05-21-2012, 11:39 AM
[quote name='Arun_S' date='20 May 2012 - 11:51 PM' timestamp='1337537592' post='114920']
By my rakoning Arihant requires 30 to 45 times that much fuel for 10 yrs operation.
[/quote]
I have merely used MV Ramana's estimates of Arihant fuel core of 90kg. I picked his maximal analysis of 160kg to facilitate a 50% uncertainty and doubled it again to arrive at 320Kg. The estimates provided in the previous post produce 333kg of 40% HEU per fuel load as opposed to 160kg listed above, which is MV Ramana's estimate. I have done this to discount the fact that the estimates of MV Ramana seemed to have arrived at these figures without accounting for 97% HEU used by US.
I have resisted a temptation to double that further to 640kg to account for the american maneuvering over and above this 50% uncertainty buffer. This was to keep the uncertainty from cascading at each stage. I had already discounted 30,000SWU/yr on the lower band figures which are close to western intel 2007 figures and an additional facility which is more than the size of the current RMP facility. I have merely taken on the doubling and capacity augmentation. I have ignored close to 25% of the expansion area. 30,000 SWU/yr is an additional 333kg of 40% HEU.
These figures provided by MV Ramana are also in line with the 0.6 to 0.7 g HEU per shaft horse power per year estimates for the american submarines. These are considered higher end figures. Of course MV Ramana bases all of this on 1959 polaris submarine data on operational uranium usage of american submarines. The submarines use much lower power most of the time unless they are performing some aggressive maneuvering. Even these are considered only typical of American submarines. All naval reactors of America up until 1970 are said to have used 10 ton of HEU in all with a 50% uncertainty. Polaris submarines with 45,000 shp consumed 8kg of HEU every six months. They also ran through a 40kg 97% HEU core in 5 years during the initial years.
I don't think the figures are that far off. Even with 640kg of 40%HEU and discounting everything else we are looking at a HEU enrichment program for weapons. I have not stated that we don't need a test. This is merely a planned expansion of the Thermonuclear capacity and it's a large stockpile.
I don't believe in just stockpiles unless there is a designed TN warhead. If the upper end of the spectrum is true we are looking at well over 100 TN warheads by 2020 with 25kg of HEU per warhead. So the accumulation of HEU indicates an intent to use in TN weapons. Can this be without tests of with tests before a war or whatever else isn't something I know. It's however clear we are moving decisively in that direction.Our weapons have so far been plutonium based. So a shift post 2009 indicates weaponization to me.
So there is no logical connection between building a lot of HEU and weapons. There surely isn't any logical connection to this HEU capacity and submarine program either. Even accounting for 10 naval vessels in 10 years including aircraft carriers there is a lot more HEU up for grab. It could merely be accumulation of HEU, but I don't see why that will be the end goal. Maybe the bombs failed, however to state that since the bombs failed we don't have TN or will not weaponize is something I don't know for sure. The timing of the 2010 and 2011 expansion in both physical scale up and replacement of old units post 2009 to me signals weaponization.
As far as NK and Pakistan go they didn't test a design yet so I don't see why I should credit them with a weapon or discredit them with an untested weapon. That does not explain our capability or lack thereof. For all I know they may have one and we may not have one without a further test.
By my rakoning Arihant requires 30 to 45 times that much fuel for 10 yrs operation.
[/quote]
I have merely used MV Ramana's estimates of Arihant fuel core of 90kg. I picked his maximal analysis of 160kg to facilitate a 50% uncertainty and doubled it again to arrive at 320Kg. The estimates provided in the previous post produce 333kg of 40% HEU per fuel load as opposed to 160kg listed above, which is MV Ramana's estimate. I have done this to discount the fact that the estimates of MV Ramana seemed to have arrived at these figures without accounting for 97% HEU used by US.
I have resisted a temptation to double that further to 640kg to account for the american maneuvering over and above this 50% uncertainty buffer. This was to keep the uncertainty from cascading at each stage. I had already discounted 30,000SWU/yr on the lower band figures which are close to western intel 2007 figures and an additional facility which is more than the size of the current RMP facility. I have merely taken on the doubling and capacity augmentation. I have ignored close to 25% of the expansion area. 30,000 SWU/yr is an additional 333kg of 40% HEU.
These figures provided by MV Ramana are also in line with the 0.6 to 0.7 g HEU per shaft horse power per year estimates for the american submarines. These are considered higher end figures. Of course MV Ramana bases all of this on 1959 polaris submarine data on operational uranium usage of american submarines. The submarines use much lower power most of the time unless they are performing some aggressive maneuvering. Even these are considered only typical of American submarines. All naval reactors of America up until 1970 are said to have used 10 ton of HEU in all with a 50% uncertainty. Polaris submarines with 45,000 shp consumed 8kg of HEU every six months. They also ran through a 40kg 97% HEU core in 5 years during the initial years.
I don't think the figures are that far off. Even with 640kg of 40%HEU and discounting everything else we are looking at a HEU enrichment program for weapons. I have not stated that we don't need a test. This is merely a planned expansion of the Thermonuclear capacity and it's a large stockpile.
I don't believe in just stockpiles unless there is a designed TN warhead. If the upper end of the spectrum is true we are looking at well over 100 TN warheads by 2020 with 25kg of HEU per warhead. So the accumulation of HEU indicates an intent to use in TN weapons. Can this be without tests of with tests before a war or whatever else isn't something I know. It's however clear we are moving decisively in that direction.Our weapons have so far been plutonium based. So a shift post 2009 indicates weaponization to me.
So there is no logical connection between building a lot of HEU and weapons. There surely isn't any logical connection to this HEU capacity and submarine program either. Even accounting for 10 naval vessels in 10 years including aircraft carriers there is a lot more HEU up for grab. It could merely be accumulation of HEU, but I don't see why that will be the end goal. Maybe the bombs failed, however to state that since the bombs failed we don't have TN or will not weaponize is something I don't know for sure. The timing of the 2010 and 2011 expansion in both physical scale up and replacement of old units post 2009 to me signals weaponization.
As far as NK and Pakistan go they didn't test a design yet so I don't see why I should credit them with a weapon or discredit them with an untested weapon. That does not explain our capability or lack thereof. For all I know they may have one and we may not have one without a further test.