05-20-2006, 07:45 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->In national disinterest
Balbir Punj
How responsive is the UPA Government towards the external security imperatives of India? Two recent incidents put its obligation in grave doubt. On May 14, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while inaugurating the Defence Research and Development Organisation's (DRDO's) new office adjacent to South Block, said that India would soon embark on production of cutting edge technology weapons in sensors, robotics, propulsion systems, stealth and fighting wars through remote technology. There is also a plan for precision-guided munitions and unarmed vehicle technologies in the 11th and 12th plan period.
Top defence scientist M Natarajan of DRDO, who is also the scientific advisor to the Defence Minister, said his organisation was technically ready with the IRBM, the 4,000-km range Agni-III, and awaiting a nod from the Government for test-firing. His emphatic words "fired-off" speculations that the distance between DRDO and South Bloc had increased.
That "nod" is unlikely to come from the Government. On May 15, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee said India was not going ahead with the Agni-III test. "Self-imposed restraint" was cited as the reason adding "as responsible members of the international community, we want to keep our international commitments on non-proliferation."
Agni-III is capable of carrying a nuclear payload. But what does the testing of a missile have to do with "commitments to non-proliferation"? India, Pakistan and Israel are not members of NPT, and testing of a missile has little to do with proliferation. On the eighth anniversary of Pokhran-II tests on May 11, the well-known strategic analyst, Mr Bharat Karnad rued that India's status as a nuclear state is more notional than real. Mr K Subrahmanyam, who wrote India's nuclear doctrine, also felt that we did not go about the nuclear programme professionally, and our deterrence capacity is less than credible. This symbolic capacity, instead of lending India any geopolitical advantage, could prove to be a liability because of which potential nuclear adversaries could hit India hard.
<b>At 20 kilotons, not only India's nuclear yield, is peanuts compared with neighbouring China (3.3 megatons), the range limitation of our trusted delivery system Agni I (700-800 km) and Agni-II (2,000 km) are obvious. </b>The two IRBMs were developed as delivery systems by the NDA Government before being handed over to Army and Air Force in October 2003 as part of minimum deterrent capacity. Indira Gandhi had not followed the Pokhran-I (1974) test to its logical conclusion by developing a nuclear delivery system. But the Vajpayee Government did so with Agni-I and Agni-II missiles with booster system provided by ISRO. It would also have put Agni-III in its place, as a functional missile by 2003, but DRDO ran into some technical troubles that delayed its delivery.
The Agni-III uses a totally new system of booster vehicle that calls for extensive ground bed tests to ensure its reliability. The Defence Minister has given the permission for ground bed testing but withheld test firing. Mr Pranab Mukherjee's rhetoric - we must behave like a "responsible member of international community", and our "commitment to non-proliferation", "self-imposed restraint", etc., - seems inane when India does not have credible deterrent capability.
Such talks are reminiscent of Nehru who stalled the Army's campaign in Mirpur and Muzaffarabad when it was getting the better of Pakistan-sponsored tribal attack in Jammu & Kashmir. Brigadier LP Sen had called it the most unpatriotic order he received in his life. Mr M Natarajan has valid reasons to relate the same about Mr Pranab Mukherjee.
But this is half as fallacious compared to the Government's plan to pull out of Saltoro. As in the case of Agni-III, it highlights a mismatch between the South Block and Ministry of Defence on the one hand and the Armed forces and strategic experts' community on the other. The Army and Air Force have been stumped by South Block's proposal sent to Pakistanis through Track II that it was willing to consider demilitarisation of Siachen provided Islamabad agreed to authentication of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). New Delhi will host the next round of expert-level talks under on two long standing bilateral disputes - Siachen (May 23-24) and Sir Creek Channel (May 25-26).
The Army Commanders, taking part in a three-day conference in New Delhi (April 21-23), unanimously cautioned the Central Government against proceeding with the demilitarisation of Siachen without proper disengagement procedures from Indian and Pakistani sides. The motive of the Pakistani Army is no less suspect today than it was in 1984, when it had provoked the Indian Army to occupy the Saltoro ridge in Siachen. The proof of Pakistan's perfidy, the Kargil offensive of 1999, is still fresh in public mind. With the mastermind of that campaign occupying the President's chair in Pakistan, it only serves to increase the fear. Pakistan has a history of aggression and remains bound by the Quranic concept of war explicated by Brigadier SK Malik and endorsed by General Zia-ul-Haq.
If India vacates Saltoro Ridge without any strong guarantee; Pakistan is bound to capture it. India has no military doctrine to reclaim PoK; however, annexing the Indian part of Jammu & Kashmir is a priority for Pakistan. At present, the strategic advantage is with New Delhi, which explains Islamabad's desperation. Now the Indian Army is acclimatised, rather acculturated, to Siachen. The casualty rate is virtually down to nil. The economic cost of maintaining our base is a trifle of the defence budget.
If Pakistan has a history of aggression, India has a record of foolish generosity. Whether it is the retreat of the Indian Army from Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Kotli and Skardu in 1948 or allowing China to gobble Tibet or giving up Haji Pir in 1966 or the Simla Agreement of 1972 or for that matter mutely watching 'secular' Bangladesh turn Islamic, we have committed one blunder after another.
Colonel Todd, in his book, Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, was not far wrong when he generalised an episode in life of Maharana Kumbha: "Abul Fazal relates this victory and dilates on Kumbha's greatness of soul in setting his enemy at liberty, not only without ransom but also with gifts. Such is the character of the Hindus; a mixture of arrogance, political blindness, pride and generosity. To spare a prostate foe is the creed of the Hindu cavalier and he carries all such maxims to excess." (Vol I, p 287) Is a similar tragedy waiting to touch new height over Saltoro?<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Balbir Punj
How responsive is the UPA Government towards the external security imperatives of India? Two recent incidents put its obligation in grave doubt. On May 14, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while inaugurating the Defence Research and Development Organisation's (DRDO's) new office adjacent to South Block, said that India would soon embark on production of cutting edge technology weapons in sensors, robotics, propulsion systems, stealth and fighting wars through remote technology. There is also a plan for precision-guided munitions and unarmed vehicle technologies in the 11th and 12th plan period.
Top defence scientist M Natarajan of DRDO, who is also the scientific advisor to the Defence Minister, said his organisation was technically ready with the IRBM, the 4,000-km range Agni-III, and awaiting a nod from the Government for test-firing. His emphatic words "fired-off" speculations that the distance between DRDO and South Bloc had increased.
That "nod" is unlikely to come from the Government. On May 15, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee said India was not going ahead with the Agni-III test. "Self-imposed restraint" was cited as the reason adding "as responsible members of the international community, we want to keep our international commitments on non-proliferation."
Agni-III is capable of carrying a nuclear payload. But what does the testing of a missile have to do with "commitments to non-proliferation"? India, Pakistan and Israel are not members of NPT, and testing of a missile has little to do with proliferation. On the eighth anniversary of Pokhran-II tests on May 11, the well-known strategic analyst, Mr Bharat Karnad rued that India's status as a nuclear state is more notional than real. Mr K Subrahmanyam, who wrote India's nuclear doctrine, also felt that we did not go about the nuclear programme professionally, and our deterrence capacity is less than credible. This symbolic capacity, instead of lending India any geopolitical advantage, could prove to be a liability because of which potential nuclear adversaries could hit India hard.
<b>At 20 kilotons, not only India's nuclear yield, is peanuts compared with neighbouring China (3.3 megatons), the range limitation of our trusted delivery system Agni I (700-800 km) and Agni-II (2,000 km) are obvious. </b>The two IRBMs were developed as delivery systems by the NDA Government before being handed over to Army and Air Force in October 2003 as part of minimum deterrent capacity. Indira Gandhi had not followed the Pokhran-I (1974) test to its logical conclusion by developing a nuclear delivery system. But the Vajpayee Government did so with Agni-I and Agni-II missiles with booster system provided by ISRO. It would also have put Agni-III in its place, as a functional missile by 2003, but DRDO ran into some technical troubles that delayed its delivery.
The Agni-III uses a totally new system of booster vehicle that calls for extensive ground bed tests to ensure its reliability. The Defence Minister has given the permission for ground bed testing but withheld test firing. Mr Pranab Mukherjee's rhetoric - we must behave like a "responsible member of international community", and our "commitment to non-proliferation", "self-imposed restraint", etc., - seems inane when India does not have credible deterrent capability.
Such talks are reminiscent of Nehru who stalled the Army's campaign in Mirpur and Muzaffarabad when it was getting the better of Pakistan-sponsored tribal attack in Jammu & Kashmir. Brigadier LP Sen had called it the most unpatriotic order he received in his life. Mr M Natarajan has valid reasons to relate the same about Mr Pranab Mukherjee.
But this is half as fallacious compared to the Government's plan to pull out of Saltoro. As in the case of Agni-III, it highlights a mismatch between the South Block and Ministry of Defence on the one hand and the Armed forces and strategic experts' community on the other. The Army and Air Force have been stumped by South Block's proposal sent to Pakistanis through Track II that it was willing to consider demilitarisation of Siachen provided Islamabad agreed to authentication of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). New Delhi will host the next round of expert-level talks under on two long standing bilateral disputes - Siachen (May 23-24) and Sir Creek Channel (May 25-26).
The Army Commanders, taking part in a three-day conference in New Delhi (April 21-23), unanimously cautioned the Central Government against proceeding with the demilitarisation of Siachen without proper disengagement procedures from Indian and Pakistani sides. The motive of the Pakistani Army is no less suspect today than it was in 1984, when it had provoked the Indian Army to occupy the Saltoro ridge in Siachen. The proof of Pakistan's perfidy, the Kargil offensive of 1999, is still fresh in public mind. With the mastermind of that campaign occupying the President's chair in Pakistan, it only serves to increase the fear. Pakistan has a history of aggression and remains bound by the Quranic concept of war explicated by Brigadier SK Malik and endorsed by General Zia-ul-Haq.
If India vacates Saltoro Ridge without any strong guarantee; Pakistan is bound to capture it. India has no military doctrine to reclaim PoK; however, annexing the Indian part of Jammu & Kashmir is a priority for Pakistan. At present, the strategic advantage is with New Delhi, which explains Islamabad's desperation. Now the Indian Army is acclimatised, rather acculturated, to Siachen. The casualty rate is virtually down to nil. The economic cost of maintaining our base is a trifle of the defence budget.
If Pakistan has a history of aggression, India has a record of foolish generosity. Whether it is the retreat of the Indian Army from Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Kotli and Skardu in 1948 or allowing China to gobble Tibet or giving up Haji Pir in 1966 or the Simla Agreement of 1972 or for that matter mutely watching 'secular' Bangladesh turn Islamic, we have committed one blunder after another.
Colonel Todd, in his book, Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, was not far wrong when he generalised an episode in life of Maharana Kumbha: "Abul Fazal relates this victory and dilates on Kumbha's greatness of soul in setting his enemy at liberty, not only without ransom but also with gifts. Such is the character of the Hindus; a mixture of arrogance, political blindness, pride and generosity. To spare a prostate foe is the creed of the Hindu cavalier and he carries all such maxims to excess." (Vol I, p 287) Is a similar tragedy waiting to touch new height over Saltoro?<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->