâs military strategy. There are three main views on this subject.
The first school of thought opines that the weapon will be used in a purely defensive role, to deter an Indian invasion. Should the IAF intrude into Pakistani airspace, the F-16s would be used to intercept and destroy the invading aircraft. Lesser aircraft in the PAF inventory, such as Mirages and F-7s, would be used in a ground attack role to take out units of the Indian army.
The second school holds that the weapon will be used in a purely offensive role to carry out a nuclear air strike deep inside India. Presumably, such an air strike would be launched only if India has invaded Pakistan, cut off its main north-south communication arteries and destroyed the bulk of Pakistanâs armoured and artillery units. The purpose of the nuclear strike would be to prevent a final surrender.
A third school believes that the weapon would be used in both roles. But the numbers being provided to the PAF are clearly insufficient for undertaking both roles with a reasonable probability of success.
As with anything else related to the F-16 deal, there is controversy about the number of aircraft that would be provided to Pakistan. Initial press reports suggested 25. However, others have argued that there is no limit to the number. One source suggests that the number is 100, another 200.
It is unclear who will pay for the purchase of 100, let alone 200 F-16s. At $60 million a copy, a 100-aircraft shopping basket would run up a price tag of $6 billion. This rises to $12 billion for 200 aircraft. The mid-point of this range represents about 10 percent of Pakistanâs gross domestic product and is clearly beyond Pakistanâs financial reach, even if the economy continues to grow at the Shaukat Aziz projection of 8 percent a year. Phantasmagoric numbers should not underpin Pakistanâs strategic calculations.
A more reasonable shopping basket might be 40-50 aircraft, which when added to the 32 in the current inventory, would be sufficient to equip six squadrons.
The other question is when would the aircraft be delivered. It takes years to build an F-16. Late 2008 would be the earliest time of delivery if new planes are supplied. If more than 25 aircraft are ordered, final shipments may run into 2009-11.
The controversy not withstanding, what is the best military use of the F-16s? The answer depends on what is Pakistanâs military objective vis à vis India.
In IAF, the PAF faces one of the best-equipped air forces in Asia. It outnumbers the PAF by 6:1 in frontline aircraft and is likely to keep at least a 5:1 edge in the years to come. Aircraft in the IAF inventory include the first-rate SU-30 and MiG-29 multi-role fighters that can easily take on the F-16, especially if they are equipped with beyond-visual-range missiles. In addition, India has one of the best air defences in Asia. The Indian army is much better equipped than the Pakistani army and double the size. The disparity in forces is even more pronounced when we compare the two navies.
The PAF would be foolhardy to assume that its F-16s can penetrate Indian airspace at will. The F-16s would be detected at take-off and face a very high risk of being shot down within seconds of entering India.
Also, very sophisticated avionics are needed to deliver nuclear warheads by F-16 aircraft. It is unlikely that the US will provide such capability to Pakistan. Of course, Pakistan may be able to âbootstrapâ such capability through other means. But this carries the risk of equipment malfunction. Finally, there is the worst scenario â the possibility that the F-16s would be destroyed on the ground in a pre-emptive air strike by India.
It may be in recognition of these difficulties that the war planners in Islamabad embarked on a ballistic missile development programme years ago. The solid-fuel Shaheen I and II missiles are capable of delivering nuclear warheads almost anywhere in India. Those, rather than the F-16s, would be the preferred weapons in a doomsday scenario. However, like any other scenario, this has its risks. For Pakistan, the risk would be destruction of the missiles and/or their launchers.
War games at numerous institutions suggest that Pakistanâs armed forces are not in a position to hold off a full-scale Indian invasion. The IAF enjoys air superiority over the PAF and Indian air defences are much better than Pakistanâs. This military imbalance cannot be overcome with bravado alone.
Should the IAF be prepared to sacrifice its own aircraft, it can destroy the PAF within a couple of days. Without air cover, the army is expected to fold in seven days. Gwadar may save the Pakistani Navy from being bottled up in the Karachi harbour, as happened in Karachi in 1971. However, it cannot save Pakistan from losing the ground battle.
Thus, the most valuable use of the F-16s is a purely defensive one, to ward off an Indian invasion by making it prohibitively costly to India. A nuclear war is a journey from which few come home. It is so much better to embark on a journey of peace and friendship. Perhaps the bus journey from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad will transform the relationship between India and Pakistan to the point that war ceases to be an option for settling disputes.
It is unclear who will pay for the purchase of 100, let alone 200 F-16s. At $60 million a copy, a 100-aircraft shopping basket would run up a price tag of $6 billion. This rises to $12 billion for 200 aircraft. The mid-point of this range represents about 10 percent of Pakistanâs gross domestic product and is clearly beyond Pakistanâs financial reach
The debate continues to rage on whether a poor nation like Pakistan, where a third of the population lives in extreme poverty and more than half is illiterate, should be spending billions of dollars on sophisticated multi-role fighters like the F-16. This is a very important issue and the debate should continue not only in the media but also in universities and think tanks and ultimately in the National Assembly. The point that national security depends as much on softer factors such as social, economic and political development as on harder military factors cannot be over-emphasised.
However, there is another question that needs to be debated in parallel. It has to do with the role of F-16s in Pakistanâs military strategy. There are three main views on this subject.
The first school of thought opines that the weapon will be used in a purely defensive role, to deter an Indian invasion. Should the IAF intrude into Pakistani airspace, the F-16s would be used to intercept and destroy the invading aircraft. Lesser aircraft in the PAF inventory, such as Mirages and F-7s, would be used in a ground attack role to take out units of the Indian army.
The second school holds that the weapon will be used in a purely offensive role to carry out a nuclear air strike deep inside India. Presumably, such an air strike would be launched only if India has invaded Pakistan, cut off its main north-south communication arteries and destroyed the bulk of Pakistanâs armoured and artillery units. The purpose of the nuclear strike would be to prevent a final surrender.
A third school believes that the weapon would be used in both roles. But the numbers being provided to the PAF are clearly insufficient for undertaking both roles with a reasonable probability of success.
As with anything else related to the F-16 deal, there is controversy about the number of aircraft that would be provided to Pakistan. Initial press reports suggested 25. However, others have argued that there is no limit to the number. One source suggests that the number is 100, another 200.
It is unclear who will pay for the purchase of 100, let alone 200 F-16s. At $60 million a copy, a 100-aircraft shopping basket would run up a price tag of $6 billion. This rises to $12 billion for 200 aircraft. The mid-point of this range represents about 10 percent of Pakistanâs gross domestic product and is clearly beyond Pakistanâs financial reach, even if the economy continues to grow at the Shaukat Aziz projection of 8 percent a year. Phantasmagoric numbers should not underpin Pakistanâs strategic calculations.
A more reasonable shopping basket might be 40-50 aircraft, which when added to the 32 in the current inventory, would be sufficient to equip six squadrons.
The other question is when would the aircraft be delivered. It takes years to build an F-16. Late 2008 would be the earliest time of delivery if new planes are supplied. If more than 25 aircraft are ordered, final shipments may run into 2009-11.
The controversy not withstanding, what is the best military use of the F-16s? The answer depends on what is Pakistanâs military objective vis à vis India.
In IAF, the PAF faces one of the best-equipped air forces in Asia. It outnumbers the PAF by 6:1 in frontline aircraft and is likely to keep at least a 5:1 edge in the years to come. Aircraft in the IAF inventory include the first-rate SU-30 and MiG-29 multi-role fighters that can easily take on the F-16, especially if they are equipped with beyond-visual-range missiles. In addition, India has one of the best air defences in Asia. The Indian army is much better equipped than the Pakistani army and double the size. The disparity in forces is even more pronounced when we compare the two navies.
The PAF would be foolhardy to assume that its F-16s can penetrate Indian airspace at will. The F-16s would be detected at take-off and face a very high risk of being shot down within seconds of entering India.
Also, very sophisticated avionics are needed to deliver nuclear warheads by F-16 aircraft. It is unlikely that the US will provide such capability to Pakistan. Of course, Pakistan may be able to âbootstrapâ such capability through other means. But this carries the risk of equipment malfunction. Finally, there is the worst scenario â the possibility that the F-16s would be destroyed on the ground in a pre-emptive air strike by India.
It may be in recognition of these difficulties that the war planners in Islamabad embarked on a ballistic missile development programme years ago. The solid-fuel Shaheen I and II missiles are capable of delivering nuclear warheads almost anywhere in India. Those, rather than the F-16s, would be the preferred weapons in a doomsday scenario. However, like any other scenario, this has its risks. For Pakistan, the risk would be destruction of the missiles and/or their launchers.
War games at numerous institutions suggest that Pakistanâs armed forces are not in a position to hold off a full-scale Indian invasion. The IAF enjoys air superiority over the PAF and Indian air defences are much better than Pakistanâs. This military imbalance cannot be overcome with bravado alone.
Should the IAF be prepared to sacrifice its own aircraft, it can destroy the PAF within a couple of days. Without air cover, the army is expected to fold in seven days. Gwadar may save the Pakistani Navy from being bottled up in the Karachi harbour, as happened in Karachi in 1971. However, it cannot save Pakistan from losing the ground battle.
Thus, the most valuable use of the F-16s is a purely defensive one, to ward off an Indian invasion by making it prohibitively costly to India. A nuclear war is a journey from which few come home. It is so much better to embark on a journey of peace and friendship. Perhaps the bus journey from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad will transform the relationship between India and Pakistan to the point that war ceases to be an option for settling disputes.