Why Was There No Tranfer Of Population?

[G.Subramaniam]

PROLOGUE
It can rightly be said that the long introduction with which this treatise opens leaves no excuse for a prologue. But there is an epilogue which is affixed to the treatise. Having done that, I thought of prefixing a prologue, firstly, because an epilogue needs to be balanced by a prologue, and secondly, because the prologue gives me room to state in a few words the origin of this treatise to those who may be curious to know it and to impress upon the readers the importance of the issues raised in it. For the satisfaction of the curious it may be stated that there exists, at any rate in the Bombay Presidency, a political organization called the Independent Labour Party (abbreviated into I.L.P.) for the last three years. It is not an ancient, hoary organization which can claim to have grown grey in politics. The I.L.P. is not in its dotage and is not overtaken by senility, for which second childhood is given as a more agreeable name. Compared with other political organizations, the I.L.P. is a young and fairly active body, not subservient to any clique or interest. Immediately after the passing of the Lahore Resolution on Pakistan by the Muslim League, the Executive Council of the I.L.P. met to consider what attitude it should adopt towards this project of Pakistan. The Executive Council could see that there was underlying Pakistan an idea to which no objection could be taken. Indeed, the
Council was attracted to the scheme of Pakistan inasmuch as it meant the creation of ethnic states as a solution of the communal problem. The Council, however, did not feel competent to pronounce at that stage a decided opinion on the issue of Pakistan. The Council, therefore, resolved to appoint a committee to study the question and make a report on it. The committee consisted of my self as the Chairman, and Principal M. V. Donde, B.A.; Mr. S. C. Joshi, M.A.,LL.B., Advocate (O.S.), M.L.C.;Mr.R.R.Bhole,B.Sc., LL.B.,. m.l.a.i Mr. D. G. Jadhav, B.A., LL.B., M.L.A., and Mr. A. V. Chitre, B.A., M.L.A., all belonging to the I.L.P., as members of the committee. Mr. D. V. Pradhan, Member, Bombay Municipal Corporation, acted as Secretary to the committee. The committee asked me to prepare a report on Pakistan which I did. The same was submitted to the Executive Council of the I.L.P., which resolved that the report should be published. The treatise now published is that report.
The book is intended to assist the student of Pakistan to come to his own conclusion. With that object in view, I have not only assembled in this volume all the necessary and relevant data but have also added 14 appendices and 3 maps, which in my judgement, form an important accompaniment to the book.
It is not enough for the reader to go over the material collected in the following pages. He must also reflect over it. Let him take to heart the warning which Carlyle gave to Englishmen of his generation.
He said: "The Genius of England no longer soars Sunward, world-defiant, like an Eagle through the storms, ' mewing her mighty youth,'.......... . . . . . . the Genius of England—much like a greedy Ostrich intent on provender and a whole skin ..........; with its Ostrich-head stuck into ...... whatever sheltering Fallacy there may be, and so awaits the issue. The issue has been slow; but it now seems to have been inevitable. No Ostrich, intent on gross terrene provender and sticking its head into Fallacies, but will be awakened one day—in a terrible a posteriori manner if not otherwise! Awake before it comes to that. Gods and men did us awake! The Voices of our Fathers, with thousand fold stern monition to one and all, bid us awake".
This warning, I am convinced, applies to Indians in their present circumstances as it once did to Englishmen, and Indians, if they pay no heed to it, will do so at their peril. Now, a word for those who have helped me in the preparation of this report. Mr. M. G. Tipnis, D.C.E., (Kalabhuwan, Baroda), and Mr. Chhaganlal S. Modyhave rendered me great assistance, the former in preparing the maps and the latter in typing the manuscript. I wish to express my gratitude to both for their work which they have done purely as a labour of love. Thanks are also due in a special measure to my friends Mr. B. R. Kadrekar and Mr. K. V. Chitre for their labours in
undertaking the most uninteresting and dull task of correcting the proof sand supervising the printing.
28th December, 1940,
'Rajagrah B.R. AMBEDKAR. Dadar, Bombay,

[G.Subramaniam]

INTRODUCTION
The Muslim Leagued Resolution on Pakistan has called forth different reactions. There are some who look upon it as a case of political measles to which a people in the infancy of their conscious unity and power are very liable. Others have taken it as a permanent frame of the Muslim mind and not merely a passing phase and have in consequence been greatly perturbed. The question is undoubtedly controversial. The issue is vital and there is no argument which has not been used in the controversy by one side to silence the other. Some argue that this demand for partitioning India into two political entities under separate national states staggers their imagination ; others are so choked with a sense of righteous indignation at this wanton attempt to break the unity of a country, which, it is claimed, has stood as one for centuries, that their rage prevents them from giving expression to their thoughts. Others think that it need not be taken seriously. They treat it as a trifle and try to destroy it by shooting into it similes and metaphors. " You don't cut your head to cure your headache," " you don't cut a baby into two because two women are engaged in fighting out a claim as to who its mother is," are some of the analogies which are used to prove the absurdity of Pakistan. In a controversy carried on the plane of pure sentiment, there is nothing surprising if a
dispassionate student finds more stupefaction and less understanding, more heat and less light, more ridicule and less seriousness. My position in this behalf is definite, if not singular. I do not think the demand for Pakistan is the result of mere political distemper, which will pass away with the efflux of time. As I read the situation, it seems to me that it is a characteristic in the biological sense of the term, which the Muslim body politic has developed in the same manner as an organism develops a characteristic. Whether it will survive or not, in the process of natural selection, must depend upon the forces that may become operative in the struggle for existence between Hindus and Musalmans. I am not staggered by
Pakistan; I am not indignant about it ; nor do I believe that it can be smashed by shooting into it similes and metaphors. Those who believe in shooting it by similes should remember that nonsense does not cease to be nonsense because it is put in. rhyme, and that a metaphor is no argument though it be sometimes the gunpowder to drive one home and imbed it in memory. I believe that it would be neither wise nor possible to reject summarily a scheme if it has behind it the sentiment, if not the passionate support, of 90 p.c. Muslims of India. I have no doubt that the only proper attitude to Pakistan is to study it in all its aspects, to understand its implications and to form an intelligent judgement about it. With all this, a reader is sure to ask : Is this book on Pakistan seasonable in the sense that one must read it, as one must eat the fruits of the season to keep oneself in health ? If it is seasonable, is it readable ? These are natural queries and an author, whose object is to attract readers, may well make use of the introduction to meet them. As to the seasonableness of the book there can be no doubt. The way of looking at India by Indians themselves must be admitted to have undergone a complete change during the last 20 years.
Referring to India Prof. Arnold Toynbee wrote in 1915—
" British statesmanship in the nineteenth century regarded India as a 'Sleeping Beauty,' whom Britain had a prescriptive right to woo when she awoke; so it hedged with thorns the garden where she lay, to safeguard her from marauders prowling in the desert without Now the princess is awake, and is claiming the right to dispose of her own hand, while the marauders have transformed themselves into respectable gentlemen diligently occupied in turning the desert into a garden too, but grievously impeded by the British thorn-hedge. When they politely request us to remove it, we shall do well to consent, for they will not make the demand till they feel themselves strong enough to enforce it, and in the tussle that will follow if we refuse, the sympathies of the Indian princess will not be on our side. now that she is awake, she wishes to walk abroad among her neighbours; she feels herself capable of rebuffing without our countenance any blandishments or threats they may offer her, and she is becoming as weary as they of the thorn-hedge that confines her to her garden. "If we treat her with tact, India will never wish to secede from the spiritual brotherhood of the British Empire, but it is inevitable that she should lead a more and more independent life of her own, and follow the example of Anglo-Saxon Commowealths by establishing direct relations with her
neighbours........" Although the writer is an Englishman, the view expressed by him in 1915 was the view commonly held by all Indians irrespective of caste or creed. Now that India the " Sleeping Beauty " of Prof. Toynbee is awake, what is the view of the Indians about her ? On this question, there can be no manner of doubt that those who have observed this Sleeping Beauty behave in recent years, feel she is a strange being quite different from the angelic princess that she was supposed to be. She is a mad maiden having a dual personality, half human, half animal, always in convulsions because of her two natures in perpetual conflict. If there is any doubt about her dual personality, it has now been dispelled by the Resolution of the Muslim League demanding the cutting up of India into two, Pakistan and Hindustan, so that these conflicts and convulsions due to a dual personality having
been bound in one may cease forever, and so freed from each other, may dwell in separate homes congenial to their respective cultures, Hindu and Muslim. It is beyond question that Pakistan is a scheme which will have to be taken into account. The Muslims will insist upon the scheme being considered. The British will insist upon some kind of settlement being reached between the Hindus and the Muslims before they consent to any devolution of political power. There is no use blaming the British for insisting upon such a settlement as a condition precedent to the transfer of power. The British cannot consent to settle power upon an aggressive Hindu majority and make it its heir, leaving it to deal with the minorities at its sweet pleasure. That would not be ending imperialism. It would be creating another imperialism. The Hindus, therefore, cannot avoid coming to grips with Pakistan, much as they would like to do.
If the scheme of Pakistan has to be considered, and there is no escape from it, then there are certain points which must be borne in mind. The first point to note is that the Hindus and Muslims must decide the question themselves. They cannot invoke the aid of anyone else. Certainly, they cannot expect the British to decide it for them. From the point of view of the Empire, it matters very little to the British whether India remains one undivided whole, or is partitioned into two parts, Pakistan and Hindustan, or into twenty linguistic fragments as planned by the Congress, so long as all of them are content to live within the Empire. The British need not interfere for the simple reason that they are not affected by such territorial divisions.
Further, if the Hindus are hoping that the British will use force to put down Pakistan, that is impossible. In the first place, coercion is no remedy. The futility of force and resistance was pointed out by Burke long ago in his speeches relating to the coercion of the American colonies. His memorable words may be quoted not only for the benefit of the Hindu Maha Sabha but also for the benefit of all. This is what he said: " The use of force alone is temporary. It may endure a moment but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again : a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered. The next objection to force is its uncertainty. Terror is not always the effect of force, and an armament is not a victory. If you do not succeed you are without resource; for conciliation failing, force remains; but
force failing, no further hope of reconciliation is left. Power and Authority are sometimes bought by kindness, but they can never be begged as alms by an impoverished and defeated violence. A further objection to force is that you impair the object by your very endeavours to preserve it. The thing you fought for (to wit the loyalty of the people) is not the thing you recover, but depreciated, sunk, wasted and consumed in the contest." Coercion, as an alternative to Pakistan, is therefore unthinkable. Again, the Muslims cannot be deprived of the benefit of the principle of self-determination. The Hindu Nationalists who rely on self-determination and ask how Britain can refuse India what the conscience of the world has conceded to the smallest of the European nations, cannot in the same
breath ask the British to deny it to other minorities. The Hindu Nationalist who hopes that Britain will coerce the Muslims into abandoning Pakistan, forgets that the right of nationalism to freedom from an aggressive foreign imperialism and the right of a minority to freedom from an aggressive majority's nationalism are not two different things; nor does the former stand on a more sacred footing than the latter. They are merely two aspects of the struggle for freedom and as such equal in their moral import. Nationalists, fighting for freedom from aggressive imperialism, cannot well ask the help of the British imperialists to thwart the right of a minority to freedom from the nationalism of an aggressive majority. The matter must, therefore, be decided upon by the Muslims and the Hindus
alone. The British cannot decide the issue for them. This is the first important point to note. The essence of Pakistan is the opposition to the establishment of one Central Government having supremacy over the whole of India. Pakistan contemplates two Central Governments, one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan. This gives rise to the second important point which Indians must take note of. That point is that the issue of Pakistan shall have to be decided upon before the plans for a new constitution are drawn and its foundations are laid. If there is to be one Central Government for India, the design of the constitutional structure would be different from what it would be if there is to be one Central Government for Hindustan and another for Pakistan. That being so, it will be most unwise to postpone the decision. Either the scheme should be abandoned and another substituted by mutual agreement or it should be decided upon. It will be the greatest folly to suppose that if Pakistan is buried for the moment, it will never raise its head again. I am sure, burying Pakistan is not the same thing as burying the ghost of Pakistan. So long as the hostility to one Central Government for India, which is the ideology underlying Pakistan, persists, the ghost of Pakistan will be there, casting its ominous shadow upon the political future of India. Neither will it be prudent to make some kind of a make-shift arrangement for the time being, leaving the permanent solution to some future day. To do so would be something like curing the symptoms without removing the disease. But, as often happens in such cases, the disease is driven in, thereby making certain its recurrence, perhaps in a more virulent form. I feel certain that whether India should have one Central Government is not a matter which can betaken as settled; it is a matter in issue and although it may not be a live issue now, some day it will be. The Muslims have openly declared that they do not want to have any Central Government in India and they have given their reasons in the most unambiguous terms. They have succeeded in bringing into being five provinces which are predominantly Muslim in population. In these provinces, they see the possibility of the Muslims forming a government and they are anxious to see that the independence of the Muslim Governments in these provinces is preserved. Actuated by these considerations, the Central Government is an eyesore to the Muslims of India. As they visualize the scene, they see their Muslim Provinces made subject to a Central Government predominantly Hindu and endowed with powers of supervision over, and even of interference in, the administration of these Muslim Provinces. The Muslims feel that to accept one Central Government for the whole of India is to consent to place the Muslim Provincial Governments under a Hindu Central Government and to see the gain secured by the creation of Muslim Provinces lost by subjecting them to a Hindu Government at the Centre. The Muslim way of escape from this tyranny of a Hindu Centre is to have no Central Government in India at all.*[f3]

[G.Subramaniam]

Are the Musalmans alone opposed to the existence of a Central Government ? What about the Hindus ? There seems to be a silent premise underlying all political discussions that are going on among the Hindus that there will always be in India a Central Government as a permanent part of her political constitution. How far such a premise can be taken for granted is more than I can say. I may, however, point out that there are two factors which are dormant for the present but which some
day may become dominant and turn the Hindus away from the idea of a Central Government. The first is the cultural antipathy between the Hindu Provinces. The Hindu Provinces are by no means a happy family. It cannot be pretended that the Sikhs have any tenderness for the Bengalees or the Rajputs or the Madrasis. The Bengalee loves only himself. The Madrasi is.bound by his own world. As to the Mahratta, who does not recall that the Mahrattas, who set out to destroy the Muslim
Empire in India, became a menace to the rest of the Hindus whom they harassed and kept under their yoke for nearly a century. The Hindu Provinces have no common traditions and no interests to bind them. On the other hand, the differences of language, race, and the conflicts of the past have been the most powerful forces tending to divide them. It is true that the Hindus are getting together and the spirit moving them to become one united nation is working on them. But it must not be forgotten that they have not yet become a nation. They are in the process of becoming a nation and before the process is completed, there may be a setback which may destroy the work of a whole century.
In the second place, there is the financial factor. It is not sufficiently known what it costs the people of India to maintain the Central Government and the proportionate burden each Province has to bear.
The total revenue of British India comes to Rs. 194,64,17,926 per annum. Of this sum, the amount raised by the Provincial Governments from provincial sources, comes annually to Rs. 73,57,50,125 and that raised by the Central Government from central sources of revenue comes to Rs. 121,06,67,801. This will show what the Central Government costs the people of India. When one considers that the Central Government is concerned only with maintaining peace and does not discharge any functions which have relation to the progress of the people, it should cause no surprise if people begin to ask whether it is necessary that they should pay annually such an enormous price to purchase peace. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the people in the provinces are literally starving and there is no source left to the provinces to increase their revenue.
This burden of maintaining the Central Government, which the people of India have to bear, is most unevenly distributed over the different provinces. The sources of central revenues are (1) Customs, (2) Excise, (3) Salt, (4) Currency, (5) Posts and Telegraphs, (6) Income Tax and (7) Railways. It is not possible from the accounts published by the Government of India to work out the distribution of
the three sources of central revenue, namely Currency, Posts and Telegraphs and Railways. Only the revenue raised from other sources can be worked out province by province. The result-is shown in the following table :—
Revenue raised by Revenue raised by
Provinces Provincial Central
Government from Government from
provincial sources central sources
Rs. Rs.
1 Madras 16,13,44,520 9,53,26,745
2 Bombay 12,44,59,553 22,53,44,247
3 Bengal 12,76,60,892 23,79,01,583
4 U.P. 12,79,99,851 4,05,53,030
5 Bihar 5,23,83,030 1,54,37,742
6 C. P. & Berar 4,27,41,280 31,42,682
7 Assam 2,58,48,474 1,87,55,967
8 Orissa 1,81,99,823 5,67,346
9 Punjab 11,35,86,355 1,18,01,385
10 N.W.F.P. 1,80,83,548 9,28,294
11 Sind 3,70,29,354 5,66,46,915
It will be seen from this table that the burden of maintaining the Central Government is not only heavy but falls unequally upon the different provinces. The Bombay Provincial Government raises Rs. 12,44,59,553; as against this, the Central Government raises Rs. 22,53,44,247 from Bombay. The Bengal Government raises Rs. 12,76,60,892; as against this, the Central Government raises Rs. 23,79,01,583 from Bengal. The Sind Government raises Rs. 3,70,29,354; as against this, the Central Government raises Rs. 5,66,46,915 from Sind. The Assam Government raises nearly Rs. 2 1/2 crores; but the Central Government raises nearly Rs. 2 crores from Assam. While such is the burden of the Central Government on these provinces, the rest of the provinces contribute next to nothing to the Central Government. The Punjab raises Rs. 11 crores for itself but contributes only Rs. 1 crore to the Central Government. In the N.W.F.P. the provincial revenue is Rs. 1,80,83,548; its total contribution to the Central Government however is only Rs. 9,28,294. U.P. raises Rs. 13 crores
but contributes only Rs. 4 crores to the Centre. Bihar collects Rs. 5 crores for itself; she gives only 1 1/2 crores to the Centre. CJP. and Berar levy a total of 4 crores and pay to the Centre 31 lakhs.
This financial factor has so far passed without notice. But time may come when even to the Hindus, who are the strongest supporters of a Central Government in India, the financial considerations may make a greater appeal than what purely patriotic considerations do now. So, it is possible that some day the Muslims, for communal considerations, and the Hindus, for financial considerations, may
join hands to abolish the Central Government. If this were to happen, it is better if it happens before the foundation of a new constitution is laid down. If it happens after the foundation of the new constitution envisaging one Central Government
were laid down, it would be the greatest disaster. Out of the general wreck, not only India as an entity will vanish, but it will not be possible to save even the Hindu unity. As I have pointed out, there is not much cement even among the Hindu Provinces, and once that little cement which exists is lost, there will be nothing with which to build up even the unity of the Hindu Provinces. It is because of this that Indians must decide, before preparing the plans and laying the foundations, for whom the constitutional structure is to be raised and whether it is temporary or permanent. After the structure is built as one whole, on one single foundation, with girders running through from one end to the other; if, thereafter, a part is to be severed from the rest, the knocking out of the rivets will shake the whole building and produce cracks in other parts of the structure which are intended to remain as
one whole. The danger of cracks is greater, if the cement which binds them is, as in the case of India, of a poor quality. If the new constitution is designed for India as one whole and a structure is raised on that basis, and thereafter the question of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan is raised and the Hindus have to yield, the alterations that may become necessary to give effect to this severance may bring about the collapse of the whole structure. The desire of the Muslim Provinces may easily infect the Hindu Provinces and the spirit of disruption generated by the Muslim Provinces may cause all round disintegration. History is not wanting in instances of constitutions threatened with disruption. There is the instance of the Southern States of the American Union. Natal has always been anxious to get out from the Union of South Africa and Western Australia recently applied, though unsuccessfully, to secede from the Australian Commonwealth.
In these cases actual disruption has not taken place and where it did, it was soon healed. Indians, however, cannot hope to be so fortunate. Theirs may be the fate of Czechoslovakia. In the first place, it would be futile to entertain the hope that if a disruption of the Indian constitution took place by the Muslim Provinces separating from the Hindu Provinces, it would be possible to win back the seceding provinces as was done in the U.S.A. after the Civil War. Secondly, if the new Indian constitution is a Dominion Constitution, even the British may find themselves powerless to save the constitution from such a disruption, if it takes place after its foundations are laid. It seems to be, therefore, imperative that the issue of Pakistan should be decided upon before the new constitution is devised. If there can be no doubt that Pakistan is a scheme which Indians will have to resolve upon at the next revision of the constitution and if there is no escape from deciding upon it, then it would be a fatal mistake for the people to approach it without a proper understanding of the question. The ignorance of some of the Indian delegates to the Round Table Conference of constitutional law, I remember, led Mr. Garvin of the Observer to remark that it would have been much better if the
Simon Commission, instead of writing a report on India, had made a report on constitutional problems of India and how they were met by the constitutions of the different countries of the world. Such a report I know was prepared for the use of the delegates who framed the constitution of South Africa. This is an attempt to make good that deficiency and as such I believe it will be welcomed as a
seasonable piece. So much for the question whether the book is seasonable. As to the second question, whether the book is readable no writer can forget the words of Augustine Birrell when he said: " Cooks, warriors, and authors must be judged by the effects they produce; toothsome dishes, glorious victories, pleasant books, these are our demands. We have nothing to do with ingredients, tactics, or methods. We have no desire to be admitted into the kitchen, the council, or the study. The cook may use her saucepans how she pleases, the warrior place his men as he likes, the author handle his material or weave his plot as best he can; when the dish is served we only ask. Is it good ?; when the battle has been fought. Who won ? ; when the book comes out. Does it read ? " Authors ought not to be above being reminded that it is their first duty to write agreeably. Some
very disagreeable men have succeeded in doing so, and there is, therefore, no need for anyone to despair. Every author, be he grave or gay, should try to make his book as ingratiating as possible. Reading is not a duty, and has consequently no business to be made disagreeable. Nobody is under any obligation to read any other man's book." I am fully aware of this. But I am not worried about it. That may well apply to other books but not to a book on Pakistan. Every Indian must read a book on Pakistan, if not this, then some other, if he wants to help his country to steer a clear path.
If any book does not read well, i.e., its taste be not good, the reader will find two things in it which, I am sure, are good. The first thing he will find is that the ingredients are good. There is in the book material which will be helpful and to gain access to which he will have to labour a great deal. Indeed, the reader will find that the book contains an epitome of India's political and social history during the last twenty years, which it is necessary for every Indian to know.
The second thing he will find is that there is no partisanship. The aim is to expound the scheme of Pakistan in all its aspects and not to advocate it. The aim is to explain and not to convert. It would, however, be a pretence to say that I have no views on Pakistan. Views I have. Some of them are expressed, others may have to be gathered. Two things, however, may well be said about my views.
In the first place, wherever they are expressed, they have been reasoned out. Secondly, whatever the views, they have certainly not the fixity of a popular prejudice. They are really thoughts and not views. In other words, I have an open mind, though not an empty mind. A person with an open mind is always the subject of congratulations. While this may be so, it must, at the same time, be realized that an open mind may also be an empty mind and that such an open mind, if it is a happy condition, is also a very dangerous condition for a man to be in. A disaster may easily overtake a man with an empty mind. Such a person is like a ship without ballast and without a rudder. It can have no direction. It may float but may also suffer a shipwreck against a rock for want of direction. While
aiming to help the reader by placing before him all the material, relevant and important, the reader will find that I have not sought to impose my views on him. I have placed before him both sides of the question and have left him to form his own opinion. The reader may complain that I have been provocative in stating the relevant facts. I am conscious that .such a charge may be levelled against me. I apologize freely and gladly for the same. My excuse is that I have no intention to hurt. I had only one purpose, that is, to force the attention of the indifferent and casual reader to the issue that is dealt with in the book. I ask the reader to put aside any irritation that he may feel with me and concentrate his thoughts on this tremendous issue : Which is to be, Pakistan or no Pakistan ?

[G.Subramaniam]

PART I
[f1] * In the first edition there unfortunately occurred through oversight in proof correction a
discrepancy between the population figures in the different districts of Bengal and the map showing
the lay-out of Pakistan as applied to Bengal which had resulted in two districts which should have
been included in the Pakistan area being excluded from it. In this edition, this error has been
rectified and the map and the figures have been brought into conformity.
[f2] * The Crisis of (he National State (1943), p. 4.
[f3] * This point of view was put forth by Sir Muhammad lqbal at the Third Round Table Conference.
PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
_________________________________________________________________
Contents
PART 1 : MUSLIM CASE FOR PAKISTAN
Chapter I : What does the league demand ?
Chapter II : A nation calling for a home
Chapter III : Escape from degradation

[G.Subramaniam]

PART 1 : MUSLIM CASE FOR PAKISTAN
The Muslim Case for Pakistan is sought to be justified on the following grounds:—
(i) What the Muslims are asking for is the creation of administrative areas which are ethnically more homogeneous.
(ii) The Muslims want these homogeneous administrative areas which are predominantly Muslim to be constituted into separate States,
(a) because the Muslims by themselves constitute a separate nation and desire to have a national home, and
(B) because experience shows that the Hindus want to use their majority to treat the Muslims as though they were
second-class citizens in an alien State.
This part is devoted to the exposition of these grounds.
CHAPTER I
WHAT DOES THE LEAGUE DEMAND ?
I
On the 26th of March 1940, Hindu India was startled to attention as it had never been before. On that day, the Muslim League at its Lahore Session passed the following Resolution :—
" 1. While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939 and 3rd of February 1940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the Scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India;
" 2. It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in as far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims, unless it is framed with their
approval and consent;
" 3. Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designated on the following basic principle, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign;
" 4. That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights, and interests in consultation with them ; and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights, and interests in consultation with them ;
" 5. This Session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a Scheme of Constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption Finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communication, customs, and such other matters as may be necessary."
What does this Resolution contemplate ? A reference to para 3 of the Resolution will show that the Resolution contemplates that the areas in which Muslims predominate shall be incorporated into independent States. In concrete terms, it means that the Punjab, the North-Western Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind in the North-West and Bengal in the East instead of remaining as the provinces of British India shall be incorporated as independent States outside of British India. This is the sum and substance of the Resolution of the Muslim League.
Does the Resolution contemplate that these Muslim provinces, after being incorporated into States, will remain each an independent sovereign State or will they be joined together into one constitution as members of a single State,
federal or unitary ? On this point, the Resolution is rather ambiguous, if not self-contradictory. It speaks of grouping the zones into " Independent States in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign." The use of the term " Constituent Units " indicates that what is contemplated is a Federation. If that is so, then, the use of the word " sovereign " as an attribute of the Units is out of place. Federation of Units and sovereignty-of Units are contradictions. It may be that what is contemplated is a confederation. It is, however, not very material for the
moment whether these Independent States are to form into a federation or a confederation. What is important is the basic demand, namely, that these areas are to be separated from India and formed into Independent States.
The Resolution is so worded as to give the idea that the scheme adumbrated in it is a new one. But, there can be no doubt that the Resolution merely resuscitates a scheme which was put forth by Sir Mahomed Iqbal in his Presidential address to the Muslim League at its Annual Session held at Lucknow in December 1930. The scheme was not then adopted by the League. It was, however, taken up by one Mr. Rehmat Ali who gave it the name, Pakistan, by which it is known. Mr. Rehmat Ali, M. A., LL.B., founded the Pakistan Movement in 1933. He divided India into two, namely, Pakistan and Hindustan. His Pakistan included the Punjab, N. W. F. Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. The rest to him was Hindustan. His idea was to have an " independent and separate Pakistan "
composed of five Muslim provinces in the North as an independent State. The proposal was circulated to the members of the Round Table Conference but never officially put forth. It seems an attempt was made privately to obtain the assent of the British Government, who, however, declined to consider it because they thought that this was a " revival of the old Muslim Empire." 1[f.1]
The League has only enlarged the original scheme of Pakistan. It has sought to create one more Muslim State in the East to include the Muslims in Bengal and Assam. Barring this, it expresses in its essence and general outline the scheme put forth by Sir Mahomed Iqbal and propagated by Mr. Rehmat Ali. There is no name given to this new Muslim State in the East. This has made no difference in the theory and the issues involved in the ideology of Mr. Rehmat Ali. The only difficulty one feels is that the League, while enlarging the facets, has not christened the two
Muslim States with short and sweet names as it might have been expected to do. That it did not do and we are left to carry on the discussion with two long jaw-breaking names of Muslim State in the West and Muslim State in the East. I propose to solve this difficulty by reserving the name Pakistan to express the ideology underlying the two-nation theory and its consequent effect, namely, partition, and by designating the two Muslim States in the North-West and North-East as Western Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.
The scheme not only called Hindu India to attention but it shocked Hindu India. Now it is natural to ask, what is there that is new or shocking in this scheme ?

[G.Subramaniam]

II
Is the idea of linking up of the provinces in the North-West a shocking idea ? If so, let it be remembered that the linking of these provinces is an age-old project put forth by successive Viceroys, Administrators and Generals. Of the Pakistan provinces in the North-West, the Punjab and N. W. F. P. constituted a single province ever since the Punjab was conquered by the British in 1849. The two continued to be a single province till 1901. It was in 1901 that Lord Curzon broke up their unity and created the present two provinces. As to the linking up of the Punjab with Sind, there can be no doubt that had the conquest of Sind followed and not preceded the conquest of the Punjab, Sind would have been incorporated into the Punjab, for the two are not only contiguous but are connected by a single
river which is the most natural tie between them. Although Sind was joined to Bombay, which in the absence of the Punjab was the only base from which it could be governed, the idea of disconnecting Sind from Bombay and joining it to the Punjab was not given up and projects in that behalf were put forth from time to time. It was first put forth during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie; but for financial reasons, was not sanctioned by the Court of Directors. After the mutiny, the question was reconsidered but owing to the backward state of communications along the Indus, Lord Canning refused to give his consent. In 1876, Lord Northbrook was of the opinion that Sind should be joined to the Punjab. In 1877, Lord Lytton, who succeeded Northbrook, sought to create a trans-indus province, consisting of the six frontier districts of the Punjab and of the transindus districts of Sind. This would have included the six Frontier districts of the Punjab, namely, Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (except the Cis-indus tracts), Dera
Ismail Khan (with the same exception), Dera Ghazi Khan, and trans-Indus Sind (with the exception of Karachi).
Lytton also proposed that Bombay should receive the whole or part of the Central Provinces, in order to compensate it for the loss of trans-indus Sind. These proposals were not acceptable to the Secretary of State. During the Vice-royalty of Lord Lansdowne (1888—94), the same project was revived in its original form, namely, the transfer of Sind to the Punjab, but owing to the formation of the Baluchistan Agency, Sind had ceased to be a Frontier district and the idea which was military in its motive, lost its force and Sind remained without being incorporated in the Punjab. Had the British not acquired Baluchistan and had Lord Curzon not thought of carving out the N. W. F. P. out of the Punjab, we would have witnessed long ago the creation of Pakistan as an administrative unit.
With regard to the claim for the creation of a National Muslim State in Bengal, again, there is nothing new in it. It will be recalled by many that in 1905, the province of Bengal and Assam was divided by the then Viceroy, Lord
Curzon into two provinces :
(1) Eastern Bengal and Assam with Dacca as its capital and
(2) Western Bengal with Calcutta as its capital. The newly-created province of Eastern Bengal and Assam included Assam and the following districts of the old province of Bengal and Assam: (1) Dacca, (2) Mymensingh, (3)
Faridpur, (4) Backer gunge, (5) Tippera, (6) Noakhali, (7) Chittagong, (8) Chittag-ong Hill Tracts, (9) Rajashahl, (10) Dinajpur, (II) Jalpaiguri, (12) Rangpur, (13) Bogra, (14) Pabna and (15) Malda. Western Bengal included the
remaining districts of the old Province of Bengal and Assam with the addition of the district of Sambalpur which was transferred from C. P. to Western Bengal.
This division of one province into two, which is known in Indian history as the Partition of Bengal, was an attempt to create a Muslim State in Eastern Bengal, inasmuch as the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was, barring
parts of Assam, a predominantly Muslim area. But, the partition was abrogated in 1911 by the British who yielded to the Hindus, who were opposed to it and did not care for the wishes of the Muslims, as they were too weak to make themselves felt. If the partition of Bengal had not been annulled, the Muslim State in Eastern Bengal, instead of being a new project, would now have been 39 years old. 2[f.2]

[G.Subramaniam]

III
Is the idea of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan shocking ? If so, let me recall a few facts which are relevant to the issue and which form the basic principles of the Congress policy. It will be remembered that as soon as Mr.Gandhi captured the Congress, he did two things to popularize it. The first thing he did was to introduce Civil Disobedience.
Before Mr. Gandhi 's entry into the politics of India, the parties contending for power were the Congress, the Liberals and the Terrorists of Bengal. The Congress and the Liberals were really one party and there was no distinction between them such as divides them today. We can, therefore, safely say that there were only two parties in India, the Liberals and the Terrorists. In both, the conditions for admission were extremely difficult. In the Liberal Party, the condition for admission was not merely education but a high degree of learning. Without first establishing
a reputation for study, one could never hope to obtain admission to the Liberal Party. It effectively excluded the uneducated from rising to political power. The Terrorists had prescribed the hardest test conceivable. Only those who were prepared to give their lives for the cause, not in the sense of dedicating them but in the sense of dying for it, could become members of their organization. No knave could, therefore, get an entry into the Terrorists' organization. Civil disobedience does not require learning. It does not call for the shedding of life. It is an easy
middle way for that large majority who have no learning and who do not wish to undergo the extreme penalty and at the same time obtain the notoriety of being patriots. It is this middle path which made the Congress more popular than the Liberal Party or the Terrorist Party.
The second thing Mr. Gandhi did was to introduce the principle of Linguistic Provinces. In the constitution that was framed by the Congress under the inspiration and guidance of Mr. Gandhi, India was to be divided into the following
Provinces with the language and headquarters as given below :—
Province Language Headquarters
Ajmere-Merwara Hindustani Ajmere.
Andbra Telegu Madras.
Assam Assamese Gauhati
Bihar Hindustani Patna.
Bengal Bengali Calcutta.
Bombay (City) Marathi-Gujarati Bombay.
Delhi Hindustani Delhi.
Gujarat Gujarati Ahmedabad.
Kamatak Kannada Dharwar
Kerala Malayalam Calicut
Mahakosal Hindustani Jubbulpore
Maharashtra Marathi Poona.
Nagpur Marathi Nagpur.
N. W. F. P. Pushtu Peshawar.
Punjab Punjabi Lahore.
Sind Sindhi Karachi.
Tamil Nadu Tamil Madras.
United Provinces Hindustani Lucknow
Utkal Oriya Cuttack.
Vidarbha(Berar) Maralhi Akola.
In this distribution no attention was paid to considerations of area, population or revenue. The thought that every administrative unit must be capable of supporting and supplying a minimum standard of civilized life, for which it must have sufficient area, sufficient population and sufficient revenue, had no place in this scheme of distribution of areas for provincial purposes. The determining factor was language. No thought was given to the possibility that it might introduce a disruptive force in the already loose structure of the Indian social life. The scheme was, no doubt, put forth with the sole object of winning the people to the Congress by appealing to their local patriotism. The idea of linguistic provinces has come to stay and the demand for giving effect to it has become so insistent and irresistible that the Congress, when it came into power, was forced to put it into effect. Orissa has already been separated from Bihar. 3[f.3] Andhra is demanding separation from Madras. Kamatak is asking for separation from Maharashtra.4[f.4] The only linguistic province that is not demanding separation from Maharashtra is Gujarat Or
rather, Gujarat has given up for the moment the idea of separation. That is probably because Gujarat has realized that union with Maharashtra is, politically as well as commercially, a better investment. Be. that as it may, the fact remains that separation on linguistic basis is now an accepted principle with the Congress.
It is no use saying that the separation of Karnatak and Andhra is based on a linguistic difference and that the claim to separation of Pakistan is based on a cultural difference. This is a distinction without difference. Linguistic difference
is simply another name for cultural difference.
If there is nothing shocking in the separation of Karanatak and Andhra, what is there to shock in the demand for the separation of Pakistan ? If it is disruptive in its effect, it is no more disruptive than the separation of Hindu provinces such as Karnatak from Maharashtra or Andhra from Madras. Pakistan is merely another manifestation of a cultural unit demanding freedom for the growth of its own distinctive culture.

[G.Subramaniam]

CHAPTER II
A NATION CALLING FOR A HOME
That there are factors, administrative, linguistic or cultural, which are the predisposing causes behind these demands for separation, is a fact which is admitted and understood by all. Nobody minds these demands and many are prepared to concede them. But, the Hindus say that the Muslims are going beyond the idea of separation and questions, such as what has led them to take this course, why are they asking for partition, for the annulment of the common tie by a legal divorce between Pakistan and Hindustan, are being raised.
The answer is to be found in the declaration made by the Muslim League in its Resolution that the Muslims of India are a separate nation. It is this declaration by the Muslim League, which is both resented and ridiculed by the Hindus. The Hindu resentment is quite natural. Whether India is a nation or not, has been the subject-matter of controversy between the Anglo-Indians and the Hindu politicians ever since the Indian National Congress was founded. The Anglo-Indians were never tired of proclaiming that India was not a nation, that ' Indians 'was only another name for the people of India. In the words of one Anglo-Indian " to know India was to forget that there is such a thing as India." The Hindu politicians and patriots have been, on the other hand, equally persistent in their assertion that India
is a nation. That the Anglo-Indians were right in their repudiation cannot be gainsaid. Even Dr. Tagore, the national poet of Bengal, agrees with them. But, the Hindus have never yielded on the point even to Dr. Tagore.
<b>This was because of two reasons. Firstly, the Hindu felt ashamed to admit that India was not a nation. In a world where nationality and nationalism were deemed to be special virtues in a people, it was quite natural for the Hindus to feel, to use the language of Mr. H. G. Wells, that it would be as improper for India to be without a nationality as it would be for a man to be without his clothes in a crowded assembly. Secondly, he had realized that nationality had a most intimate connection with the claim for self-government. He knew that by the end of the 19th century, it had become an accepted principle that the people, who constituted a nation, were entitled on that account to self-government and that any patriot, who asked for self-government for his people, had to prove that they were a nation. The Hindu for these reasons never stopped to examine whether India was or was not a nation in fact</b>. He never cared to reason whether nationality was merely a question of calling a people a nation or was a question of the people being a nation. He knew one thing, namely, that if he was to succeed in his demand for self-government for India, he must maintain, even if he could not prove it, that India was a nation.
In this assertion, he was never contradicted by any Indian. The thesis was so agreeable that even serious Indian students of history came forward to write propagandist literature in support of it, no doubt out of patriotic motives.
The Hindu social reformers, who knew that this was a dangerous delusion, could not openly contradict this thesis. For, anyone who questioned it was at once called a tool of the British bureaucracy and enemy of the country. The Hindu politician was able to propagate his view for a long time. His opponent, the Anglo-lndian, had ceased to reply to him. His propaganda had almost succeeded. When it was about to succeed comes this declaration of the Muslim League— this rift in the lute. Just because it does not come from the Anglo-Indian, it is a deadlier blow. It destroys the work which the Hindu politician has done for years. If the Muslims in India are a separate nation, then, of course, India is not a nation. This assertion cuts the whole ground from under the feet of the Hindu politicians. It is natural that they should feel annoyed at it and call it a stab in the back.
But, stab or no stab, the point is, can the Musalmans be said to constitute a nation ? Everything else is beside the point. This raises the question : What is a nation ? Tomes have been written on the subject. Those who are curious may go through them and study the different basic conceptions as well as the different aspects of it. It is, however, enough to know the core of the subject and that can be set down in a few words. Nationality is a social feeling. It is a feeling of a corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel that they are kith and kin. This national feeling is a double edged feeling. It is at once a feeling of fellowship for one's own kith and kin and an anti-fellowship feeling for those who are not one's own kith and kin. It is a feeling of " consciousness of kind " which on the one hand binds together those who have it, so strongly that it over-rides all differences arising out of economic conflicts or social gradations and, on the other, severs them from those who are not of their kind. It is a longing not to belong to any other group. This is the essence of what is called a nationality and national feeling.
Now apply this test to the Muslim claim. Is it or is it not a fact that the Muslims of India are an exclusive group ? Is it or is it not a fact that they have a consciousness of kind ? Is it or is not a fact that every Muslim is possessed by a
longing to belong to his own group and not to any non-Muslim group ?
If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, then the controversy must end and the Muslim claim that they are a nation must be accepted without cavil.
What the Hindus must show is that notwithstanding some differences, there are enough affinities between Hindus and Musalmans to constitute them into one nation, or, to use plain language, which make Muslims and Hindus long
to belong together.
Hindus, who disagree with the Muslim view that the Muslims are a separate nation by themselves, rely upon certain features of Indian social life which seem to form the bonds of integration between Muslim society and Hindu
society. In the first place, it is said that there is no difference of race between the Hindus and the Muslims. That the Punjabi Musalman and the Punjabi Hindu, the U. P. Musalman and the U. P. Hindu, the Bihar Musalman and the Bihar
Hindu, the Bengal Musalman and the Bengal Hindu, the Madras Musalman and the Madras Hindu, and the Bombay Musalman and the Bombay Hindu are racially of one stock. Indeed there is more racial affinity between the Madras
Musalman and the Madras Brahmin than there is between the Madras Brahmin and the Punjab Brahmin. In the second place, reliance is placed upon linguistic unity between Hindus and Muslims. It is said that the Musalmans have no common language of their own which can mark them off as a linguistic group separate from the Hindus. On the contrary, there is a complete linguistic unity between the two. In the Punjab, both Hindus and Muslims speak Punjabi. In Sind, both speak Sindhi. In Bengal, both speak Bengali. In Gujarat, both speak Gujarati. In Maharashtra, both speak Marathi. So in every province. It is only in towns that the Musalmans speak Urdu and the Hindus the language of the province. Bu,t outside, in the mofussil, there is complete linguistic unity between Hindus and Musalmans. Thirdly, it is pointed out that India is the land which the Hindus and Musalmans have now inhabited together for centuries. It is not exclusively the land of the Hindus, nor is it exclusively the land of the Mahomedans.
Reliance is placed not only upon racial unity but also upon certain common features in the social and cultural life of the two communities. It is pointed out that the social life of many Muslim groups is honeycombed with Hindu customs. For instance, the Avans of the Punjab, though they are nearly all Muslims, retain Hindu names and keep their genealogies in the Brahmanic fashion. Hindu surnames are found among Muslims. For instance, the surname Chaudhari is a Hindu surname but is common among the Musalmans of U.P. and Northern India. In the matter of
marriage, certain groups of Muslims are Muslims in name only. They either follow the Hindu form of the ceremony alone, or perform the ceremony first by the Hindu rites and then call the Kazi and have it performed in the Muslim form. In some sections of Muslims, the law applied is the Hindu Law in the matter of marriage, guardianship and inheritance. Before the Shariat Act was passed, this was true even in the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. In the social sphere the caste system is alleged to be as much a part of Muslim society as it is of Hindu society. In the religious sphere, it is pointed out that many Muslim pirs had Hindu disciples ; and similarly some Hindu yogis have had Muslim chelas. Reliance is placed on instances of friendship between saints of the rival creeds. At Girot, in the
Punjab, the tombs of two ascetics, Jamali Sultan and Diyal Bhawan, who lived in close amity during the early part of the nineteenth century, stand close to one another, and are reverenced by Hindus and Musalmans alike. Bawa Fathu,
a Muslim saint, who lived about 1700 A.D. and whose tomb is at Ranital in the Kangra District, received the title of prophet by the blessing of a Hindu saint, Sodhi Guru Gulab Singh. On the other hand, Baba Shahana, a Hindu saint whose cult is observed in the Jang District, is said to have been the chela of a Muslim pir who changed the original name (Mihra), of his Hindu follower, into Mir Shah.
All this, no doubt, is true. That a large majority of the Muslims belong to the same race as the Hindus is beyond question. That all Mahomedans do not speak a common tongue, that many speak the same language as the Hindus cannot be denied. That there are certain social customs which are common to both cannot be gainsaid. That certain religious rites and practices are common to both is also a matter of fact. But the question is : can all this support the conclusion that the Hindus and the Mahomedans on account of them constitute one nation or these things have fostered in them a feeling that they long to belong to each other ?
There are many flaws in the Hindu argument. In the first place, what are pointed out as common features are not the result of a conscious attempt to adopt and adapt to each other's ways and manners to bring about social fusion. On
the other hand, this uniformity is the result of certain purely mechanical causes. They are partly due to incomplete conversions. In a land like India, where the majority of the Muslim population has been recruited from caste and out-caste Hindus, the Muslimization of the convert was neither complete nor effectual, either from fear of revolt or because of the method of persuasion or insufficiency of preaching due to insufficiency of priests. There is, therefore, little wonder if great sections of the Muslim community here and there reveal their Hindu origin in their religious and social life. Partly it is to be explained as the effect of common environment to which both Hindus and Muslims have been subjected for centuries. A common environment is bound to produce common reactions, and reacting constantly in the same way to the same environment is bound to produce a common type. Partly are these common features to be explained as the remnants of a period of religious amalgamation between the Hindus and the Muslims
inaugurated by the Emperor Akbar, the result of a dead past which has no present and no future.
As to the argument based on unity of race, unity of language and inhabiting a common country, the matter stands on a different footing. If these considerations were decisive in making or unmaking a nation, the Hindus would be right
in saying that by reason of race, community of language and habitat the Hindus and Musalmans form one nation. As a matter of historical experience, neither race, nor language, nor country has sufficed to mould a people into a nation. The argument is so well put by Renan that it is impossible to improve upon his language. Long ago in his famous essay on Nationality, Renan observed :—
" that race must not be confounded with nation. The truth is that . there is no pure race; and that making politics depend upon ethnographical analysis, is allowing it to be borne upon a chimera . . . Racial facts, important as they are in the beginning, have a constant tendency to lose their importance. Human history is essentially different from zoology. Race is not everything, as it is in the sense of rodents and felines."
Speaking about language, Renan points out that :—
" Language invites re-union ; it does not force it. The United States and England, Spanish America and Spain speak the same languages and do not form single nations. On the contrary, Switzerland which owes her stability to the fact that she was founded by the assent of her several parts counts three or four languages. In man there is something superior to language, —will. The will of Switzerland to be united, in spite of the variety of her languages,' is a much more important fact than a similarity of language, often obtained by persecution."
As to common country, Renan argued that :—
" It is no more the land than the race that makes a nation. The land provides a substratum, the field of battle and work; man provides the soul ; man is everything in the formation of that sacred thing which is called a people.
Nothing of material nature suffices for it" Having shown, that race, language, and country do not suffice to create a nation, Renan raises in a pointed manner
the question, what more, then, is necessary to constitute a nation ? His answer may be given in his own words :—
" A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common possession of a rich heritage of memories ; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve worthily the undivided inheritance which has been handed down. Man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, and sacrifices, and devotion. Ancestor-worship is therefore, all the more legitimate ; for our
ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory,—1 mean glory of the genuine kind,—these form the social capital, upon which a national idea may be founded. To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have done great things together, to will to do the like again,—such are the essential conditions for the . making of a people. We love in proportion to the sacrifices we have consented to make, to the sufferings we have endured. We love the house that we have built, and will hand down to our descendant. The Spartan hymn, ' We are what you were ; we shall be what you are,' is in its simplicity the national anthem of every land. " In the past an inheritance of glory and regrets to be shared, in the future a like ideal to be realised ; to have suffered, and rejoiced, and hoped together; all these things are worth more than custom houses in common, and frontiers in accordance with strategical ideas; all these can be understood in spite of diversities of race and language.
I said just now, ' to have suffered together ' for indeed, suffering in common is a greater bond of union than joy. As regards national memories, mournings are worth more than triumphs; for they impose duties, they demand common effort."

[G.Subramaniam]

Are there any common historical antecedents which the Hindus and Muslims can be said to share together as matters of pride or as matters of sorrow ? That is the crux of the question. That is the question which the Hindus must answer, if they wish to maintain that Hindus and Musalmans together form a nation. So far as this aspect of their relationship is. concerned, they have been just two armed battalions warring against each other. There was no common cycle of participation for a common achievement. Their past is a past of mutual destruction—a past of mutual animosities, both in the political as well as in the religious fields. As Bhai Parmanand points out in his pamphlet called " The Hindu National Movement":—"In history the Hindus revere the memory of Prithvi Raj, Partap, Shivaji and, Beragi Bir, who fought for the honour and freedom of this land (against the Muslims), while the Mahomedans look upon the invaders of India, like Muhammad Bin Qasim and rulers like Aurangzeb as their national heroes." In the religious field, the Hindus draw their inspiration from the Ramayan, the Mahabharat, and the
Geeta. The Musalmans, on the other hand, derive their inspiration from the Quran and the Hadis. Thus, the things that divide are far more vital than the things which unite. In depending upon certain common features of Hindu and Mahomedan social life, in relying upon common language, common race and common country, the Hindu is mistaking what is accidental and superficial for what is essential and fundamental. The political and religious antagonisms divide the Hindus and the Musalmans far more deeply than the so-called common things are able to
bind them together. The prospects might perhaps be different if the past of the two communities can be forgotten by both, Renan points out the importance of forgetfulness as a factor in building up a nation :—
" Forgetfulness, and I shall even say historical error, form an essential factor in the creation of a nation; and thus it is that the progress of historical studies may often be dangerous to the nationality. Historical research, in fact, brings back to light the deeds of violence that have taken place at the commencement of all political formations, even of those the consequences of which have been most beneficial. Unity is ever achieved by brutality. The union of Northern and Southern France was the result of an extermination, and of a reign of terror lhal lasted for nearly a hundred years. The king of France who was, if I may say so, the ideal type of a secular crystalliser, the king of France who made the most perfect national unity in existence, lost his prestige when seen at too close a distance. The
nation that he had formed cursed him ; and today the knowledge of what he was worth, and what he did, belongs only to the cultured.
" It is by contrast that these great laws of the history of Western Europe become apparent. In the undertaking which the king of France, in part by his justice, achieved so admirably, many countries came to disaster. Under the crown
of St. Stephen, Magyars and Slavs have remained as distinct as they were eight hundred years ago. Far from combining the different elements in its dominions, the house of Hapsburg has held them apart and often opposed to one another. In Bohemia, the Czech element and the German element are superimposed like oil and water in a glass.
The Turkish policy of separation of nationalities according to religion has had much graver results. It has brought about the ruin of the East. Take a town like Smyrna or Salonica; you will find there five or six communities each with its own memories, and possessing among them scarcely anything in common. But the essence of the nation is, that all its individual members should have things in common; and also, that all of them should hold many things in oblivion. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, or a Visigoth; every French citizen ought to have forgotten St. Bartholomew, and the massacres of the South in the thirteenth century. There are not ten families in France able to furnish proof of a French origin; and yet, even if such a proof were given it would be essentially
defective, in consequence of a thousand unknown crosses, capable of deranging all genealogical systems."
The pity of it is that the two communities can never forget or obliterate their past. Their past is imbedded in their religion, and for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. To hope for this is to hope in vain. In the absence of common historical antecedents, the Hindu view that Hindus and Musalmans form one nation falls to the ground. To maintain it is to keep up a hallucination. There is no such longing between the Hindus and Musalmans to belong together as there is among the Musalmans of India. It is no use saying that this claim of the Musalmans being a nation is an after-thought of their leaders. As an accusation, it is true. The Muslims were hitherto quite content to call themselves a community. It is only recently that they have begun to style themselves a nation. But an accusation, attacking the motives of a person, does not amount to a refutation of his thesis. To say that because the Muslims once called themselves a community, they are,
therefore, now debarred from calling themselves a nation is to misunderstand the mysterious working of the psychology of national feeling. Such an argument presupposes that wherever there exist a people, who possess the elements that go to the making up of a nation, there must be manifested that sentiment of nationality which is their natural consequence and that if they fail to manifest it for sometime, then that failure is to be used as evidence showing the unreality of the claim of being a nation, if made afterwards. There is no historical support for such a contention. As Prof. Toynbee points out :—
"It is impossible to argue a priory from the presence of one or even several of these factors to the existence of a nationality; they may have been there for ages and kindled no response and if is impossible to argue from one case to another; precisely the same group of factors may produce nationality here, and there have no effect."
This is probably due to the fact, as pointed out by Prof. Barker, that it is possible for nations to exist and even for centuries, in unreflective silence, although there exists that spiritual essence of a national life of which many of its members are not aware. Some such thing has no doubt happened in the case of the Musalmans. They were not aware of the fact that there existed for them the spiritual essence of a national life. This explains why their claim to separate nationality was made by them so late. But, it does not mean that the spiritual essence of a national life had no existence at all.
It is no use contending that there are cases where a sense of nationality exists but there is no desire for a separate national existence. Cases of the French in Canada and of the English in South Africa, may be cited as cases in point. It must be admitted that there do exist cases, where people are aware of their nationality, but this awareness does not produce in them that passion which is called nationalism. In other words, there may be nations conscious of themselves without being charged with nationalism. On the basis of this reasoning, it may be argued that the
Musalmans may hold that they are a nation but they need not on that account demand a separate national existence ;
why can they not be content with the position which the French occupy in Canada and the English occupy in South Africa ? Such a position is quite a sound position. It must, however, be remembered that such a position can only be taken by way of pleading with the Muslims not to insist on partition. It is no argument against their claim for partition, if they insist upon it. Lest pleading should be mistaken for refutation, it is necessary to draw attention to two things. First, there is a difference between nationality and nationalism. They are two different psychological states of the human mind.
Nationality means " consciousness of kind, awareness of the existence of that tie of kinship." Nationalism means " the desire for a separate national existence for those who are bound by this tie of kinship." Secondly, it is true that there cannot be
nationalism without the feeling of nationality being in existence. But, it is important to bear in mind that the converse is not always true. The feeling of nationality may be present and yet the feeling of nationalism may be quite absent. That is to say, nationality does not in all cases produce nationalism. For nationality to flame into nationalism two conditions must exist. First, there must arise the " will to live as a nation. Nationalism is the dynamic expression of that desire. Secondly, there must be a territory which nationalism could occupy and make it a state, as well as a
cultural home of the nation. Without such a territory, nationalism, to use Lord Acton's phrase, would be a " soul as it. were wandering in search of a body in which to begin life over again and dies out finding none." The Muslims have developed a " will to live as a nation." For them nature has found a territory which they can occupy and make it a state as well as a cultural home for the new-born Muslim nation. Given these favourable conditions, there should be no wonder, if the Muslims say that they are not content to occupy the position which the French choose to occupy in Canada or the English choose to occupy in South Africa, and that they shall have a national home which they can call their own

[G.Subramaniam]

CHAPTER III
ESCAPE FROM DEGRADATION
"What justification have the Musalmans of India for demanding the partition of India and the establishment of separate Muslim States ? Why this insurrection ? What grievances have they ? "—ask the Hindus in a spirit of righteous indignation. Anyone, who knows history, will not fail to realize that it has now been a well established principle that nationalism is a sufficient justification for the creation of a national state. As the great historian Lord Acton points out :—
" In the old European system, the rights of nationalities were neither recognised by Governments nor asserted by the people. The interest of the reigning families, not those of the nations, regulated the frontiers, and the administration was conducted generally without any reference to popular desires. Where all liberties were suppressed, the claims of national independence were necessarily ignored, and a princess, in the words of Fenelon, carried a monarchy in her wedding portion. "
Nationalities were at first listless. When they became conscious—
" They first rose against their conquerors in defence of their legitimate rulers. They refused to be governed by usurpers. Next came a time when they revolted because of the wrongs inflicted upon them by their rulers. The insurrections were provoked by particular grievances justified by definite complaints. Then came the French Revolution which effected a complete change. It taught the people to regard their wishes and wants as the supreme criterion of their right to do what they liked to do with themselves. It proclaimed the idea of the sovereignty of the
people uncontrolled by the past and uncontrolled by the existing state. This text taught by the French Revolution became an accepted dogma of all liberal thinkers. Mill gave it his support. ' One hardly knows, ' says Mill, ' what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves.' "
He even went so far as to hold that—
" It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities. "
Thus history shows that the theory of nationality is imbedded in the democratic theory of the sovereignty of the will of a people. This means that the demand by a nationality for a national state does not require to be supported by any list of grievances. The will of the people is enough to justify it. But, if grievances must be cited in support of their claim, the Muslims say that they have them in plenty. They may be summed up in one sentence, that constitutional safeguards have failed to save them from the tyranny of the Hindu majority.
At the Round Table Conference, the Muslims presented their list of safeguards, which were formulated in the well-known fourteen points. The Hindu representatives at the Round Table Conference would not consent to them. There was an impasse. The British Government intervened and gave what is known as " the Communal decision ".
By that decision, the Muslims got all their fourteen points. There was much bitterness amongst the Hindus against the Communal Award. But, the Congress did not take part in the hostility that was displayed by the Hindus generally
towards it, although it did retain the right to describe it as anti national and to get it changed with the consent of the Muslims. So careful was the Congress not to wound the feelings of the Muslims that when the Resolution was moved in the Central Assembly condemning the Communal Award, the Congress, though it did not bless it, remained neutral, neither opposing nor supporting it. The Mahomedans were well justified in looking upon this Congress attitude as a friendly gesture.
The victory of the Congress at the polls in the provinces, where the Hindus are in a majority, did not disturb the tranquillity of the Musalmans. They felt they had nothing to fear from the Congress and the prospects were that the Congress and the Muslim League would work the constitution in partnership. But, two years and three months of the Congress Government in the Hindu Provinces have completely disillusioned them and have made them the bitterest enemies of the Congress. The Deliverance Day celebration held on the 22nd December 1939 shows the depth of their resentment. What is worse, their bitterness is not confined to the Congress. The Musalmans, who at the Round Table Conference joined in the demand for Swaraj, are today the most ruthless opponents of Swaraj.
What has the Congress done to annoy the Muslims so much ? The Muslim League has asserted that under the Congress regime the Muslims were actually tyrannized and oppressed. Two committees appointed by the League are said to have investigated and reported on the matter. But apart from these matters which require to be examined by an impartial tribunal, there are undoubtedly two things which have produced the clash: (1) the refusal by the Congress to recognize the Muslim League as the only representative body of the Muslims, (2) the refusal by the Congress to form Coalition Ministries in the Congress Provinces.
On the first question, both the Congress and the League are adamant. The Congress is prepared to accept the Muslim League as one of the many Muslim political organizations, such as the Ahrars, the National Muslims and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. But it will not accept the Muslim League as the only representative body of the Muslims. The Muslim League, on the other hand, is not prepared to enter into any talk unless the Congress accepts it as the only representative body of the Musalmans of India. The Hindus stigmatize the claim of the League as an extravagant one and try to ridicule it. The Muslims may say that if the Hindus would only stop to inquire how treaties between nations are made, they would realize the stupidity of their view. It may be argued that when a nation proceeds to
make a treaty with another nation, it recognizes the Government of the latter as fully representing it. In no country does the Government of the day represent the whole body of people. Everywhere it represents only a majority. But nations do not refuse to settle their disputes because the Governments, which represent them, do not represent the whole people. It is enough if each Government represents a majority of its citizens. This analogy, the Muslims may contend, must apply to the Congress-League quarrel on this issue. The League may not represent the whole body of the Muslims but if it represents a majority of them, the Congress should have no compunction to deal with -it for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question. Of course, it is open to the Government of a country not to recognize the Government of another country where there is more than one body claiming to be the Government. Similarly, the Congress may not recognize the League. It must, however, recognize either the National Muslims or the Ahrars or the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and fix the terms of settlement between the two communities. Of course, it must act with the full knowledge as to which is more likely to be repudiated by the Muslims—an agreement with the League or an agreement with the other Muslim parties. The Congress must deal with one or the
other. To deal with neither is not only stupid but mischievous. This attitude of the Congress only serves to annoy the Muslims and to exasperate them. The Muslims rightly interpret this attitude of the Congress as an attempt to create divisions among them with a view to cause confusion in their ranks and weaken their front.
On the second issue, the Muslim demand has been that in the cabinets there shall be included Muslim Ministers who have the confidence of the Muslim members in the Legislature. They expected that this demand of theirs would be met by the Congress if it came in power. But, they were sorely disappointed. With regard to this demand, the Congress took a legalistic attitude. The Congress agreed to include Muslims in their cabinets, provided they resigned from their parties, joined the Congress and signed the Congress pledge. This was resented by the Muslims on three grounds.
In the first place, they regarded it as a breach of faith. The Muslims say that this demand of theirs is in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. At the Round Table Conference, it was agreed that the cabinets shall include representatives of the minority communities. The minorities insisted that a provision to that effect should be made a part of- the statute. The Hindus, on the other hand, desired that the matter should be left to be regulated by convention. A via media was found. It was agreed that the provision should find a place in the Instrument of Instructions to the Governors of the provinces and an obligation should be imposed upon them to see that effect was given to the convention in the formation of the cabinets. The Musalmans did not insist upon making this provision a part of the statute because they depended upon the good faith of the Hindus. This agreement was broken by a party which had given the Muslims to understand that towards them its attitude would be not only correct but considerate. In the second place, the Muslims felt that the Congress view was a perversion of the real scope of the convention.
They rely upon the text of the clause 5[f.5] in the Instrument of Instructions and argue that the words " member of a minority community " in it can have only one meaning, namely, a person having the confidence of the community.
The position taken by the Congress is in direct contradiction with the meaning of this clause and is indeed a covert attempt to break all other parties in the country and to make the Congress the only political party in the country. The demand for signing the Congress pledge can have no other intention. This attempt to establish a totalitarian state may be welcome to the Hindus, but it meant the political death of the Muslims as a free people. This resentment of the Muslims was considerably aggravated when they found the Governors, on whom the obligation was imposed to see that effect was given to the convention, declining to act. Some Governors declined, because they were helpless by reason of the fact that the Congress was the only majority party which could produce a stable government, that a Congress Government was the only government possible and that there was no alternative to it except suspending the constitution. Other Governors declined, because they became active supporters of the Congress Government and showed their partisanship by praising the Congress or by wearing Khadi which is the official party dress of the Congress. Whatever be the reasons, the Muslims discovered that an important safeguard had failed to save them.
The Congress reply to these accusations by the Muslims is twofold. In the first place, they say that coalition cabinets are inconsistent with collective responsibility of the cabinets. This, the Musalmans refuse to accept as an honest plea. The English people were the first and the only people, who made it a principle of their system of government. But even there it has been abandoned since. The English Parliament debated 6[f.6] the issue and came to the conclusion that it was not so sacrosanct as it was once held and that a departure from it need not necessarily affect the efficiency or smooth working of the governmental machine. Secondly, as a matter of fact, there was no collective responsibility in the Congress Government. It was a government by departments. Each Minister was independent of the other and the Prime Minister was just a Minister. For the Congress to talk about collective responsibility was really impertinent. The plea was even dishonest, because it is a fact that in the provinces where the Congress was in a minority, they did form Coalition Ministries without asking the Ministers from other parties to sign the Congress pledge. The Muslims are entitled to ask ' if coalition is bad, how can it be good in one place and bad in another ? '
The second reply of the Congress is that even if they take Muslim Ministers in their cabinet who have not the confidence of the majority of the Muslims, they have not failed to protect their interests. Indeed they have done every thing to advance
the interests of the Muslims. This no doubt rests on the view Pope held of government when he said :" For forms of government let fools contest ; What is best administered is best. "
In making this reply, the Congress High Command seems to have misunderstood what the main contention of the Muslims and the minorities has been. Their quarrel is not on the issue whether the Congress has or has not done any good to the Muslims and the minorities. Their quarrel is on an issue which is totally different. Are the Hindus to be a ruling race and the Muslims and other minorities to be subject races under Swaraj ? That is the issue involved in the demand for coalition ministries. On that, the Muslims and other minorities have taken a definite stand. They are not prepared to accept the position of subject races.
That the ruling community has done good to the ruled is quite beside the point and is no answer to the contention of the minority communities that they refuse to be treated as a subject people. The British have done many good things in India for the Indians. They have improved their roads, constructed canals on more scientific principles, effected their transport by rail, carried their letters by penny post, flashed their messages by lightning, improved their currency, regulated their weights and measures, corrected their notions of geography, astronomy and medicine, and stopped their internal quarrels and effected some advancement in their material conditions. Because of these acts of good government, did anybody ask the Indian people to remain grateful to the British and give up their agitation for self-government ? Or because of these acts of social uplift, did the Indians give up their protest against being treated as a subject race by the British ? The Indians did nothing of the kind. They refused to be satisfied with these good deeds and continued to agitate for their right to rule themselves. This is as it should be. For, as was said by Curran, the Irish patriot, no man can be grateful at the cost of his self-respect, no woman can be grateful at the cost of her chastity and no nation can be grateful at the cost of its honour. To do otherwise is to show that one's philosophy of life is just what Carlyle called ' pig philosophy '. The Congress High Command does not seem to realize that the Muslims and other minorities care more for the recognition of their self-respect at the hand of the Congress than for
mere good deeds on the part of the Congress. Men, who are conscious of their being, are not pigs who care only for fattening food. They have their pride which they will not yield even for gold. In short " life is more than the meat ".
It is no use saying that the Congress is not a Hindu body. A body which is Hindu in its composition is bound to reflect the Hindu mind and support Hindu aspirations. The only difference between the Congress and the Hindu Maha Sabha is that the latter is crude in its utterances and brutal in its actions while the Congress is politic and polite. Apart from this difference of fact, there is no other difference between the Congress and the Hindu Maha Sabha.
Similarly, it is no use saying that the Congress does not recognize the distinction between the ruler and the ruled. If this is so, the Congress must prove its bonafides by showing its readiness to recognize the other communities as free and equal partners. What is the test of such recognition ? It seems to me that there can be only one—namely, agreeing to share power with the effective representatives of the minority communities. Is the Congress prepared for it ? Everyone knows the answer. The Congress is not prepared to share power with a member of a community who does not owe allegiance to the Congress. Allegiance to the Congress is a condition precedent to sharing power. It seems to be a rule with the Congress that if allegiance to the Congress is not forthcoming from a community, that community must be excluded from political power. Exclusion from political power is the essence of the distinction between a ruling race and a subject race ; and inasmuch as the Congress maintained this principle, it must be said that this distinction was enforced by the Congress while it was in the saddle. The Musalmans may well complain that they have already suffered enough and that this reduction to the position of a subject race is like the proverbial last straw. Their decline and fall in India began ever since the British occupation of the country. Every change, executive, administrative, or legal, introduced by the British, has inflicted a series of blows upon the Muslim Community. The Muslim rulers of India had allowed the Hindus to retain their law in civil matters. But, they abrogated the Hindu Criminal Law and made the Muslim Criminal Law the law of the State, applicable to all Hindus as well as Muslims. The first thing the British did was to displace gradually the Muslim Criminal Law by another of their making, until the process was finally completed by the enactment of Macaulay's Penal Code. This was the first blow to the prestige and position of the Muslim community in India. This was followed by the abridgement of the field of application of the Shariat or the Muslim Civil Law. Its application was restricted to matters concerning personal relations, such as marriage and inheritance, and then only to the extent permitted by the British. Side by side came the abolition, in 1837, of Persian as the official language of the Court and of general administration and the substitution of English and the vernaculars in place of Persian. Then came the abolition of the Qazis, who, during the Muslim rule, administered the Shariat. In
their places, were appointed law officers and judges, who might be of any religion but who got the right of interpreting Muslim Law and whose decisions became binding on Muslims. These were severe blows to the Muslims. As a result, the Muslims found their prestige gone, their laws replaced, their language shelved and their education shorn of its monetary value. Along with these came more palpable blows in the shape of annexation of Sind and Oudh and the Mutiny. The last, particularly, affected the higher classes of Muslims, who suffered enormously by the extensive confiscation of property inflicted upon them by the British, as a punishment for their suspected complicity in the Mutiny. By the end of the Mutiny, the Musalmans, high and low, were brought down by these series of events to the lowest depths of broken pride, black despair and general penury. Without prestige, without education and without resources, the Muslims were left to face the Hindus. The British, pledged the neutrality, were indifferent to the result of the struggle between the two communities. The result was that the Musalmans were completely worsened in the struggle. The British conquest of India brought about a complete
political revolution in the relative position of the two communities. For six hundred years, the Musalmans had been the masters of the Hindus. The British occupation brought them down to the level of the Hindus. From masters to fellow subjects was degradation enough, but a change from the status of fellow subjects to that of subjects of the Hindus is really humiliation. Is it unnatural, ask the Muslims, if they seek an escape from so intolerable a position by the creation of separate national States, in which the Muslims can find a peaceful home and in which the conflicts
between a ruling race and a subject race can find no place to plague their lives ?

[G.Subramaniam]

Contents PART II
[f.1]Halide Edib— Inside India, p. 355.
[f.2]Government of India Gazette Notification No. 2832, dated 1st September 1905. The two provinces became
separate administrative units from 16th October 1905.
[f.3]This was done under the Government of India Act, 1935.
[f.4]Kamatak also wants some districts from the Madras Presidency.
[f.5]" In making appointments to his Council of Ministers, our Governor shall use his best endeavours to select his
Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgement is
most likely to command a stable majority in the Legislature, those persons (including so far as practicable, members
of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the
Legislature. In so acting, he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among
his Ministers. "
[f.6]See the announcement on 22nd January 1932 by the British Prime Minister on the decision of the cabinet to
agree to differ on the Tariff Question and the debate on it in Parliament.

[G.Subramaniam]

Contents
PART II - HINDU CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN
Chapter IV : Break-up of Unity
Chapter V : Weakening of the Defences
Chapter VI : Pakistan and communal peace
HINDU CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN
There seem to be three reasons present to the mind of the Hindus who are opposing this scheme of Pakistan. They
object to the scheme :—
1. Because it involves the breaking-up of the unity of India.
2. Because it weakens the defence of India.
3. Because it fails to solve the communal problem.
Is there any substance in these objections ? This part is concerned with an examination of the validity of these
objections.
CHAPTER IV
BREAK-UP OF UNITY
I
Before the Hindus complain of the
destruction of the unity of India, let
them make certain that the unity they
are harping upon does exist. What
unity is there between Pakistan and
Hindustan?
Those Hindus, who maintain the affirmative, rely chiefly upon the fact that the areas which the Muslims want to be separated from India have always been a part of India. Historically this is, no doubt, true. This area was a part of India when Chandragupta was the ruler; it continued to be a part of India when Hsuan Tsang, the Chinese pilgrim, visited India in the 7th century A. D. In his diary, Hsuan Tsang has recorded that India was divided into five divisions or to use his language, there were ‘ five Indies '1[f.1] : (1) Northern India, (2) Western India, (3) Central India, (4) Eastern India and (5) Southern India and that these five divisions contained 80 kingdoms. According to Hsuan Tsang, Northern India comprised the Punjab proper, including Kashmir and the adjoining hill States with the whole of Eastern Afghanistan beyond the Indus, and the present Cis-Satlaj States to the west of the Sarasvati river.
Thus, in Northern India there were included the districts of Kabul, Jallalabad, Peshawar, Ghazni and Bannu, which were all subject to the ruler of Kapisa, who was a Hindu Kshatriya and whose capital was most probably at Charikar, 27 miles from Kabul. In the Punjab proper, the hilly districts Taxila, Singhapura, Urasa, Punch and Rajaori, were subject to the Raja of Kashmir; while the whole of the plains, including Multan and Shorkot, were dependent on the ruler of Taki or Sangala, near Lahore. Such was the extent of the northern boundary of India at the
time when Hsuan Tsang came on his pilgrimage. But as Prof. Toynbee points out :
" We must be on our guard against ' historical sentiment ', that is against arguments taken from conditions which once existed or were supposed to exist, but which are no longer real at the present moment They are most easily illustrated by extreme examples. Italian newspapers have described the annexation of Tripoli as recovering the soil of the Fatherland because it was once a province of the Roman Empire; and the entire region of Macedonia is claimed by Greek Chauvinists on the one hand, because it contains the site of Pella, the cradle of Alexandar the Great in the fourth century B.C. and by Bulgarians on the other, because Ochrida, in the opposite corner, was the capital of the Bulgarian Tzardom in the tenth century A. D., though the drift of time has buried the tradition of the
latter almost as deep as the achievements of the ' Emathian Conqueror ' on which the modem Greek nationalists insist so strongly. "
The same logic applies here. Here also arguments are taken from conditions which once existed but which are no longer real and which omit to take into consideration later facts which history has to record during practically one thousand years—after the return of Hsuan Tsang. It is true that when Hsuan Tsang came, not only the Punjab but what is now Afghanistan was part of India and further, the people of the Punjab and Afghanistan were either Vedic or Buddhist by religion. But what has happened since Hsuan Tsang left India ?
The most important thing that has happened is the invasion of India by the Muslim hordes from the north-west. The first Muslim invasion of India was by the Arabs who were led by Mahommad Bin Qasim. It took place in 711 A. D. and resulted in the conquest of Sind. This first Muslim invasion did not result in a permanent occupation of the country because the Caliphate of Baghdad, by whose order and command the invasion had taken place, was obliged by the middle of the 9th century A. D. to withdraw 2[f.2] its direct control from this distant province of Sind. Soon after this withdrawal, there began a series of terrible invasions by Muhammad of Ghazni in 1001 A. D. Muhammad died in 1030 A. D., but within the short span of 30 years, he invaded India 17 times. He was followed by Mahommad Ghori who began his career as an invader in 1173. He was killed in 1206. For thirty years had Muhammad of Ghazni ravaged India and for thirty years Mahommad Ghori harried the same country in the same way. Then followed the incursions of the Moghul hordes of Chenghiz Khan. They first came in 1221. They then only wintered on the border of India but did not enter it. Twenty years after, they marched on Lahore and sacked it. Of their inroads, the most terrible was under Taimur in 1398. Then comes on the scene a new invader in the person of Babar who invaded India in 1526. The invasions of India did not stop with that of Babar. There occurred two more invasions. In 1738 Nadirshah's invading host swept over the Punjab like a flooded river " furious as the ocean ". He was followed by Ahmadshah Abdalli who invaded India in 1761, smashed the forces of the Mahrattas at Panipat and crushed for ever the attempt of the Hindus to gain the ground which they had lost to their Muslim invaders.
These Muslim invasions were not undertaken merely out of lust for loot or conquest. There was another object behind them. The expedition against Sind by Mahommad bin Qasim was of a punitive character and was undertaken to punish Raja Dahir of Sind who had refused to make restitution for the seizure of an Arab ship at Debul, one of the sea-port towns of Sind. But, there is no doubt that striking a blow at the idolatry and polytheism of Hindus and establishing Islam in India was also one of the aims of this expedition. In one of his dispatches to
Hajjaj, Mahommad bin Qasim is quoted to have said :
" The nephew of Raja Dahir, his warriors and principal officers have been dispatched, and the infidels converted to Islam or destroyed. Instead of idol-temples, mosques and other places of worship have been created, the Kulbah it
read, the call to prayers is raised, so that devotions are performed at staled hours. The Takbir and praise to the Almighty God are offered every morning and evening. " 3[f.3]
After receiving the above dispatch, which had been forwarded with the head of the Raja, Hajjaj sent the following reply to his general:
" Except that you give protection to all, great and small alike, make no difference between enemy and friend. God, says, ' Give no quarter to infidels but cut their throats '. Then know that this is the command of the great God. You shall not be too ready to grant protection, because it will prolong your work. After this give no quarter to any enemy except those who are of rank." 4[f.4]

[G.Subramaniam]

Muhammad of Ghazni also looked upon his numerous invasions of India as the waging of a holy war. Al' Utbi, the historian of Muhammad, describing his raids writes :
" He demolished idol temples and established Islam. He captured ...... cities, killed the polluted wretches, destroying the idolaters, and gratifying Muslims. ' He then returned home and promulgated accounts of the victories obtained for Islam. ....... and vowed that every year he would undertake a holy war against Hind 5[f.5] . " Mahommed Ghori was actuated by the same holy zeal in his invasions of India. Hasan Nizami, the historian, describes his work in the following terms :
" He purged by his sword the land of Hind from the filth of infidelity and vice, and freed the whole of that country from the thorn of God-plurality and the impurity of idol-worship, and by his royal vigour and intrepidity left not one temple standing 6[f.6]
Taimur has in his Memoir explained what led him to invade India. He says:
" My object in the invasions of Hindustan is to lead a campaign against the infidels, to convert them to the true faith according to the command of Muhammad (on whom and his family be the blessing and peace of God), to purify the land from the defilement of misbelief and polytheism, and overthrow the temples and idols, whereby we shall be Ghazis and Mujahids, companions and soldiers of the faith before God. " 7[f.7]
These invasions of India by Muslims were as much invasions of India as they were wars among the Muslims themselves. This fact has remained hidden because the invaders are all lumped together as Muslims without distinction. But as a matter of fact, they were Tartars, Afghans and Mongols. Muhammad of Ghazni was a Tartar,
Mahommed of Ghori was an Afghan, Taimur was a Mongol, Babar was a Tartar, while Nadirshah and Ahmadshah Abdalli were Afghans. In invading India, the Afghan was out to destroy the Tartar and the Mongol was out to destroy the Tartar as well as the Afghan. They were not a loving family cemented by the feeling of Islamic brotherhood. They were deadly rivals of one another and their wars were often wars of mutual extermination. What is, however, important to bear in mind is that with all their internecine conflicts they were all united by one common objective and that was to destroy the Hindu faith.
The methods adopted by the Muslim invaders of India are not less significant for the subsequent history of India than the object of their invasions.
Mahommad bin Qasim's first act of religious zeal was forcibly to circumcise the Brahmins of the captured city of Debul ; but on discovering that they objected to this sort of conversion, he proceeded to put all above the age of 17 to death, and to order all others, with women and children, to be led into slavery. The temple of the Hindus was looted, and the rich booty was divided equally among the soldiers, after one-fifth, the legal portion for the government, had been set aside.
Muhammad of Ghazni from the first adopted those plans that would strike terror into the hearts of the Hindus. After the defeat of Raja JaipalinA.D. 1001, Muhammad ordered that Jaipal " be paraded about in the streets so that his sons and chieftains might see him in that condition of shame, bonds and disgrace; and that fear of Islam might fly abroad through the country of the infidels. "
"The slaughtering of ' infidels' seemed to be one thing that gave Muhammad particular pleasure. In one attack on Chand Rai, in A. D. 1019, many infidels were slain or taken prisoners, and the Muslims paid no regard to booty until they had satiated themselves with the slaughter of the infidels and worshippers of the sun and fire. The historian naively adds that the elephants of the Hindu armies came to Muhammad of their own accord, leaving idols, preferring the service of the religion of Islam. " 8[f.8]
Not infrequently, the slaughter of the Hindus gave a great setback to the indigenous culture of the Hindus, as in the conquest of Bihar by Muhammad Bakhtyar Khilji. When he took Nuddea (Bihar) the Tabaquat-i-Nasiri informs us
that:
" great plunder fell into the hands of the victors. Most of the inhabitants were Brahmins with shaven heads. They were put to death. Large number of books were found......... but none could explain their contents as all the men had
been killed, the whole fort and city being a place of study. " 9[f.9]
Summing up the evidence on the point. Dr. Titus concludes :
" Of the destruction of temples and the desecration of idols we have an abundance of evidence. Mahommad bin Qasim carried out his plan of destruction systematically in Sind, we have seen, but he made an exception of the famous temple at Multan for purposes of revenue, as this temple was a place of resort for pilgrims, who made large gifts to the idol. Nevertheless, while he thus satisfied his avarice by letting the temple stand, he gave vent to his malignity by having a piece of cow's flesh tied around the neck of the idol. " Minhaj-as-Siraj further tells how Mahommad became widely known for having destroyed as many as a thousand temples, and of his great feat in destroying the temple of Somnath and carrying off its idol, which he asserts was broken into four parts. One part he deposited in the Jami Masjid of Ghazni, one he placed at the entrance of the royal palace, the third he sent to Mecca, and the fourth to Medina. 10[f.10] "
It is said by Lane Poole that Muhammad of Ghazni " who had vowed that every year should see him wage a holy war against the infidels of Hindustan " could not rest from his idol-breaking campaign so long as the temple of Somnath remained inviolate. It was for this specific purpose that he, at the very close of his career, undertook his arduous march across the desert from Multan to Anhalwara on the coast, fighting as he went, until he saw at last the famous temple:
" There a hundred thousand pilgrims were wont to assemble, a thousand Brahmins served the temple and guarded its treasures, and hundreds of dancers and singers played before its gates. Within stood the famous linga, a rude pillar stone adorned with gems and lighted by jewelled candelebra which were reflected in rich hangings, embroidered with precious stones like stars, that decked the shrine..... Its ramparts were swarmed with incredulous Brahmins, mocking the vain arrogance of foreign infidels whom the God of Somnath would assuredly consume.
The foreigners, nothing daunted, scaled the walls; the God remained dumb to the urgent appeals of his servants;
fifty thousand Hindus suffered for their faith and the sacred shrine was sacked to the joy of the true believers. The great stone was cast down and its fragments were carried off to grace the conqueror's palace. The temple gates were setup at Ghazni and a million pounds worth of treasure rewarded the iconoclast " 11[f.11]
The work done by Muhammad of Ghazni became a pious tradition and was faithfully followed by those who came after him. In the words of Dr. Titus 12[f.12]
"Mahommad Ghori, one of the enthusiastic successors of Muhammad of Ghazni, in his conquest of Ajmir destroyed pillars and foundations of the idol-temples, and built in their stead mosques and colleges, and the precepts of Islam and the customs of the law were divulged and established. At Delhi, the city and its vicinity were freed from idols and idol worship, and in the sanctuaries of the images of the Gods mosques were raised by the worshippers of the one God.
" Qutb-ud-Din Aybak also is said to have destroyed nearly a thousand temples, and then raised mosques on their foundations. The same author states that he built the Jami Masjid, Delhi, and adorned it with the stones and gold obtained from the temples which had been demolished by elephants, and covered it with inscriptions (from the Quran) containing the divine commands. We have further evidence of this harrowing process having been systematically employed from the inscription extant over the eastern gateway of this same mosque at Delhi, which
relates that the materials of 27 idol temples were used in its construction.
" Ala-ud-Din, in his zeal to build a second Minar to the Jami Masjid, to rival the one built by Qulb-ud-Din, is said by Amir Khusru not only to have dug stones out of the hills, but to have demolished temples of the infidels to furnish a supply. In his conquests of South India the destruction of temples was carried out by Ala-ud-Din as it had been in the north by his predecessors.
" The Sultan Firoz Shah, in his Futuhat, graphically relates how he treated Hindus who had dared to build new temples. ' When they did this in the city (Delhi) and the environs, in opposition to the law of the Prophet, which declares that such are not to be tolerated, under Divine guidance I destroyed these edifices. I killed these leaders of infidelity and punished others with stripes, until this abuse was entirely abolished and where infidels and idolaters worshipped idols, Musalmans now by God's mercy perform their devotions to the true God."
Even in the reign of Shah Jahan, we read of the destruction of the temples that the Hindus had started to rebuild, and the account of this direct attack on the piety of the Hindus is thus solemnly recorded in the Badshah-namah :
" It had been brought to the notice of His Majesty, says the historian, that during the late reign (of Akbar) many idol-temples had been begun but remained unfinished at Benares, the great stronghold of infidelity. The infidels were now desirous of completing them. His Majesty, the defender of the faith, gave orders that at Benares and throughout all his dominions in every place all temples that had been begun should be cast down. It was reported from the Province of Allahabad that 76 temples had been destroyed in the district of Benares. " 13[f.13]
It was left to Aurangzeb to make a final attempt to overthrow idolatry. The author of ' Ma ' athir-i-Alamgiri dilates upon his efforts to put down Hindu teaching, and his destruction of temples in the following terms :
" In April, A. D. 1669, Aurangzib learned that in the provinces of Thatta, Multan and Benares, but especially in the latter, foolish Brahmins were in the habit of expounding frivolous books in their schools, and that learners, Muslims as well as Hindus, went there from long distances.... The ' Director of the Faith ' consequently issued orders to all the governors of provinces to destroy with a willing hand the schools and temples of the infidels; and they were enjoined to put an entire stop to the teaching and practising of idolatrous worship.. ...Later it was reported to his
religious Majesty that the Government officers had destroyed the temple of Bishnath at Benares. " 14[f.14]
As Dr. Titus observes 15 [f.15] —
" Such invaders as Muhammad and Timur seem to have been more concerned with iconoclasm, the collection of booty, the enslaving of captives, and the sending of infidels to hell with the' proselytizing sword ' than they were with the conversion of them even by force. But when rulers were permanently established the winning of converts became a matter of supreme urgency. It was a part of the stale policy to establish Islam as the religion of the whole land.
"Qutb-ud-Din, whose reputation for destroying temples was almost as great as that of Muhammad, in the latter part of the twelfth century and early years of the thirteenth, must have frequently resorted to force as an incentive to conversion. One instance may be noted: when he approached Koil (Aligarh) in A. D. 1194, ' those of the garrison who were wise and acute were converted to Islam, but the others were slain with the sword '.
" Further examples of extreme measures employed to effect a change of faith are all too numerous. One pathetic case is mentioned in the lime of the reign of Firoz Shah (A. D. 1351—1388). An old Brahmin of Delhi had been accused of worshipping idols in his house, and of even leading Muslim women to become infidels. He was sent for and his case placed before the judges, doctors, elders and lawyers. Their reply was that the provisions of the law were clear. The Brahmin must either become a Muslim or be burned. The true faith was declared to him and the right course pointed out, but he refused to accept it. Consequently he was burned by the order of the Sultan, and the commentator adds, ' Behold the Sultan's strict adherence to law and rectitude, how he would not deviate in the least
from its decrees '. "
Muhammad not only destroyed temples but made it a policy to make slaves of the Hindus he conquered. In the words of Dr. Titus:
" Not only was slaughter of the infidels and the destruction of their temples resorted to in earlier period of Islam's contact with India, but as we have seen, many of the vanquished were led into slavery. The dividing up of booty was one of the special attractions, to the leaders as well as to the common soldiers in these expeditions. Muhammad seems to have made the slaughter of infidels, the destruction of their temples, the capturing of slaves, and the plundering of the wealth of the people, particularly of the temples and the priests, the main object of his raids. On the occasion of his first raid he is said to have taken much booty ; and half a million Hindus, ' beautiful men and women ', were reduced to slavery and taken back to Ghazni. " 16[f.16]
When Muhammad later took Kanauj, in A. D. 1017, he took so much booty and so many prisoners that * the fingers of those who counted them would have tired '. Describing how common Indian slaves had become in Ghazni and Central Asia after the campaign of A. D. 1019, the historian of the times says 17[f.17] :
"The number of prisoners may be conceived from the fact that each was sold for from two to ten dirhams. These were afterwards taken to Ghazni, and merchants came from far distant cities to purchase them ;. . ....and the fair and the dark, the rich and the poor were commingled in one common slavery. " In the year A.D. 1202, when Qulb-ud-Din captured Kalinjar, after the temples had been convened into mosques, and the very name of idolatry was annihilated, fifty thousand men came under the collar of slavery and the plain became black as pitch with Hindus. "
Slavery was the fate of those Hindus who were captured in the holy war. But, when there was no war the systematic abasement of the Hindus played no unimportant part in the methods adopted by the Muslim invaders. In the days of
Ala-ud-Din, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Hindus had in certain parts given the Sultan much trouble. So, he determined to impose such taxes on them that they would be prevented from rising in rebellion.
" The Hindu was to be left unable to keep a horse to ride on, to carry arms, to wear fine clothes, or to enjoy any of the luxuries of life. " 18[f.18]
Speaking of the levy of Jizyah Dr. Titus says 19[f.19] ''
" The payment of the Jizyah by the Hindus continued throughout the dominions of the sultans, emperors, and kings in various parts of India with more or less regularity, though often, the law was in force in theory only ; since it depended entirely on the ability of the sovereign to enforce his demands. But, finally, it was abolished throughout the Moghul Empire in the ninth year of the enlightened Akbar's reign (A. D. 1665), after it had been accepted as a fundamental part of Muslim government policy in India for a period of more than eight centuries. "
Lane Poole says that " the Hindu was taxed to the extent of half the produce of his land, and had to pay duties on all his buffaloes, goats, and other milk-cattle. The taxes were to be levied equally on rich and poor, at so much per acre, so much per
animal. Any collectors or officers taking bribes were summarily dismissed and heavily punished with sticks, pincers, the rack, imprisonment and chains. The new rules were strictly carried out, so that one revenue officer would string together 20 Hindu notables and enforce payment by blows. No gold or silver, not even the betelnut, so cheering and stimulative to pleasure, was to be seen in a Hindu house, and the wives of the impoverished native officials were reduced to taking service in Muslim families. Revenue officers came to be regarded as more deadly than the plague; and to be a government clerk was disgrace worse than death, in so much that no Hindu would marry his daughter to such a man. " 20[f.20]

[G.Subramaniam]

These edicts, says the historian of the period,
" were so strictly carried out that the chaukidars and khuts and muqad-dims were not able to ride on horseback, to find weapon, to wear fine clothes, or to indulge in betel. . .... No Hindu could hold up his head. ..... Blows, confinement in the stocks, imprisonment and chains were all employed to enforce payment. "
All this was not the result of mere caprice or moral perversion. On the other hand, what was done was in accordance with the ruling ideas of the leaders of Islam in the broadest aspects. These ideas were well expressed by the Kazi in reply to a question put by Sultan Ala-ud-Din wanting to know the legal position of the Hindus under Muslim law. The Kazi said :—
" They are called payers of tribute, and when the revenue officer demands silver from them they should without question, and with all humility and respect, tender gold. If the officer throws dirt in their mouths, they must without reluctance open their mouths wide to receive it..... The due subordination of the Dhimmi is exhibited in this humble payment, and by this throwing of dirt into their mouths. The glorification of Islam is a duty, and contempt for religion is vain. God holds them in contempt, for he says, ' Keep them in subjection '. To keep the Hindus in
abasement is especially a religious duty, because they are the most inveterate enemies of the Prophet, and because the Prophet has commanded us to slay them, plunder them, and make them captive, saying, ' Convert them to Islam
or kill them, and make them slaves, and spoil their wealth and properly '. No doctor but the great doctor (Hani-fah), to whose school we belong, has assented to the imposition of jizya on Hindus ; doctors of other schools allow no other alternative but ' Death or Islam '. " 21[f.21] Such is the story of this period of 762 years which elapsed between the advent of Muhammad of Ghazni and the return of Ahmadshah Abdalli.
How far is it open to the Hindus to say that Northern India is part of Aryavarta ? How far is it open to the Hindus to say because once it belonged to them, therefore, it must remain for ever an integral part of India ? Those who oppose separation and hold to the ' historic sentiment ' arising out of an ancient fact that Northern India including Afghanistan was once part of India and that the people of that area were either Buddhist or Hindus, must be asked whether the events of these 762 years of incessant Muslim invasions, the object with which they were launched and the methods adopted by these invaders to give effect to their object are to be treated as though they were matters of no account ?
Apart from other consequences which have flowed from them these invasions have, in my opinion, so profoundly altered the ' culture and character of the northern areas, which it is now proposed to be included in a Pakistan, that there is not only no unity between that area and the rest of India but that there is as a matter of fact a real antipathy between the two.
The first consequence of these invasions was the breaking up of the unity of Northern India with the rest of India. After his conquest of Northern India, Muhammad of Ghazni detached it from India and ruled it from Ghazni. When Mahommed Ghori came in the field as a conqueror, he again attached it to India and ruled it from Lahore and then from Delhi. Hakim, the brother of Akbar, detached Kabul and Kandahar from Northern India. Akbar again attached it to Northern India. They were again detached by Nadirshah in 1738 and the whole of Northern India would have been severed from India had it not been for the check provided by the rise of the Sikhs. Northern India, therefore, has been like a wagon in a train, which can be coupled or uncoupled according to the circumstances of the moment. If analogy is wanted, the case of Alsace-Lorraine could be cited. Alsace-Lorraine was originally part of Germany, like the rest of Switzerland and the Low Countries. It continued to be so till 1680, when it was taken by France and incorporated into French territory. It belonged to France till 1871, when it was detached by Germany and made part of her territory. In 1918, it was again detached from Germany and made part of France. In 1940, it was detached from France and made part of Germany.
The methods adopted by the invaders have left behind them their aftermath. One aftermath is the bitterness between the Hindus and the Muslims which they have caused. This bitterness, between the two, is so deep-seated that a century of political life has neither succeeded in assuaging it, nor in making people forget it. As the invasions were accompanied with. destruction of temples and forced conversions, with spoliation of property, with slaughter,, enslavement and abasement of men, women and children, what wonder if the memory of these invasions has ever remained green, as a source of pride to the Muslims and as a source of shame to the Hindus ? But these things apart, this north-west corner of India has been a theatre in which a stern drama has been played. Muslim hordes, in wave after wave, have surged down into this area and from thence scattered themselves in spray over the rest of India. These reached the rest of India in thin currents. In time, they also receded from their farthest limits ; while they lasted, they left a deep deposit of Islamic culture over the original Aryan culture in this north-west corner of India which has given it a totally different colour, both in religious and political outlook. The Muslim invaders, no doubt, came to India singing a hymn of hate against the Hindus. But, they did not merely sing their hymn of hate and go back burning a few temples on the way. That would have been a blessing. They were not content with so negative a result. They did a positive act, namely, to plant the seed of Islam. The growth of this plant is remarkable. It is not a summer sapling. It is as great and as strong as an oke. Its growth is the thickest in Northern India. The successive invasions have deposited their ' silt ' more there than anywhere else, and have served as watering exercises of devoted gardeners. Its growth is so thick in Northern India that the remnants of Hindu and Buddhist culture are just shrubs. Even the Sikh axe could not fell this oak. Sikhs, no doubt , became the political masters of Northern India, but they did not gain back Northern India to that spiritual and cultural unity by which it was bound to the rest of India before HsuanTsang. The Sikhs coupled it back to India. Still, it remains like Alsace-Lorraine politically detachable and spiritually alien so far as the rest of India is concerned. It is only an unimaginative person who could
fail to take notice of these facts or insist in the face of them that Pakistan means breaking up into two what is one whole.

What is the unity the Hindu sees between Pakistan and Hindustan ? If it is geographical unity, then that is no unity. Geographical unity is unity intended by nature. In building up a nationality on geographical unity, it must be remembered that it is a case where Nature proposes and Man disposes. If it is unity in external things, such as ways and habits of life, that is no unity. Such unity is the result of exposure to a common environment. If it is administrative unity, that again is no unity. The instance of Burma is in point. Arakan and Tenas-serim were annexed in 1826 by the treaty of Yendabu. Pegu and Martaban were annexed in 1852. Upper Burma was annexed in 1886. The administrative unity between India and Burma was forged in 1826. For over 110 years that administrative unity continued to exist. In 1937, the knot that tied the two together was cut asunder and nobody
shed a tear over it. The unity between India and Burma was not less fundamental. If unity is to be of an abiding character, it must be founded on a sense of kinship, in the feeling of being kindred. In short, it must be spiritual.
Judged in the light of these considerations, the unity between Pakistan and Hindustan is a myth. Indeed, there is more spiritual unity between Hindustan and Burma than there is between Pakistan and Hindustan. And if the Hindus did not object to the severance of Burma from India, it is difficult to understand how the Hindus can object to the severance of an area like Pakistan, which, to repeat, is politically detachable from, socially hostile and spiritually alien to, the rest of India.

[G.Subramaniam]

CHAPTER V
WEAKENING OF THE DEFENCES
How will the creation of Pakistan affect the question of the Defence of Hindustan ? The question is not a very urgent one. For, there is no reason to suppose that Pakistan will be at war with Hindustan immediately it is brought into being. Nevertheless, as the question is sure to be raised, it is better to deal with it.
The question may be considered under three heads: (1) Question of Frontiers, (2) Question of Resources and (3)
Question of Armed Forces.
I
QUESTION OF FRONTIERS
It is sure to be urged by the Hindus that Pakistan leaves Hindustan without a scientific frontier. The obvious reply, of course, is that the Musalmans cannot be asked to give up their right to Pakistan, because it adversely affects the Hindus in the matter of their boundaries. But banter apart, there are really two considerations, which, if taken into account, will show that the apprehensions of the Hindus in this matter are quite uncalled for.
In the first place, can any country hope to have a frontier which may be called scientific? As Mr. Davies, the author of North-West Frontier, observes:
" It would be impossible to demarcate on the North-West of our Indian Empire a frontier which would satisfy ethnological, political and military requirements. To seek for a zone which traverses easily definable geographical features; which does not violate ethnic considerations by cutting through the territories of closely related tribes; and which at the same time serves as a political boundary, is Utopian."
As a matter of history, there has been no one scientific boundary for India and different persons have advocated different boundaries for India. The question of boundaries has given rise to two policies, the " Forward " Policy and the " Back to the Indus " Policy. The " Forward " Policy had a greater and a lesser intent, to use the language of Sir George Macmunn. In its greater intent, it meant active control in the affairs of Afghanistan as an Etat Tampion to India and the extension of Indian influence up to the Oxus. In its lesser intent, it was confined to the absorption of the tribal hills between the administered territory (i.e. the Province of N.-W.F.) and Afghanistan as defined by the Durand Line and the exercise of British control right up to that line. The greater intent of the Forward Policy, as a basis for a safe boundary for India, has long been abandoned. Consequently, there remain three possible boundary lines to choose from: (1) the Indus River, (2) the present administrative boundary of the N.-W. F. P. and (3) the Durand Line. Pakistan will no doubt bring the boundary of Hindustan Back to the Indus, indeed behind the Indus, to the Sutlej. But this " Back to the Indus " policy was not without its advocates. The greatest exponent, of the Indus boundary was Lord Lawrence, who was strongly opposed to any forward move beyond the trans-indus foot-hills.
He advocated meeting any invader in the valley of the Indus. In his opinion, it would be an act of folly and weakness to give battle at any great distance from the Indus base ; and the longer the distance an invading army has to march through Afghanistan and the tribal country, the more harassed it would be. Others, no doubt, have pointed out that a river is a weak line of defence. But the principal reason for not retiring to the Indus boundary seems to lie elsewhere. Mr. Davies gives the real reason when he says that the " ' Back to Indus ' cry becomes absurd when it is examined from the point of view of the inhabitants of the modern North-West Frontier Province. Not only would withdrawal mean loss of prestige, but it would also be a gross betrayal of those peoples to whom we have extended our beneficent rule."
In fact, it is no use insisting that any particular boundary is the safest, for the simple reason that geographical conditions are not decisive in the world today and modern technique has robbed natural frontiers of much of their former importance, even where they are mighty mountains, the broadest streams, widest seas or far stretching deserts.
In the second place, it is always possible for nations with no natural boundaries to make good this defect. Countries are not wanting which have no natural boundaries. Yet, all have made good the deficiencies of nature, by creating artificial fortifications as barriers, which can be far more impregnable than natural barriers. There is no reason to suppose that the Hindus will not be able to accomplish what other countries similarly situated have done. Given the resources, Hindus need have no fear for want of a naturally safe frontier.
II
QUESTION OF RESOURCES
More important than the question of a scientific frontier, is the question of resources. If resources are ample for the necessary equipment, then it is always possible to overcome the difficulties created by an unscientific or a weak frontier. We must, therefore, consider the comparative resources of Pakistan and Hindustan. The following figures are intended to convey an idea of their comparative resources:—
Resources of Pakistan
Provinces Area Population Revenues 22[f.22] Rs.
N.-W. F. P. 13,518 2,425,003 1,90,11,842
Punjab 91,919 23,551,210 12,53,87,730
Sind 46,378 3,887,070 9,56,76,269
Baluchistan .. 54,228 420,648
Bengal 82,955 50,000,000 36,55,62,485
Total .. 288,998 80,283,931 60,56,38,326
Resources of Hindustan
Provinces Area Population Revenues 23[f.23] Rs.
Ajmer-Mcrwara 2,711 560,292 21,00,000
Assam 55,014 8,622,251 4,46,04,441
Bihar 69,348 32,371,434 6,78,21,588
Bombay 77,271 18,000,000 34,98,03,800
C. P. & Berar 99957 15,507,723 4,58,83,962
Coorg 1,593 163,327 11,00,000
Delhi 573 636,246 70,00,000
Madras 142,277 46,000,000 25,66,71,265
Orissa 32,695 8,043,681 87,67,269
U.P. 206,248 48,408,763 16,85,52,881
Total 607,657 178,513,919 96,24,05,206
These are gross figures. They are subject to certain additions and deductions. Revenues derived by the Central Government from Railways, Currency and Post and Telegraphs are not included in these figures, as it is not possible to ascertain how much is raised from each Province. When it is done, certain additions will have to be made to the figures under revenue. There can be no doubt that the share from these heads of revenue that will come to Hindustan, will be much larger than the share that will go to Pakistan. Just as additions will have to be made to these figures, so also deductions will have to be made from them. Most of these deductions will, of course, fall to the lot of Pakistan. As will be shown later, some portion of the Punjab will have to be excluded from the scheme of Western Pakistan. Similarly, some portion of Bengal will have to be excluded from the proposed Eastern Pakistan, although a district from Assam will have to be added to it. According to me, fifteen districts will have to be excluded from Bengal and thirteen districts shall have to be excluded from the Punjab. Sufficient data are not
available to enable any one to give an exact idea of what would be the reduction in the area, population and revenue, that would result from the exclusion of these districts. One may, however, hazard the guess that so far as the Punjab and Bengal are concerned, their revenues would be halved. What is lost by Pakistan by this exclusion, will of course be gained by Hindustan. To put it in concrete terms, while the revenues of Western and Eastern Pakistan will be 60 crores minus 24crores, i.e., 36 crores, the revenues of Hindustan will be about 96 crores plus 24
crores, i.e., 120 crores.
The study of these figures, in the light of the observations I have made, will show that the resources of Hindustan are far greater than the resources of Pakistan, whether one considers the question in terms of area, population or revenue. There need, therefore, be no apprehension on the score of resources. For, the creation of Pakistan will not leave Hindustan in a weakened condition.

[G.Subramaniam]

Ill
QUESTION OF ARMED FORCES
The defence of a country does not depend so much upon its scientific frontier as it does upon its resources. But more than resources does it depend upon the fighting forces available to it. What are the fighting forces available to Pakistan and to Hindustan ? The Simon Commission pointed out, as a special feature of the Indian Defence Problem, that there were special areas which alone offered recruits to the Indian Army and that there were other areas which offered none or if at all, very few. The facts revealed in the following table, taken from the Report of the Commission, undoubtedly will come as a most disagreeable surprise to many Indians, who think and care about the defence of India :
Areas of Recruitment Number of Recruits drawn
1 N.-W. Frontier Province 5,600
2 Kashmir 6,500
3 Punjab 86,000
4 Baluchistan 300
5 Nepal 19,000
6 United Provinces 16,500
7 Rajputana 7,000
8 Central India 200
9 Bombay 7,000
10 Central Provinces 100
11 Bihar & Orissa 300
12 Bengal Nil
13 Assam Nil
14 Burma 3,000
15 Hyderabad 700
16 Mysore 100
17 Madras 4,000
18 Miscellaneous 1,900
TOTAL 158,200
The Simon Commission found that this state of affairs was natural to India, and in support of it, cited the following figures of recruitment from the different Provinces of India during the Great War especially because " it cannot be suggested that any discouragement was offered to recruitment in any area ":
Province
Combatants Recruits
Enlisted
Non-combatants
Recruits Enlisted
Total
Madras Bombay 51,223 41,117 92,340
Bengal 41,272 30,211 71,483
United Provinces 7,117 51,935 59,052
Punjab 163,578 117,565 281,148
North-West 349,688 97,288 446,976
Frontier 32,181 13,050 45,231
Baluchistan 1,761 327 2,088
Burma 14,094 4,579 18,673
Bihar and Orissa 8,576 32,976 41,552
Central Provinces 5,376 9,631 15,007
Assam 942 14,182 15,124
Ajmer-Marwar 7,341 1,632 8,973
Nepal 58,904 - 58,904
Total 742,053 414,493 1,156,546

[G.Subramaniam]

These data reveal in a striking manner that the fighting forces available for the defence of India mostly come from areas which are to be included in Pakistan. From this it may be argued, that without Pakistan, Hindustan cannot defend itself.
The facts brought out by the Simon Commission are, of course, beyond question. But they cannot be made the basis of a conclusion, such as is suggested by the Simon Commission, namely, that only Pakistan can produce soldiers and that Hindustan cannot. That such a conclusion is quite untenable will be seen from the following considerations.
In the first place, what is regarded by the Simon Commission as something peculiar to India is not quite so peculiar. What appears to be peculiar is not due to any inherent defect in the people. The peculiarity arises because of the policy of recruitment followed by the British Government for years past. The official explanation of this predominance in the Indian Army of the men of the North-West is that they belong to the Martial Classes. But Mr. Chaudhari 24 [f.24] has demonstrated, by unimpeachable data, that this explanation is far from being true. He has shown that the predominance in the Army of the men of the North-West took place as early as the Mutiny of 1857, some 20 years before the theory of Martial and Non-martial Classes was projected in an indistinct form for the first
time in 1879 by the Special Army Committee 25[f.25] appointed in that year, and that their predominance had nothing to do with their alleged fighting qualities but was due to the fact, that they helped the British to suppress the Mutiny in which the Bengal Army was so completely involved. To quote Mr. Chaudhari :
" The pre-Mutiny army of Bengal was essentially a Brahmin and Kshalriya army of the Ganges basin. All the three Presidency Armies of those days, as we have slated in the first part of this article, were in a sense quite representative of the military potentialities of the areas to which they belonged, though none of them could, strictly speaking, be correctly described as national armies of the provinces concerned, as there was no attempt to draw upon any but the traditional martial elements of the population. But they all got their recruits mainly from their
natural areas of recruitment, viz., the Madras Army from the Tamil and Telugu countries, the Bombay Army from Western India, and the Bengal Army from Bihar and U. P. and to a very limited extent from Bengal. There was no official restriction on the enrolment of men of any particular tribe or caste or region, provided they were otherwise eligible. Leaving aside for the moment the practice of the Bombay and the Madras Armies, the only exception to this general rule in the Bengal Army was that which applied to the Punjabis and Sikhs, who, inspite of their magnificent military traditions, were not given a fair representation in the Army of Northern India. Their recruitment, on the contrary, was placed under severe restrictions by an order of the Government, which laid down that ' the number of Punjabis in a regiment is never to exceed 200, nor are more than 100 of them lobe Sikhs'. It was only the revolt of the Hindustani regiments of the Bengal Army that gave an opportunity to the Punjabis to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the British authorities. Till then, they remained suspect and under a ban, and the Bengal Army on the eve of the Mutiny was mainly recruited from Oudh, North and South Bihar, especially the latter, principally Shahabad and Bhojpur, the Doab of the Ganges and Jumna and Rohilkhund. The soldiers recruited from these areas were mostly high-caste men. Brahmins of all denominations, Kshatriyas, Rajputs and
Ahirs. The average proportion in which these classes were enrolled in a regiment was: (1) Brahmin 7/24, (2) Rajputs 1/4, (3) Inferior Hindus 1/6, (4) Musalmans 1/6, (5) Punjabis 1/8.
"To this army, the area which now-a-days furnishes the greatest number of soldiers—the Punjab, Nepal, N.-W. F. Province, the hill tracts of Kumaon and Garhwal, Rajpulana,—furnished very few recruits or none at all. There was practical exclusion in it of all the famous fighting castes of India,—Sikhs, Gurkhas, Punjabi Musalmans, Dogras, Jats, Pathans, Garhwalis, Rajpulana Rajpuls, Kumaonis, Gujars, all the tribes and seels, in fact, which are looked upon today as atower of strength of the Indian Army. A single year and a single rebellion was, however, to change all this. The Mutiny, which broke out in 1857, blew up the old Bengal Army and brought into existence a Punjabized and barbarized army, resembling the Indian Army of today in broad lines and general proportions of its
composition.
" The gaps created by the revolt of the Hindustani regiments (of the Bengal Army) were at once filled up by Sikhs and other Punjabis, and hillmen eager for revenge and for the loot of the cities of Hindustan. They had all been conquered and subjugated by the British with the help of the Hindustani soldiers, and in their ignorance, they regarded the Hindustanis, rather the handful of British, as their real enemies. This enmity was magnificently exploited by the British authorities in suppressing the Mutiny. When the news of the enlistment of Gurkhas reached
Lord Dalhousie in England he expressed great satisfaction and wrote to a friend: ' Against the Oudh Sepoys they may confidently be expected to fight like devils'. And after the Mutiny, General Mansfield, the Chief of the Staff of the Indian Army, wrote about the Sikhs: ' It was not because they loved us, but because they hated Hindustan and haled the Bengal Army that the Sikhs had flocked to our standard instead of seeking the opportunity to strike again for their freedom. They wanted to revenge themselves and to gain riches by the plunder of Hindustani cities. They
were not attracted by mere daily pay, it was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and stamping on the heads of their enemies. In short, we turned to profit the esprit de corps of the old Khalsa Army of Ranjit Singh, in the manner which for a time would most effectually bind the Sikhs to us as long as the active service against their old enemies may last ".
" The relations thus established were in fact to last much longer. The services rendered by the Sikhs and Gurkhas during the Mutiny were not forgotten and henceforward the Punjab and Nepal had the place of honour in the Indian
Army."
That Mr. Chaudhari is right when he says that it was the Mutiny of 1857 which was the real cause of the preponderance in the Indian Army of the men of the North-West is beyond the possibility of doubt. Equally incontrovertible is the view of Mr. Chaudhari that this preponderance of the men of the North-West is not due to
their native superiority in fighting qualities, as the same is amply borne out by the figures which he has collected, showing the changes in the composition of the Indian Infantry before and after the Mutiny.

[G.Subramaniam]

CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN INFANTRY
Percentage of men from different Paris
Year North-West India North-East India
U. P, Bihar
South India Burma
Punjab, N.-W. F.,
Kashmir
Nepal, Garhwal,
Kumaon
1856 Less than 10 Negligible Not less Nil
than 90
1858 47 6 47
1883 48 17 35
1893 53 24 23
1905 47 15 22 16
1919 46 14.8 25.5 12 1.7
1930 58.5 22 11.0 5.5 3
These figures show that in 1856, one year before the Mutiny, the men from the North-West were a negligible factor in the Indian Army. But in 1858, one year after the Mutiny, they had acquired a dominant position which has never received a setback.
It will thus be seen that the distinction between Martial and Non-martial Classes, which was put forth for the first time in 1879, as a matter of principle, which was later on insisted upon as a matter of serious consideration by Lord Roberts 26 [f.26] and which was subsequently recognised by Lord Kitchener as a principle governing recruitment to the Indian Army, had nothing to do with the origin of this preponderance of the men of the North-West in the Indian Army. No doubt, the accident that the people from North-West India had the good luck of being declared by the Government as belonging to the Martial Class, while most of the classes coming from the rest of India had the ill-luck of being declared Non-martial Classes had important consequences. Being regularly employed in the Army, the people of North-West India came to look upon service in the Army as an occupation with a security and a career which was denied to men from the rest of India. The large number of recruits drawn from North-West India, therefore, indicates nothing more than this—namely, owing to the policy of the British Government, service in the Army has become their occupation and if people in other parts of India do not readily come forth to enlist in the Army, the reason is that Government did not employ them in the Army. People follow their ancestral occupations whether they like it or not. When a people do not take to a new occupation it does not necessarily mean that they are not fit for it. It only means that it is not their ancestral occupation.
This division between Martial and Non-martial Classes is, of course, a purely arbitrary and artificial distinction. It is as foolish as the Hindu theory of caste, making birth instead of worth, the basis for recognition. At one time, the
Government insisted that the distinction they had adopted was a real distinction and that in terms of fighting qualities, it meant so much fighting value. In fact, this was their justification for recruiting more men from the North-West of India. That this distinction has nothing to do with any difference in fighting qualities has now been admitted. Sir Phillip Chetwode, 27[f27] late Commander-in-Chief of India, broadcasting from London on the constitution of the Indian Army, took pains to explain that the recruitment of a larger proportion of it from the Punjab, did not mean that the people of the Peninsula were without martial qualities. Sir Phillip Chetwode explained that the reason why men of the North were largely recruited for the Indian Army was chiefly climatic, as the men from the South cannot stand the extremes of heat and cold of North India. No race can be permanently
without martial spirit. Martial spirit is not a matter of native instinct. It is a matter of training and anybody can be trained to it.
But apart from this, there is enough fighting material in Hindustan, besides what might be produced by special training. There are the Sikhs, about whose fighting equalities nothing need be said. There are the Rajputs who are even now included in the category of Martial Classes. In addition to these, there are the Mahrattas who proved their calibre as a fighting race during the last European War. Even the people of the Madras Presidency can be depended upon for military purposes. Speaking of the Madrasis as soldiers, General Sir Frederick P. Haines, at one time
Commander-in-Chief in India, observed :
" It has been customary to declare that the Madras Army is composed of men physically inferior to those of the Bengal Army, and if stature alone be taken into consideration, this is true. It is also said that by the force of circumstances the martial feeling and the characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no longer to be found in its ranks. I feel bound to reject the above assertions and others which ascribe comparative inefficiency to Madras troops. It is true that in recent years they have seen but little service; for, with the exception of the sappers, they
have been specially excluded from all participation in work in the field. I cannot admit for one moment that anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the Madras Sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill training and discipline, the Madras Sepoy is inferior to none; while in point of health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favourably with his neighbours. This has been manifested by the sappers and their followers in the Khyber; and the sappers are of the same race as the Sepoys."
Hindustan need, therefore, have no apprehension regarding the supply of an adequate fighting force from among its own people. The separation of Pakistan cannot weaken her in that respect. The Simon Commission drew attention to three features of the Indian Army, which struck them as being special and peculiar to India. It pointed out that the duty of the Army in India was two-fold; firstly, to prevent the independent tribes on the Indian side of the Afghan frontier from raiding the peaceful inhabitants of the plains below. Secondly, to protect India against invasion by countries lying behind and beyond this belt of unorganized
territories. The Commission took note of the fact that from 1850 to 1922, there were 72 expeditions against the independent tribes, an average of one a year, and also of the fact that in the countries behind and beyond this belt of unorganized territory, lies the direction from which, throughout the ages, the danger to India's territorial integrity has come. This quarter is occupied by " States which according to the Commission are not members of the League of Nations " and is, therefore, a greater danger to India now than before. The Commission insisted on emphasizing
that these two facts constituted a peculiar feature of the problem of military defence in India and so far as the urgency and extent of the problem is concerned, they are " without parallel elsewhere in the Empire, and constituted a difficulty in developing self-government which never arose in any comparable degree in the case of the self-governing Dominions ".
As a second unique feature of the Indian Army, the Commission observed:
" The Army in India is not only provided and organized to ensure against external dangers of a wholly exceptional character: it is also distributed and habitually used throughout India for the purpose of maintaining or restoring internal peace. In all countries . . . . the military is not normally employed in this way, and certainly is not organized for this purpose. But the case of India is entirely different. Troops are employed many times a year to prevent internal disorder and, if necessary, to quell it. Police forces, admirably organized as they are, cannot be expected in
all cases to cope with the sudden and violent outburst of a mob driven frantic by religious frenzy. It is, therefore, well understood in India both by the police and by the military—and, what is even more to the point, by the public at large—that the soldiers may have to be sent for.. . This Use of the Army for the purpose of maintaining or restoring internal order was increasing rather than diminishing, and that on these occasions the practically universal request was for British troops. The proportion of the British to Indian troops allotted to this duty has in fact risen in
the last quarter of a century. The reason, of course, is that the British soldier is a neutral, and is under no suspicion of favouring Hindus against Mahomedans or Mahomedans against Hindus ..... Inasmuch as the vast majority of the disturbances which call for the intervention of the military have a communal or religious complexion, it is natural and inevitable that the intervention which is most likely to be authoritative should be that which has no bias, real or suspected, to either side. It is a striking fact in this connection that, while in regular units of the Army in India as a whole British soldiers are in a minority of about 1 to 21/2, in the troops allotted for internal security the preponderance is reversed, and for this purpose a majority of British troops is employed—in the troops car-marked
(or internal security the proportion is about eight British to seven Indian soldiers."
Commenting upon this feature of the Indian Army the Commission said:
" When, therefore, one contemplates a future for India in which, in place of the existing Army organization, the country is defended and pacified by exclusively Indian units, just as Canada relics on Canadian troops and Ireland on Irish troops, it is essential to realize and bear in mind the dimensions and character of the Indian problem of internal order and the part which the British soldier at present plays (to the general satisfaction of the country-side) in supporting peaceful government."
The third unique feature of the Indian Army, which was pointed out by the Simon Commission, is the preponderance in it of the men from the North-West. The origin of this preponderance and the reasons underlying the official explanation given therefor have already been examined. But, there is one more special feature of the Indian Army to which the Commission made no reference at all. The
commission either ignored it or was not aware of it. It is such an important feature that it overshadows all the three features to which the Commission refers, in its importance and in its social and political consequences. It is a feature which, if widely known, will set many people to think furiously. It is sure to raise questions which may prove insoluble and which may easily block the path of India's political progress—questions of far greater importance and complexity than those relating to Indianization of the Army. This neglected feature relates to the communal composition of the Indian Army. Mr. Chaudhari has collected the relevant data in his articles, already referred to, which throws a flood of light on this aspect of the Indian Army. The following table shows the proportion of soldiers serving in the Indian Infantry, according to the area and the community from which they are drawn:

[G.Subramaniam]

Changes in the Communal
Composition of the Indian Army
Area and Communities Percentage in 1914
Percentage in 1918 Percentage in 1919 Percentage in 1930
I. The Punjab, N.-W. F. P. and Kashmir
47 46.5 46 58.5
(1) Sikhs 19.2 17.4 15.4 13.58
(2) Punjabi Musalmans 11.1 11.3 12.4 22.6
(3) Pathans 6.2 5.42 4.54 6.35
II. Nepal, Kumaon, Garhwal 15 18.9 14.9 22.0
(1) Gurkhas 13.1 16.6 12.2 16.4
III. Upper India
22 22.7 25.5 11.0
(1) U.P.Rajputs 6.4 6.8 7.7 2.55
(2) Hindustani Musalmans 4.1 3.42 4.45 Nil
(3) Brahmins 1.8 1.86 2.5 Nil
IV. South India
16 11.9 12 5.5
(1) Mahrattas 4.9 3.85 3.7 5.33
(2) Madras! Musalmans 3.5 2.71 2.13 Nil
(3) Tamils 2.5 2.0 1.67 Nil
V. Burma
(1) Burmans Nil Negligible 1.7 3.0
This table brings out in an unmistakable manner the profound changes which have been going on in the communal composition of the Indian Army particularly after 1919. They are (1) a phenomenal rise in the strength of the Punjabi Musalman and the Pathan, (2) a substantial reduction in the position of Sikhs from first to third, ( 3) the degradation of the Rajputs to the fourth place, and (4 ) the shutting out of the U. P. Brahmins, the Madrasi Musalmans, and the Tamilians, both Brahmins and Non-Brahmins.
A further analysis of the figures for 1930, which discloses the communal composition of the Indian Infantry and Indian Cavalry, has been made by Mr. Chaudhari in the following table. 28[f.28] Communal Composition of the Indian Army in 1930 Class Areas Percentage in Infantry Percentage in Cavalry Excluding
Gurkhas Including Gurkhas
1. Punjabi Musalman Punjab 27 22.6 14.28
2. Gurkhas Nepal 16.4
3. Sikhs Punjab 16.24 13.58 23.81
4. Dogras North Punjab and 11.4 9.54 9.53
Kashmir
5. Jats Rajputana, U. P., 9.5 7.94 19.06
Punjab
6. Pathans N.-W. F. Province 7.57 6.35 4.76
7. Mahrattas Konkan 6.34 5.33
8. Garhwalis Garhwal 4.53 3.63
9. U. P. Rajputs U. P. 3.04 2.54
10. Rajputana Rajputs Rajputana 2.8 2.35
11. Kumaonis Kumaon 2.44 2.05
12. Gujars N. E. Rajputana 1.52 1.28
13. Punjabi Hindus Punjab 1.52 1.28
14. Ahirs Do. 1.22 1.024
15. Musalmans, Rajputs, Neighbourhood of 1.22 1.024 7.14
Ranghars. Delhi
16. Kaimkhanis Rajputana 4.76
17. Kachins Burma 1.22 1.024
18. Chins Do. 1.22 1.024
19. Karens Do. 1.22 1.024
20. Dekhani Musalmans Deccan 4.76
21. Hindustani
Musalmans
U. P. 2.38
Reducing these figures in terms of communities, we get the following percentage as it stood in 1930 :—
Communities Percentage in Infantry Percentage -in Cavalry
Including Gurkhas Excluding Gurkhas
1. Hindus and Sikhs 60.55 50.554 61.92
2. Gurkhas 16.4
3. Muhammadans 35.79 29.974 30.08
4. Burmans 3.66 3.072
These figures show the communal composition of the Indian Army. The Musalmans according to Mr. Chaudhari formed 36% of the Indian Infantry and 30% of the Indian Cavalry. These figures relate to the year 1930. We must now find out what changes have taken place since then in this proportion.
It is one of the most intriguing things in the Military history of India that no information is available on this point after 1930. It is impossible to know what the proportion of the Muslims in the Indian Army at present is. There is no Government publication from which such information can be gathered. In the past, there was no dearth of publications giving this information. It is very surprising that they should have now disappeared, or if they do appear, that they should cease to contain this information. Not only is there no Government publication containing information on this point, but Government has refused to give any information on the point when asked by members of the Central Legislative Assembly. The following questions and answers taken from the proceedings of
the Central Legislative Assembly show how Government has been strenuously combating every attempt to obtain information on the point :

[G.Subramaniam]

There was an interpellation on 15th September 1938, when the following questions were asked and replies as stated below were given:—
Arrangements for the Defence of India. 29[f.29]
Q. 1360: Mr.Badri Dull Pande (on behalf of Mr. Amarendra Nath Chattopadhya).
(a) x x x x
(B) x x x x
© x x x x
(d) How many Indians have been recruited during 1937 and 1938 as soldiers and officers during 1937-38 for the Infantry and Cavalry respectively? Amongst the soldiers and officers recruited, how many are Punjabi Sikhs, Pathans, Garhwalis, Mahrattas, Madrasis, Biharis, Bengalis and Hindustanis of the United Provinces and Gurkhas ?
(e) If none but the Punjabi Sikhs, Pathans and Garhwalis have been recruited, is it in contemplation of the Honourable Member to recruit from all the Provinces for the defense of India and give them proper military training ?
(f) Will the Defence Secretary be pleased to state if Provincial Governments will be asked to raise Provincial Regiments, trained and fully mechanised, for the defence of India? If not, what is his plan of raising an efficient army for the defence of India ?
Mr. C.M.G.Oglvie:
(a) The Honourable Member will appreciate that it is not in the public interest to disclose the details of such arrangements.
(B) 5 cadets and 33 Indian apprentices were recruited for the Indian Air Force during 1937-38.
© During 1937-38, 5 Indians have already been recruited to commissioned ranks in the Royal Indian Navy, 4 will be taken by competitive examination in October 1938, and 3 more by special examination of " Dufferin " cadets only. During the same period, 314 Indians were recruited to different non-commissioned categories in the Royal Indian Navy.
(d) During the year ending the 31st March 1938, 54 Indians were commissioned as Indian Commissioned Officers. They are now attached to British units for training, and it is not yet possible to say what proportion will be posted to infantry and cavalry, respectively. During the same period, 961 Indian soldiers were recruited for cavalry, and 7,970 for infantry. Their details by classes are not available at Army Headquarters and to call for them from the recruiting officers all over India would not justify the expenditure of time and labour involved.
(e) No.
(f) The reply to the first portion is in the negative. The reply to the second portion is that India already possesses an efficient army and so far as finances permit, every effort is made to keep it up-to-date in all respects. Mr. S. Satyamurti: With reference to the answers to clauses (d) and (e) of the question taken together, may I know whether the attention of Government has been drawn to statements made by many public men that the bulk of the army is from the Punjab and from one community ? Have Government considered those facts and will Government also consider the desirability of making the army truly national by extending recruitment to all provinces and communities, so as to avoid the danger present in all countries of a military dictatorship seizing political power ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I am not sure how that arises from this question, but I am prepared to say that provincial boundaries do not enter into Government's calculations at all. The best soldiers are chosen to provide the best army for India and not for any province, and in this matter national considerations must come above provincial considerations. Where the bulk of best military material is found, there we will go to get it, and not elsewhere. Mr. S. Saty'amurti : May I know whether the bulk of the army is from the Punjab and whether the Government
have forgotten the experience of the brave exploits of men from my province not very long ago in the Indian Army, and may I know if Madrasis are practically kept out and many other provinces are kept out of the army altogether ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Madras is not practically kept out of the army. Government gladly acknowledge the gallant services of the Madrasis in the army and they are now recruited to those Units where experience has proved them to be best. There are some 4,500 serving chiefly in the Sappers and Miners and Artillery.
Mr. S. Sayamurti : Out of a total of 120,000 ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : About that.
Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I take it, that, that is a proper proportion, considering the population of Madras, the revenue that Madras pays to the Central exchequer, and the necessity of having a national army recruited from all the provinces ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The only necessity we recognise is to obtain the best possible army.
Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I know by what tests Government have come to the conclusion that provinces other than the Punjab cannot supply the best elements in the Indian Army ?
Mr. Ogilvie : By experience.
Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmed: May I ask if it is not a fact that all branches of Accounts Department are monopolised by the Madrasis and will Government immediately reduce the number in proportion to their numerical strength in India?
Mr. Ogilvie : I do not see how that arises from this question either, but the Government are again not prepared to sacrifice efficiency for any provincial cause.
Indian Regiment consisting of Indians belonging to Different Castes 30[f.30]
Q. 1078 : Mr.M.Anantasayanam Ayyangar (on behalf of Mr. Manu Subedar):
(a) Will the Defence Secretary state whether any experiment has ever been made under British rule of having an Indian regiment consisting of Indians recruited from different provinces and belonging to the different castes and sections, such as Sikhs, Mahrattas, Rajputs, Brahmins and Muslims ?
(B) If the reply to part (a) be in the negative, can a statement of Government's policy in this regard be made giving reasons why it has not been considered proper to take such action ?
© Is His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief prepared to take up this matter with His Majesty's Government ?
(d) Are Government aware that in the University Corps and in the Bombay Scout Movement, and in the Police Forces of the country, there is no separation by caste or creed ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :
(a) No.
(B) Government regard it as a fundamental principle of organization that Military Sub-Units, such as companies and squadrons, must be homogeneous.
© No, for the reason just mentioned.
(d) Yes.
Mr. S. Satyamurti: May I know the meaning which Government attach to the word " homogeneous " ? Does it mean from the same province or the same community ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : It means that they must belong to the same class of persons.
Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I ask for some elucidation of this point ? Do they make distinction between one class and another ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Certainly.
Mr. S. Satyamurti: On what basis ? Is it religious class or racial class or provincial class ? .
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Neither. It is largely racial class.
.Mr. S. Satyamurti: Which races are preferred and which are not preferred ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: I refer the Honourable Member to the Army List. Recruitment to the Indian Army 31[f.31]
Q. 1162: Mr.Brojendra Narayan Chaudhary: Will the Defence Secretary please state :—
(a) Whether the attention of Government has been drawn to the address of the Punjab's Premier, the Hon'ble Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to his brother soldiers, in these words : " No patriotic Punjabi would wish to impair Punjab's position of supremacy in the Army," as reported by the Associated Press of India in the Hindustan Times of the 5th September 1938; and
(B) Whether it is the policy of Government to maintain the supremacy of Punjabis in the army by continuing to recruit the major portion from the Punjab ; or to attempt recruitment of the Army from all the provinces without racial or provincial considerations ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :
(a) Yes.
(B) I refer the Honourable Member to replies I gave to the supplementary questions arising from starred question No. 1060 asked by Mr. Amarendra Nath Chattopadhyaya on 15th September 1938. Mr. S. Satyamurti : With reference to the answer to part (a) of the question, my Honourable friend referred to previous answers. As far as I remember, they were not given after this statement was brought before this House. May I know if the Government of India have examined this statement of the Punjab Premier, " No patriotic Punjabi would wish to impair Punjab's position of supremacy in the Army" ? May I know whether Government have considered the dangerous implications of this statement and will they take steps to prevent a responsible Minister going about and claiming provincial or communal supremacy in the Indian Army, which ought to remain Indian
first and Indian last ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I can only answer in exactly the same words as I answered to a precisely similar question of the Hon'ble Member on the 15th September last. The policy of Government with regard to the recruitment has been repeatedly stated and is perfectly clear. Mr. S. Satyamurti: That policy is to get the best material and I am specifically asking my Honourable friend—1 hope he realises the implications of that statement of the Punjab Premier. I want to know whether the Government have examined the dangerous implications of any provincial Premier claiming provincial supremacy in the Indian Army and whether they propose to take any steps to correct this dangerous misapprehension ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government consider that there are no dangerous implications whatever but rather the reverse.
Mr. Satyamurti : Do Government accept the supremacy of any province or any community as desirable consideration, even if it is a fact, to be uttered by responsible public men and do not the Government consider that this will give rise to communal and provincial quarrels and jealousies inside the army and possibly a military dictatorship in this country ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government consider that none of these foreboding have any justification at all.
Mr. M. S. Aney : Do the Government subscribe to the policy implied in the statement of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government's policy has been repeatedly stated and made clear.
Mr. M. S. Aney : Is it the policy that the Punjab should have its supremacy in the Army ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The policy is that the best material should be recruited for the Army.
Mr. M. S .Aney : I again repeat the question. Is it the policy of Government that Punjab should have supremacy in the Army ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I have repeatedly answered that question. The policy is that the Army should get the best material from all provinces and Government are quite satisfied that it has the best material at present.
Mr. M. S. Aney : Is it not, therefore, necessary that Government should make a statement modifying the policy suggested by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: Government have no intention whatever of changing their policy in particular. Another interpolation took place on 23rd November 1938 when the question stated below was asked :—
Recruitment to the Indian Army from the Central Provinces and Berar 32[f.32]
Q. 1402 : Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh : Will the Defence Secretary please state :—
(a) The centres in the Central Provinces and Berar for recruiting men for the Indian Army ;
(B) The classes from which such men are recruited;
© The proportion of the men from the C. P. & Berar in the Army to the total strength of the Army, as well as to the population of these provinces ; and
(d) The present policy of recruitment, and if it is going to be revised; if not, why not?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :
(a) There are no recruiting centres in the C. P. or Berar. Men residing in the C. P. are in the area of the Recruiting Officer, Delhi, and those of Berar in the area of the Recruiting Officer, Poona.
(B) Mahrattas of Berar are recruited as a separate class. Other Hindus and Mussalmans who are recruited from the C. P. and Berar are classified as " Hindus " or " Musalmans ", and are not entered under any class denomination.
© The proportion to the total strength of the Army is .03 per cent. and the proportion to the total male population
of these provinces is .0004 per cent.
(d) There is at present no intention of revising the present policy, the reasons for which were stated in my reply to a supplementary question arising out of Mr. Satyamurti's starred question No. 1060, on the 15th September 1938, and in answer to part (a) of starred question No. 1086 asked by Mian Ghulam Kadir Muhammad Shahban on the same date, and in the reply of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the debates in the Council of State on the Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar Roy Chaudhary's Resolution regarding military training for Indians on the 21st February 1938 and on the Honourable Mr. P. N. Sapru's Resolution on the recruitment of all classes to the Indian Army in April 1935. This was followed by an interpellation on 6th February 1939, when the below mentioned question was asked :—
Recruitment to the Indian Army 33[f.33]
Q. 729; Mr. S. Satyamurti: Will the Defence Secretary be pleased to state:
(a) Whether Government have since the last answer on this question reconsidered the question of recruiting to the Indian Army from all provinces and from all castes and communities;
(B) Whether they have come to any conclusion ;
© Whether Government will categorically state the reasons as to why other provinces and communities are not allowed to serve in the army ; and
(d) What are the tests by which they have come to the conclusion that other provinces and other communities than those from whom recruitment is made to the Indian Army to-day cannot come up to the standard of efficiency required of the Indian Army ?
Mr. C.M.G.Ogilvie:
(a) No.
(B) Does not arise.
© and
(d) The reasons have been categorically stated in my replies to starred questions Nos. 1060 and 1086of 15th September 1938, No. 1162 of 20th September 1938 and No. 1402 of 23rd November 1938 and also in the replies of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the Council of State to the debates on the Honourable Mr. P. N. Sapru's Resolution regarding recruitment of all classes to the Indian Army and the Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar Roy Chaudhary's Resolution regarding Military training for Indians, on the 13th March 1935 and 21st February 1938
respectively. This conspiracy of silence on the part of the Government of India, was quite recently broken by the Secretary of State for India, who came forward to give the fullest information on this most vital and most exciting subject, in
answer to a question in the House of Commons. From his answer given on 8th July 1943 we know the existing communal and provincial composition of the Indian Army to be as follows :—
1. Provincial Composition of the Indian Army Province Percentage Province Percentage
1. Punjab 50 7. Bengal Presidency 2
2. U. P. 15 8. C. P. & Berar
3. Madras Presidency 10 9. Assam 5
4. Bombay Presidency 10 10. Bihar
5. N. W. F. Province 5 11. Orissa
6. Ajmere & Merwara 3 12. Nepal 8
II. Communal Composition of the Indian Army
1. Muslims
2. Hindus & Gurkhas
3. Sikhs
4. Christians & The Rest
34 p.c.
50 p.c.
10 p.c.
6 p.c.
The information given by the Secretary of State is indeed very welcome. But, this is the war-time composition of the Indian Army. The peace-time composition must be very different. It rested on the well-known distinction between the Martial and Non-Martial Races. That distinction was abolished during the War. There is, however, no certainty that it will not be revived now that peace has returned. What we want to know is the peacetime communal composition of the Indian Army. That still remains an unknown fact and a subject of speculation. Some say that the normal pre-war proportion of Muslims was between 60 and 70 p.c. Others say that it is somewhere in the neighbourhood of 50 p.c. In the absence of exact information, one could well adopt the latter figure as disclosing the true situation especially, when on inquiry, it happens to be confirmed by those who are in a
position to form some idea on the matter. Even if the proportion be 50% it is high enough to cause alarm to the Hindus. If this is true, it is a flagrant violation of well established principles of British Army policy in India, adopted after the Mutiny.
After the Mutiny, the British Government ordered two investigations into the organization of the Indian Army. The first investigation was carried out by the Peel Commission which was appointed in 1859. The second investigation was undertaken by a body, called the Special Army Committee, appointed in 1879 to which reference has already been made.