<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->No end in sight for Muslim-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka
COLOMBO DIARY | PK Balachandran
August 1, 2005
Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims speak the same language and have lived cheek by jowl peacefully and harmoniously for centuries in most parts of the island, including the currently troubled Eastern districts. But since the early 20th century they have drifted apart and been at loggerheads for one reason or the other. And time, instead closing the gap, has only widened it. Sadly, as on date, there is no light at the end of the tunnel.
Basically, the Tamil-Muslim spat or stand off has been a product of identity movements and identity politics. The Muslims' demand for an identity of their own based on religion, culture and a supposedly Arab origin, has clashed with the Tamils' movement to unify all "Tamil-speaking people" of the Northern and Eastern districts to fight for their collective rights against Sinhala majoritarianism.
The demand for a separate Muslim identity arose at a time when the other two major communities in the island, namely, the Sinhalas and Tamils, had developed communal consciousness and were jockeying for power on the basis of a mixture of religion and ethnicity. The Muslims followed suit.
In the process, the Muslims clashed with the Tamils rather than the Sinhalas, despite the fact that two thirds of the Muslims lived among the Sinhalas in Sinhala-majority districts in South, Central, and Western Sri Lanka. This was because the Tamils, to expand their base and power in the country, had claimed that the Tamil-speaking Muslims were actually Tamils converted to Islam and that they were no different from Tamils who converted to Christianity, who saw themselves as being part of the Tamil community. This claim made by leading a Tamil personality, set off alarm bells among the Muslims who felt that they would lose their identity and get swamped by a more powerful, more influential and more numerous Tamil community. There was too much in common between the Muslims and the Tamils for the Muslims to feel secure from threats of absorption by the Tamils.
A move to get separate representation and separate schools began. The Sinhala majority community, which initially disliked the Muslims and even rioted against them in 1915, later began to support them in their efforts to distance themselves from the Tamils, as the latter were seen as the Sinhalas' principal political and economic rivals.
In the years that followed, the "Arabisation" of Sri Lankan Muslim life and culture further widened the gap between the Muslims and the Tamils as the many common threads began to vanish one by one, barring the Tamil language. But even Tamil language ceased to be considered the "mother tongue". It was designated as the "home language" instead!
Influence of Colombo-based leaders
The Tamils attribute the widening of the gap to the leaders of the Muslims who were then drawn mainly from the elite classes living in the Sinhala-majority areas of Sri Lanka. The essentially Colombo-based leaders did not want anything to do with the post-independence Tamil movement for autonomy/independence in the North Eastern districts. Since two thirds of the Muslims of the island lived peacefully in the Sinhala majority areas, they felt that joining such a movement would not be in their interest. Furthermore, they had obtained some concessions in education and other spheres which would be lost if they merged with the Tamils. As a United National Party MP, Azwer, once said, separate "Muslim" schools or places in the administration secured on the basis of religion would have gone.
However, at least initially, the Muslims living in the Tamil majority North Eastern districts did cast their lot with the Tamils, and many Muslims were active participants in the Tamil parties fighting for autonomy for the Tamil-speaking North East. This was because the Muslims too had lost out in the state-sponsored colonization schemes in the newly irrigated areas, which had brought in Sinhala settlers from outside. The government's Sinhala-Only language policy affected them too. The Muslims and the Tamils were also economically dependent on each other in the agricultural economy of the East. The settlement and land holding patterns made communal cooperation imperative. Unlike the Western Sri Lankan Muslims, the Eastern Muslims were not just traders at a remove from the environment.
Divide and rule
The Tamils allege that the Sinhala political leaders, in collusion with the then leaders of the Muslims, drove a wedge between the Muslims and Tamils in the East by luring the Muslim leaders from the East with loaves and fishes of office. They encouraged Muslims to defect from Tamil parties to mainstream Sinhala-oriented parties like the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP).
With the result, the primary concern of most Muslim leaders centred round securing state offices for themselves and some concessions for their community. They showed no interest in broader and deeper issues like autonomy, federalism and self-determination, which were the core concerns of the Tamil struggle. While the Tamils kept off offices of the state, the Muslims actively sought them. In the process, the Muslims developed a symbiotic and pragmatic relationship with the Sinhala majoritarian parties and the Tamils got farther and farther away from them. Often, the Muslim-Sinhala symbiotic relationship seemed like "collusion" to the Tamils.
When total independence for a Tamil Eelam became the official creed of the Tamil movement in 1976, the Muslims began to fall out completely with the Tamils. The Tamil leader SJV Chelvanayakam's efforts to unify the "Tamil-speaking" people of the North East, including Muslims, had failed to strike a chord among the Muslims.
War and terrorism sharpen divide
The contradiction between the Tamils and Muslims in the North East became sharper with the rise of Tamil militant groups, the start of a series of Sri Lankan military operations, and the use of the Muslims as a state fifth column in the Tamil areas. This resulted in a number of anti-Muslim actions from the Tamil side, including the wholesale expulsion of Muslims from the Jaffna peninsula, and the massacre of Muslims in Kattankudy in 1990.
Political epicentre shifts to East
Since the trouble was in the North East, there was a change in Muslim politics too. The Colombo and West districts-based leadership began to yield place to a new leadership from the East, particularly, the South Eastern districts of Amparai and Batticaloa, where the Muslims were concentrated. The East-based Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) emerged under the leadership of MHM Ashraff.
This was also the time when a constitutional settlement was being talked about to end the war and the ethnic conflict. The Muslims found that in these discussions, only the Tamil case was being talked about. The India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 and the 13th amendment, which stemmed from it, had nothing for the Muslims as such. Then came President Chandrika Kumaratunga's constitutional proposals of 2000. By then, Ashraff had managed to get recognition for his demand for a Muslim majority South Eastern Council in the corridors of power in Colombo.
However, the LTTE, and most other Tamil parties, rejected Kumaratunga's proposals, which had included a provision for a Muslim-majority South Eastern Council.
Attempt to divide Tamil Homeland
The Tamils looked upon the South Eastern Council idea as an unwarranted attempt to divide the North Eastern "Tamil Homeland" or the "Homeland of the Tamil-speaking people". They had to oppose the move tooth and nail.
A common Tamil argument against giving in to the Muslims' demand is that while the Tamils had struggled for decades and shed blood and made great sacrifices towards getting a Tamil Homeland, the Muslims had not. The Tamils also point out that the Muslims keep quiet and even collaborate with the government when the Tamils are struggling, but when the cake is about to be given to the Tamils, the Muslims appear on the scene with a demand for a share. "The Muslims can't have the cake and eat it too," said a Tamil journalist.
The LTTE's plank (as articulated by Kariklalan, a former Batticaloa leader in 2002) has been that the Muslims have special cultural and religious rights but no special political rights as distinct from the Tamils.
Tamil leaders like Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP, R Sampanthan, wonder why the Muslims want safeguards and special rights in the Tamil-majority areas only, and never in the Sinhala-majority areas? The Muslims counter this by pointing out that in the Sinhala-dominated areas, the Muslims don't face armed terrorist groups and are not chased out and persecuted as they are in the North East.
However, the Tamils see collusion between the majority Sinhala polity and the Muslim leadership in denying them their "Traditional Homeland". The Sinhala majoritarian polity has a vested interest in breaking the unity of the North East. Indeed, the merger of the Northern and Eastern districts to form a predominantly Tamil North Eastern Province, brought about by the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, is opposed by both the Sinhalas and the Muslims. They want the merger to be annulled. This is a major point of conflict between the Tamils, on the one hand, and the Muslims and Sinhalas on the other. While, the demand for a unified Tamil Homeland in the North and East is a cardinal principle of the Tamil movement, its annulment is seen by the Muslims as a condition for their survival, and by the Sinhalas as a requirement to weaken the Tamils' separatist movement.
Peace process: LTTE says no to separate Muslim representation
When the war between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE formally ceased in February 2002 (with a Ceasefire Agreement and a MOU being signed) the Muslims, represented by the SLMC, wanted to open its own dialogue with the LTTE because the displaced Muslims had to go back to their homes, lands grabbed by the LTTE/Tamils had to be returned, and extortion and harassment had to be stopped. The LTTE was also keen to make up with the Muslims to consolidate its hold on the North East. In April 2002, LTTE Supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran and the SLMC chief Rauff Hakeem signed a MOU, which undertook to resolve most of the Muslim grievances. But significantly, the political demands were not mentioned.
As peace talks between the government and the LTTE were to start, the Muslims, led by the SLMC, demanded that they be deemed an independent third party at the talks. But the LTTE would not agree, saying that the peace talks were bi-partisan and that the Muslims could join only when their problems were taken up. Clearly, the LTTE did not want the Tamil political agenda to be diluted by the presence of the Muslims as a third political group.
The then Wickremesinghe government supported the Muslim demand, but eventually it persuaded the SLMC leader to accept a compromise, which was that he would attend the talks, although only as a member of the government delegation.
As it happened, the Muslim issue was not taken up in any significant manner in the six rounds of talks, which were held, till the LTTE walked out in 2003 complaining of lack of progress in material terms.
Demand for share in ISGA
In October-November 2003, the LTTE presented a proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) in the North Eastern province. But besides being very radical, it did not mention the Muslims as a special category deserving autonomy within the North East. Like the majority Sinhalas, the Muslims too totally rejected the ISGA proposal.
Meanwhile, the Prabhakaran-Hakeem MOU had become a dead letter. Grabbed Muslims lands in the East were not returned. Nor were there any guarantees given to displaced Muslims wanting to return to the Jaffna peninsula. But the Tamils said that the LTTE could not be held responsible for this. As TNA MP R Sampanthan put it, Jaffna peninsula had got back to government control, and therefore, it was the government, which should be held responsible for not re-settling the Muslims. "The government has not resettled the Tamils either," he pointed out.
Another TNA MP, Suresh Premachandran, said that the Muslim leaders were not serious about resettlement of the Muslim refugees or attending to their other problems, and that their main aim was only to secure places in power structures.
Deeply divided
Though the community's grievances were well known and every Muslim leader would voice it vociferously, there was no unity in action. The SLMC had split, and two factions of the party were in the government. More time was spent in in fighting than in upholding the common Muslim cause. The Muslim leaders based in the Sinhala areas and those with the mainstream Sinhala parties did not bother about the North Eastern Muslims, because the latter were with the SLMC and its splinter groups. All this only helped the LTTE get its way.
Aftermath of tsunami
When the tsunami hit the Sri Lankan coast in December 2004, the worst affected were the North Eastern coastline, especially, the largely Muslim South Eastern coastline. More Muslims died in the disaster. The community accounted for more property loss as compared to the Tamils or Sinhalas. But the Muslims did not ask for a Joint Mechanism with the government to do reconstruction work in their areas. As before, the Tamils, or rather the LTTE, took the initiative, and sought a Joint Mechanism with the government for reconstruction work in the North East, including the Muslim areas. The international community backed this scheme as it felt that this would be the best way to reach aid to LTTE-controlled areas and also to bring the LTTE into the mainstream and pave the way for the resumption of peace talks. The Kumaratunga government concurred.
The Muslims wanted to participate in the formulation of the Joint Mechanism and be a third signatory to it, but the LTTE objected, and the government and the Norwegian facilitators led them up the garden path. The structure that was finalised gave more power to the LTTE than to the Muslims. The power to sanction and to authorise spending was vested in a "Regional Committee" based in Kilinochchi, the LTTE's headquarters. In the Regional Committee, the LTTE was given the casting vote too. The LTTE felt that the safeguards contained in the structure for the minorities like the Muslims were enough. Clearly, the LTTE did not want its plan to dominate the North East diluted by a third party.
An angry SLMC declared that it would boycott the Joint Mechanism, forcing the others to do the same. Meanwhile, the Sinhala-majoritarian Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) challenged some of the provisions (largely unrelated to the Muslims) in the Supreme Court. The court virtually outlawed the Regional Committee.
The Joint Mechanism episode resulted in a stand off between the LTTE and the government/Sinhala nationalist parties, and also between the LTTE and the Muslim political parties. Now, the Colombo-based Council of Muslims of Sri Lanka wants armed security for the Muslims in the East. All Muslim groups want an annulment of the unification of the North and East. The LTTE, for its part, is organising a series of public rallies to demand a unified and "sovereign" Tamil Homeland embracing two thirds of the Sri Lankan coast and a third of the island's land mass.
By-passing parties, LTTE cultivates Muslim civil society
However, in spite of all this, the LTTE is keen on getting the Muslims on board its bandwagon. The Muslims ( who are about a third of the population in the East and who are now getting some international sympathy) are too big to be ignored forever. Since it sees the present political leaders of the Muslims as being in cahoots with the Sinhala majoritarian polity, and being mainly interested in ministerships and the loaves and fishes of office, the LTTE does not want to have anything to do with them. It wants to cultivate the non-political Muslims.
It has had meetings with religious leaders and mosque committee members. In the recent rally in Vavuniya to seek "sovereignty" for the Tamil Homeland, there were Muslim delegates from all the districts in the North and they spoke for Muslim-Tamil unity under the leadership of the LTTE.
"There is no problem at all between the Tamils and the Muslims in the North East. It is the Muslim leadership, which is misleading the Muslims and creating a rift with the Tamils. There is some confusion in Muslim minds about loss of some privileges. But these issues can be addressed," says R Sampanthan TNA MP.
But a Muslim-Tamil rapprochement is contingent on the continuation and consolidation of peace and the peace process. If the peace process gets stalled as a result of political and military developments, and if war breaks out, Muslim-Tamil relations will only get worse. The past will catch up to smother the present and the future.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/7752_14...04100180006.htm<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
