02-18-2004, 08:07 PM
Today's Wall Street Journal article (subsciption site hence posting in full):
This article says, among other things, that:
The Peoples' Liberation Army has proliferated nuclear and missile technology to Pyongyang in order to make money, and to build up North Korea as a strategic distraction for the United States. Moreover, it's now clear that someone in China abetted Pakistan's proliferation activities. That's because it would have been impossible for the transport aircraft involved in the nuclear technology-for-missiles exchange to fly from Pakistan to North Korea without refueling in China on route.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE WALLSTREET JOURNAL ONLINE, FEBRUARY 18, 2004
Â
COMMENTARY
Persuading China to Rein in Pyongyang
By ROBYN LIM
For the United States, next week's talks in Beijing on the North Korean nuclear problem are expected to reinforce the message that the only road to dealing with Pyongyang lies through the Chinese capital. The future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is at stake, following North Korea's unilateral withdrawal last year. And there are very real fears that the rogue regime in Pyongyang might sell fissile material to other rogue states or terrorist groups.
But there is a crucial difference from Iraq that explains why, instead of invading, Washington will be sitting down for another round of six-party talks -- the other participants are China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas -- on Feb. 25.
America was able to liberate Iraq largely on the basis of its own resources. But, when it comes to Pyongyang, not only are the likely casualties of any military action far higher. In addition to that consideration, even the most unilateralist-minded U.S. administration would be unable to ignore China's interests on the Korean peninsula. China is Pyongyang's neighbor, has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and possesses its own nuclear weapons.
Moreover, these days South Korea seems more an ally of China than America. South Korea is ever ready to bribe and appease the North, out of a mixture of naivete and fear -- fear of the costs of absorbing the North, and fear of its nuclear and other weapons. Kim Jong Il, by cultivating an image of irrationality, has succeeded in engendering great fear among his neighbors. This is, after all, a regime with a long history of state-sponsored terrorism. So others are willing to believe that the Dear Leader might indeed use nuclear weapons, even at the risk of self-destruction. That fear even extends to some quarters in China, his key supporter and only ally.
So Washington is seeking to convince China that North Korea is damaging its own interests and that it would be far better for Beijing to act to rein in Pyongyang than risk leaving it to Washington to do so. But China's internal disunity on this issue remains a crucial obstacle. Those who think Kim is the devil they know are still winning the argument in Beijing.
The Peoples' Liberation Army has proliferated nuclear and missile technology to Pyongyang in order to make money, and to build up North Korea as a strategic distraction for the United States. Moreover, it's now clear that someone in China abetted Pakistan's proliferation activities. That's because it would have been impossible for the transport aircraft involved in the nuclear technology-for-missiles exchange to fly from Pakistan to North Korea without refueling in China on route.
But as Chinese scholar James Yang has pointed out in an article on this page ("China Must Dump North Korea," April 9, 2003), China stands to lose more than any other country if it fails to rein in North Korea. Beijing has been unable to control Kim -- or prevent him from acting in ways that injure China's own interests, especially in relation to Tokyo. In particular, Beijing cannot ignore the fact that, because of Japan's growing perception of a North Korean threat, it is no longer taboo in Tokyo to talk about nuclear weapons.
Japan is also strengthening its alliance with America, and has agreed to participate with the United States in missile defense. China cannot be thrilled to see members of Japan's Self Defense Force in Iraq, even in a non-combat role. Japan is also acquiring military capabilities that might one day be used against China, or in defense of Taiwan. Even now, Japan's navy is far more powerful than China's.
For China, there are other costs involved in continuing to prop up Pyongyang. As China becomes enmeshed in global capitalism, it sees that international norms and institutions can serve its interests. For example, China is now the world's second-largest importer of oil after America, and so has a growing stake in stability in the Middle East. Thus North Korea's proliferation activities there, like those of the PLA, undermine China's wider goals.
When Deng Xiaoping was China's paramount leader, he was willing to take exceptional risks when disobedient Communists in a neighboring country threatened China's interests. In early 1979, China invaded northern Vietnam. Deng's purpose was not to capture Hanoi, but to teach its Communist rulers a lesson -- that Beijing would not sit by while Vietnam invaded Cambodia (China's ally) with Soviet backing. But it was a high-risk strategy, which led to huge Chinese casualties.
So it's hard to imagine that Deng, if he'd still been around today, would have permitted a pudgy playboy like Kim to engender fear in Beijing, and threaten China's national interests through his nuclear adventurism. But the problem is that no one in power in Beijing today has nearly as much as authority as Deng used to command. Former leader Jiang Zemin is still chairman of the Central Military Commission, and has appointed most of the senior generals. But Mr. Jiang is not a military veteran, and lacks Deng's stature. Meanwhile, China new leaders, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, are still struggling to complete the succession.
Thus the Dear Leader benefits from China's disunity. But that need not stop next week's six-party talks from playing into the hands of those in China who argue that Kim has become a growing liability. Rightly, America will insist that any deal with North Korea must be verifiable, complete and irreversible. But all that Pyongyang is likely to offer is a nuclear "freeze" -- that is, mere promises of better behavior, provided that suitable bribes and security guarantees are attached. That's a movie which we've seen before, and will rightly be rejected by the Bush administration.
Of course, China can be expected to back North Korea, at least to the extent of insisting that Washington make more concessions. But with luck, North Korea will engage in the same kind of tantrums that marked the first round of talks in Beijing last spring, and so further embarrass and anger its hosts. And that might help convince China that it is finally time to take North Korea's flagrant refusal to adhere to the NPT to the United Nations Security Council.
Behind the scenes, America should urge China to take more drastic action. The Chinese, as a consequence of having saved the North Korean regime from defeat through their extensive military assistance during the Korean War -- for which they got little thanks from Pyongyang -- presumably retain assets in its military. Of course, a coup attempt might not work, at least the first time around. But even a failed putsch might persuade other key members of North Korea's ruling elite that the time was finally up for the Dear Leader.
Ms. Lim is professor of international politics at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan and the author of "The Geopolitics of East Asia" (Curzon Press, 2003).
Updated February 18, 2004
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
This article says, among other things, that:
The Peoples' Liberation Army has proliferated nuclear and missile technology to Pyongyang in order to make money, and to build up North Korea as a strategic distraction for the United States. Moreover, it's now clear that someone in China abetted Pakistan's proliferation activities. That's because it would have been impossible for the transport aircraft involved in the nuclear technology-for-missiles exchange to fly from Pakistan to North Korea without refueling in China on route.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE WALLSTREET JOURNAL ONLINE, FEBRUARY 18, 2004
Â
COMMENTARY
Persuading China to Rein in Pyongyang
By ROBYN LIM
For the United States, next week's talks in Beijing on the North Korean nuclear problem are expected to reinforce the message that the only road to dealing with Pyongyang lies through the Chinese capital. The future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is at stake, following North Korea's unilateral withdrawal last year. And there are very real fears that the rogue regime in Pyongyang might sell fissile material to other rogue states or terrorist groups.
But there is a crucial difference from Iraq that explains why, instead of invading, Washington will be sitting down for another round of six-party talks -- the other participants are China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas -- on Feb. 25.
America was able to liberate Iraq largely on the basis of its own resources. But, when it comes to Pyongyang, not only are the likely casualties of any military action far higher. In addition to that consideration, even the most unilateralist-minded U.S. administration would be unable to ignore China's interests on the Korean peninsula. China is Pyongyang's neighbor, has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and possesses its own nuclear weapons.
Moreover, these days South Korea seems more an ally of China than America. South Korea is ever ready to bribe and appease the North, out of a mixture of naivete and fear -- fear of the costs of absorbing the North, and fear of its nuclear and other weapons. Kim Jong Il, by cultivating an image of irrationality, has succeeded in engendering great fear among his neighbors. This is, after all, a regime with a long history of state-sponsored terrorism. So others are willing to believe that the Dear Leader might indeed use nuclear weapons, even at the risk of self-destruction. That fear even extends to some quarters in China, his key supporter and only ally.
So Washington is seeking to convince China that North Korea is damaging its own interests and that it would be far better for Beijing to act to rein in Pyongyang than risk leaving it to Washington to do so. But China's internal disunity on this issue remains a crucial obstacle. Those who think Kim is the devil they know are still winning the argument in Beijing.
The Peoples' Liberation Army has proliferated nuclear and missile technology to Pyongyang in order to make money, and to build up North Korea as a strategic distraction for the United States. Moreover, it's now clear that someone in China abetted Pakistan's proliferation activities. That's because it would have been impossible for the transport aircraft involved in the nuclear technology-for-missiles exchange to fly from Pakistan to North Korea without refueling in China on route.
But as Chinese scholar James Yang has pointed out in an article on this page ("China Must Dump North Korea," April 9, 2003), China stands to lose more than any other country if it fails to rein in North Korea. Beijing has been unable to control Kim -- or prevent him from acting in ways that injure China's own interests, especially in relation to Tokyo. In particular, Beijing cannot ignore the fact that, because of Japan's growing perception of a North Korean threat, it is no longer taboo in Tokyo to talk about nuclear weapons.
Japan is also strengthening its alliance with America, and has agreed to participate with the United States in missile defense. China cannot be thrilled to see members of Japan's Self Defense Force in Iraq, even in a non-combat role. Japan is also acquiring military capabilities that might one day be used against China, or in defense of Taiwan. Even now, Japan's navy is far more powerful than China's.
For China, there are other costs involved in continuing to prop up Pyongyang. As China becomes enmeshed in global capitalism, it sees that international norms and institutions can serve its interests. For example, China is now the world's second-largest importer of oil after America, and so has a growing stake in stability in the Middle East. Thus North Korea's proliferation activities there, like those of the PLA, undermine China's wider goals.
When Deng Xiaoping was China's paramount leader, he was willing to take exceptional risks when disobedient Communists in a neighboring country threatened China's interests. In early 1979, China invaded northern Vietnam. Deng's purpose was not to capture Hanoi, but to teach its Communist rulers a lesson -- that Beijing would not sit by while Vietnam invaded Cambodia (China's ally) with Soviet backing. But it was a high-risk strategy, which led to huge Chinese casualties.
So it's hard to imagine that Deng, if he'd still been around today, would have permitted a pudgy playboy like Kim to engender fear in Beijing, and threaten China's national interests through his nuclear adventurism. But the problem is that no one in power in Beijing today has nearly as much as authority as Deng used to command. Former leader Jiang Zemin is still chairman of the Central Military Commission, and has appointed most of the senior generals. But Mr. Jiang is not a military veteran, and lacks Deng's stature. Meanwhile, China new leaders, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, are still struggling to complete the succession.
Thus the Dear Leader benefits from China's disunity. But that need not stop next week's six-party talks from playing into the hands of those in China who argue that Kim has become a growing liability. Rightly, America will insist that any deal with North Korea must be verifiable, complete and irreversible. But all that Pyongyang is likely to offer is a nuclear "freeze" -- that is, mere promises of better behavior, provided that suitable bribes and security guarantees are attached. That's a movie which we've seen before, and will rightly be rejected by the Bush administration.
Of course, China can be expected to back North Korea, at least to the extent of insisting that Washington make more concessions. But with luck, North Korea will engage in the same kind of tantrums that marked the first round of talks in Beijing last spring, and so further embarrass and anger its hosts. And that might help convince China that it is finally time to take North Korea's flagrant refusal to adhere to the NPT to the United Nations Security Council.
Behind the scenes, America should urge China to take more drastic action. The Chinese, as a consequence of having saved the North Korean regime from defeat through their extensive military assistance during the Korean War -- for which they got little thanks from Pyongyang -- presumably retain assets in its military. Of course, a coup attempt might not work, at least the first time around. But even a failed putsch might persuade other key members of North Korea's ruling elite that the time was finally up for the Dear Leader.
Ms. Lim is professor of international politics at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan and the author of "The Geopolitics of East Asia" (Curzon Press, 2003).
Updated February 18, 2004
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->