<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->16 May 2006
"Militancy in India's Northeast"
[From: Power & Interest News Report]
India's northeast is a geopolitically strategic region. It comprises
eight states -- Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura,
Mizoram, Meghalaya and Sikkim -- and is spread over a 262,179 square
kilometer (101,201 square miles) area. The eight states contain a
total population of 39 million. India's northeast connects with five
countries -- Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, China and Nepal -- by a
4,500 kilometer (2,796 miles) international border; the region,
however, connects to India only through a narrow and tenuous land
corridor measuring merely 22 kilometers (14 miles).
A fact that further jeopardizes mainland India's links with the region
is the thriving militancy in most of the northeast states. The demands
of the different militant groups range from autonomy within the
provisions of the Indian constitution to outright secession. Such
militant movements started early with India's independence in 1947. At
one point, more than 120 militant groups operated in India's
northeast. In recent years, the Indian government has had some success
in achieving stability in the region, using tactics from negotiations
to military operations to root out militants. Nevertheless, the region
remains a potential tinderbox.
Militants in India's northeast once enjoyed vast popular support since
they, in their formative years, voiced genuine grievances of the
people such as poor governance, alienation, lack of development and an
apathetic attitude from the central government in New Delhi; in recent
years, however, this influence has been reduced. Nevertheless, in most
of the states in the northeast, anti-government militants retain
significant nuisance value and often indulge in successful strikes
against government interests.
Militancy: An Early Beginning
Nagaland, then part of the larger state of Assam, was the first to
experience militancy. Long before the British left India, Nagas
considered themselves to be independent and petitioned the British to
declare them as an independent country. After being snubbed by both
the British and the new regime in New Delhi, Nagas, under the
leadership of the Naga National Council (N.N.C.), headed by A.Z.
Phizo, declared independence. In his declaration, Phizo argued that in
a plebiscite held in Nagaland in May 1951, more than 99 percent of
voters favored independence. The veracity of the plebiscite remains
debatable.
Subsequently, the N.N.C. split into different factions and its
breakaway faction, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(N.S.C.N.) also broke into two factions; those factions were the
Isak-Muivah faction (N.S.C.N.-I.M.) and the Khaplang faction
(N.S.C.N.-K.). These organizations have continued separate violent
struggles for Nagaland's independence.
Similarly, in Mizoram, which was a part of the state of Assam before
it was granted statehood in 1987, experienced militancy after the
Union government failed to respond positively to its demand for
assistance during the massive "Mautam famine." The Mizo National Front
(M.N.F.), led by the legendary leader Laldenga, launched the movement
on February 28, 1966 and demanded independence for Mizoram.
In Tripura, the smallest of the northeastern states, migration of
Hindus from the British-ruled East Bengal, which subsequently became
East Pakistan and then Bangladesh, is believed to have been
responsible for reducing the indigenous tribal people in the state to
minority status; this development sparked a violent backlash among the
indigenous people. Starting in 1970, militant groups sprang up in the
state demanding the restoration of the tribal rights from the Bengali
population, who are accused of dominating the political and economic
affairs of Tripura state.
Migration from Bangladesh, a fact that is refuted by that country, was
the source of militancy in the state of Assam as well. A movement that
started demanding the deportation of the illegal migrants also
witnessed the birth of the militant outfit the United Liberation Front
of Asom (U.L.F.A.) in 1979. Following U.L.F.A.'s example, a number of
militant groups, each claiming to represent the aspirations of
different tribal communities in the state, formed. Prominent among
these groups are the Bodo Liberation Tigers, the National Democratic
Front of Bodoland (N.D.F.B.), the United People's Democratic
Solidarity (U.P.D.S.) and the Dima Halim Daogah.
In the state of Manipur, militancy originated in protest against the
forcible merger of the former Manipur Kingdom with India. In 1964, the
United National Liberation Front formed with an avowed objective of
ending the discrimination against Manipur, which was accorded
statehood only in 1972 nearly 23 years after its merger. Subsequently,
a number of militant organizations have formed with each representing
the cause of different tribes, sometimes more than one outfit
espousing the same cause.
Transformation of Militancy
Analysts indicate that most of the militant outfits in the region have
been quick to transform themselves into purely terrorist entities,
bereft of their original objectives and ideology. For example,
U.L.F.A. in Assam, which originated as a reaction to Bangladeshi
migration into the state, has found shelter in Bangladesh and through
a publication in the 1990s has repudiated its earlier anti-Bangladeshi
position. Militant outfits in Tripura, the National Liberation Front
of Tripura (N.L.F.T.) and the All Tripura Tiger Force espousing the
tribal cause have indulged in a number of attacks on the tribal
population. Militant groups in certain states also have clashed among
themselves. For example, in Nagaland, most fatalities are recorded as
a result of the infighting between the two factions of the N.S.C.N.,
rather than from government forces.
With small arms being easily available in the region and the
neighboring countries, capabilities of even relatively smaller groups
to challenge state authority have dramatically grown over the years.
As a result, militant groups have successfully transformed themselves
into huge abduction and extortion rackets collecting regular
contributions from the public, government servants and the business
houses. With little protection available from the state government,
people have often found it convenient to bribe the militant groups for
peace, rather than risk death and abduction.
Military Operations
Security force operations using the army, state police forces and the
paramilitary forces remain the preferred mode of official response to
contain militancy. A strong military presence has been the feature of
all the militancy-affected states in the region. The Union government,
as a matter of policy, reimburses security-related expenditure
incurred by the states. It also has an ongoing program for the
modernization of the state police forces that sometimes possess
weapons of lesser sophistication than the militants. Interestingly, in
all of the northeastern states, the ratio of policemen per 10,000
people is far above the national average.
Military operations in Mizoram, where the army reportedly launched air
strikes to neutralize the M.N.F. cadres, resulted in several
fatalities and displacement among the civilian population. Military
operations in Nagaland, too, resulted in civilian fatalities and
large-scale displacement. In Assam, in the beginning of the 1990s, two
military operations, Operation Rhino and Operation Bajrang, were
launched against U.L.F.A. militants. These forced U.L.F.A. to move out
of the state and locate itself in areas outside the country. However,
such operations have not been able to post conclusive gains against
militancy in any of the states. In states like Manipur, militants have
been able to carve out vast stretches of "liberated zones" where only
their laws and dictates hold sway.
Dialogue for Peace
While military operations have achieved only limited results, it is
the dialogue for peace with the militant outfits that has brought some
order to the northeastern region. Dialogue with the M.N.F. remains the
only example of the culmination of a successful peace process that
ended militancy in Mizoram in 1986. Experiences such as the Mizo Peace
Accord, however, have not been replicated. Other peace deals such as
the Shillong Accord in 1975 with the N.N.C. in Nagaland, the 1988
agreement with the Tripura National Volunteers in Tripura, the
Bodoland Autonomous Council agreement of 1993 with the Bodo militants
in Assam have all fallen through as new factions, dissatisfied with
the terms of the agreement, have resumed hostilities under new
leaderships.
At present, the Union government has ongoing ceasefire agreements with
six militant groups in different states. The oldest one with the
N.S.C.N.-I.M. dates back to July 25, 1997 and the other one with its
rival outfit the N.S.C.N.-K. has lasted since April 28, 2001. In
Assam, the following organizations have ceasefire agreements with the
government: U.P.D.S. since January 1, 2004, the U.P.D.S. since May 23,
2002 and the N.D.F.B. since May 25, 2005. Similarly, in the state of
Meghalaya, the Achik National Volunteer Council has had a ceasefire
agreement with the government since July 23, 2004. U.L.F.A. in Assam
in 2005, too, has appointed a People's Consultative Group to prepare
the groundwork for eventual dialogue with the government.
Whereas ceasefire agreements with different groups have led to a
reduction in the militancy-related fatalities in their respective
states, the Union government has not been able to carve out a road map
toward a situation of permanent agreement. In many cases, the process
of dialogue is yet to formally start with the outfits. Militant
groups, on the other hand, have taken advantage of the protracted
peace processes and continued with their activities such as extortion
and abduction with impunity. In Nagaland, fratricidal clashes between
militant groups have remained a major issue of concern. In Assam, even
after its moves for peace, U.L.F.A. continues to indulge in sporadic
acts of violence.
Foreign Hand
Although most militant outfits have originated within their respective
states and have operated with relative ease in their homelands, the
Indian government has accused neighboring Bangladesh and Pakistan of
promoting insurgency in the region. The Border Security Force -- the
paramilitary force guarding India's borders -- has furnished the
details of the militant camps that function in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi
authorities have refuted Indian claims and have refused permission for
a joint operation by forces of both countries against such camps.
Similarly, Pakistan, through its intelligence agency the I.S.I., is
believed to have assisted the militant groups in terms of training and
finance. Photographic evidence, passports seized from the arrested
militants and the confessional statements by the arrested and
surrendered militants has been provided as evidence behind the Indian
claim. Pakistan, however, refutes such claims.
China, too, is believed to have provided some assistance to groups
such as the N.S.C.N. in the 1980s. The militant leaders have on record
confessed to have traveled to China and secured help for their
movements. However, such a nexus, if any, does not exist today.
Besides, militant camps in Nagaland as well as Manipur militant groups
exist in the bordering areas of Myanmar. Outfits like U.L.F.A. and the
N.D.F.B. have reportedly used the facilities. The Myanmar army,
starting from mid-1990s, launched several operations against the
organizations, although successes in such operations have been
temporary. Militant groups reestablish their camps after the army
withdraws.
Bhutan remains the only country that successfully dislodged several
militant camps of the northeastern groups through a military operation
launched in December 2003. A number of cadres of U.L.F.A., N.D.F.B.
and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization, an outfit operating in the
North Bengal area, stationed in the country since the early 1990s,
were either arrested or were forced to flee following the operation
launched after several reminders by the Bhutanese authorities failed
to force the militants exit.
Costs of Militancy
No estimates exist regarding the fatalities in militancy-related
violence during the pre-1992 period in the northeast. According to the
Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, between 1992 and 2005 over 15,600
fatalities have been reported from each of these states, though the
actual number is believed to be much more. Civilians account for more
than 50 percent of the total fatalities.
Apart from the body count, the development of the region has been a
sheer casualty of the raging militancy. Recently, on April 23, 2006,
the chief minister of Manipur said that all development projects have
been stalled due to interference by militant groups. He said,
"Militants are extorting money from each and every one, including
barbers, small-time traders and low-ranking government employees. This
has become unbearable for the people." Prevalence of militancy ensures
that a large chunk of the development fund passes on to the coffers of
the militant organizations. In the oil-rich Assam, militants have
periodically targeted oil and gas pipelines for sabotage, alleging
that India is exploiting the natural resources of the state. In
Tripura, national projects -- such as the extension of the rail lines
-- have either been stalled or have moved with a tardy pace after
militants attacked the construction sites and abducted workers.
Militancy has also stalled the prospect of linking the economy of the
northeast with the neighboring Southeast Asian countries.
Tourism, which could have flourished in the scenic northeast, has
suffered. Although no foreign tourist has been abducted by the
militants, an atmosphere of fear and trepidation has prevented
national as well as international tourists from choosing the region as
their destination. The education sector too has been affected by
militancy. A number of schools in states like Tripura's interior areas
have been shut as teachers avoid the areas due to fear of militant
strikes. Extortion by the militant groups on the national highways
that connect the different states with mainland India has shot up the
prices of essential commodities. Trucks and buses have been burned and
destroyed for non-payment of "taxes."
The Way Forward
In 2005, with 410 militancy-related deaths, Manipur was the second
most violent state in the country behind Jammu and Kashmir. Still,
neither Manipur, nor the northeast, has figured prominently in the
policymaking of the national leaders. For instance, fencing the 4,095
kilometer (2,545 miles) long Indo-Bangladesh border, pitted as the
solution to the problems of cross-border militancy as well as illegal
migration, has progressed at a tardy pace.
While the government's military options have achieved only minimal
results, lack of development continues to alienate the people of the
region further from the mainstream. The region has also received
little attention from either the national or the international media.
Achievements by a separate ministry created by the Indian government
for the development of the region remain minimal. With the current
trend, the region is expected to remain volatile for the foreseeable
future.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_rep...9&language_id=1
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