The principal question considered by the Peel Commission was to find out the weaknesses in the Bengal Army, which led to the Mutiny of 1857. The Peel Commission was told by witness after witness that the principal weakness in the Bengal Army which mutinied was that " In the ranks of the regular Army men stood mixed up as chance might befall. There was no separating by class and clan into companies........ In the lines, Hindu and Mahomedan, Sikh and Poorbeah were mixed up, so that each and all lost to some extent their racial prejudice and became inspired with one common sentiment." 34[f.34]
It was, therefore, proposed by Sir John Lawrence that in organizing the Indian Army care should be taken " to preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and while it lasts, makes the Mahomedan of one country despise, fear or dislike the Mahomedan of another; Corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked. Let all races, Hindu or Mahomedan of one province be enlisted in one regiment and no others, and having created distinctive regiments, let us keep them so,
against the hour of need. .. .. By the system thus indicated two great evils are avoided : firstly, that community of feeling throughout the native army and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces." 35[f.35]
This proposal was supported by many military men before the Peel Commission and was recommended by it as a principle of Indian Army Policy. This principle was known as the principle of Class Composition. The Special Army Committee of 1879 was concerned with quite a different problem. What the problem was,
becomes manifest from the questionnaire issued by the Committee. The questionnaire included the following question :â
"If the efficient and available reserve of the Indian Army is considered necessary for the safety of the Empire, should it not be recruited and maintained from those parts of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than among the weakest and least warlike races of India, due regard, of course, being had to the necessity of not giving too great strength or prominence to any particular race or religious group and with due regard to the safety of the Empire ? "
The principal part of the question is obviously the necessity or otherwise of" not giving too great strength or prominence to any particular race or religious group ". On this question official opinion expressed before the Committee was unanimous.
Lt.-General H. J. Warres, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, stated:â
" I consider it is not possible to recruit the reserve of the Indian Army altogether from those parts of India which are said to produce best soldiers, without giving undue strength and prominence to the races and religions of these countries."
The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick P. Haines, said:â
" Distinct in race, language and interests from the more numerous Army of Bengal, it is, in my opinion, eminently politic and wise to maintain these armies (the Madras and Bombay Armies) as a counterpoise to it, and I would in
no way diminish their strength in order that a reserve composed of what is called ' the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure ' may be established. If by this it is meant to replace Sepoys of Madras and Bombay by a reserve of men passed through the ranks of the Bengal Army and composed of the same classes of which it is formed, I would say, that anything more unwise or more impolitic could hardly be conceived."
The Lt-Governor of the Punjab also shared this view. He too declared that he was " opposed to having one recruiting field for the whole armies " in India. " It will be necessary," he added, " for political reasons, to prevent preponderance of one nationality."
The Special Committee accepted this view and recommended that the composition of the Indian Army should be so regulated that there should be no predominance of any one community or nationality in the Army. These two principles have the governing principles of Indian Army policy. Having regard to the principle laid down by the Special Army Committee of 1879, the changes that have taken place in the communal composition of the Indian Army amount to a complete revolution. How this revolution was allowed to take place is beyond comprehension. It is a revolution which has taken place in the teeth of a well-established principle. The principle was really suggested by the tear of the growing predominance of the men of the North-West in the Indian Army and was invoked with the special object of curbing that tendency. The principle was not only enunciated as a rule of guidance but was taken to be rigorously applied. Lord Roberts, who was opposed to this principle because it set a limit upon the recruitment of his pet men of the North-West, had to bow to this principle during his regime as the Commander-in-Chief of India. So well was the principle respected that when in 1903, Lord Kitchener entered upon the project of converting fifteen regiments of Madrasis into Punjab regiments, he immediately setup a counterpoise to the Sikhs and the Punjabi Musalmans by raising the proportion of the Gurkhas and the Pathans. As Sir George Arthur, his biographer, says:â
" The Government, mindful of the lesson taught by the Mutiny, was alive to the danger of allowing any one element in the Indian Army to preponderate unduly. An increase in the Punjabee infantry had as its necessary sequel a further recruitment of the valuable Gurkha material and the enlistment of more trans-border Pathans in the Frontier Militia."
That a principle, so unanimously upheld and so rigorously applied upto the period of the Great War, should have been thrown to the wind after the Great War, without ceremony and without compunction and in a clandestine manner, is really beyond comprehension. What is the reason which has led the British to allow so great a preponderance of the Muslims in the Indian Army ? Two explanations are possible. One is that the Musalmans really proved, in the Great War, that they were better soldiers than the Hindus. The second explanation is that the
British have broken the rule and have given the Musalmans such a dominating position in the Army because they wanted to counteract the forces of the Hindu agitation for wresting political power from the hands of the British.
Whatever be the explanation, two glaring facts stand out from the above survey. One is that the Indian Army today is predominantly Muslim in its composition. The other is that the Musalmans who predominate are the Musalmans from the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. Such a composition of the Indian Army means that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are made the sole defenders of India from foreign invasion. So patent has this fact become that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are quite conscious of this proud position which has
been assigned to them by the British, for reasons best known to them. For, one often hears them say that they are the ' gatekeepers ' of India. The Hindus must consider the problem of the defence of India in the light of this crucial fact. How far can the Hindus depend upon these ' gate-keepers' to hold the gate and protect the liberty and freedom of India ? The answer to this question must depend upon who comes to force the gate open. It is obvious that there are only two foreign countries which are likely to force this gate from the North-West side of India, Russia or Afghanistan, the borders of both of which touch the border of India. Which of them will invade India and when, no one can say definitely. If the invasion came from Russia, it may be hoped that these gate-keepers of India will be staunch and loyal enough to hold the gate and stop the invader. But suppose the Afghans singly or in combination with other Muslim States march on India, will these gate-keepers stop the invaders or will they open the gates and let them in ? This is a question which no Hindu can afford to ignore. This is a question on which every Hindu must feel assured, because it is the most crucial question.
It is possible to say that Afghanistan will never think of invading India. But a theory is best tested by examining its capacity to meet the worst case. The loyalty and dependability of this Army of the Punjabi and N. W. F. P. Muslims can only be tested by considering how it will be have in the event of an invasion by the Afghans. Will they respond to the call of the land of their birth or will they be swayed by the call of their religion, is the question which must be faced if ultimate security is to be obtained. It is not safe to seek to escape from these annoying and discomforting questions by believing that we need not worry about a foreign invasion so long as India is under the protection of the British. Such a complacent attitude is unforgivable to say the least. In the first place, the last war has shown that a situation may arise when Great Britain may not be able to protect India, although, that is the time when India needs her protection most. Secondly, the efficiency of an institution must be tested under natural conditions and not under artificial conditions. The behaviour of the Indian soldier under British control is artificial. His behaviour when he is under Indian control is his natural behaviour. British control does not allow much play to the natural instincts and natural sympathies of the men in the Army. That is why the men in the Army behave so well. But that is an artificial and not a natural condition. That the Indian Army behaves well under British control is no guarantee of its good behaviour under Indian control. A Hindu must be satisfied that it will behave as well when British
control is withdrawn. The question how this army of the Punjabi and the N. W. F. P. Muslims will behave if Afghanistan invades India, is a very pertinent and crucial question and must be faced, however unpleasant it may be.
Some may sayâwhy assume that the large proportion of Muslims in the Army is a settled fact and that it cannot be unsettled ? Those who can unsettle it are welcome to make what efforts they can. But, so far as one can see, it is not going to be unsettled. On the contrary, I should not be surprised if it was entered in the constitution, when revised, as a safeguard for the Muslim Minority. The Musalmans are sure to make this demand and as against the Hindus, the Muslims somehow always succeed. We must, therefore, proceed on the assumption that the composition of the Indian Army will remain what it is at present. The basis remaining the same, the question to be pursued remains what it was : Can the Hindus depend upon such an Army to defend the country against the invasion of Afghanistan? Only the so-called Indian Nationalists will say * yes * to it. The boldest among the realists must stop to think before he can give an answer to the question. The realist must take note of the fact that the Musalmans look upon
the Hindus as Kaffirs, who deserve more to be exterminated than protected. The realist must take note of the fact that while the Musalman accepts the European as his superior, he looks upon the Hindu as his inferior. It is doubtful how far a regiment of Musalmans will accept the authority of their Hindu officers if they be placed under them. The realist must take note that of all the Musalmans, the Musalman of the North-West is the most disaffected Musalman in his relation with the Hindus. The realist must take note that the Punjabi Musalman is fully susceptible to the propaganda in favour of Pan-lslamism. Taking note of all these considerations, there can be very little doubt that he would be a bold Hindu who would say that in any invasion by Muslim countries, the Muslims in the Indian Army
would be loyal and that there is no danger of their going over to the invader. Even Theodore Morrison 36[f.36] writing in 1899, was of the opinion thatâ
" The views held by the Mahomedans (certainly the most aggressive and truculent of the peoples of India) are alone sufficient to prevent the establishment of an independent Indian Government Were the Afghan to descend from the north upon an autonomous India, the Mahomedans, instead of uniting with the Sikhs and the Hindus to repel him, would be drawn by all the ties of kinship and religion to join his flag."
And when it is recalled that in 1919 the Indian Musalmans who were carrying on the Khilafat movement actually went to the length of inviting the Amir of Afghanistan to invade India, the view expressed by Sir Theodore Morrison acquires added strength and ceases to be a matter of mere speculation. How this Army composed of the Muslims of the Punjab and N. W. F. P. will behave in the case of an invasion by Afghanistan is not the only question which the Hindus are called upon to consider. There is another and equally important question on which the Hindus must ponder. That question is: Will the Indian Government be free to use this Army, whatever its loyalties, against the invading Afghans ? In this connection, attention must be drawn to the stand taken by the Muslim League. It is to the effect that the Indian Army shall not be used against Muslim powers.
There is nothing new in this. This principle was enunciated by the Khilafat Committee long before the League.
Apart from this, the question remains how far the Indian Muslims will, in future, make it their article of faith. That the League has not succeeded in this behalf against the British Government does not mean that it will not succeed against an Indian Government. The chances are that it will, because, however unpatriotic the principle may be from the standpoint of the Hindus, it is most agreeable to the Muslim sentiment and the League may find a sanction for it in the general support of the Muslim community in India. If the Muslim League succeeds in enforcing this limitation upon Indians right to use her fighting forces, what is going to be the position of the Hindus ? This is another question which the Hindus have to consider. If India remains politically one whole and the two-nation mentality created by Pakistan continues to be fostered, the Hindus will find themselves between the devil and the deep sea, so far as the defence of India is concerned. Having
an Army, they will not be free to use it because the League objects. Using it, it will not be possible to depend upon it because its loyalty is doubtful. This is a position which is as pathetic as it is precarious. If the Army continues to be dominated by the Muslims of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P., the Hindus will have to pay it but will not be able to use it and even if they were free to use it against a Muslim invader, they will find it hazardous to depend upon it.
If the Hague view prevails and India does not remain free to use her Army against Muslim countries, then, even if the Muslims lose their predominance in the Army, India on account of these military limitations, will have to remain on terms of subordinate co-operation with the Muslim countries on her bolder, as do the Indian States under British paramountcy. The Hindus have a difficult choice to make: to have a safe Army or a safe border. In this difficulty, what is the wisest course for the Hindus to pursue ? Is it in their interest to insist that the Muslim India should remain part of India so that they may have a safe border, or is it in their interest to welcome its separation from India so that they may have a sale Army ? The Musalmans of this area are hostile to the Hindus. As to this, there can be no doubt.
Which is then better for the Hindus : Should these Musalmans be without and against or should they be within and against ? If the question is asked to any prudent man, there will be only one answer, namely, that if the Musalmans are to be against the Hindus, it is better that they should be without and against, rather than within and against. Indeed, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished that the Muslims should be without. That is the only way of getting rid of the Muslim preponderance in the Indian Army.
How can it be brought about ? Here again, there is only one way. to bring it about and that is to support the scheme of Pakistan. Once Pakistan is created, Hindustan, having ample resources in men and money, can have an Army which it can call its own and there will be nobody to dictate as to how it should be used and against whom it should be used. The defence of Hindustan, far from being weakened by the creation of Pakistan, will be infinitely improved by it.
The Hindus do not seem to realize at what disadvantage they are placed from the point of view of their defence, by their exclusion from the Army. Much less do they know that, strange as it may appear, they are in fact purchasing this disadvantage at a very heavy price.
The Pakistan area which is the main recruiting ground of the present Indian Army, contributes very little to the Central Exchequer as will be seen from the following figures :â
Contribution to the Central Exchequer Rs.
Punjab 1,18,01,385
North-West Frontier 9,28,294
Sind 5,86,46,915
Baluchistan Nil
Total 7,13,76,594
As against this the provinces of Hindustan contribute as follows:â
Rs.
Madras 9,53,26,745
Bombay 22,53,44,247
Bengal 37[f.37] 12,00,00,000
U.P. 4,05,53,000
Bihar 1,54,37,742
C.P. & Berar 31,42,682
Assam 1,87,55,967
Orissa 5,67,346
Total 51,91,27,729
The Pakistan Provinces, it will be seen, contribute very little. The main contribution comes from the Provinces of Hindustan. In fact, it is the money contributed by the Provinces of Hindustan which enables the Government of India to carry out its activities in the Pakistan Provinces. The Pakistan Provinces are a drain on the Provinces of Hindustan. Not only do they contribute very little to the Central Government but they receive a great deal from the Central Government. The revenue of the Central Government amounts to Rs.121 crores. Of this, about Rs. 52 crores are annually spent on the Army. In what area is this amount spent ? Who pays the bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores ? The bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores which is spent on the Army is spent over the Muslim Army drawn from the Pakistan area. Now the bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores is contributed by the Hindu Provinces and is spent on an Army which for the most part consists of non-Hindus ! ! How many Hindus are aware of this tragedy ? How many know at whose cost this tragedy is being enacted ? Today the Hindus are not responsible for it because they cannot prevent it. The question is whether they will allow this tragedy to continue. If they mean to stop it, the surest way of putting an end to it is to allow the scheme of Pakistan to take effect. To oppose it, is to buy a sure weapon of their own destruction. A safe Army is better than a safe border.
CHAPTER VI
PAKISTAN AND COMMUNAL PEACE
Does Pakistan solve the Communal Question is a natural question which every Hindu is sure to ask. A correct
answer to this question calls for a close analysis of what is involved in it. One must have a clear idea as to what is
exactly meant, when the Hindus and Muslims speak of the Communal Question. Without it, it will not be possible
to say whether Pakistan does or does not solve the Communal Question.
It is not generally known that the Communal Question like the " Forward Policy " for the Frontier has a " greater "
and a " lesser intent, " and that in its lesser intent it means one thing, and in its greater intent it means quite a
different thing.
I
To begin with the Communal Question in its " lesser intent ". In its lesser intent, the Communal Question relates to
the representation of the Hindus and the Muslims in the Legislatures. Used in this sense, the question involves the
settlement of two distinct problems :â
(1) The number of seats to be allotted to the Hindus and the Muslims in the different legislatures, and
(2) The nature of the electorates through which these seats are to be filled in.
The Muslims at the Round Table Conference claimed :â
(1) That their representatives in all the Provincial as well as in the Central Legislatures should be elected by
separate electorates ;
(2) That they should be allowed to retain the weightage in representation given to Muslim minorities in those
Provinces in which they were a minority in the population, and that in addition, they should be given in those
Provinces where they were a majority such as the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Bengal, a
guaranteed statutory majority of seats.
The Hindus from the beginning objected to both these Muslim demands. They insisted on joint electorates for
Hindus and Muslims in all elections to all the Legislatures, Central and Provincial, and on population ratio of
representation, for both minorities, Hindus and Muslims, wherever they may be, and raised the strongest objections
to a majority of seats being guaranteed to any community by statute.
The Communal Award of His Majesty's Government settled this dispute by the simple, rough and ready method of
giving the Muslims all that they wanted, without caring for the Hindu opposition. "The Award allowed the Muslims
to retain weight-age and separate electorates, and in addition, gave them the statutory majority of seats in those
provinces where they were a majority in the population.
What is it in the Award that can be said to constitute a problem ? Is there any force in the objections of the Hindus
to the Communal Award of His Majesty's Government ? This question must be considered carefully to find out
whether there is substance in the objections of the Hindus to the Award.
Firstly, as to their objection to the weightage to Muslim minorities in the matter of representation. Whatever may be
the correct measure of allotting representation to minorities, the Hindus cannot very well object to the weightage
given to Muslim minorities, because similar weightage has been given to the Hindus in those Provinces in which
they are a minority and where there is sufficient margin for weightage to be allowed. The treatment of the Hindu
minorities in Sind and the North-West Frontier Province is a case in point.
Secondly, as to their objection to a statutory majority. That again does not appear to be well founded. A system of
guaranteed representation may be wrong and vicious and quite unjustifiable on theoretical and philosophical
grounds. But considered in the light of circumstances, such as those obtaining in India, the system of statutory
majority appears to be inevitable. Once it is granted that the representation to be given to a minority must not
reduce the majority to minority, that very provision creates, as a mere counterpart, a system of statutory majority to
the majority community. For, fixing the seats of the minority involves the fixation of the seats of the majority.
There is, therefore, no escape from the system of statutory majority, once it is conceded that the minority is not
entitled to representation which would convert a majority into a minority. There is, therefore, no great force in the
objections of the Hindus to a statutory majority of the Muslims in the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province,
Sind and Bengal. For, even in the Provinces where the Hindus are in a majority and the Muslims are in minority,
the Hindus have got a statutory majority over the Muslims. At any rate, there is a parity of position and to that
extent there can be said to be no ground for complaint.
This does not mean that because the objections set forth by the Hindus have no substance, there are no real grounds
for opposing the Communal Award. There does exist a substantial ground of objection to the Communal Award,
although, it does not appear to have been made the basis of attack by the Hindus.
This objection may be formulated in order to bring out its point in the following manner. The Muslim minorities in
the Hindu Provinces insisted on separate electorates. The Communal Award gives them the right to determine that
issue. This is really what it comes to when one remembers the usual position taken, viz., that the Muslim minorities
could not be deprived of their separate electorates without their consent, and the majority community of the Hindus
has been made to abide by their determination. The Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces insisted that there should
be joint electorates. Instead of conceding their claim, the Communal Award forced upon them the system of
separate electorates to which they objected. If in the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minorities are allowed the right
of self-determination in the matter of electorates, the question arises : Why are not the Hindu minorities in the
Muslim Provinces given the right of self-determination in the matter of their electorates ? What is the answer to this
question ? And, if there is no answer, there is undoubtedly a deep seated inequity in the Communal Award of His
Majesty's Government, which calls for redress.
It is no answer that the Hindus also have a statutory majority based on separate electorates 38[f.38] in those
Provinces where the Musalmans are in a minority. A little scrutiny will show that there is no parity of position in
these two cases. The separate electorates for the Hindu majorities in the Hindu Provinces are not a matter of their
choice. It is a consequence resulting from the determination of the Muslim minorities who claimed to have separate
electorates for themselves. A minority in one set of circumstances may think that separate electorates would be a
better method of self-protection and may have no fear of creating against itself and by its own action a statutory
majority based on separate electorates for the opposing community. Another minority or, for the matter of that, the
same minority in a different set of circumstances would not like to create by its own action and against itself a
statutory majority based upon separate electorates and may, therefore, prefer joint electorates to separate electorates
as a better method of self-protection. Obviously the guiding principle, which would influence a minority, would be :
Is the majority likely to use its majority in a communal manner and purely for communal purposes ? If it felt certain
that the majority community is likely to use its communal majority for communal ends, it may well choose joint
electorates, because it would be the only method by which it would hope to take away the communal cement of the
statutory majority by influencing the elections of the representatives of the majority community in the Legislatures.
On the other hand, a majority community may not have the necessary communal cement, which alone would enable
it to use its communal majority for communal ends, in which case a minority, having no fear from the resulting
statutory majority and separate electorates for the majority community, may well choose separate electorates for
itself. To put it concretely, the Muslim minorities in choosing separate electorates are not afraid of the separate
electorates and the statutory majority of the Hindus, because they feel sure that by reason of their deep-seated
differences of caste and race the Hindus will never be able to use their majorities against the Muslims. On the other
hand, the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces have no doubt that, by reason of their social solidarity, the
Muslims will use their statutory majority to set into operation a "Resolute Muslim Government", after the plan
proposed by Lord Salisbury for Ireland as a substitute for Home Rule; with this difference, that Salisbury's Resolute
Government was to last for twenty years only, while the Muslim Resolute Government was to last as long as the
Communal Award stood. "The situations, therefore, are not alike. The statutory majority of the Hindus based on
separate electorates is the result of the choice made by the Muslim minority. The statutory majority of the Muslims
based on separate electorates is something which is not the result of the choice of the Hindu minority. In one case,
the Government of the Muslim minority by a Hindu communal majority is the result of the consent of the Muslim
minority, In the other case, the Government of the Hindu minority by the Muslim majority is not the result of the
consent of the Hindu minority, but is imposed upon it by the might of the British Government.
To sum up this discussion of the Communal Award, it may be said that, as a solution of the Communal Question in
its " lesser intent ", there is no inequity in the Award on the ground that it gives weightage to the Muslim minorities
in the Hindu Provinces. For, it gives weightage also to Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces. Similarly, it may be
said that there is no inequity in the Award, on the ground that it gives a statutory majority to the Muslims in Muslim
Provinces in which they are a majority. If there is any, the statutory limitation put upon the Muslim number of
seats, also gives to the Hindus in Hindu Provinces a statutory majority. But the same cannot be said of the Award in
the matter of the electorates. The Communal Award is iniquitous inasmuch as it accords unequal treatment to the
Hindu and Muslim minorities in the matter of electorates. It grants the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces
the right of self-determination in the matter of electorates, but it does not grant the same right to the Hindu
minorities in the Muslim Provinces. In the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minority is allowed to choose the kind of
electorates it wants and the Hindu majority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. But in the Muslim
Provinces, it is the Muslim majority which is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it prefers and the Hindu
minority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. Thus , the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces having been
given both statutory majority and separate electorates, the Communal Award must be said to impose upon the
Hindu minorities Muslim rule, which they can neither alter nor influence.
This is what constitutes the fundamental wrong in the Communal Award. That this is a grave wrong must be
admitted. For, it offends against certain political principles, which have now become axiomatic. First is, not to trust
any one with unlimited political power. As has been well said,
" If in any state there is a body of men who possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule can never
be free. For, the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably
poisonous to those who possess it. They are always tempted to impose their canon of good upon others, and in the
end, they assume that the good of the community depends upon the continuance of their power. Liberty always
demands a limitation of political authority......"
The second principle is that, as a King has no Divine Right to rule, so also a majority has no Divine Right to rule.
Majority Rule is tolerated only because it is for a limited period and subject to the right to have it changed, and
secondly because it is a rule of a political majority, i.e., majority which has submitted itself to the suffrage of a
minority and not a communal majority. If such is the limited scope of authority permissible to a political majority
over a political minority, how can a minority of one community be placed under the perpetual subjection of a
majority of another community ? To allow a majority of one community to rule a minority of another community
without requiring the majority to submit itself to the suffrage of the minority, especially when the minority demands
it, is to enact a perversion of democratic principles and to show a callous disregard for the safety and security of the
Hindu minorities.
II
To turn to the Communal Question in its " greater intent ". What is it, that the Hindus say is a problem ? In its
greater intent the Communal Question relates to the deliberate creation of Muslim Provinces. At the time of the
Lucknow Pact, the Muslims only raised the Communal Question in its lesser intent. At the Round Table
Conference, the Muslims put forth, for the first time, the plan covered by the Communal Question in its greater
intent. Before the Act of 1935, there were a majority of Provinces in which the Hindus were in a majority and the
Muslims in a minority. There were only three Provinces in which the Muslims were in a majority and the Hindus in
a minority. They were the Punjab, Bengal and the North-West Frontier Province. Of these, the Muslim majority in
the North-West Frontier Province was not effective, because there was no responsible government in that province,
the Montagu-Chemsford Scheme of Political Reforms not being extended to it. So, for all practical purposes, there
were only two provincesâthe Punjab and Bengalâwherein the Muslims were in majority and the Hindus in
minority. The Muslims desired that the number of Muslim Provinces should be increased. With this object in view,
they demanded that Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and created into a new self-governing
Province, and that the North-West Frontier Province, which was already a separate Province, should be raised to the
status of a self-governing Province. Apart from other considerations, from a purely financial point of view, it was
not possible to concede this demand. Neither Sind nor the North-West Frontier Province were financially
self-supporting. But in order to satisfy the Muslim demand, the British Government went to the length of accepting
the responsibility of giving an annual subvention to Sind 39[f.39] and North-West Frontier Province 40[f.40] from
the Central Revenues, so as to bring about a budgetary equilibrium in their finances and make them financially
self-supporting.
These four Provinces with Muslims in majority and Hindus in minority, now functioning as autonomous and
self-governing Provinces, were certainly not created for administrative convenience, nor for purposes of
architectural symmetryâthe Hindu Provinces poised against the Muslim Provinces. It is also true that the scheme
of Muslim Provinces was not a matter of satisfying Muslim pride which demanded Hindu minorities under Muslim
majorities to compensate the humiliation of having Muslim minorities under Hindu majorities. What was then, the
motive underlying this scheme of Muslim Provinces ? The Hindus say that the motive for the Muslim insistence,
both on statutory majority and separate electorates, was to enable the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces to mobilize
and make effective Muslim power in its exclusive form and to the fullest extent possible. Asked what could be the
purpose of having the Muslim political power mobilized in this fashion, the Hindus answer that it was done to place
in the hands of the Muslims of the Muslim Provinces an effective weapon to tyrannize their Hindu minorities, in
case the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces were tyrannized by their Hindu majorities. The scheme thus
became a system of protection, in which blast was to be met by counter-blast, terror by terror and tyranny by
tyranny. The plan is undoubtedly, a dreadful one, involving the maintenance of justice and peace by retaliation, and
providing an opportunity for the punishment of an innocent minority, Hindus in Muslim Provinces and Muslims in
Hindu Provinces, for the sins of their co-religionists in other Provinces. It is a scheme of communal peace through a
system of communal hostages.
That the Muslims were aware from the very start, that the system of communal Provinces was capable of being
worked in this manner, is clear from the speech made by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as President of the Muslim
League Session held in Calcutta in 1927. In that speech the Maulana declared:â
" That by the Lucknow Pact they had sold away their interests. The Delhi proposals of March last opened the door
for the first time to the recognition of the real rights of Musalmans in India. The separate electorates granted by the
Pact of 1916 only ensured Muslim representation, but what was vital for the existence of the community was the
recognition of its numerical strength. Delhi opened the way to the creation of such a state of at fairs as would
guarantee to them in the future of India a proper share. Their existing small majority in Bengal and the Punjab was
only a census figure, but the Delhi proposals gave them for the first time five provinces of which no less than three
(Sind, the Frontier Province and Baluchistan) contained a real overwhelming Muslim majority. If the Muslims did
not recognise this great step they were not fit to live. There would now be nine Hindu provinces against five
Muslim provinces, and whatever treatment Hindus accorded in the nine provinces, Muslims would accord the same
treatment to Hindus in the five Provinces. Was not this a great gain ? Was not a new weapon gained for the
assertion of Muslim rights ? "
That those in charge of these Muslim provinces know the advantage of the scheme, and do not hesitate to put it to
the use for which it was intended, is clear from the speeches made not long ago by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, as Prime
Minister of Bengal.
That this scheme of Communal Provinces, which constitutes the Communal Question in its larger intent, can be
used as an engine of communal tyranny, there can be no doubt. The system of hostages, which is the essence of the
scheme of communal provinces, supported by separate electorates, is indeed insupportable on any ground. If this is
the underlying motive of the demand for the creation of more Muslim Provinces, the system resulting from it is
undoubtedly a vicious system.
This analysis leaves no doubt that the communal statutory majority based on separate communal electorates and the
communal provinces, especially constituted to enable the statutory majority to tyrannize the minority, are the two
evils which compose what is called, ' the Communal Problem '.
For the existence of this problem the Hindus hold the Muslims responsible and the Muslims hold the Hindus
responsible. The Hindus accuse the Muslims of contumacy. The Muslims accuse Hindus of meanness. Both,
however, forget that the communal problem exists not because the Muslims are extravagant and insolent in their
demands and the Hindus are mean and grudging in their concessions. It exists and will exist wherever a hostile
majority is brought face to face against a hostile minority. Controversies relating to separate vs. joint electorates,
controversies relating to population ratio vs. weightage are all inherent in a situation where a minority is pitted
against a majority. The best solution of the communal problem is not to have two communities facing each other,
one a majority and the other a minority, welded in the steel-frame of a single government.
How far does Pakistan approximate to the solution of the Communal Question?
The answer to this question is quite obvious. If the scheme of Pakistan is to follow the present boundaries of the
Provinces in the North-West and in Bengal, certainly it does not eradicate the evils which lie at the heart of the
Communal Question. It retains the very elements which give rise to it, namely, the pitting of a minority against a
majority. The rule of the Hindu minorities by the Muslim majorities and the rule of the Muslim Minorities by the
Hindu majorities are the crying evils of the present situation. This very evil will reproduce itself in Pakistan, if the
provinces marked out for it are incorporated into it as they are, i.e., with boundaries drawn as at present. Besides
this, the evil which gives rise to the Communal Question in its larger intent, will not only remain as it is but will
assume a new malignity. Under the existing system, the power centered in the Communal Provinces to do mischief
to their hostages is limited by the power which the Central Government has over the Provincial Governments. At
present, the hostages are at least within the pale of a Central Government which is Hindu in its composition and
which has power to interfere for their protection. But, when Pakistan becomes Muslim State with full sovereignty
over internal and external affairs, it would be free from the control of the Central Government. The Hindu
minorities will have no recourse to an outside authority with overriding powers, to interfere on their behalf and curb
this power of mischief, as under the scheme, no such overriding authority is permitted to exist. So, the position of
the Hindus in Pakistan may easily become similar to the position of the Armenians under the Turks or of the Jews
in Tsarist Russia or in Nazi Germany. Such a scheme would be intolerable and the Hindus may well say that they
cannot agree to Pakistan and leave their co-religionist as a helpless prey to the fanaticism of a Muslim National
State.
Ill
This, of course, is a very frank statement of the consequences which will flow from giving effect to the scheme of
Pakistan. But care must be taken to locate the source of these consequences. Do they flow from the scheme of
Pakistan itself or do they flow from particular boundaries that may be fixed for it. If the evils flow from the scheme
itself, i.e., if they are inherent in it, it is unnecessary for any Hindu to waste his time in considering it. He will be
justified in summarily dismissing it. On the other hand, if the evils are the result of the boundaries, the question of
Pakistan reduces itself to a mere question of changing the boundaries.
A study of the question amply supports the view that the evils of Pakistan are not inherent in it. If any evil results
follow from it they will have to be attributed to its boundaries. This becomes clear if one studies the distribution of
population. The reasons why these evils will be reproduced within Western and Eastern Pakistan is because, with
the present boundaries, they do not become single ethnic states. They remain mixed states, composed of a Muslim
majority and a Hindu minority as before. The evils are the evils which are inseparable from a mixed state. If
Pakistan is made a single unified ethnic state, the evils will automatically vanish. There will be no question of
separate electorates within Pakistan, because in such a homogeneous Pakistan, there will be no majorities to rule
and no minorities to be protected. Similarly, there will be no majority of one community to hold, in its possession, a
minority of an opposing community.
The question, therefore, is one of demarcation of boundaries and reduces itself to this : Is it possible for the
boundaries of Pakistan to be so fixed, that instead of producing a mixed state composed of majorities and
minorities, with all the evils attendant upon it, Pakistan will be an ethnic state composed of one homogeneous
community, namely Muslims ? The answer is that in a large part of the area affected by the project of the League, a
homogeneous state can be created by shifting merely the boundaries, and in the rest, homogeneity can be produced
by shifting only the population.
In this connection, I invite the reader to study carefully the figures given in the Appendices V, X, XI showing the
distribution of the population in the areas affected, and also the maps showing how new boundaries can create
homogeneous Muslim States. Taking the Punjab, two things will be noted :â
(i) There are certain districts in which the Musalmans predominate. There are certain districts in which the
Hindus predominate. There are very few in which the two are, more or less, evenly distributed; and
(ii) The districts in which Muslims predominate and the districts in which the Hindus predominate are not
interspersed. The two sets of districts form two separate areas.
For the formation of the Eastern Pakistan, one has to take into consideration the distribution of population in both
the Provinces of Bengal and Assam. A scrutiny of the population figures showsâ
(i) In Bengal, there are some districts in which the Muslims predominate. In others, the Hindus
predominate.
(ii) In Assam also, there are some districts in which the Muslims predominate. In others, the Hindus
predominate.
(iii) Districts in which the Muslims predominate and those in which the Hindus predominate are not
interspersed. They form separate areas.
(iv) The districts of Bengal and Assam in which the Muslims predominate are contiguous.
Given these facts, it is perfectly possible to create homogeneous Muslim States out of the Punjab, Bengal and
Assam by drawing their boundaries in such a way that the areas which are predominantly Hindu shall be excluded.
That this is possible is shown by the maps given in the appendix.
In the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, the situation is rather hard. How the matter stands in the North-West
Frontier Province and Sind may be seen by an examination of the figures given in the appendices VI to IX. As may
be seen from the appendices, there are no districts in which the Hindus in the North-West Frontier Province and
Sind are concentrated. They are scattered and are to be found in almost every ^strict of the two provinces in small,
insignificant numbers. These appendices show quite unmistakably that the Hindus in Sind and the North-West
Frontier Province are mostly congregated in urban areas of the districts. In Sind, the Hindus outnumber the
Muslims in most of the towns, while the Muslims outnumber the Hindus in villages. In the North-West Frontier
Province, the Muslims outnumber the Hindus in towns as well as in villages.
The case of the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, therefore, differs totally from the case of the Punjab and
Bengal. In the Punjab and Bengal, owing to the natural segregation of the Hindus and Muslims in different areas, it
is possible to create a homogeneous State by merely altering their boundaries, involving the shifting of the
population in a very small degree. But in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, owing to the scattered state of
the Hindu population, alteration of boundaries cannot suffice for creating a homogeneous State. There is only one
remedy and that is to shift the population.
Some scoff at the idea of the shifting and exchange of population. But those who scoff can hardly be aware of the
complications, which a minority problem gives rise to and the failures attendant upon almost all the efforts made to
protect them. The constitutions of the post-war states, as well as of the older states in Europe which had a minority
problem, proceeded on the assumption that constitutional safeguards for minorities should suffice for their
protection and so the constitutions of most of the new states with majorities and minorities were studded with long
lists of fundamental rights and safeguards to see that they were not violated by the majorities. What was the
experience ? Experience showed that safeguards did not save the minorities. Experience showed that even a ruthless
war on the minorities did not solve the problem. The states then agreed that the best way to solve it was for each to
exchange its alien minorities within its border, for its own which was without its border, with a view to bring about
homogeneous States. This is what happened in Turky, Greece and Bulgaria. Those, who scoff at the idea of transfer
of population, will do well to study the history of the minority problem, as it arose between Turky, Greece and
Bulgaria. If they do, they will find that these countries found that the only effective way of solving the minorities
problem lay in exchange of population. The task undertaken by the three countries was by no means a minor
operation. It involved the transfer of some 20 million people from one habitat to another. But undaunted, the three
shouldered the task and carried it to a successful end because they felt that the considerations of communal peace
must outweigh every other consideration.
That the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy for communal peace is beyond doubt. If that is so, there is
no reason why the Hindus and the Muslims should keep on trading in safeguards which have proved so unsafe. If
small countries, with limited resources like Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, were capable of such an undertaking,
there is no reason to suppose that what they did cannot be accomplished by Indians. After all, the population
involved is inconsiderable and because some obstacles require to be removed, it would be the height of folly to give
up so sure a way to communal peace.
There is one point of criticism to which no reference has been made so far. As it is likely to be urged, I propose to
deal with it here. It is sure to be asked, how will Pakistan affect the position of the Muslims that will be left in
Hindustan ? The question is natural because the scheme of Pakistan does seem to concern itself with the Muslim
majorities who do not need protection arid abandons the Muslim minorities who do. But the point is : who can raise
it ? Surely not the Hindus. Only the Muslims of Pakistan or the Muslims of Hindustan can raise it. The question
was put to Mr. Rehmat Ali, the protagonist of Pakistan and this is the answer given by him :â
"How will it affect the position of the forty five million Muslims in Hindustan proper ?
" The truth is that in this struggle their thought has been more than a wrench to me. They are the flesh of our flesh
and the soul of our soul. We can never forget them ; nor they, us. Their present position and future security is, and
shall ever be, a mailer of great importance to us. As things are at present, Pakistan will not adversely affect their
position in Hindustan. On the basis of population (one Muslim to four Hindus), they will still be entitled to the same
representation in legislative as well as administrative fields which they possess now. As to the future, the only
effective guarantee we can offer is that of reciprocity, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to give all those
safeguards to non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan which will be conceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan.
" But what sustains us most is the fact that they know we are proclaiming Pakistan in the highest interest of the'
Millet'. It is as much theirs as it is ours. While for us it is a national citadel, for them it will ever be a moral anchor.
So long as the anchor holds, everything is or can be made safe. But once it gives way, all will be lost ".
The answer given by the Muslims of Hindustan is equally clear. They say, " We are not weakened by the separation
of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindustan. We are better protected by the existence of separate Islamic States on the
Eastern and Western borders of Hindustan than we are by their submersion in Hindustan. " Who can say that they
are wrong ? Has it not been shown that Germany as an outside state was better able to protect the Sudeten Germans
in Czechoslovakia than the Sudetens were able to do themselves ? 41[f.41]
Be that as it may, the question does not concern the Hindus. The question that concerns the Hindus is : How far
does the creation of Pakistan remove the communal question from Hindustan ? That is a very legitimate question
and must be considered. It must be admitted that by the creation of Pakistan, Hindustan is not freed of the
communal question. While Pakistan can be made a homogeneous state by redrawing its boundaries, Hindustan must
remain a composite state. The Musalmans are scattered all over Hindustanâthough they are mostly congregated in
townsâand no ingenuity in the matter of redrawing of boundaries can make it homogeneous. The only way to
make Hindustan homogeneous is to arrange for exchange of population. Until that is done, it must be admitted that
even with the creation of Pakistan, the problem of majority vs. minority will remain in Hindustan as before and will
continue to produce disharmony in the body politic of Hindustan.
Admitting that Pakistan is not capable of providing a complete solution of the Communal Problem within
Hindustan, does it follow that the Hindus on that account should reject Pakistan ? Before the Hindus draw any such
hasty conclusion, they should consider the following effects of Pakistan.
First, consider the effect of Pakistan on the magnitude of the communal Problem. That can be best gauged by
reference to the Muslim population as it will be grouped within Pakistan and Hindustan.
Muslim Population in Pakistan. Muslim Population in India
1. Punjab 13.332,460 1. Total Muslim Population in
British India (Excluding Burma and
Aden).
66,442,766
2. N.W.F.P. 2,227,303
3. Sind 2,830,800
4. Baluchistan 405,309 2. Muslim Population grouped in
Pakistan and Eastern Bengal State.
47,897,301
5. Eastern Bengal 27,497,624
Muslim States 3. Balance of Muslims in British
Hindustan
18,545,465
(i) Eastern Bengal 27,497,624
(ii) Sylhet 1,603,805
Total 47,897,301
What do these figures indicate ? What they indicate is that the Muslims who will be left in British Hindustan will be
only 18,545,465 and the rest 47,897,301, forming a vast majority of the total Muslim population, will be out of it
and will be the subjects of Pakistan States. This distribution of the Muslim population, in terms of the communal
problem, means that while without Pakistan the communal problem in India involves 6 1/2 crores of Muslims, with
the creation of Pakistan it will involve only 2 crores of Muslims. Is this to be no consideration for Hindus who want
communal peace ? To me, it seems that if Pakistan does not solve the communal problem within Hindustan, it
substantially reduces its proportion and makes it of minor significance and much easier of peaceful solution.
In the second place, let the Hindus consider the effect of Pakistan on the communal representation in the Central
Legislature. The following table gives the distribution of seats in the Central Legislature, as prescribed under the
Government of India Act, 1935 and as it would be, if Pakistan came into being.
Name of the
Chamber
Distribution of seats. Distribution of seats.
IâAs at present. II.âAfter Pakistan.
Non- Non-
Total
seats.
Muslim
(Hindu)
Territorial
Scats.
Muslim
Territorial
Seats.
Total
seals.
Muslim (Hindu)
Territorial Seats.
Muslim Territorial
Seats.
Council of State. 150 75 49 126 75 25
Federal Assembly. 250 105 82 211 105 43
To bring out clearly the quantitative change in the communal distribution of seats, which must follow the
establishment of Pakistan, the above figures are reduced to percentage in the table that follows:â
Name of the
Chamber.
Distribution of seats. Distribution of seats.
1.âAs at present. II.âAfter Pakistan
Percentage of
Muslim seats to
Hindu seals.
Percentage of
Muslim scats to total
seats.
Percentage of Muslim
seats to Hindu seats.
Percentage of Muslim
seats to total seals.
Council of State
Federal Assembly
33
33
66
80
25
21
33 1/3,
40
From this table one can see what vast changes must follow the establishment of Pakistan. Under the Government of
India Act, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total is 33% in both the Chambers, but to the Hindu seats, the ratio is
66% in the Council of State and 80% in the Assemblyâalmost a position of equality with the Hindus. After
Pakistan, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total seats falls from 33 1/3 % to 25% in the Council and to 21% in the
Assembly, while the ratio to Hindu seats falls from 66% to 33 1/3 % in the Council and from 80% to 40% in the
Assembly. The figures assume that the weightage given to the Muslims will remain the same, even after Hindustan
is separated from Pakistan. If the present weightage to Muslims is cancelled or reduced, there would be further
improvement in the representation of the Hindus. But assuming that no change in weightage is made, is this a small
gain to the Hindus in the matter of representation at the Centre ? To me, it appears that it is a great improvement in
the position of the Hindus at the Centre, which would never come to them, if they oppose Pakistan.
These are the material advantages of Pakistan. There is another which is psychological. The Muslims, in Southern
and Central India, draw their inspiration from the Muslims of the North and the East. If after Pakistan there is
communal peace in the North and the East, as there should be, there being no majorities and minorities therein, the
Hindus may reasonably expect communal peace in Hindustan. This severance of the bond between the Muslims of
the North and the East and the Muslims of Hindustan is another gain to the Hindus of Hindustan.
Taking into consideration these effects of Pakistan, it cannot be disputed that if Pakistan does not wholly solve the
communal problem within Hindustan, it frees the Hindus from the turbulence of the Muslims as predominant
partners. It is for the Hindus to say whether they will reject such a proposal, simply because it does not offer a
complete solution. Some gain is better than much harm.
Admitting that Pakistan is not capable of providing a complete solution of the Communal Problem within
Hindustan, does it follow that the Hindus on that account should reject Pakistan ? Before the Hindus draw any such
hasty conclusion, they should consider the following effects of Pakistan.
First, consider the effect of Pakistan on the magnitude of the communal Problem. That can be best gauged by
reference to the Muslim population as it will be grouped within Pakistan and Hindustan.
Muslim Population in Pakistan. Muslim Population in India
1. Punjab 13.332,460 1. Total Muslim Population in
British India (Excluding Burma and
Aden).
66,442,766
2. N.W.F.P. 2,227,303
3. Sind 2,830,800
4. Baluchistan 405,309 2. Muslim Population grouped in
Pakistan and Eastern Bengal State.
47,897,301
5. Eastern Bengal 27,497,624
Muslim States 3. Balance of Muslims in British
Hindustan
18,545,465
(i) Eastern Bengal 27,497,624
(ii) Sylhet 1,603,805
Total 47,897,301
What do these figures indicate ? What they indicate is that the Muslims who will be left in British Hindustan will be
only 18,545,465 and the rest 47,897,301, forming a vast majority of the total Muslim population, will be out of it
and will be the subjects of Pakistan States. This distribution of the Muslim population, in terms of the communal
problem, means that while without Pakistan the communal problem in India involves 6 1/2 crores of Muslims, with
the creation of Pakistan it will involve only 2 crores of Muslims. Is this to be no consideration for Hindus who want
communal peace ? To me, it seems that if Pakistan does not solve the communal problem within Hindustan, it
substantially reduces its proportion and makes it of minor significance and much easier of peaceful solution.
In the second place, let the Hindus consider the effect of Pakistan on the communal representation in the Central
Legislature. The following table gives the distribution of seats in the Central Legislature, as prescribed under the
Government of India Act, 1935 and as it would be, if Pakistan came into being.
Name of the
Chamber
Distribution of seats. Distribution of seats.
IâAs at present. II.âAfter Pakistan.
Non- Non-
Total
seats.
Muslim
(Hindu)
Territorial
Scats.
Muslim
Territorial
Seats.
Total
seals.
Muslim (Hindu)
Territorial Seats.
Muslim Territorial
Seats.
Council of State. 150 75 49 126 75 25
Federal Assembly. 250 105 82 211 105 43
To bring out clearly the quantitative change in the communal distribution of seats, which must follow the
establishment of Pakistan, the above figures are reduced to percentage in the table that follows:â
Name of the
Chamber.
Distribution of seats. Distribution of seats.
1.âAs at present. II.âAfter Pakistan
Percentage of
Muslim seats to
Hindu seals.
Percentage of
Muslim scats to total
seats.
Percentage of Muslim
seats to Hindu seats.
Percentage of Muslim
seats to total seals.
Council of State
Federal Assembly
33
33
66
80
25
21
33 1/3,
40
From this table one can see what vast changes must follow the establishment of Pakistan. Under the Government of
India Act, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total is 33% in both the Chambers, but to the Hindu seats, the ratio is
66% in the Council of State and 80% in the Assemblyâalmost a position of equality with the Hindus. After
Pakistan, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total seats falls from 33 1/3 % to 25% in the Council and to 21% in the
Assembly, while the ratio to Hindu seats falls from 66% to 33 1/3 % in the Council and from 80% to 40% in the
Assembly. The figures assume that the weightage given to the Muslims will remain the same, even after Hindustan
is separated from Pakistan. If the present weightage to Muslims is cancelled or reduced, there would be further
improvement in the representation of the Hindus. But assuming that no change in weightage is made, is this a small
gain to the Hindus in the matter of representation at the Centre ? To me, it appears that it is a great improvement in
the position of the Hindus at the Centre, which would never come to them, if they oppose Pakistan.
These are the material advantages of Pakistan. There is another which is psychological. The Muslims, in Southern
and Central India, draw their inspiration from the Muslims of the North and the East. If after Pakistan there is
communal peace in the North and the East, as there should be, there being no majorities and minorities therein, the
Hindus may reasonably expect communal peace in Hindustan. This severance of the bond between the Muslims of
the North and the East and the Muslims of Hindustan is another gain to the Hindus of Hindustan.
Taking into consideration these effects of Pakistan, it cannot be disputed that if Pakistan does not wholly solve the
communal problem within Hindustan, it frees the Hindus from the turbulence of the Muslims as predominant
partners. It is for the Hindus to say whether they will reject such a proposal, simply because it does not offer a
complete solution. Some gain is better than much harm.
Contents PART III
[f.1]Cunnigham's Ancient Geography of India (Ed. Majumdar), pp. 13-14. The writers of the Puranas divided India
into nine divisions.
[f.2]Sind was reoccupied by Mahommed Ghori.
[f.3]Indian Islam by Dr. Titus, p. 10.
[f.4]Quoted by Dr. TilusâIbid., p. 10.
[f.5]lbid.,p.11
[f.6]lbid.,p.11.
[f.7]Quoted by Lane Poole in Medieval India, p. 155.
[f.8]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, p. 22
[f.9]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam,
[f.10]p. 22. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
[f.11]Lane Poole: Medieval India, p. 26
[f.12]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, pp. 23-24.
[f.13]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, p. 24.
[f.14]lbid.,p.22
[f.15]Ibid.. pp. 31-32.
[f.16]Quoted by Dr. TitusâIndian Islam, p. 24.
[f.17]lbid.,p.26 [f.17]
[f.18]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, p. 29
[f.19]Ibid., p. 30.
[f.20]Lane Poole : Medieval India, p. 104.
[f.21]Quoted by Dr. TitusâIndian Islam, p. 29.
[f.22]Revenues include revenue raised both by Provincial Government in the Provinces from provincial sources
and by the Central Government from Central revenues.
[f.23]Revenues include revenue raised both by Provincial Government in the Provinces from provincial sources
and by the Central Government from Central revenues.
[f.24]See his series of articles on " The Martial Races of India " published in the Modern Review for July 1930,
September 1930, January 1931 and February 1931.
[f.25]The Questionnaire circulated by the Committee included the following question:â " If an efficient and
available reserve of the Indian Army be considered necessary for the safely of the Empire, should it not be recruited
and maintained from those parts of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than amongst the weakest and
least warlike races of India ?".......
[f.26]In his Forty-One Years he wrote: " Each cold season, I made long lours in order to acquaint myself with the
needs and capabilities of the men of the Madras Army. I tried hard to discover in them those fighting qualities
which had distinguished their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of the present century. . .
And I was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had died in them, as it had died in the ordinary
Hindustani of Bengal and the Mahratta of Bombay, and that they could no longer with safely be pitted against
warlike races, or employed outside the limit of Southern India."
[f27]Indian Social Reformer, January 27lh, 1940.
[f.28]This table shows the percentage of men of each eligible class in the Indian Infantry (82 active and 18 training
battations), the Indian Cavalry (21 regiments), and the 20 battalions of the Gurkha infantry. This table does not
include the Indian personnel of (a) the 19 ballerics of Indian Mountain Artillery, and (B) 3 regiments of Sappers and
Miners, © the Indian Signal Corps, and (d) the Corps of Indian Pioneers, all of which are composed of different
proportions of the Punjabi Musalmans, Sikhs, Pathans, Hindustani Ilindus and Musalmans, Madrasis of all classes
and Hazra Afghans, either in class units or class companies. Except that some units in these arms of the service are
composed of the Madrasis and Hazras, now enrolled in other units of the Indian Army, the class composition of
these units docs not materially alter the proportion of the classes as given in the table. This table does not also
include the Indian personnel attached to the British Infantry and Artillery units.
[f.29]Legislative Assembly Debales, 1938 Vol. VI, page 2462.
[f.30]Legislative Assembly Debates, 193S, Vol. VI, page 2478.
[f.31]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. VI, page 2754.
[f.32]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol.VII, page 3313.
[f.33]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1939, Vol. I, page 253.
[f.34]MacMunn and Lovett, The Armies of India, pp. 84-85, quoted by Chaudhari
[f.35]As quoted by Chaudhari
[f.36]Imperial Rule in India, page 5.
[f.37]Only 1/2 revenue is shown because nearly 1/2 population is Hindu.
[f.38]It is perhaps not quite correct to speak of a Hindu Electorate. The Electorate is a General Electorate
consisting of all those who are not included in any separate electorate. But as the majority in the General Electorate
consists of Hindus, it is called a Hindu Electorate
[f.39]Sind gets an annual subvention of Rs. 1.05,00,000.
[f.40]North-West Frontier Province gets an annual subvention of Rs. 1,00,00,000
[f.41]The leaders of the Muslim League seem to have studied deeply Hitler's bulling tactics against Czechoslovakia
in the interest of the Sudeten Germans and also learned the lessons which those tactics teach. See their threatening
speeches in the Karachi Session of the League held in 1937.
PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
_______________________________________________________________
Contents
Part III - WHAT IF NOT PAKISTAN ?
Chapter VII : Hindu alternative to Pakistan
Chapter VIII : Muslim alternative to Pakistan
Chapter IX : Lessons from abroad
Part III
WHAT IF NOT PAKISTAN ?
Having stated the Muslim case for Pakistan and the Hindu case against it, it is necessary to turn to
the alternatives to Pakistan, if there be any. In forming one's judgement on Pakistan, one must take
into account the alternatives to it. Either there is no alternative to Pakistan : or there is an
alternative to Pakistan, but it is worse than Pakistan. Thirdly, one must also take into consideration
what would be the consequences, if neither Pakistan nor its alternative is found acceptable to the
parties concerned. The relevant data, having a bearing on these points, are presented in this part
under the following heads :â
1 Hindu alternative to Pakistan.
2 Muslim alternative to Pakistan.
3 Lessons from abroad.
CHAPTER VII
HINDU ALTERNATIVE TO PAKISTAN
I
Thinking of the Hindu alternative to Pakistan, the scheme that at once comes to one's mind is the
one put forth by the late Lala Hardayal in 1925. It was published in the form of a statement which
appeared in the Pratap of Lahore. In this statement, which he called his political testament, Lala
Hardayal said:â
" I declare that the future of the Hindu race, of Hindustan and of the Punjab, rests on these four
pillars: (1) Hindu Sangalhan, (2) Hindu Raj, (3) Shuddhi of Moslems, and (4) Conquest and
Shuddhi of Afghanistan and the Frontiers. So long as the Hindu nation does not accomplish these
four things, the safely of our children and great-grandchildren will be ever in danger, and the safety
of the Hindu race will be impossible. The Hindu race has but one history, and its institutions are
homogeneous. But the Musalmans and Christians are far removed from the confines of Hindustan,
for their religions are alien and they love Persian, Arab and European institutions. Thus, just as one
removes foreign matter from the eye, Shuddhi must be made of these two religions. Afghanistan
and the hilly regions of the frontier were formerly part of India, but are at present under the
domination of Islam..... Just as there is Hindu religion in Nepal, so there must be Hindu institutions
in Afghanistan and the frontier territory; otherwise it is useless to win Swaraj. For mountain tribes
are always warlike and hungry. If they become our enemies, the age of Nadirshah and Zamanshah
will begin anew. At present English officers are protecting the frontiers; but it cannot always
be....... If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and
convert all the mountain tribes."
I do not know how many Hindus would come forward to give their support to this scheme of Lala
Hardayal as an alternative to Pakistan. 1[f.1]
In the first place, Hindu religion is not a proselytising religion. Maulana Mahomed Ali was quite
right when, in the course of his address as President of the Congress, he said:
" Now, this has been my complaint for a long lime against Hinduism, and on one occasion,
lecturing at Allahabad in 1907,I had pointed out the contrast between Musalmans and Hindus, by
saying that the worst that can be said of a Muslim was that he had a tasteless mess which he called
a dish fit for kings, and wanted all to share it with him, thrusting it down the throats of such as did
not relish it and would rather not have it, while his Hindu brother, who prided himself on his
cookery, retired into the privacy of his kitchen and greedily devoured all that he had cooked,
without permitting even the shadow of his brother to fall on his food, or sparing even a crumb for
him. This was said not altogether in levity; and in fact, I once asked Mahatma Gandhi to justify this
feature of his faith to me. "
What answer the Mahatma gave to his question, Mr. Mahmed Ali did not disclose. The fact is that
however much the Hindus may wish, Hindu religion cannot become a missionary religion like
Islam or Christianity. It is not that the Hindu religion was never a missionary religion. On the
contrary, it was once a missionary religionâindeed could not but have been a missionary religion,
otherwise it is difficult to explain how, it could have spread over an area so vast as the Indian
continent. 2[f.2] But once a missionary religion, Hinduism perforce ceased to be a missionary
religion after the time when the Hindu society developed its system of castes. For, caste is
incompatible with conversion. To be able to convert a stranger to its religion, it is not enough for a
community to offer its creed. It must be in a position to admit the convert to its social life and to
absorb and assimilate him among its kindred. It is not possible for the Hindu society to satisfy this
prerequisite of effective conversion. There is nothing to prevent a Hindu, with a missionary zeal, to
proceed to convert an alien to the Hindu faith. But before he converts the alien, he is bound to be
confronted with the question: What is to be the caste of the convert ? According to the Hindus, for a
person to belong to a caste he must be born in it. A convert is not born in a caste, therefore he
belongs to no caste. This is also an important question. More than political or religious, man is a
social animal. He may not have, need not have, religion ; he may not have, need not have, politics.
He must have society; he cannot do without society. For a Hindu to be without caste is to be
without society. Where there is no society for the convert, how can there be any conversion ? So
long as Hindu society is fragmented in autonomous and autogenic castes, Hindu religion cannot be
a missionary religion. The conversion of the Afghans and the frontier tribes to Hinduism is,
therefore, an idle dream.
In the second place, Lala Hardayal's scheme must call for financial resources the immensity of
which it is hardly possible to compute. , Who can furnish the funds necessary for the conversion
of the Afghans and the Frontier Tribesmen to Hinduism ? The Hindus, having ceased to convert
others to their faith for a long time, have also lost the. zeal for conversion. Want of zeal is bound to
affect the question of finances. Further, Hindu society being moulded in the cast of the
Chaturvarna, wealth has, from very ancient times, been most unevenly distributed. It is only the
Baniya who is the heir to wealth and property among the Hindus. There are, of course, the
landlords who are the creation of foreign invaders or native rebels, but they are not as numerous as
the Baniya. The Baniya is money-made and his pursuits are solely for private gain. He knows no
other use of money except to hold it and to transmit it to his descendants. Spread of religion or
acquisition and promotion of culture do not interest him. Even decent living has no place in his
budget. This has been his tradition for ages. If money is expected, he is not much above the brute in
the conception and manner of life. Only one new service, on the expenditure side, has found a place
in his budget. That service is politics. This happened since the entry of Mr. Gandhi as a political
leader. That new service is the support of Gandhian politics. Here again, the reason is not love of
politics. The reason is to make private gain out of public affairs. What hope is there that such men
will spend money on such a bootless cause as the spread of Hindu religion among the Afghans and
Frontier Tribes ?
Thirdly, there is the question of facilities for conversion that may be available in Afghanistan. Lala
Hardayal evidently thought that it is possible to say in Afghanistan, with the same impunity as in
Turkey, that the Koran is wrong or out of date. Only one year before the publication of his political
testament by Lala Hardayal, i.e., in 1924; one Niamatullaâa follower of Mirza Ghulam Ahamed of
Quadiyanâwho claimed to be the messiah and Mahdi and a prophet of a sortâwas stoned to death
3[f.3] at Kabul by the order of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of Afghanistan. The crime of this
man was, as reported by a Khilafat paper, that he was professing and preaching ideas and beliefs,
inconsistent with Islam and Shariat. This man, says the same paper, was stoned to death according
to the agreeing judgements of the first Shariat (canon) Court, the Central Appellate Court and the
Ulema and Divines of the final Appellate Committee of the Ministry of Justice. In the light of these
difficulties, the scheme must be said to be wild in its conception and is sure to prove ruinous in its
execution. It is adventurous in character and is too fantastic to appeal to any reasonable man except
perhaps some fanatical Arya Samajists of the Punjab.
II
The stand taken by Hindu Mahasabha has been defined by Mr. V. D. Savarkar, the President of the
Sabha, in his presidential addresses at the annual sessions of the Sabha. As defined by him, the
Hindu Maha Sabha is against Pakistan and proposes to resist it by all means. What these means are
we do not know. If they are force, coercion and resistance, they are only negative alternatives and
Mr. Savarkar and the Hindu Maha Sabha alone can say how far these means will succeed.
It would, however, not be fair to Mr. Savarkar to say that he has only a negative attitude towards
the claim put forth by the Muslims of India. He has put forth his positive proposals in reply to
them.
To understand his positive proposals, one must grasp some of his basic conceptions. Mr. Savarkar
lays great stress on a proper understanding of the terms, Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindudom. He
says : 4[f.4]
" In expounding the ideology of the Hindu movement, it is absolutely necessary to have a correct
grasp of the meaning attached to these three terms. From the word " Hindu" has been coined the
word "Hinduism " in English. It means the schools or system of Religion the Hindus follow. The
second word " Hindutva " is far more comprehensive and refers not only to the religious aspects of
the Hindu people as the word " Hinduism " does but comprehend even their cultural, linguistic,
social and political aspects as well. It is more or less akin to " Hindu Polity " and its nearly exact
translation would be " Hinduness ". The third word " Hindudom " means the Hindu people spoken
of collectively. It is a collective name for the Hindu World, just as Islam denotes the Moslem
World."
Mr. Savarkar takes it as a gross misrepresentation to say that the Hindu Maha Sabha is a religious
body. In refutation of this misrepresentation, Mr. Savarkar says : 5[f.5]
" It has come to my notice that a very large section of the English educated Hindus hold back from
joining the Hindu Maha Sabha.... under the erroneous idea that it is an exclusively Religious
organizationâ something like a Christian Mission. Nothing could be far from truth. The Hindu
Maha Sabha is not a Hindu Mission. It leaves Religious questions regarding theism, monotheism.
Pantheism or even atheism to be discussed and determined by the different Hindu schools of
religious persuasions. It is not a Hindu Dharma Maha Sabha, but a Hindu National Maha Sabha.
Consequently by its very constitution it is debarred to associate itself exclusively as a partisan with
any particular religious school or sect even within the Hindu fold. As a national Hindu body it will
of course propagate and defend the National Hindu Church comprising each and all religions of
Hindusthani origin against any non-Hindu attack or encroachment. But the sphere of its activity is
far more comprehensive than that of an exclusively religious body. The Hindu Maha Sabha
identifies itself with the National life of Hindudom in all its entirety, in all its social, economical,
cultural and above all political aspects and is pledged to protect and promote all that contributes to
the freedom, strength and glory of the Hindu Nation; and as an indispensable means to that end to
attain Puma Swarajya, absolute political Independence of Hindusthan by all legitimate and proper
means. "
Mr. Savarkar does not admit that the Hindu Maha Sabha is started to counteract the Muslim League
and that as soon as the problems arising out of the Communal Award are solved to the satisfaction
of both Hindus and Musalmans, the Hindu Maha Sabha will vanish. Mr. Savarkar insists that the
Hindu Maha Sabha must continue to function even after India becomes politically free. He says :
6[f.6]
"...... Many a superficial critic seems to fancy that the Maha Sabha was only contrived to serve as a
make-weight, as a reaction checkmating the Moslem League or the anti-Hindu policy of the present
leaders of the Congress and will be out of court or cease automatically 10 function as soon as it is
shorne of this spurious excuse to exist. But if the aims and object of the Maha Sabha mean anything
it is clear that it was not the outcome of any frothy effusion, any fussy agitation to remove a
grievance here or oppose a seasonal party there. The fact is that every organism whether, individual
or social which is living and deserves to survive throws out offensive and defensive organs as soon
as it is brought to face adversely changing environments. The Hindu Nation too as soon as it
recovered and freed itself from the suffocating grip of the pseudo-nationalistic ideology of the
Congress brand developed a new organ to battle in the struggle for existence under the changed
conditions of modem age. This was the Hindu Maha Sabha. It grew up of a fundamental necessity
of the National life and not of any ephemeral incident. The constructive side of its aims and objects
make it amply clear that its mission is as abiding as the life of the Nation itself. But that apart, even
the day to day necessity of adapting its policy to the ever changing political currents makes it
incumbent on Hindudom to have an exclusively Hindu organization independent of any moral or
intellectual servility or subservience to any non-Hindu or jointly representative institution, to guard
Hindu interests and save them from being jeopardised. It is not so, only under the present political
subjection of Hindustan but it will be all the more necessary to have some such exclusively Hindu
organization, some such Hindu Maha Sabha in substance whether it is identical with this present
organization or otherwise to -serve as a watchtower at the gates of Hindudom for at least a couple
of centuries to come, even after Hindustan is partially or wholly free and a National Parliament
controls its political destiny.
" Because, unless something altogether cataclysmic in nature upsets the whole political order of
things in the world which practical politics cannot envisage today, all that can be reasonably
expected in immediate future is that we Hindus may prevail over England and compel her to
recognise India as a self-governing unit with the status contemplated in the Westminster Statute.
Now a National Parliament in such a self-governing India can only reflect the electorate as it is, the
Hindus and the Moslems as we find them, their relations a bit bettered, perhaps a bit worsened. No
realist can be blind to the probability that the extraterritorial designs and the secret urge goading on
the Moslems to transform India into a Moslem stale may at any time confront the Hindustani state
even under self-government either with a Civil War or treacherous overtures to alien invaders by
the Moslems. Then again there is every likelihood that there will ever continue at least for a century
to come a danger of fanatical riots, the scramble for services, legislative seats, weightages out of
proportion to their population on the part of the Moslem minority and consequently a constant
danger threatening internal peace. To checkmate this probability which if we are wise we must
always keep in view even after Hindustan attains the status of a self-governing country, a powerful
and exclusive organization of Hindudom like the Hindu MahaSabha will always prove a sure and
devoted source of strength, a reserve force for the Hindus to fall back upon to voice their
grievances more effectively than the joint Parliament can do, to scent danger ahead, to warn the
Hindus in lime against it and to fight out if need be any treacherous design to which the joint state
itself may unwittingly fall a victim.
"The History of Canada, of Palesline,of the movement of the Young Turks will show you that in
every slate where two or more such conflicting elements as the Hindus and Moslems in India
happen to exist as constituents, the wiser of them has to keep its exclusive organization intact,
strong and watchful to defeat any attempt at betrayal or capture of the National State by the
opposite party; especially so if that party has extra-territorial affinities, religious or cultural, with
alien bordering states."
Having stated what is Hindustan, and what is Hindu Maha Sabha, Mr. Savarkar next proceeds to
define his conception of Swaraj. According to Mr. Savarkar : 7[f.7]
" Swaraj to the Hindus must mean only that in which their" Swaraj ", their " Hindutva " can assert
itself without being overlorded by any non-Hindu people, whether they be Indian Territorials or
extra-Territorialsâ-some Englishmen are and may continue to be territorially born Indians. Can,
therefore, the overlordships of these Anglo-indians be a " Swarajya " to the Hindus ? Aurangzeb or
Tipu were hereditary Indians, nay, were the sons of converted Hindu mothers. Did that mean that
the rule of Aurangzeb or Tipu was a "Swarajya" to the Hindus ? No ! Although they were
territorially Indians they proved to be the worst enemies of Hindudom and therefore, a Shivaji, a
Gobindsingh, a Pratap or the Peshwas had to fight against the Moslem domination and establish
real Hindu Swarajya. "
As part of his Swaraj Mr. Savarkar insists upon two things.
Firstly, the retention of the name Hindustan as the proper name for lndia 8[f.8] " The name "
Hindustan " must continue to be the appellation of our country. Such other names as India, Hind,
etc., being derived from the same original word Sindhu may be used but only to signify the same
senseâdie land of the Hindus, a country which is the abode of the Hindu Nation. Aryavarta,
Bharat-Bhumi and such other names are of course the ancient and the most cherished epithets of
our Mother Land and will continue to appeal to the cultured elite. In this insistence that the Mother
Land of the Hindus must be called but " Hindustan ", no encroachment or humiliation is implied in
connection with any of our non-Hindu countrymen. Our Parsee and Christian countrymen are
already too akin to us culturally and .arc too patriotic and the Anglo-indians too sensible to refuse
to fall in line with us Hindus on so legitimate a ground. So far as our Moslem countrymen are
concerned it is useless to conceal the fact that some of them are already inclined to look upon this
molehill also as an insuperable mountain in their way to Hindu-Moslem unity. But they should
remember that the Moslems do not dwell only in India nor are the Indian Moslems the only heroic
remnants of the Faithful in Islam. China has crores of Moslems. Greece, Palestine and even
Hungary and Poland have thousands of Moslems amongst their nationals. But being there a
minority, only a community, their existence in these countries has never been advanced as a ground
to change the ancient names of these countries which indicate the abodes of those races whose
overwhelming majority owns the land. The country of the Poles continues to be Poland and of the
Grecians as Greece. The Moslems there did not or dared not to distort them but are quite content to
distinguish themselves as Polish Moslems or Grecian Moslems or Chinese Moslems when occasion
arises, so also our Moslem countrymen may distinguish themselves nationally or territorially
whenever they want, as" Hindustance Moslems "without compromising in the least their
separateness as Religious or Cultural entity. Nay, the Moslems have been calling themselves as "
Hindustanis " ever since their advent in India, of their own accord.
" But if inspite of it all some irascible Moslem sections amongst our countrymen object even to this
name of our Country, that is no reason why we should play cowards to our own conscience. We
Hindus must not betray or break up the continuity of our Nation from the Sindhus. in Rigvedic days
to the Hindus of our own generation which is implied in " Hindustan ", the accepted appellation of
our Mother Land. Just as the land of the Germans is Germany, of the English England, of the Turks
Turkistan, of the Afghans Afghanistanâeven so we must have it indelibly impressed on the map of
the earth for all times to come a " Hindustan "âthe land of the " Hindus ".
The second is the retention of Sanskrit as sacred language, Hindi as national language and Nagari
as the script of Hindudom. 9[f.9]
"The Sanskrit shall be our " Deva Bhasha)" 10[f.10] our sacred language and the "Sanskrit
Nishtha" 11[f.11] Hindi, the Hindi which is derived from Sanskrit and draws its nourishment from
the latter, is our ' 'mr' ' (Rashtra Bhasha) 12[f.12] our current national languageâ-besides being
the richest and the most cultured of the ancient languages of the world, to us Hindus the Sanskrit is
the holiest tongue of tongues. Our scriptures, history, philosophy and culture have their roots so
deeply imbedded in the Sanskrit literature that it forms veritably the brain of our Race. Mother of
the majority of our mother tongues, she has suckled the rest of them at her breast. All Hindu
languages current today whether derived from Sanskrit or grafted on to it can only grow and
flourish on the sap of life they imbibe from Sanskrit. The Sanskrit language therefore must ever be
an indispensable constituent of the classical course for Hindu youths.
" In adopting the Hindi as the National tongue of Hindudom no humiliation or any invidious
distinction is implied as regards other provincial tongues. We are all as attached to our provincial
tongues as to Hindi and they will all grow and flourish in their respective spheres. In fact some of
them are today more progressive and richer in literature. But nevertheless, taken all in all the Hindi
can serve the purpose of a National Pan-Hindu language best. It must also be remembered that the
Hindi is not made a National Language to order. The fact is that long before either the English or
even the Moslems stepped in India the Hindi in its general form had already come to occupy the
position of a National tongue throughout Hindustan. The Hindu pilgrim, the tradesman, the tourist,
the soldier, the Pandit travelled up and down from Bengal to Sind and Kashmere to Rameshwar by
making himself understood from locality to locality through Hindi. Just as the Sanskrit was the
National Language of the Hindu intellectual world even so Hindi has been for at least a thousand
years in the past the National Indian Tongue of the Hindu community.....
"By Hindi we of course mean the pure "Sanskrit Nistha" Hindi, as we find it for example in the "
Satyartha Prakash " written by Maharsi Dayananda Saraswati. How simple and untainted with a
single unnecessary foreign word is that Hindi and how expressive withal ! It may be mentioned in
passing that Swami Dayanandaji was about the first Hindu leader who gave conscious and definite
expression to the view that Hindi should be the Pan-Hindu National language of India. " This
Sanskrit Nistha " Hindi has nothing to do with that hybrid, the so-called Hindusthani which is being
hatched up by the Wardha scheme. It is nothing short of a linguistic monstrosity and must be
ruthlessly suppressed. Not only that but it is our bounden duty to oust as ruthlessly all unnecessary
alien words whether Arabian or English, from every Hindu tongueâwhether provincial or
dialectical. . . . . . .
"....... Our Sanskrit alphabetical order is phonetically about the most perfect which the world has
yet devised and almost all our current Indian scripts already follow it. The Nagari Script too
follows this order. Like the Hindi language the Nagari Script too has already been current for
centuries all over India amongst the Hindu literary circles for some two thousand years at any rate
in the past and was even popularly nick-named as the " Shastri Lipi " the script of our Hindu
Scriptures. ....It is a matter of common knowledge that if Bengali or Gujarathi is printed in Nagari it
is more or less understood by readers in several other provinces. To have only one common
language throughout Hindustan at a stroke is impracticable and unwise. But to have the Nagari
script as the only common script throughout Hindudom is much more feasible. Nevertheless, it
should be borne in mind that the different Hindu scripts current in our different provinces have a
future of their own and may flourish side by side with the Nagari. All that is immediately
indispensable in the common interest of Hindudom as a whole is that the Nagari Script must be
made a compulsory subject along with the Hindi language in every school in the case of Hindu
students. "
What is to be the position of the Non-Hindu minorities under the Swaraj as contemplated by Mr.
Savarkar ? On this question, this is what Mr. Savarkar has to say : 13[f.13]
"When once the Hindu Maha Sabha not only accepts but maintains the principles of" one man one
vote " and the public services to go by merit alone added to the fundamental rights and obligations
to be shared by all citizens alike irrespective of any distinction of Race or Religion . . .. any further
mention of minority rights is on the principle not only unnecessary but self-contradictory. Because
it again introduces a consciousness of majority and minority on Communal basis. But as practical
politics requires it and as the Hindu Sanghatanists want to relieve our non-Hindu countrymen of
even a ghost of suspicion, we are prepared to emphasise that the legitimate rights of minorities with
regard to their Religion, Culture, and Language will be expressly guaranteed: on one condition only
that the equal rights of the majority also must not in any case be encroached upon or abrogated.
Every minority may have separate schools to train up their children in their own tongue, their own
religious or cultural institutions and can receive Government help also for these,âbut always in
proportion to the taxes they pay into the common exchequer. The same principle must of course
hold good in case of the majority too.
"Over and above this, in case the constitution is not based on joint electorates and on the unalloyed
National principle of one man one vote, but is based on the communal basis then those minorities
who wish to have separate electorate or reserve seats will be allowed to have them,âbut always in
proportion to their population and provided that it does not deprive the majority also of an equal
right in proportion of its population too."
That being the position assigned to the minorities, Mr. Savarkar concludes 14 [f.14] that under his
scheme of Swaraj :
"The Moslem minority in India will have the right to be treated as equal citizens, enjoying equal
protection and civic rights in proportion to their population. The Hindu majority will not encroach
on the legitimate rights of any non-Hindu minority. But in no case can the Hindu majority resign its
right which as a majority it is entitled to exercise under any democratic and legitimate constitution.
The Moslem minority in particular has not obliged the Hindus by remaining in minority and
therefore, they must remain satisfied with the status they occupy and with the legitimate share of
civic and political rights that is their proportionate due. It would be simply preposterous t endow
the Moslem minority with the right of exercising a practical veto on the legitimate rights and
privileges of the majority and call it a " Swarajya ". The Hindus do not want a change of masters,
are not going to struggle and fight and die only to replace an Edward by an Aurangazeb simply
because the latter happens to be born within Indian borders, but they want henceforth to be masters
themselves in their own house, in their own Land. " And it is because he wants his Swaraj to bear
the stamp of being a Hindu Raj that Mr. Savarkar wants that India should have the appellation of
Hindustan.
This structure has been reared by Mr. Savarkar on two propositions which he regards as
fundamental.
The first is that the Hindu are a nation by themselves. He enunciates this proposition with great
elaboration and vehemence. Says 15[f.15] Mr. Savarkar :
" In my Presidential speech at Nagpur I had, for the first time in the history of our recent politics
pointed out in bold relief that the whole Congress ideology was vitiated ab initio by its unwitted
assumption that the territorial unity, a common habitat, was the only factor that constituted and
ought to and must constitute a Nation. This conception of a Territorial Nationality has since then
received a rude shock in Europe itself from which it was imported wholesale to India and the
present War has justified my assertion by exploding the myth altogether. All Nations carved out to
order on the Territorial design without any other common bond to mould each of them into a
national being have gone to rack and ruin, tumbled down like a house of cards. Poland and
Czechoslovakia will ever serve as a stem warning against any such efforts to frame heterogeneous
peoples into such hotch-potch Nation, based only on the shifting sands of the conception of
Territorial Nationality, not cemented by any cultural, racial or historical affinities and consequently
having no common will to incorporate themselves into a Nation. These treaty-Nations broke up at
the first opportunity they got: The German part of them went over to Germany, the Russian to
Russia, Czechs to Czechs and Poles to Poles. The cultural, linguistic, historical and such other
organic affinities proved sponger than the Territorial one. Only those Nations have persisted in
maintaining their National unity and identity during the last three to four centuries in Europe which
had developed racial, linguistic cultural and such other organic affinities in addition to their
Territorial unity or even at times in spite of it and consequently willed to be homogeneous National
unitsâsuch as England, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, etc.
" Judged by any and all of these tests which go severally and collectively to form such a
homogeneous and organic Nation, in India we Hindus are marked out as an abiding Nation by
ourselves. Not only do we own a common Fatherland, a Territorial unity, but what is scarcely
found anywhere else in the world, we have a common Holy Land which is identified with our
common Fatherland. This Bharat Bhumi, this Hindustan, India is both our 1^^ and gi^. Our
patriotism therefore is doubly sure. Then, we have common affinities, cultural, religious, historical,
linguistic, and racial which through the process of countless centuries of association and
assimilation moulded us into a homogeneous and organic nation and above all induced a will to
lead a corporate and common national life. The Hindus are no treaty Nationâbut an organic
National Being.
" One more pertinent point must be met as it often misleads our Congressite Hindu brethren in
particular. The homogeneity that wields a people into a National Being does not only imply the
total absence of all internal differences, religious, racial or linguistic, of sects and sections amongst
themselves. It only means that they differ more from other people as a national unit than they differ
amongst themselves. Even the most unitarian nations of todayâsay the British or the Frenchâ
cannot be free from any religious, linguistic, cultural, racial or other differences, sects or sections or
even some antipathies existing amongst themselves. National homogeneity connotes oneness of a
people in relation to the contrast they present to any other people as a whole.
" We Hindus, in spite of thousand and one differences within our fold, are bound by such religious,
cultural, historical, racial, linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as a definitely
homogeneous people as soon as we are placed in contrast with any other non-Hindu peopleâ say
the English or Japanese or even the Indian Moslems. That is the reason why today we the Hindus
from Cashmere to Madras and Sindh to Assam will have to be a Nation by ourselves ". . .
The second proposition on which Mr. Savarkar has built up his scheme relates to the definition of
the term Hindu. According to Mr. Savarkar a Hindu is a person:
" ...... who regards-and owns this Bharat Bhumi, this land from the Indus to the Seas, as his
Fatherland as well as his Holy Land;âi.e., the land of the origin of his religion, the cradle of his
faith.
The followers therefore of Vaidicism, SanaUmism, Jainism, Buddhism, Lingaitism, Sikhism, the
Arya Samaj, the Brahmosamaj, the Devasamaj, the Prarlhana
Samajandsucholherreligionsofindianorigin are Hindus and constitute Hindudom, i.e., Hindu people
as a whole.
Consequently the so-called aboriginal or hill-tribes also are Hindus : because India is their
Fatherland as well as their Holy Land whatever form of religion or worship they follow. The
definition rendered in Sanskrit stands thus:
ASINDHU SINDH PANYANTA YSMA BHARAT BHUMIKA I
PRITIBHU H PUNDYABHOOSHRAIV SA VAI HINDURITISMRITAH II
This definition , therefore, should be recognized by the Government and made the test of '
Hindutva * in enumerating the population of Hindus in the Government census to come. "
This definition of the term Hindu has been framed with great care and caution. It is designed to
serve two purposes which Mr. Savarkar has in view. First, to exclude from it Muslims, Christians,
Parsis and Jews by prescribing the recognition of India as a Holy Land as a qualification for being a
Hindu. Secondly, to include Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, etc., by not insisting upon belief in the sanctity
of the Vedas as an element in the qualifications.
Such is the scheme of Mr. Savarkar and the Hindu Maha Sabha. As must have been noticed, the
scheme has some disturbing features.
One is the categorical assertion that the Hindus are a nation by themselves. This, of course, means
that the Muslims are a separate nation by themselves. That this is his view, Mr. Savarkar does not
leave to be inferred. He insists upon it in no uncertain terms and with the most absolute emphasis
he is capable of. Speaking at the Hindu Maha Sabha Session held at Ahmedabad in 1937, Mr.
Savarkar said :â
" Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in supposing that India is already welded
into a harmonious nation, or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so. These our
well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. That is why they are impatient
of communal tangles and attribute them to communal organizations. But the solid fact is that the
so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural,
religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. When the time is ripe you
can solve them; but you cannot suppress them by merely refusing recognition of them. It is safer to
diagnose and treat deep-seated disease than to ignore it. Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they
are. India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary
these are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India. "
Strange as it may appear, Mr. Savarkar and Mr. Jinnah instead of being opposed to each other on
the one nation versus two nations issue are in complete agreement about it. Both agree, not only
agree but insist that there are two nations in Indiaâone the Muslim nation and the other the Hindu
nation. They differ only as regards the terms and conditions on which the two nations should live.
Mr. Jinnah says India should be cut up into two, Pakistan and Hindustan, the Muslim nation to
occupy Pakistan and the Hindu nation to occupy Hindustan. Mr. Savarkar on the other hand insists
that, although there are two nations in India, India shall not be divided into two parts, one for
Muslims and the other for the Hindus ; that the two nations shall dwell in one country and shall live
under the mantle of one single constitution; that the constitution shall be such that the Hindu nation
will be enabled to occupy a predominant position that is due to it and the Muslim nation made to
live in the position of subordinate co-operation with the Hindu nation. In the struggle for political
power between the two nations the rule of the game, which Mr. Savarkar prescribes, is to be one
man one vote, be the man Hindu or Muslim. In his scheme a Muslim is to have no advantage which
a Hindu does not have. Minority is to be no justification for privilege and majority is to be no
ground for penalty. The State will guarantee the Muslims any defined measure of political power in
the form of Muslim religion and Muslim culture. But the State will not guarantee secured seats in
the Legislature or in the Administration and, if such guarantee is insisted upon by the Muslims,
16[f.16] such guaranteed quota is not to exceed their proportion to the general population. Thus by
confiscating its weightages, Mr. Savarkar would even strip the Muslim nation of all the political
privileges it has secured so far.
This alternative of Mr. Savarkar to Pakistan has about it a frankness, boldness and definiteness
which distinguishes it from the irregularity, vagueness and indefiniteness which characterizes the
Congress declarations about minority rights. Mr. Savarkar's scheme has at least the merit of telling
the Muslims, thus far and no further. The Muslims know where they are with regard to the Hindu
Maha Sabha. On the other hand, with the Congress the Musalmans find themselves nowhere
because the Congress has been treating the Muslims and the minority question as a game in
diplomacy, if not in duplicity.
At the same time, it must be said that Mr. Savarkar's attitude is illogical, if not queer. Mr. Savarkar
admits that the Muslims are a separate nation. He concedes that they have a right to cultural
autonomy. He allows them to have a national flag. Yet he opposes the demand of the Muslim
nation for a separate national home. If he claims a national home for the Hindu nation, how can he
refuse the claim of the Muslim nation for a national home ?
It would not have been a matter of much concern if inconsistency was the only fault of Mr.
Savarkar. But Mr. Savarkar in advocating his scheme is really creating a most dangerous situation
for the safety and security of India. History records two ways as being open to a major nation to
deal with a minor nation when they are citizens of the same country and are subject to the same
constitution. One way is to destroy the nationality of the minor nation and to assimilate and absorb
it into the major nation, so as to make one nation out of two. This is done by denying to the minor
nation any right to language, religion or culture and by seeking to enforce upon it the language,
religion and culture of the major nation. The other way is to divide the country and to allow the
minor nation a separate, autonomous and sovereign existence, independent of the major nation.
Both these ways were tried in Austria and Turkey, the second after the failure of the first.
Mr. Savarkar adopts neither of these two ways. He does not propose to suppress the Muslim nation.
On the contrary he is nursing and feeding it by allowing it to retain its religion, language and
culture, elements which go to sustain the soul of a nation. At the same time he does not consent to
divide the country so as to allow the two nations to become separate, autonomous states, each
sovereign in its own territory. He wants the Hindus and the Muslims to live as two separate nations
in one country, each maintaining its own religion, language and culture. One can understand and
even appreciate the wisdom of the theory of suppression of the minor nation by the major nation
because the ultimate aim is to bring into being one nation. But one cannot follow what advantage a
theory has which says that there must ever be two nations but that there shall be no divorce between
them. One can justify this attitude only if the two nations were to live as partners in friendly
intercourse with mutual respect and accord. But that is not to be, because Mr. Savarkar will not
allow the Muslim nation to be co-equal in authority with the Hindu nation. He wants the Hindu
nation to be the dominant nation and the Muslim nation to be the servient nation. Why Mr.
Savarkar, after sowing this seed of enmity between the Hindu nation and the Muslim nation should
want that they should live under one constitution and occupy one country, is difficult to explain.
One cannot give Mr. Savarkar credit for having found a new formula. What is difficult to
understand is that he should believe that his formula is the right formula. Mr. Savarkar has taken
old Austria and old Turkey as his model and pattern for his scheme of Swaraj. He sees that in
Austria and Turkey there lived one major nation juxtaposed to other minor nations bound by one
constitution with the major nation dominating the minor nations and argues that if this was possible
in Austria and Turkey, why should it not be possible for the Hindus to do the same in India.
That Mr. Savarkar should have taken old Austria and old Turkey as his model to build upon is
really very strange. Mr. Savarkar does not seem to be aware of the fact that old Austria and old
Turkey are no more. Much less does he seem to know the forces which have blown up old Austria
and old Turkey to bits. If Mr. Savarkar instead of studying the pastâof which he is very
fondâwere to devote more attention to the present, he would have learnt that old Austria and old
Turkey came to ruination for insisting upon maintaining the very scheme of things which Mr.
Savarkar has been advising his " Hindudom " to adopt, namely, to establish a Swaraj in which there
will be two nations under the mantle of one single constitution in which the major nation will be
allowed to hold the minor nation in subordination to itself.
The history of the disruption of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Turkey is of the utmost importance to
India and the members of the Hindu Maha Sabha will do well to peruse the same. I need say
nothing here about it because I have drawn attention to lessons from their fateful history in another
chapter. Suffice it to say that the scheme of Swaraj formulated by Mr. Savarkar will give the
Hindus an empire over the Muslims and thereby satisfy their vanity. and their pride in being an
imperial race. But it can never ensure a stable and peaceful future for the Hindus, for the simple
reason that the Muslims will never yield willing obedience to so dreadful an alternative.
III
Mr. Savarkar is quite unconcerned about the Muslim reaction to his scheme. He formulates his
scheme and throws it in the face of the Muslims with the covering letter ' take it or leave it '. He is
not perturbed by the Muslim refusal to join in the struggle for Swaraj. He is quite conscious of the
strength of the Hindus and the Hindu Maha Sabha and proposes to carry on the struggle in the
confident hope that, alone and unaided, the Hindus will be able to wrest Swaraj from the British.
Mr. Savarkar is quite prepared to say to the Musalmans :
"If you come, with you, if you don't, without you; and if you oppose, in spite of youâthe Hindus
will continue to fight for their national freedom as best as they can. "
Not so Mr. Gandhi. At the very commencement of his career as a political leader of India when Mr.
Gandhi startled the people of India by his promise to win Swaraj within six months, Mr. Gandhi
said that he could perform the miracle only if certain conditions were fulfilled. One of these
conditions was the achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Gandhi is never tired of saying that
there is no Swaraj without Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Gandhi did not merely make this slogan the
currency of Indian politics but he has strenuously worked to bring it about. Mr. Gandhi, it may be
said, began his carrier as a political leader of India with the manifesto dated 2nd March 1919
declaring his intention to launch Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act and asking those who desired
to join him to sign the Satyagraha pledge. That campaign of Satyagraha was a short-lived campaign
and was suspended by Mr. Gandhi on 18th April 1919. As a part of his programme Mr. Gandhi had
fixed 17[f.17] the 6th March 1919 to be observed all over India as a day of protest against the
Rowlatt Act. Mass meetings were to be held on that day and Mr. Gandhi had prescribed that the
masses attending the meetings should take a vow in the following terms :
" With God as witness, we Hindus, and Mahomedans declare that we shall behave towards one
another as children of the same parents, that we shall have no differences, that the sorrows of each
shall be the sorrows of the other and that each shall help the other in removing them. We shall
respect each other's religion and religious feelings and shall not stand in the way of our respective
religious practices. We shall always refrain from violence to each other in the name of religion. "
There was nothing in the campaign of Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act which could have led to
any clash between the Hindus and Muslims. Yet Mr. Gandhi asked his followers to take the vow.
This shows how insistent he was from the very beginning upon Hindu-Muslim unity.
The Mahomedans started the Khilafat movement in 1919. The objective of the movement was
two-fold; to preserve the Khilafat and to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Both these
objectives were unsupportable. The Khilafat could not be saved simply because the Turks, in whose
interest this agitation was carried on, did not want the Sultan. They wanted a republic and it was
quite unjustifiable to compel the Turks to keep Turkey a monarchy when they wanted to convert it
into a republic. It was not open to insist upon the integrity of the Turkish Empire because it meant
the perpetual subjection of the different nationalities to the Turkish rule and particularly of the
Arabs, especially when it was agreed on all hands that the doctrine of self-determination should be
made the basis of the peace settlement.
The movement was started by the Mahomedans. It was taken up by Mr. Gandhi with a tenacity and
faith which must have surprised many Mahomedans themselves. There were many people who
doubted the ethical basis of the Khilafat movement and tried to dissuade Mr. Gandhi from taking
any part in a movement the ethical basis of which was so questionable. But Mr. Gandhi had so
completely persuaded himself of the justice of the Khilafat agitation that he refused to yield to their
advice. Time and again he argued that the cause was just and it was his duty to join it. The position
taken up by him may be summed up in his own words. 18[f18]
" (1) In my opinion, the Turkish claim is not only not immoral and unjust, but it is highly equitable,
only because Turkey wants to retain what is her own. And the Mahomedan manifesto has definitely
declared that whatever guarantee may be necessary to be taken for the protection of the
non-Muslim and non-Turkish races, should be taken so as to give the Christians theirs and the
Arabs their self-government under the Turkish suzerainty;
(2) I do not believe the Turk to be weak, incapable or cruel. He is certainly disorganised and
probably without good generalship. The argument of weakness, incapacity and cruelly one often
hears quoted in connection with those from whom power is sought to be taken away. About the
alleged massacres a proper commission has been asked for, but never granted. And in any case
security can be taken against oppression;
(3) I have already stated that, if I were not interested in the Indian Mahomedans, I would not
interest myself in the welfare of the Turks any more than I am in that of the Austrians or the Poles.
But I am bound as an Indian to share the sufferings and trials of fellow-Indians. If I deem the
Mahomedan to be my brother, it is my duty to help him in his hour of peril to the best of my ability,
if his cause commends itself to me as just;
(4) The fourth refers to the extent Hindus should join hands with the Mahomedans. It is, therefore,
a matter of feeling and opinion. It is expedient to suffer for my Mahomedan brother to the utmost in
a just cause and I should, therefore, travel with him along the whole road so long as the means
employed by him are as honourable as his end. I cannot regulate the Mahomedan feeling. I must
accept his statement that the Khilafat is with him a religious question in the sense that it binds him
to reach the goal even at the cost of his own life. "'
Mr. Gandhi not only agreed with the Muslims in the Khilafat cause but acted as their guide and
their friend. The part played by Mr. Gandhi in the Khilafat agitation and the connection between
the Khilafat agitation and the Non-co-operation Movement has become obscure by the reason of
the fact that most people believed that it was the Congress which initiated the Non co-operation
Movement and it was done as a means for winning Swaraj. That such a view should prevail is quite
understandable because most people content themselves with noting the connection between the
Non-co-operation Movement and the special session of the Congress held at Calcutta on 7th and
8th September 1920. But anyone, who cares to go behind September 1920 and examine the
situation as it then stood, will find that this view is not true. The truth is that the non-co-operation
has its origin in the Khilafat agitation and not in the Congress Movement for Swaraj : that it was
started by the Khilafatists to help Turkey and adopted by the Congress only to help the Khilafatists
: that Swaraj was not its primary object, but its primary object was Khilafat and that Swaraj was
added as a secondary object to induce the Hindus to join it will be evident from the following facts.
The Khilafat movement may be said to have begun on 27th October 1919 when the day was
observed as the Khilafat Day all over India. On 23rd November 1919 the first Khilafat Conference
met at Delhi. It was at this session that the Muslims considered the feasibility of non-co-operation
as a means of compelling the British Government to redress the Khilafat wrong. On 10th March
1920 the Khilafat Conference met at Calcutta and decided upon non-co-operation as the best
weapon to further the object of their agitation.
On 9th June 1920 the Khilafat Conference met at Allahabad and unanimously reaffirmed their
resolve to resort to non-co-operation and appointed an Executive Committee to enforce and lay
down a^ detailed programme. On 22nd June 1920 the Muslims sent a message to the Viceroy
stating that they would start non-co-operation if the Turkish grievances were not redressed before
1st August 1920. On 30th June 1920 the Khilafat Committee meeting held at Allahabad resolved to
start non-co-operation, after a month's notice to the Viceroy. Notice was given on 1st July 1920 and
non-co-operation commenced on 1st August 1920. This short resume shows that the
non-co-operation was started by the Khilafat Committee and all that the Congress special session at
Calcutta did was to adopt what the Khilafat Conference had already done and that too not in the
interest of Swaraj but in the interest of helping the Musalmans in furthering the cause of Khilafat.
This is clear from the perusal of the Congress Resolution 19 [f.19] passed at the special session
held at Calcutta.
Although the Non-co-operation Movement was launched by the Khilafat Committee and merely
adopted by the Congress primarily to help the Khilafat cause, the person who suggested it to the
Khilafat Committee and who identified himself with the Committee and took the responsibility of
giving effect to it and who brought about its adoption by the Congress was Mr. Gandhi. At the first
Khilafat Conference held at Delhi on 23rd November
1919 Mr. Gandhi was present. Not only was Mr. Gandhi present but also it was he who advised the
Muslims to adopt non-co-operation as a method for forcing the British to yield to their demands
regarding the Khilafat. The joining of Mr. Gandhi in the Khilafat movement is full of significance.
The Muslims were anxious to secure the support of the Hindus in the cause of Khilafat. At the
Conference held on 23rd November 1919 the Muslims had invited the Hindus. Again on 3rd June
1920 a joint meeting of the Hindus and the Khilafatist Muslims was held at Allahabad. This
meeting was attended among others by Sapru, Motilal Nehru and Annie Besant. But the Hindus
were hesitant in joining the Muslims. Mr. Gandhi was the only Hindu who joined the Muslims. Not
only did he show courage to join them, but also he kept step with them, nay, led them. On 9th June
1920 when the Khilafat Conference met at Allahabad and formed an Executive Committee to
prepare a detailed programme of non co-operation and give effect to it, Mr. Gandhi was the only
Hindu on that Executive Committee. On 22nd June 1920 the Muslims sent a message to the
Viceroy that they would start non-co-operation if the Turkish grievances were not redressed before
1st August 1920. On the same day Mr. Gandhi also sent a letter to the Viceroy explaining the
justice of the Khilafat cause, the reasons why he has taken up the cause and the necessity of
satisfying the hands of the Khilafatists. For instance the notice given to the Viceroy on 1st July
1920 that non-co-operation will be started on 1st August was given by Mr. Gandhi and not by the
Khilafatists. Again when non-co-operation was started by the Khilafatist on 31st August 1920 Mr.
Gandhi was the first to give a concrete shape to it by returning his medal. After inaugurating the
Non-co-operation Movement as an active member of the Khilafat Committee Mr. Gandhi next
directed his energy to the cause of persuading the Congress to adopt non-co-operation and
strengthen the Khilafat movement. With that object in view Mr. Gandhi toured the country between
1st August and 1st September 1920 in the company of the Ali Brothers who were the founders of
the Khilafat movement impressing upon the people the necessity of non-co-operation. People could
notice the disharmony in the tune of Mr. Gandhi and the Ali Brothers. As the Modern Review
pointed out: " Reading between the lines of their speeches, it is not difficult to see that with one of
them the sad plight of the Khilafat in distant Turkey is the central fact, while with the other
attainment of Swaraj here in India is the object in view ". This dichotomy 20[f.20] of interest did
not augur well for the success of the ultimate purpose. Nonetheless Mr. Gandhi succeeded in
carrying the Congress with him in support of the Khilafat cause. 21[f.21]
For a long time the Hindus had been engaged in wooing the Muslims to their side. The Congress
was very anxious to bridge the gulf between itself and the Muslim League. The ways and means
adopted in 1916 for bringing about this consummation and which resulted in the Lucknow Pact
signed between the Congress and the Muslim League have been graphically told by Swami
Shradhanand in his impressions of the Congress Session held in that year at Lucknow. Says the
Swami 22[f.22] :
" On sitting on the dias (Lucknow Congress platform) the first thing that I noticed was that the
number of Moslem delegates was proportionately fourfold of what it was at Lahore in 1893. The
majority of Moslem delegates Bad donned gold, silver and silk embroidered chogas (flowing robes)
over their ordinary coarse suits of wearing apparel. It was rumoured that these ' chogas ' had been
put by Hindu moneyed men for Congress Tamasha. Of some 433 Moslem delegates only some 30
had come from outside, the rest belonging to Lucknow City. And of these majority was admitted
free to delegate seals, board and lodging. Sir Syed Ahmad's anti-Congress League had tried in a
public meeting to dissuade Moslems from joining the Congress as delegates. As a countermove the
Congress people lighted the whole Congress camp some four nights before the session began and
advertised that that night would be free. The result was that all the " Chandul Khanas " of Lucknow
were emptied and a huge audience of some thirty thousand Hindus and Moslems was addressed
from half a dozen platforms. It was then that the Moslem delegates were elected or selected. All
this was admitted by the Lucknow Congress organisers to me in private.
" A show was being made of the Moslem delegates. Moslem delegate gets up to second a resolution
in Urdu. He begins : ' Hozarat, I am a Mahomedan delegate '. Some Hindu delegate gels up and
calls for three cheers for Mahomedan delegates and the response is so enthusiastic as to be beyond
description. "
In taking up the cause of Khilafat Mr. Gandhi achieved a double purpose. He carried the Congress
Plan of winning over the Muslims to its culmination. Secondly he made the Congress a power in
the country, which it would not have been, if the Muslims had not joined it. The cause of the
Khilafat appealed to the Musalmans far more than political safeguards, with the result that the
Musalmans who were outside it trooped into the Congress. The Hindus welcomed them. For, they
saw in this a common front against the British, which was their main aim. The credit for this must
of course go to Mr. Gandhi. For there can be no doubt that this was an act of great daring.
When the Musalmans in 1919 approached the Hindus for participation in the Non-co-operation
Movement which the Muslims desired to start for helping Turkey and the Khilafat, the Hindus were
found to be divided in three camps. One was a camp of those who were opposed to
non-co-operation in principle. A second camp consisted of those Hindus who were prepared to join
the Muslims in their campaign of non-co-operation provided the Musalmans agreed to give up Cow
Slaughter. A third group consisted of the Hindus who feared that the Mahomedans might extend
their non-co-operation to inviting the Afghans to invade India, in which case the movement instead
of resulting in Swaraj might result in the subjection of India to Muslim Raj.
Mr. Gandhi did not care for those Hindus who were opposed to joining the Muslims in the
Non-co-operation Movement. But with regard to the others he told them that their attitude was
unfortunate.
To those Hindus who wanted to give their support on the condition that the Muslims give up cow
killing, Mr. Gandhi said 23[f.23] :
" I submit that the Hindus may not open the Goraksha (cow protection) question here. The test of
friendship is assistance in adversity, and that too, unconditional assistance. Co-operation that needs
consideration is a commercial contract and not friendship. Conditional co-operation is like
adulterated cement which does not bind. It is the duty of the Hindus, if they see the justice of the
Mahomedan cause to render co-operation. If the Mahomedans feel themselves bound in honour to
spare the Hindu's feelings and to slop cow killing, they may do so, no matter whether the Hindus
co-operate with them or not. Though therefore, I yield to no Hindu in my worship of the cow, I do
not want to make the slopping of cow killing a condition precedent to co-operation. Unconditional
co-operation means the protection of the cow."
To those Hindus who feared to join the Non-co-operation Movement for the reasons that Muslims
may invite the Afghans to invade India, Mr. Gandhi said 24[f.24] :
" It is easy enough to understand and justify the Hindu caution. It is difficult to resist the
Mahomedan position. In my opinion, the best way to prevent India from becoming the battle
ground between the forces of Islam and those of the English is for Hindus to make
non-co-operation a complete and immediate success, and I have little doubt that, if the
Mahomedans remain true to their declared intention and are able to exercise self-restraint and make
sacrifices, the Hindus will ' play the game ' and join them in the campaign of non-co-operation. I
feel equally certain that Hindus will not assist Mahomedans in promoting or bringing about an
armed conflict between the British Government and their allies, and Afghanistan. British forces are
too well organised to admit of any successful invasion of the Indian frontier. The only way,
therefore, the Mahomedans can carry on an effective struggle on behalf of the honour of Islam is to
take up non-co-operation in real earnest. It will not only be completely effective if it is adopted by
the people on an extensive scale, but it will also provide full scope for individual conscience. If I
cannot bear an injustice done by an individual or a corporation, and, I am directly or indirectly
instrumental in upholding that individual or corporation, I must answer for it before my Maker; but
I have done all that is humanly possible for me to do consistently with the moral code that refuses
to injure even the wrong-doers, if I cease to support the injustice in the manner described above. In
applying, therefore, such a great force, there should be no haste, there should be no temper shown.
Non-co-operation must be and remain absolutely a voluntary effort. The whole thing, then, depends
upon Mahomedans themselves. If they will but help themselves, Hindu help will come and the
Government, great and mighty though it is, will have to bend before the bloodless opposition of a
whole nation. "
Unfortunately, the hope of Mr.Gandhi that ' no Government can possibly withstand the bloodless
opposition of a whole nation ' did not come true. Within a year of the starting of the
Non-co-operation Movement, Mr. Gandhi had to admit that the. Musalmans had grown impatient
and that :
" In their impatient anger, the Musalmans ask for more energetic and more prompt action by the
Congress and Khilafat organisations. To the Musalmans, Swaraj means, as it must mean, India's
ability to deal effectively with the Khilafat question. The Musalmans, therefore, decline to wait if
the attainment of Swaraj means indefinite delay of a programme that may require the Musalmans of
India to become impotent witnesses of the extinction of Turkey in European waters.
" It is impossible not to sympathise with this attitude. I would gladly recommend immediate action
if I could think of any effective course. I would gladly ask for postponement of Swaraj activity if
thereby we could advance the interest of Khilafat. I could gladly take up measures outside
non-co-operation, if I could think of any, in order to assuage the pain caused to the millions of the
Musalmans.
" But, in my humble opinion, attainment of Swaraj is the quickest method of righting the Khilafat
wrong. Hence it is, that for me the solution of the Khilafat question is attainment of Swaraj and vice
versa. The only way to help the affiliated Turks is for India to generate sufficient power to be able
to assert herself. If she cannot develop that power in time, there is no way out for India and she
must resign herself to the inevitable. What can a paralytic do to stretch forth a helping hand to a
neighbour but to try to cure himself of his paralysis ? Mere ignorant, thoughtless and angry outburst
of violence may give vent to pent-up rage but can bring no relief to Turkey. "
The Musalmans were not in a mood to listen to the advice of Mr. Gandhi. They refused to worship
the principle of non-violence. They were not prepared to wait for Swaraj. They were in a hurry to
find the most expeditious means of helping Turkey and saving the Khilafat. And' the Muslims in
their impatience did exactly what the Hindus feared they would do, namely, invite the Afghans to
invade India. How far the Khilafatists had proceeded in their negotiations with the Amir of
Afghanistan it is not possible to know. But that such a project was entertained by them is beyond
question. It needs no saying that the project of an invasion of India was the most dangerous project
and every sane Indian would dissociate himself from so mad a project. What part Mr. Gandhi
played in this project it is not possible to discover. Certainly he did not dissociate himself from it.
On the contrary his misguided zeal for Swaraj and his obsession on Hindu-Moslem unity as the
only means of achieving it, led him to support the project. Not only did he advise 25[f.25] the
Amir not to enter into any treaty with the British Government but declared:
" I would, in a sense, certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan if he waged war against the British
Government. That is to say, I would openly tell my countrymen that it would be a crime to help a
government which had lost the confidence of the nation to remain in power ".
Can any sane man go so far, for the sake of Hindu-Moslem unity ? But, Mr. Gandhi was so
attached to Hindu-Moslem unity that he did not stop to enquire what he was really doing in this
mad endeavour. So anxious was Mr. Gandhi in laying the foundation of Hindu-Moslem unity well
and truly, that he did not forget to advise his followers regarding the national crisis. In an Article in
Young India of 8th September 1920 Mr. Gandhi said :
" During the Madras tour, at Bezwada I had occasion to remark upon the national crisis and
suggested that it would be better to have cries about ideals than men. I asked the audience t replace
Mahatma Gandhi-ki-jai and Mahomed Ali Shoukat Ali-ki-jai by Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai. Brother
Shoukat Ali, who followed, positively laid down the law. In spite of the Hindu-Muslim unity, he
had observed that, if Hindus shouted Bande Mataram, the Muslims rang out with AllahoAkbar and
vice ersa. This, he rightly said jarred on the ear and still showed that the people did not act with one
mind. There should be therefore only three cries recognised. Allaho Akbar to be joyously sung out
by Hindus and Muslims, showing that God alone was great and no other. The second should be
Bande Malaram (Hail Motherland) or Bharat Mata-ki-jai (Victory to Mother Hind). The third
should be Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai without which there was no victory for India, and no true
demonstration of the greatness of God.. I do wish that the newspapers and public men would take
up the Maulana's suggestion and lead the people only to use the three cries. They are full of
meaning. The first is a prayer and confession of our littleness and therefore a sign of humility. It is
a cry in which all Hindus and Muslims should join in reverence and prayfulness. Hindus may not
fight shy of Arabic words, when their meaning is not only totally inoffensive but even ennobling.
God is no respecter of any particular tongue. Bande Mataram, apart from its wonderful
associations, expresses the one national wishâthe rise of India to her full height. And I should
prefer Bande Mataram to Bharat Mata-ki-jai, as it would be a graceful recognition of the
intellectual and emotional superiority of Bengal. Since India can be nothing without the union of
the Hindu and the Muslim heart, Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai is a cry which we may never forget.
" There should be no discordance in these cries. Immediately some one has taken up any of the
three cries, the rest should take it up and not attempt to yell out their favourite. Those, who do not
wish to join, may refrain, but should consider it a breach of etiquette to interpolate their own when
a cry has already been raised. It would be better too, always to follow out the three cries in the
order given above. "
These are not the only things Mr. Gandhi has done to build up Hindu-Moslem unity. He has never
called the Muslims to account even when they have been guilty of gross crimes against Hindus.
It is a notorious fact that many prominent Hindus who had offended the religious susceptibilities of
the Muslims either by their writings or by their part in the Shudhi movement have been murdered
by some fanatic Musalmans. First to suffer was Swami Shradhanand, who was shot by Abdul
Rashid on 23rd December 1926 when he was lying in his sick bed. This was followed by the
murder of Lala Nanakchand, a prominent Arya Samajist of Delhi. Rajpal, the author of the Rangila
Rasool, was stabbed by llamdin on 6th April 1929 while he was sitting in his shop. Nathuramal
Sharma was murdered by Abdul Qayum in September 1934. It was an act of great daring. For
Sharma was stabbed to death in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind where he was
seated awaiting the hearing of his appeal against his conviction under Section 195, 1. P. C., for the
publication of a pamphlet on the history of Islam. Khanna, the Secretary of the Hindu Sabha, was
severely assaulted in 1938 by the Mahomedans after the Session of the Hindu Maha Sabha held in
Ahmedabad and very narrowly escaped death.
This is, of course, a very short list and could be easily expanded. But whether the number of
prominent Hindus killed by fanatic Muslims is large or small matters little. What matters is the
attitude of those who count, towards these murderers. The murderers paid the penalty of law where
law is enforced. The leading Moslems, however, never condemned these criminals. On the
contrary, they were hailed as religious martyrs and agitation was carried on for clemency being
shown to them. As anillustration of this attitude, one may refer to Mr. Barkat Alli, a Barrister of
Lahore, who argued the appeal of Abdul Qayum. He went to the length of saying that Qayum was
not guilty of murder of Nathuramal because his act was justifiable by the law of the Koran. This
attitude of the Moslems is quite understandable. What is not understandable is the attitude of Mr.
Gandhi.
Mr. Gandhi has been very punctilious in the matter of condemning any and every act of violence
and has forced the Congress, much against its will to condemn it. But Mr. Gandhi has never
protested against such murders. Not only have the Musalmans not condemned 26[f.26] these
outrages but even Mr. Gandhi has never called upon the leading Muslims to condemn them. He has
kept silent over them. Such an attitude can be explained only on the ground that Mr. Gandhi was
anxious to preserve Hindu-Moslem unity and did not mind the murders of a few Hindus, if it could
be achieved by sacrificing their lives.
This attitude to excuse the Muslims any wrong, lest it should injure the cause of unity, is well
illustrated by what Mr. Gandhi had to say in the matter of the Mopla riots.
The blood-curdling atrocities committed by the Moplas in Malabar against the Hindus were
indescribable. All over Southern India, a wave of horrified feeling had spread among the Hindus of
every shade of opinion, which was intensified when certain Khilafat leaders were so misguided as
to pass resolutions of " congratulations to the Moplas on the brave fight they were conducting for
the sake of religion". Any person could have said that this was too heavy a price for Hindu-Moslem
unity. But Mr. Gandhi was so much obsessed by the necessity of establishing Hindu-Moslem unity
that he was prepared to make light of the doings of the Moplas and the Khilafats who were
congratulating them. He spoke of the Moplas as the " brave God-fearing Moplas who were fighting
for what they consider as religion and in a manner which they consider as religious ". Speaking of
the Muslim silence over the Mopla atrocities Mr. Gandhi told the Hindus:
" The Hindus must have the courage and the faith to feel that they can protect their religion in spite
of such fanatical eruptions. A verbal disapproval by the Mussalmans of Mopla madness is no test of
Mussalman friendship. The Mussalmans must naturally feel the shame and humiliation of the
Mopla conduct about forcible conversions and looting, and they must work away so silently and
effectively that such a thing might become impossible even on the part of the most fanatical among
them. My belief is that the Hindus as a body have received the Mopla madness with equanimity and
that the cultured Mussalmans are sincerely sorry of the Mopla's perversion of the teaching of the
Prophet"
The Resolution 27[f.27] passed by the Working Committee of the Congress on the Mopla
atrocities shows how careful the Congress was not to hurt the feelings of the Musalmans.
" The Working Committee places on record its sense of deep regret over the deeds of violence done
by Moplas in certain areas of Malbar, these deeds being evidence of the fact that there are still
people in India who have not understood the message of the Congress and the Central Khilafat
Committee, and calls upon every Congress and Khilafat worker to spread the said message of
non-violence even under the gravest provocation throughout the length and breadth of India.
" Whilst, however, condemning violence on the part of the Moplas, the working Committee desires
it to be known that the evidence in its possession shows that provocation beyond endurance was
given to the Moplas and that the reports published by and on behalf of the Government have given
a one-sided and highly exaggerated account of the wrongs done by the Moplas and an
understatement of the needless destruction of life resorted to by the Government in the name of
peace and order.
" The Working Committee regrets to find that there have been instances of so-called forcible
conversion by some fanatics among Moplas, but warms the public against believing in the
Government and inspired versions. The Report before the Committee says:
" The families, which have been reported to have been forcibly converted into Mahomedanism,
lived in the neighbourhood of Manjeri. It is clear that conversions were forced upon Hindus by a
fanatic gang which was always opposed to the Khilafat and Non-co-operation Movement and there
were only three cases so far as our information goes. ' "
The following instances of Muslim intransigence, over which Mr. Gandhi kept mum are recorded
by Swami Shradhanand in his weekly journal called the Liberator. Writing in the issue of 30th
September 1926 the Swamiji says :
" As regards the removal of untouchability it has been authoritatively ruled several times that it is
the duty of Hindus to expiate for their past sins and non-Hindus should have nothing to do with it
But the Mahomedan and the Christian Congressmen have openly revolted against the dictum of Mr.
Gandhi at Vaikorn and other places. Even such an unbiased leader as Mr. Yakub Hassan, presiding
over a meeting called to present an address to me at Madras, openly enjoined upon Musalmans the
duty of converting all the untouchables in India to Islam. "
But Mr. Gandhi said nothing by way of remonstrance either to the Muslims or to the Christians.
In his issue of July 1926 the Swami writes :
" There was another prominent fact to which I drew the attention of Mahatma Gandhi. Both of us
went together one night to the Khilafat Conference at Nagpur. The Ayats (verses) of the Quran
recited by the Maulanas on that occasion, contained frequent references to Jihad and killing of the
Kaffirs.But when I drew his attention to this phase of the Khilafat movement, Mahatmaji smiled
and said, ' They are alluding to the British Bureaucracy '. In reply I said that it was all subversive of
the idea of non-violence and when the reversion of feeling came the Mahomedan Maulanas would
not refrain from using these verses against the Hindus. "
The Swami 's third instance relates to the Mopla riots. Writing in the Liberator of 26th August
1926 the Swami says :
"The first warning was sounded when the question of condemning the Moplas for their atrocities on
Hindus came up in the Subjects Committee. The original resolution condemned the Moplas
wholesale for the killing of Hindus and burning of Hindu homes and the forcible conversion to
Islam. The Hindu members themselves proposed amendments till it was reduced to condemning
only certain individuals who had been guilty of the above crimes. But some of the Moslem leaders
could not bear this even. Maulana Fakir and other Maulanas, of course, opposed the resolution and
there was no wonder. But I was surprised, an out-and-out Nationalist like Maulana Hasrat Mohani
opposed the resolution on the ground that the Mopla country no longer remained Dar-ul-Aman but
became Dar-ul-Harab and they suspected the Hindus of collusion with the British enemies of the
Moplas. Therefore, the Moplas were right in presenting the Quran or sword to the Hindus. And if
the Hindus became Mussalmans to save themselves from death, it was a voluntary change of faith
and not forcible conversionâWell, even the harmless resolution condemning some of the Moplas
was not unanimously passed but had to be accepted by a majority of votes only. There were other
indications also, showing that the Mussalmans considered the Congress to be existing on their
sufferance and if there was the least attempt to ignore their idiosyncracies the superficial unity
would be scrapped asunder. "
The last one refers to the burning of the foreign cloth started by Mr. Gandhi. Writing in the
Liberator of 31st August 1926 the Swamiji says:
" While people came to the conclusion, that the burning of foreign cloth was a religious duty of
Indians and Messrs. Das, Nehru and other topmost leaders made bon-fire of cloth worth thousands,
the Khilafat Musalmans got permission from Mahatmaji to send all foreign cloth for the use of the
Turkish brethren. This again was a great shock to me. While Mahatmaji stood adamant and did not
have the least regard for Hindu feelings when a question of principle was involved, for the Moslem
dereliction of duty, there was always a soft corner in his heart "
In the history of his efforts to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity mention must be made of two
incidents. One is the Fast, which Mr. Gandhi underwent in the year 1924. It was a fast of 21 days.
Before undertaking the fast Mr. Gandhi explained the reasons for it in a statement from which the
following extracts are taken:
" The fact that Hindus and Musalmans, who were only two years ago apparently working together
as friends, are now fighting like cats and dogs in some places, shows conclusively that the
non-co-operation they offered was not non-violent. I saw the symptoms in Bombay, Chauri Chaura
and in a host of minor cases. I did penance then. It had its effects protanto. But this Hindu-Muslim
tension was unthinkable. It became unbearable on hearing of the Kohat tragedy. On the eve of my
departure from Sabarmati for Delhi, Sarojinj Devi wrote to me that speeches and homilies on peace
would not do. I must find out an effective remedy. She was right in saddling the responsibility on
me. Had I not been instrumental in bringing into being the vast energy of the people? I must find
the remedy if the energy proved self-destructive.
* * *
" I was violently shaken by Amethi, Sambhal and Gulbarga. I had read the reports about Amelhi
and Sambhal prepared by Hindu and Musalman friends. I had learnt the joint finding of Hindu and
Musalman friends who went to Gulbarga. I was writhing in deep pain and yet I had no remedy. The
news of Kohal set the smouldering mass aflame. Something had got to be done. I passed two nights
in restlessness and pain. On Wednesday I knew the remedy. I must do penance.
"It is a warning to the Hindus and Musalmans who have professed to love me. If they have loved
me truly and if I have been deserving of their love, they will do penance with me for the grave sin
of denying God in their hearts.
" The penance of Hindus and Mussalmans is not falling but retracting their steps. It is true penance
for a Mussalman to harbour no ill-will for his Hindu brother and an equally true penance for a
Hindu to harbour none for his Mussalman brother.
" I did not consult friendsânoteven Hakim Saheb who was close with me for a long lime on
Wednesdayânot Maulana Mahomed Ali under whose roof I am enjoying the privilege of
hospitality.
"But was it right for me to go through the last under a Mussalman roof? (Gandhi was at that time
the guest of Mr. Mahomed Ali at Delhi). Yes, it was. The fast is not born out of ill-will against a
single soul. My being under a Mussalman roof ensures it against any such interpretation. It is in the
fitness of things that this fast should be taken up and completed in a Mussalman house.
" And who is Mahomed Ali ? Only two days before the fast we had a discussion about a private
matter in which I had told him what was mine was his and what was his was mine. Let me
gratefully tell the public that I have never received warmer or teller treatment than under Mahomed
Ali's roof. Every want of mine is anticipated. The dominant thought of every one of his household
is to make me and mine happy and comfortable. Doctors Ansari and Abdur Rehman have
constituted themselves my medical advisers. They examine me daily. I have had many a happy
occasion in my life. This is no less happy than the previous ones. Bread is not everything. I am
experiencing here the richest love. It is more than bread [or me.
" It has been whispered that by going so much with Mussalman friends, I make myself unfit to
know the Hindu mind. The Hindu mind is myself. Surely I do not live amidst Hindus to know the
Hindu mind when every fibre of my being is Hindu. My Hinduism must be a very poor thing if it
cannot flourish under influences the most adverse. I know instinctively what is necessary for
Hinduism. But I must labour to discover the Mussalman mind. The closer I come to the best of
Mussalmans,the juster I am likely to be in my estimate of the Mussalmans and their doings. I am
striving to become the best cement between the two communities. My longing is to be able to
cement the two with my blood, if necessary. But, before I can do so, I must prove to the
Mussalmans that I love them as well as I love the Hindus. My religion teaches me to love all
equally. May God help me to do so I My fast among other things is meant to qualify me for
achieving that equal and selfless love.
The fast produced Unity Conferences. But the Unity Conferences produced nothing except pious
resolutions which were broken as soon as they were announced.
This short historical sketch of the part Mr. Gandhi played in bringing about Hindu-Moslem unity
may be concluded by a reference to the attitude of Mr. Gandhi in the negotiations about the
Communal Settlement. He offered the Muslims a blank cheque. The blank cheque only served to
exasperate the Muslims as they interpreted it as an act of evasion. He opposed the separate
electorates at the Round Table Conference. When they were given to the Muslims by the
Communal Award, Mr. Gandhi and the Congress did not approve of them. But when it came to
voting upon it, they took the strange attitude of neither approving it nor opposing it.
Such is the history of Mr. Gandhi's efforts to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity. What fruits did
these efforts bear? To be able to answer this question it is necessary to examine the relationship
between the two communities during 1920-40, the years during which Mr. Gandhi laboured so hard
to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity. The relationship is well described in the Annual Reports on
the affairs of India submitted year by year to Parliament by the Government of India under the old
Government of India Act. It is on these reports 28[f.28] that I have drawn for the facts recorded
below.
Beginning with the year 1920 there occurred in that year in Malabar what is known as the Mopla
Rebellion. It was the result of the agitation carried out by two Muslim organizations, the
Khuddam-i-Kaba (servants of the Mecca Shrine) and the Central Khilafat Committee. Agitators
actually preached the doctrine that India under the British Government was Dar-ul-Harab and that
the Muslims must fight against it and if they could not, they must carry out the alternative principle
of Hijrat. The Moplas were suddenly carried off their feet by this agitation. The outbreak was
essentially a rebellion against the British Government The aim was to establish the kingdom of
Islam by overthrowing the British Government. Knives, swords and spears were secretly
manufactured, bands of desperadoes collected for an attack on British authority. On 20th August a
severe encounter took place between the Moplas and the British forces at Pinmangdi Roads were
blocked, telegraph lines cut, and the railway destroyed in a number of places. As soon as the
administration had been paralysed, the Moplas declared that Swaraj had been established. A certain
Ali Mudaliar was proclaimed Raja, Khilafat flags were flown, and Ernad and Wallurana were
declared Khilafat Kingdoms. As a rebellion against the British Government it was quite
understandable. But what baffled most was the treatment accorded by the Moplas to the Hindus of
Malabar. The Hindus were visited by a dire fate at the hands of the Moplas. Massacres, forcible
conversions, desecration of temples, foul outrages upon women, such as ripping open pregnant
women, pillage, arson and destructionâ in short, all the accompaniments of brutal and unrestrained
barbarism, were perpetrated freely by the Moplas upon the Hindus until such time as troops could
be hurried to the task of restoring order through a difficult and extensive tract of the country. This
was not a Hindu-Moslem riot. This was just a Bartholomew. The number of Hindus who were
killed, wounded or converted, is not known. But the number must have been enormous.
In the year 1921-22 communal jealously did not subside. The Muharram Celebrations had been
attended by serious riots both in Bengal and in the Punjab. In the latter province in particular,
communal feeling at Multan reached very serious heights, and although the casualty list was
comparatively small, a great deal of damage to property was done.
Though the year 1922-23 was a peaceful year the relations between the two communities were
strained throughout 1923-24. But in no locality did this tension produce such tragic consequences
as in the city of Kohat. The immediate cause of the trouble was the publication and circulation of a
pamphlet containing a virulently anti-Islamic poem. Terrible riots broke out on the 9th and 10th of
September 1924, the total casualties being about 155 killed and wounded. House property to the
estimated value of Rs. 9 lakhs was destroyed, and a large quantity of goods were looted. As a result
of this reign of terror the whole Hindu population evacuated the city of Kohat. After protracted
negotiations an agreement of reconciliation was concluded between the two communities.
Government giving an assurance that, subject to certain reservations, the prosecution pending
against persons concerned in rioting should be dropped. With the object of enabling the sufferers to
restart their businesses and rebuild their houses. Government sanctioned advances, free of interest
in certain instances, amounting to Rs. 5 lakhs. But even after the settlement had been reached and
evacuees had returned to Kohat there was no peace and throughout 1924-25 the tension between
the Hindu and Musalman masses in various parts of the country increased to a lamentable extent. In
the summer months, there was a distressing number of riots. In July, severe fighting broke out
between Hindus and Musalmans in Delhi, which was accompanied by serious casualties. In the
same month, there was a bad outbreak at Nagpur. August was even worse. There were riots at
Lahore, at Lucknow, at Moradabad, at Bhagalpur and Nagpur in British India ; while a severe
affray took place at Gulbarga in the Nizam's Dominions. September-October saw severe fighting at
Lucknow, Shahajahanpur, Kankinarah and at Allahabad. The most terrible outbreak of the year
being the one that took place at. Kohat which was accompanied by murder, arson and loot.
In 1925-26 the antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims became widespread. Very
significant features of the Hindu-Muslim rioting, which took place during this year were its wide
distribution and its occurrence, in some cases, in small villages. Calcutta, the United Provinces, the
Central Provinces and the Bombay Presidency were all scenes of riots, some of which led to
regrettable losses of life. Certain minor and local Hindu festivals which occurred at the end of
August, gave rise to communal trouble in Calcutta, in Berar, in Gujarat in the Bombay Presidency,
and in the United Provinces. In some of these places there were actual clashes between the two
communities, but elsewhere, notably at Kankinarahâone of the most thickly populated jute mill
centres of Calcuttaâserious rioting was prevented by the activity of the police. In Gujarat,
Hindu-Muslim feeling was running high in these days and was marked by at least one case of
temple desecration. The important Hindu festival of Ramlila, at the end of September, gave rise to
acute anxiety in many places, and at Aligarh, an important place in the United Provinces, its
celebration was marked by one of the worst riots of the year. The riot assumed such dangerous
proportions that the police were compelled to fire in order to restore order, and five persons were
killed, either by the police or by riots. At Lucknow, the same festival gave rise at one time to a
threatening situation, but the local authorities prevented actual rioting. October saw another serious
riot at Sholapur in the Bombay Presidency. There, the local Hindus were taking a car with Hindu
idols through the city, and when they came near a mosque, a dispute arose between them and
certain Muslims, which developed into a riot.
A deplorable rioting started in Calcutta in the beginning of April as an affray outside a mosque
between Muslims and some Arya Samajists and continued to spread until 5th April, though there
was only one occasion on which the police or military were faced by a crowd which showed
determined resistance, namely, on the evening of the 5th April, when fire had to be opened. There
was also a great deal of incendiarism and in the first three days of this incendiarism, the Fire
Brigade had to deal with 110 fires. An unprecedented feature of the riots was the attacks on temples
by Muslims and on mosques by Hindus which naturally led to intense bitterness. There were 44
deaths and 584 injured. There was a certain amount of looting and business was suspended, with
great economic loss to Calcutta. Shops began to reopen soon after the 5th, but the period of tension
was prolonged by the approach of a Hindu festival on the 13th of April, and of the Id on the 14th.
The Sikhs were to have taken out a procession on the 13th, but Government were unable to give
them the necessary license. The apprehensions with regard to the 13th and 14th of April,
fortunately, did not materialise and outward peace prevailed until 22nd April when it was abruptly
broken as a result of a petty quarrel in a street, which restarted the rioting. Fighting between the
mobs of the two communities, generally on a small scale, accompanied by isolated assaults and
murders continued for six days. During this period there were no attacks on the temples and
mosques and there was little arson or looting. But there were more numerous occasions, on which
the hostile mobs did not immediately disperse on the appearance of the police and on 12 occasions
it was necessary to open fire. The total number of casualties during this second phase of the rioting
was 66 deaths and 391 injured. The dislocation of business was much more serious during the first
riots and the closing of Marwari business houses was not without an effect on European business
firms. Panic caused many of the markets to be wholly or partially closed and for two days the meat
supply was practically stopped. So great was the panic that the removal of refuse in the disturbed
area was stopped. Arrangements were, however, made to protect supplies, and the difficulty with
the Municipal scavengers was overcome, as soon as the Municipality had applied to the police for
protection. There was slight extension of the area of rioting, but no disturbances occurred in the
mill area around Calcutta. Systematic raiding of the portions of the disturbed area, the arrest of
hooligans, the seizure of weapons and the re-inforcement of the police by the posting of British
soldiers to act as special police officers had the desired effect, and the last three days of April, in
spite of the continuance of isolated assaults and murders, witnessed a steady improvement in the
situation. Isolated murders were largely attributable to hooligans of both communities and their
persistence during the first as well as the second outbreak induced a general belief that these
hooligans were hired assassins. Another equally persistent feature of the riots, namely, the
distribution of inflammatory printed leaflets by both sides, together with the employment of hired
roughs, strengthened the belief that money had been spent to keep the riots going.
The year 1926-27 was one continuous period of communal riots. Since April 1926, every month
witnessed affrays more or less serious between partizans of the two communities and only two
months passed without actual rioting in the legal sense of the word. The examination of the
circumstances of these numerous riots and affrays shows that they originated either in utterly petty
and trivial disputes between individuals, as, for example, between a Hindu shopkeeper and a
Mahomedan customer, or else, the immediate cause of trouble was the celebration of some
religious festival or the playing of music by Hindu processionists in the neighbourhood of
Mahomedan places of worship. One or two of the riots, indeed, were due to nothing more than
strained nerves and general excitement. Of these, the most striking example occurred in Delhi on
24th June, when the bolting of a pony in a crowded street gave the impression that a riot had
started, upon which both sides immediately attacked each other with brickbats and staves.
Including the two outbursts of rioting in Calcutta during April and May 1926,40 riots took place
during the twelve months ending with April 1st 1927, resulting in the death of 197 and injuries,
more or less severe, to 1,598 persons. These disorders were widespread, but Bengal, the Punjab,
and the United Provinces were the parts of India most seriously affected. Bengal suffered most
from rioting, but on many occasions during the year, tension between Hindus and Mahomedans
was high in the Bombay Presidency and also in Sind. Calcutta remained uneasy throughout the
whole of the summer. On 1st June a petty dispute developed into a riot in which forty persons were
hurt. After this, there was a lull in overt violence until July 15th on which day fell an important
Hindu religious festival. During its celebration the passage of a procession, with bands playing in
the neighbourhood of certain mosques, resulted in a conflict, in which 14 persons were killed and
116 injured. The next day saw the beginning of the important Mahomedan festival of Muharram.
Rioting broke out on that day and, after a lull, was renewed on the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd.
Isolated assaults and cases of stabbing occurred on the 23rd, 24th and 25th. The total ascertained
casualties during this period of rioting were 28 deaths and 226 injured. There were further riots in
Calcutta on the 15th September and 16th October and on the latter day there was also rioting in the
adjoining city of Howrah, during which one or two persons were killed and over 30 injured. The
April and May riots had been greatly aggravated by incendiarism, but, happily, this feature was
almost entirely absent from the later disorders and during the July riots, for example, the Fire
Brigade was called upon to deal with only four incendiary fires.
Coming to the year 1927-28 the following facts stare us in the face. Between the beginning of April
and the end of September 1927, no fewer than 25 riots were reported. Of these 10 occurred in the
United Provinces, six in the Bombay Presidency, 2 each in the Punjab, the Central Provinces,
Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa, and one in Delhi. The majority of these riots occurred during the
celebration of a religious festival by one or other of the two communities, whilst some arose out of
the playing of music by Hindus in the neighbourhood of mosques or out of the slaughter of cows by
the Muslims. The total casualties resulting from the above disorders were approximately 103
persons killed and 1,084 wounded.
By far the most serious riot reported during the year was that which took place in Lahore between
the 4th and 7th of May 1927. Tension between the two communities had been acute for some time
before the outbreak, and the trouble when it came was precipitated by a chance collision between a
Mahomedan and two Sikhs. The disorder spread with lightning speed and the heavy casualty
listâ27 killed 272 injuredâwas largely swollen by unorganised attacks on individuals. Police and
troops were rushed to the scene of rioting quickly and it was impossible for clashes on a big scale
to take place between hostile groups. Casual assassinations and assaults were however, reported,
for two or three days longer before the streets and lanes of Lahore became safe for the solitary
passerby.
After the Lahore riot in May, there was a lull for two months in inter-communal rioting, if we
except a minor incident, which happened about the middle of June in Bihar and Orissa ; but July
witnessed no fewer than eight riots of which the most serious occurred in Multan in the Punjab, on
the occasion of the annual Muharram celebrations. Thirteen killed and twenty-four wounded was
the toll taken by this riot. But August was to see worse rioting still. In that month, nine riots
occurred, two of them resulting in heavy loss of life. In a riot in Bettiah, a town in Bihar and Orissa,
arising out of a dispute over a religious procession, eleven persons were killed and over a hundred
injured, whilst the passage of a procession in front of a mosque in Bareilly in the United Provinces
was the occasion of rioting in which fourteen persons were killed and 165 were injured.
Fortunately, this proved to be the turning point in inter-communal trouble during the year, and
September witnessed only 4 riots. One of these, however, the riot in Nagpur in the Central
Provinces on September 4th was second only to Lahore riot in seriousness and in the damage which
it caused. The spark, which started the fire, was the trouble in connection with a Muslim
procession, but the materials for the combustion had been collected for some time. Nineteen
persons were killed and 123 injured were admitted to hospitals as a result of this riot, during the
course of which many members of the Muslim community abandoned their homes in Nagpur.
A feature of Hindu-Muslim relations during the year which was hardly less serious than the riots
was the number of murderous outrages committed by members of one community against persons
belonging to the other. Some of the most serious of these outrages were perpetrated in connection
with the agitation relating to Rangila Rasul and Risala Vartman, two publications containing most
scurrilous attack on the Prophet Muhammed and as a result of them, a number of innocent persons
lost their lives, sometimes in circumstances of great barbarity. In Lahore a series of outrages
against individuals led to a state of great excitement and insecurity during the summer of 1927.
The excitement over the Rangila Rasul 29[f.29] case had by now travelled far from its original
centre and by July had begun to produce unpleasant repercussions on and across the North-West
Frontier. The first signs of trouble in this region became apparent early in June, and by the latter
part of July the excitement had reached its height. On the British side of the border, firm and tactful
handling of the situation by the local authorities averted, what would have been a serious breach of
the peace. Economic boycott of Hindus was freely advocated in the British Frontier Districts,
especially in Peshawar, but this movement met with little success, and although the Hindus were
maltreated in one or two villages, the arrest of the culprits, together with appropriate action under
the Criminal Law, quickly restored order. Across the border however, the indignation, aroused by
these attacks on the Prophet, gave rise to more serious consequences. The Frontier tribesmen are
acutely sensitive to the appeal of religion and when a well-known Mullah started to preach against
the Hindus among the Afridis and Shinwaris in the neighbourhood of the Khyber Pass, his words
fell on fruitful ground. He called upon the Afridis and Shinwaris to expel all the Hindus living in
their midst unless they declared in writing that they dissociated themselves from the doings of their
co-religionists down country. The first to expel their Hindu neighbours were two clans of the
Khyber Afridis, namely the Kuikhel and Zakkakhel, on the 22nd July. From these, the excitement
spread among their Shinwari neighbours, who gave their Hindu neighbours notice to quit a few
days later. However, after the departure of some of the Hindus, the Shinwaris agreed to allow the
remainder to stay on. Some of the Hindus on leaving the Khyber were roughly handled. In two
cases, stones were thrown, though happily without any damage resulting. In a third case, a Hindu
was wounded and a large amount of property carried off, but this was recovered by Afridi
Khassadars in full, and the culprits were fined for the offence. Thereafter, arrangements were made
for the picketing of the road for the passage of any Hindu evacuating tribal territory. Under
pressure from the Political Agent an Afridi jirga decided towards the end of July to suspend the
Hindu boycott pending a decision in the Risala Vartman case. In the following week, however,
several Hindu families, who had been living at Landi Kotal at the head of the Khyber Pass moved
to Peshawar refusing to accept assurances of the tribal chiefs but leaving one person from each
family behind to watch over their interests. All told, between four hundred and fifty Hindus, men,
women and children, had come into Peshawar by the Middle of August, when the trouble was
definitely on the wane. Some of the Hindus were definitely expelled, some were induced to leave
their homes by threats, some left from fear, some no doubt from sympathy with their neighbours.
This expulsion and voluntary exodus from tribal territory were without parallel. Hindus had lived
there for more generations than most of them could record as valued and respected, and, indeed, as
essential members of the tribal system, for whose protection the tribesmen had been jealous, and
whose blood feuds they commonly made their own. In all, about 450 Hindus left the Khyber during
the excitement ; of these, about 330 had returned to their homes in tribal territory by the close of the
year 1927. Most of the remainder had decided to settle, at any rate for the present, amid the more
secure conditions of British India.
The year 1928-29 was comparatively more peaceful than the year 1927-28. His Excellency Lord
Irwin, by his speeches to the Central Legislature and outside, had given a strong impetus to the
attempts to find some basis for agreement between the two communities, on those questions of
political importance, which were responsible for the strained relations between them. Fortunately
the issues arising out of the inquiry by the Simon Commission which was appointed in 1929,
absorbed a large part of the energy and attention of the different communities, with the result that
less importance came to be attached to local causes of conflict, and more importance to the broad
question of constitutional policy. Moreover, the legislation passed during the autumn session of the
Indian Legislature in 1927 penalising the instigation of inter-communal hostility by the press, had
some effect in improving the inter-communal disturbances. The number of riots during the twelve
months ending with March 31st, 1929, was 22. Though the number of riots was comparatively
small, the casualties,âswelled heavily by the Bombay riots,âwere very serious, no fewer than 204
persons having been killed and nearly a thousand injured. Of these, the fortnight's rioting in
Bombay accounts for 149 killed and 739 injured. Seven of these 22 riots, or roughly one-third of
them, occurred on the day of the celebration of the annual Muslim festival of Bakr-i-Id at the end of
May. The celebration of this festival is always a dangerous time in Hindu-Muslim relations. The
Muslim regard it as a day of animal sacrifice, and as the animal chosen is almost always a cow the
slightest tension between the two communities is apt to produce an explosion. Of the Bakr-i-Id riots
only two were serious and both of them took place in the Punjab. The first took place in a village in
the Ambala District in which ten people were killed and nine injured. The other riot which took
place in Softa village in the Gurgaon District in the Southern Punjab, attained considerable
notoriety because of its sensational features. The village of Softa is about 27 miles south of Delhi
and is inhabited by Muslims. This village is surrounded by villages occupied by Hindu cultivators
who, on hearing that the muslims of Softa intended to sacrifice a cow on the ' Id Day ', objected to
the sacrifice of the particular cow selected on the ground that it had been accustomed to graze in
fields belonging to the Hindu cultivators. The dispute over the matter assumed a threatening aspect
and the Superintendent of Police of the district accordingly went with a small force of police, about
25 men in all, to try to keep peace. He took charge of the disputed cow and locked it up, but his
presence did not deter the Hindu cultivators of a few neighbouring villages from collecting about a
thousand people armed with pitchforks, spears and staves, and going to Softa. The Superintendent
of Police and an Indian Revenue official, who were present in the village, assured the crowd that
the cow, in connection with which the dispute had arisen would not be sacrificed, but this did not
satisfy the mob which threatened to burn the whole village if any cow was sacrificed, and also
demanded that the cow should be handed over to them. The Superintendent of Police refused to
agree to this demand, whereupon the crowd became violent and began to throw stones at the police
and to try to get round the latter into the village. The Superintendent of Police warned the crowd to
disperse, but to no effect. He, therefore, fired one shot from his revolver as a further warning.
Notwithstanding the crowd still continued to advance and the Superintendent had to order his party
of police to fire. Only one volley was fired at first, but as this did not cause the retreat of the mob,
two more volleys had to be fired before the crowd slowly dispersed, driving off some cattle
belonging to the village.
While the police were engaged in this affair a few Hindu cultivators got into Softa at another place
and tried to set fire to the village. They were, however, driven away by the police after they had
inflicted injuries on three or four men. In all 14 persons were killed and 33 were injured. The
Punjab Government deputed a judicial officer to enquire into this affair. His report, which was
published on 6th July, justified the action of the police in firing on the mob and recorded the
opinion that there was no reason to suppose that the firing was excessive or was continued after the
mob had desisted from its unlawful aggression. Had the police not opened fire, the report proceeds,
their own lives would have been in immediate danger, as also the lives of the people of Softa.
Lastly, in the opinion of the officer writing the report, had Softa village been sacked, there would
certainly have broken up, within 24 hours, a terrible communal conflagration in the whole of the
surrounding country-side.
The riots of Kharagpur, an important railway centre not far from Calcutta, also resulted in serious
loss of life. Two riots took place at Kharagpur, the first on the occasion of the Muharram
celebration at the end of June and the second on the 1st September 1928, when the killing of a cow
served as a cause. In the first riot 15 were killed and 21 injured, while in the second riot, the
casualties were 9 killed and 35 wounded. But none of these riots is to be compared with those that
raged in Bombay from the beginning to the middle of February, when, as we have seen, 149
persons were killed and well over 700 injured.
During the year 1929-30 communal riots, which had been so conspicuous and deplorable a feature
of public life during the preceding years, were very much less frequent. Only 12 were of sufficient
importance to be reported to Government of India, and of these only the disturbances in the City of
Bombay were really serious. Starting on the 23rd of April they continued sporadically until the
middle of May, and were responsible for 35 deaths and about 200 other casualties. An event which
caused considerable tension in April was the murder at Lahore of Rajpal, whose pamphlet Rangila
Rasul, containing a scurrilous attack on the Prophet of Islam, was responsible for much of the
communal trouble in previous years, and also for a variety of legal and political complications.
Fortunately, both communities showed commendable restraint at the time of the murder, and again
on the occasion of the execution and funeral of the convicted man ; and although feelings ran high
no serious trouble occurred.
The year 1930-31 saw the eruption of the Civil Disobedience Movement It gave rise to riots and
disturbances all over the country. They were mostly of a political character and the parties involved
in them were the police and the Congress volunteers. But, as it always happens in India, the
political disturbances took a communal twist. This was due to the fact that the Muslims refused to
submit to the coercive methods used by Congress volunteers to compel them to join in Civil
Disobedience. The result was that although the year began with political riots it ended in numerous
and quite serious communal riots. The worst of these communal riots took place in and around
Sukkur in Sind between the 4th and 11th of August and affected over a hundred villages. The
outbreak in the Kishoreganj subdivision of Mymensingh District (Bengal) on the 12th/15th of July
was also on a large scale. In addition, there were communal disturbances on the 3rd of August in
Ballia (United Provinces) ; on the 6th of September in Nagpur, and on the 6th/7th September in
Bombay ; and a Hindu-Christian riot broke out near Tiruchendur (Madras) on the 31st of October.
On the 12th of February, in Amritsar, an attempt was made to murder a Hindu cloth merchant who
had defied the picketers, and a similar outrage which was perpetrated the day before in Benares had
very serious consequences. On this occasion, the victim was a Muslim trader, and the attack proved
fatal; as a result, since Hindu-Muslim relations throughout most of Northern India were by this time
very strained, a serious communal riot broke out and continued for five days, causing great
destruction of property and numerous casualties. Among the other communal clashes during this
period were the riots at Nilphamari (Bengal) on the 25th of January and at Rawalpindi on the 31st.
Throughout Northern India communal relations had markedly deteriorated during the first two
months of 1931, and already, in February, there had been serious communal rioting in Benares,
This state of affairs was due chiefly to the increasing exasperation created among Muslims by the
paralysis of trade and the general atmosphere of unrest and confusion that resulted from Congress
activities. The increased importance which the Congress seemed to be acquiring as a result of the
negotiations with the Government aroused in the Muslims serious apprehensions and had the effect
of worsening the tension between the two communities. During March, this tension, in the United
Provinces at any rate, became greatly increased. Between the 14th and 16th there was serious
rioting in the Mirzapur District, and on the 17th, trouble broke out in Agra and continued till the
20th. There was also a communal riot in Dhanbad (Bengal) on the 28th, and in Amritsar District on
the 30th ; and in many other parts of the country, the relations between members of the two
communities had become extremely strained.
In Assam, the communal riot which occurred at Digboi in Lakhimpur District, resulted in deaths of
one Hindu and three Muslims. In Bengal, a communal riot took place in the Asansol division
during the Muharram festival. In Bihar and Orissa there was a certain amount of communal tension
during the year, particularly in Saran. Altogether there were 16 cases of communal rioting and
unlawful assembly. During the Bakr-i-Id festival a clash occurred in the Bhabua sub-division of
Shahabad. Some 300 Hindus collected in the mistaken belief that a cow had been sacrificed. The
local officers had succeeded in pacifying them when a mob of about 200 Muhammedans armed
with lathis, spears and swords, attacked the Hindus, one of whom subsequently died. The prompt
action of the police and the appointment of a conciliation committee prevented the spread of the
trouble. The Muharram festival was marked by two small riots in Monghyr, the Hindus being the
aggressors on one occasion and the Muslims on the other. In the Madras Presidency there were also
several riots of a communal nature during the year and the relations between the communities were
in places distinctly strained. The most serious disturbance of the year occurred at Vellore on the 8th
of June, as a result of the passage of a Muslim procession with Tazias near a Hindu temple ; so
violent was the conflict between members of the two communities that the police were compelled
to open fire in order to restore order ; and sporadic fighting continued in the town during the next
two or three days. In Salem town, owing to Hindu-Muslim tension a dispute arose on the 13th of
July, as to who had been the victor at a largely attended Hindu-Muslim wrestling match at
Shevapet. Another riot occurred in October at Kitchipalaiyam near Salem town ; the trouble arose
from a few Muslims disturbing a street game played by some young Hindus. Hindu-Muslim
disturbances also arose in Polikal village, Kurnool District, on the 15th of March, owing to a
dispute about the route of a Hindu procession, but the rioters were easily dispersed by a small force
of police. In the Punjab there were 907 cases of rioting during the year as compared with 813 in
1929. Many of them were of a communal character, and the tension between the two principal
communities remained acute in many parts of the Province. In the United Provinces, although
communal tension during 1930 was not nearly so acute as during the first 3 months of 1931, and
was for a while overshadowed by the excitement engendered by the Civil Disobedience Movement,
indications of it were fairly numerous, and the causes of disagreement remained as potent as ever.
In Dehra Dun and Bulandshahr there were communal riots of the usual type, and a very serious riot
occurred in Ballia city as a result of a dispute concerning the route taken by a Hindu procession,
which necessitated firing by the police. Riots also occurred in Muttra, Azamgarh, Mainpuri and
several other places.
Passing on to the events of the year 1931-32, the progress of constitutional discussions at the R. T.
C. had a definite reaction in that it bred a certain nervousness among the Muslim and other minority
communities as to their position under a constitution functioning on the majority principle. The first
session of the Round Table Conference afforded the first " close-up " of the constitutional future.
Until then the ideal of Dominion Status had progressed little beyond a vague and general
conception, but the declaration of the Princes at the opening of the Conference had brought
responsibility at the Centre, in the form of a federal government, within definite view. The
Muslims, therefore, felt that it was high time for them to take stock of their position. This
uneasiness was intensified by the Irwin-Gandhi settlement, which accorded what appeared to be a
privileged position to the Congress, and Congress elation and pose of victory over the Government
did not tend to ease Muslim misgivings. Within three weeks of the " pact " occurred the savage
communal riots at Cawnpore, which significantly enough began with the attempts of Congress
adherents to force Mahomedan shopkeepers to observe a hartal in memory of Bhagat Singh who
was executed on 23rd March. On 24th March began the plunder of Hindu shops. On the 25th there
was a blaze. Shops and temples were set fire to and burnt to cinders. Disorder, arson, loot, murder,
spread like wild fire. Five hundred families abandoned their houses and took shelter in villages. Dr.
Ramchandra was one of the worst sufferers. All members of his family, including his wife and aged
parents, were killed and their bodies thrown into gutters. In the same slaughter Mr. Ganesh Shankar
Vidyarthi lost his life. The Cawnpore Riots Inquiry Committee in its report states that the riot was
of unprecedented violence and peculiar atrocity, which spread with unexpected rapidity through the
whole city and even beyond it. Murders, arson and looting were widespread for three days, before
the rioting was definitely brought under control. Afterwards it subsided gradually. The loss of life
and property was great. The number of verified deaths was 300; but the death roll is known to have
been larger and was probably between four and five hundred. A large number of temples and
mosques were desecrated or burnt or destroyed and a very large number of houses were burnt and
pillaged.
This communal riot, which need never have occurred but for the provocative conduct of the
adherents of the Congress, was the worst which India has experienced for many years. The trouble,
moreover, spread from the city to the neighbouring villages, where there were sporadic communal
disturbances for several days afterwards.
The year 1932-33 was relatively free from communal agitations and disturbances. This welcome
improvement was doubtless in some measure due to the suppression of lawlessness generally and
the removal of uncertainty in regard to the position of the Muslims under the new constitution.
But in 1933-34 throughout the country communal tension had been increasing and disorders which
occurred not only on the occasion of such festivals as Holi, Id and Muharram, but also many
resulting from ordinary incidents of every-day life indicated, that there had been a deterioration in
communal relations since the year began. Communal riots during Holi occurred at Benares and
Cawnpore in the United Provinces, at Lahore in the Punjab, and at Peshawar. Bakr-i-ld was marked
by serious rioting at Ayodhya, in the United Provinces over cow sacrifice, also at Bhagalpore in
Bihar and Orissa and at Cannanore in Madras. A serious riot in the Ghazipur District of the United
Provinces also resulted in several deaths. During April and May there were Hindu-Muslim riots at
several places in Bihar and Orissa, in Bengal, in Sind and Delhi, some of them provoked by very
trifling incidents, as for instance, the unintentional spitting by a Muslim shopkeeper of Delhi upon
a Hindu passer-by. The increase in communal disputes in British India was also reflected in some
of the States where similar incidents occurred.
The position with regard to communal unrest during the months from June to October was
indicative of the normal, deep-seated antagonism between the two major communities. June and
July months, in which no Hindu or Muhammedan festival of importance took place, were
comparatively free from riots, though the situation in certain areas of Bihar necessitated the
quartering of additional police. A long-drawn-out dispute started in Agra. The Muslims of this city
objected to the noise of religious ceremonies in certain Hindu private houses which they said
disturbed worshippers at prayers in a neighbouring mosque. Before the dispute was settled, riots
occurred on the 20th July and again on the 2nd September, in the course of which 4 persons were
killed and over 80 injured. In Madras a riot, on the 3rd September resulting in one death and
injuries to 13 persons was occasioned by a book published by Hindus containing alleged reflections
on the Prophet. During the same month minor riots occurred in several places in the Punjab and the
United Provinces.
In 1934-35 serious trouble arose in Lahore on the 29th June as a result of a dispute between
Muslims and Sikhs about a mosque situated within the precincts of a Sikh temple known as the
Shahidganj Gurudwara. Trouble had been brewing for some time. Ill-feeling became intensified
when the Sikhs started to demolish the Mosque despite Muslim protests. The building had been the
subject of prolonged litigation, which has confirmed the Sikh right of possession.
On the night of the 29th June a crowd of 3 or 4 thousand Muslims assembled in front of the
Gurudwara. A struggle between this crowd and the Sikhs inside the Gurudwara was only averted by
the prompt action of the local authorities. They subsequently obtained an undertaking from the
Sikhs to refrain from further demolition. But during the following week, while strenuous efforts
were being made to persuade the leaders to reach an amicable settlement, the Sikhs under pressure
of extremist influence again set about demolishing the mosque. This placed the authorities in a
most difficult position. The Sikhs were acting within their legal rights. Moreover the only effective
method of stopping demolition would have been to resort to firing. As the building was full of
Sikhs and was within the precincts of a Sikh place of worship, this would not only have caused
much bloodshed but, for religious reasons, would have had serious reactions on the Sikh population
throughout the Province. On the other hand, inaction by Government was bound to cause great
indignation among the Muslims, for religious reasons : and it was expected that this would show
itself in sporadic attacks on the Sikhs and perhaps on the forces of Government.
It was hoped that discussions between leaders of the two communities would effect some
rapprochement, but mischief-makers inflamed the minds of their co-religionists. Despite the arrest
of the chief offenders, the excitement increased. The Government's gesture in offering to restore to
the Muslims another mosque which they had purchased years ago proved unavailing.
The situation took a further turn for the worse on the 19th July and during the following two days
the situation was acutely dangerous. The Central Police station was practically besieged by the
huge crowds, which assumed a most menacing attitude. Repeated attempts to disperse them without
the use of firearms failed and the troops had to fire twice on the 20th July and eight times on the
21st. In all 23 rounds were fired and 12 persons killed. Casualties, mostly of a minor nature, were
numerous amongst the military and police.
As a result of the firing, the crowds dispersed and did not reassemble. Extra police were brought in
from other Provinces and the military garrisons were strengthened. Administrative control was
re-established rapidly, but the religious leaders continued to fan the embers of the agitation. Civil
litigation was renewed and certain Muslim organisations framed some extravagant demands.
The situation in Lahore continued to cause anxiety up to the close of the year. On the 6th
November, a Sikh was mortally wounded by a Muslim. Three days later a huge Sikh-Hindu
procession was taken out. The organisers appeared anxious to avoid conflict but nonetheless one
serious clash occurred. This was followed by further rioting on the next day. But for the good work
of the police and the troops, in breaking up the fights quickly, the casualties might have been very
large.
On the 19th March 1935 a serious incident occurred in Karachi after the execution of Abdul
Quayum, the Muslim who had murdered Nathuramal, a Hindu, already referred to as the writer of a
scurrilous pamphlet about the Prophet. Abdul Quayum's body was taken by the District Magistrate,
accompanied by a police party, to be handed over to the deceased's family for burial outside the
city. A huge crowd, estimated to be about 25,000 strong, collected at the place of burial. Though
the relatives of Abdul Quayum wished to complete the burial at the cemetery, the most violent
members of the mob determined to take the body in procession through the city. The local
authorities decided to prevent the mob entering, since this would have led to communal rioting. All
attempts of the police to stop the procession failed, so a platoon of the Royal Sussex Regiment was
brought in to keep peace. It was forced to open fire at short range to stop the advance of the
frenzied mob and to prevent itself from being overwhelmed. Forty-seven rounds were fired by
which 47 people were killed and 134 injured. The arrival of reinforcements prevented further
attempts to advance. The wounded were taken to the Civil Hospital and the body of Abdul Quayum
was then interred without further trouble.
On the 25th August 1935 there was a communal riot at Secunderabad.
In the year 1936 there were four communal riots. On the 14th April there occurred a most terrible
riot at Firozabad in the Agra District. A Muslim procession was proceeding along the main bazar
and it is alleged that bricks were thrown from the roofs of Hindu houses. This enraged the Muslims
in the procession who set fire to the house of a Hindu, Dr. Jivaram, and the adjacent temple of
Radha Krishna. The inmates of Dr. Jivaram's house in addition to 11 Hindus including 3 children
were burnt to death. A second Hindu-Muslim riot broke out in Poona in the Bombay Presidency on
24th April 1936. On the 27th April there occurred a Hindu-Muslim riot in Jamalpur in the Monghyr
District. The fourth Hindu-Muslim riot of the year took place in Bombay on the 15th October 1936.
The year 1937 was full of communal disturbances. On the 27th March 1937 there was a
Hindu-Muslim riot at Panipat over the Holi procession and 14 persons were killed. On the 1st May
1937 there occurred a communal riot in Madras in which 50 persons were injured. The month of
May was full of communal riots which took place mostly in the C. P. and the Punjab. One that took
place in Shikarpur in Sind caused great panic. On 18th June there was a Sikh-Muslim riot in
Amritsar. It assumed such proportions that British troops had to be called out to maintain order.
The year 1938 was marked by two communal riotsâone in Allahabad on 26th March and. another
in Bombay in April.
There were 6 Hindu-Muslim riots in 1939. On the 21st January there was a riot at Asansol in which
one was killed and 18 injured. It was followed by a riot in Cawnpore on the 11th February in which
42 were killed, 200 injured and 800 arrested. On the 4th March there was a riot at Benares followed
by a riot at Cassipore near Calcutta on the 5th March. On 19th June there was again a riot at
Cawnpore over the Rathajatra procession.
A serious riot occurred on 20th November 1939 in Sukkur in Sind. The riot was the culmination of
the agitation by the Muslims to take possession, even by force, of a building called Manzilgah
which was in the possession of Government as Government property and to the transfer of which
the Hindus had raised objections. Mr. E. Westonânow a judge of the Bombay High Courtâwho
was appointed to investigate into the disturbances gives 30[f.30] the following figures of the
murdered and the wounded :
Taluka. Murders committed. Persons
injured.
Persons
Subsequently
died from injuries.
Hindus. Mdns. Ilindus. Mdns. Ilindus. Mdns.
Sukkur Town 20 12 11 11 1
Sukkur Taluka 2 2 23 5
Shikarpur Taluka 5 11 2
Garhi Yasin Taluka 24 4
Rohri Taluka 10 3
Pano Akil Taluka 6 1
Ghorki Taluka 1 1
Mirpur Mathelo Taluka 1
Ubauro Taluka 4 3 1 1
142 14 58 12 9
Of the many gruesome incidents recorded by him the following may be quoted:
" The most terrible of all the disturbances occurred on the night of the 20th at Gosarji village which
is eight miles from Sukkur and sixteen from Shikarpur. According to an early statement sent by the
District Magistrate to Government, admittedly incomplete, 27 Hindus were murdered there that
night. According to the witnesses examined the number was 37.
" Pamanmal, a contractor of Gosarji states that at the time of satyagraha the leading Hindus of
Gosarji came in deputation to the leading zemindar of the locality Khan Sahib Amirbux who was
then at Sukkur. He reassured them and said he was responsible for their safely. On the 20th Khan
Sahib Amirbux was at Gosarji, and that morning Mukhi Mahrumal was murdered there. The
Hindus went to Khan Sahib Amirbux for protection and were again reassured, but that night
wholesale murder and looting took place. Of the 37 murdered, seven were women. Pamanmal
states that the following morning he went to the Sub-Inspector of Bagerji, which is one mile from
Gosarji, but he was abused and driven from the thana. He then went to Shikarpur and complained
to the panchayat, but did not complain to any officer there. I may mention that the Sub-Inspector of
Bagerji was afterwards prosecuted under section 211, Indian Penal Code, and has been convicted
for failure to make arrests in connection with murders at Gosarji.
" As Khan Sahib Amirbux, the zemindar, who was said to have given assurance of protection to the
Hindus of Bagerji, was reported to be attending the Court, he was called and examined as a Court
witness. He states that he lives half a mile from Gosarji village. The Sub-Inspector of Bagerji came
to Gosarji on the 20th after the murder of Mehrumal, and he acted as a mashir. He says that the
Hindus did not ask for help and there was no apprehension of trouble. On the night of the 20th he
was not well, and he heard nothing of the murders. He admits that he had heard of the Manzilgah
evacuation. Later in his evidence he admits that he told the villagers of Gosarji to be on the alert as
there was trouble in Sukkur, and he says he had called the panchayat on the evening of the 19th. He
went to Gosarji at sunrise on the 21st after the murders. He admits that he is regarded as the
protector of Gosarji. "
Mr. Weston adds 31[f.31] :â
" I find it impossible to believe the evidence of this witness. I have no doubt that he was fully aware
that there was trouble in Gosarji on the night of 20th and preferred to remain in his house. "
Who can deny that this record of rioting presents a picture which is grim in its results and sombre
in its tone ? But being chronological in order, the record might fail to give an idea of the havoc
these riots have caused in any given Province and the paralysis it has brought about in its social and
economic life. To give an idea of the paralysis caused by the recurrence of riots in a Province I
have recast the record of riots for the Province of Bombay. When recast the general picture appears
as follows :
Leaving aside the Presidency and confining oneself to the City of Bombay, there can be no doubt
that the record of the city is the blackest. The first Hindu-Muslim riot took place in 1893. This was
followed by a long period of communal peace which lasted upto 1929. But the years that have
followed have an appalling story to tell. From February 1929 to April 1938âa period of nine
yearsâthere were no less than 10 communal riots. In 1929 there were two communal riots. In the
first, 149 were killed and 739 were injured and it lasted for 36 days. In the second riot 35 were
killed, 109 were injured and it continued for 22 days. In 1930 there were two riots. Details as to
loss of life and its duration are not available. In 1932 there were again two riots. The first was a
small one. In the second 217 were killed, 2,713 were injured and it went on for 49 days. In 1933
there was one riot, details about which are not available. In 1936 there was one riot in which 94
were killed, 632 were injured and it continued to rage for 65 days. In the riot of 1937, 11 were
killed, 85 were injured and it occupied 21 days. The riot of 1938 lasted for 2 1/2 hours only but
within that time 12 were killed and a little over 100 were injured. Taking the total period of 9 years
and 2 months from February 1929 to April 1938 the Hindus and Muslims of the City of Bombay
alone were engaged in a sanguinary warfare for 210 days during which period 550 were killed and
4,500 were wounded. This does not of course take into consideration the loss of property which
took place through arson and loot.
" Pamanmal, a contractor of Gosarji states that at the time of satyagraha the leading Hindus of
Gosarji came in deputation to the leading zemindar of the locality Khan Sahib Amirbux who was
then at Sukkur. He reassured them and said he was responsible for their safely. On the 20th Khan
Sahib Amirbux was at Gosarji, and that morning Mukhi Mahrumal was murdered there. The
Hindus went to Khan Sahib Amirbux for protection and were again reassured, but that night
wholesale murder and looting took place. Of the 37 murdered, seven were women. Pamanmal
states that the following morning he went to the Sub-Inspector of Bagerji, which is one mile from
Gosarji, but he was abused and driven from the thana. He then went to Shikarpur and complained
to the panchayat, but did not complain to any officer there. I may mention that the Sub-Inspector of
Bagerji was afterwards prosecuted under section 211, Indian Penal Code, and has been convicted
for failure to make arrests in connection with murders at Gosarji.
" As Khan Sahib Amirbux, the zemindar, who was said to have given assurance of protection to the
Hindus of Bagerji, was reported to be attending the Court, he was called and examined as a Court
witness. He states that he lives half a mile from Gosarji village. The Sub-Inspector of Bagerji came
to Gosarji on the 20th after the murder of Mehrumal, and he acted as a mashir. He says that the
Hindus did not ask for help and there was no apprehension of trouble. On the night of the 20th he
was not well, and he heard nothing of the murders. He admits that he had heard of the Manzilgah
evacuation. Later in his evidence he admits that he told the villagers of Gosarji to be on the alert as
there was trouble in Sukkur, and he says he had called the panchayat on the evening of the 19th. He
went to Gosarji at sunrise on the 21st after the murders. He admits that he is regarded as the
protector of Gosarji. "
Mr. Weston adds 31[f.31] :â
" I find it impossible to believe the evidence of this witness. I have no doubt that he was fully aware
that there was trouble in Gosarji on the night of 20th and preferred to remain in his house. "
Who can deny that this record of rioting presents a picture which is grim in its results and sombre
in its tone ? But being chronological in order, the record might fail to give an idea of the havoc
these riots have caused in any given Province and the paralysis it has brought about in its social and
economic life. To give an idea of the paralysis caused by the recurrence of riots in a Province I
have recast the record of riots for the Province of Bombay. When recast the general picture appears
as follows :
Leaving aside the Presidency and confining oneself to the City of Bombay, there can be no doubt
that the record of the city is the blackest. The first Hindu-Muslim riot took place in 1893. This was
followed by a long period of communal peace which lasted upto 1929. But the years that have
followed have an appalling story to tell. From February 1929 to April 1938âa period of nine
yearsâthere were no less than 10 communal riots. In 1929 there were two communal riots. In the
first, 149 were killed and 739 were injured and it lasted for 36 days. In the second riot 35 were
killed, 109 were injured and it continued for 22 days. In 1930 there were two riots. Details as to
loss of life and its duration are not available. In 1932 there were again two riots. The first was a
small one. In the second 217 were killed, 2,713 were injured and it went on for 49 days. In 1933
there was one riot, details about which are not available. In 1936 there was one riot in which 94
were killed, 632 were injured and it continued to rage for 65 days. In the riot of 1937, 11 were
killed, 85 were injured and it occupied 21 days. The riot of 1938 lasted for 2 1/2 hours only but
within that time 12 were killed and a little over 100 were injured. Taking the total period of 9 years
and 2 months from February 1929 to April 1938 the Hindus and Muslims of the City of Bombay
alone were engaged in a sanguinary warfare for 210 days during which period 550 were killed and
4,500 were wounded. This does not of course take into consideration the loss of property which
took place through arson and loot.
No one is more competent to answer this question than James Bryce. It was just such a question he
had to consider in discussing the vitality of the Holy Roman Empire as contrasted with the Roman
Empire. If any Empire can be said to have succeeded in bringing about political unity among its
diverse subjects it was the Roman Empire. Paraphrasing for the sake of brevity the language of
Bryce :âThe gradual extension of Roman citizenship through the founding of colonies, first
throughout Italy and then in the provinces, the working of the equalized and equalizing Roman
Law, the even pressure of the government on all subjects, the movements of population, caused by
commerce and the slave traffic, were steadily assimilating the various peoples. Emperors, who were
for the most part natives of the provinces, cared little to cherish Italy or even after the days of the
Antonines, to conciliate Rome. It was their policy to keep open for every subject a career by whose
freedom they had themselves risen to greatness. Annihilating distinctions of legal status among
freemen, it completed the work, which trade and literature and toleration to all beliefs but one were
already performing. No quarrel of race or religions disturbed that calm, for all national distinctions
were becoming merged in the idea of a common Empire.
This unity produced by the Roman Empire was only a political unity. How long did this political
unity last ? In the words of Bryce:
"Scarcely had these slowly working influences brought about this unity, when other influences
began to threaten it. New foes assailed the frontiers ; while the loosening of the structure within
was shown by the long struggles for power which followed the death or deposition of each
successive emperor. In the period of anarchy after the fall of Valerian, generals were raised by their
armies in every part of the Empire, and ruled great provinces as monarchs apart, owning no
allegiance to the possessor of the capital. The breaking-up of the western half of the Empire into
separate kingdoms might have been anticipated by two hundred years, had there not arisen in
Diocletian a prince active and skilful enough to bind up the fragments before they had lost all
cohesion, meeting altered conditions by new remedies. The policy he adopted by dividing and
localizing authority recognized the fact that the weakened heart could no longer make its pulsations
fell to the body's extremities. He parcelled out the supreme power among four monarchs, ruling as
joint emperors in four capitals, and then sought to give it a fictitious strength by surrounding it with
an oriental pomp which his earlier predecessors would have scorned. . . . The prerogative of Rome
was menaced by the -rivalry of Nicomedia, and the nearer greatness of Milan. "
It is, therefore, evident that political unity was not enough to give permanence and stability to the
Roman Empire and as Bryce points out that " the breaking-up of the western half (of the Roman
Empire) into separate kingdoms might have been anticipated by two hundred years, had the
barbarian tribes on the border been bolder, or had there not arisen in Diocletian a prince active and
skilful enough to bind up the fragments before they had lost all cohesion, meeting altered
conditions by new remedies ". But the fact is that the Roman Empire which was tottering and
breaking into bits and whose political unity was not enough to bind it together did last for several
hundred years as one cohesive unit after it became the Holy Roman Empire. As Prof. Marvin points
out 34[f.34] :
" The unity of the Roman Empire was mainly political and military. It lasted for between four and
Five hundred years. The unity which supervened in the Catholic Church was religious and moral
and endured for a thousand years. "
The question is what made the Holy Roman Empire more stable than the Roman Empire could ever
hope to be ? According to Bryce it was a common religion in the shape of Christianity and a
common religious organization in the shape of the Christian Church which supplied the cement to
the Holy Roman Empire and which was wanting in the Roman Empire. It was this cement which
gave to the people of the Empire a moral and social unity and made them see such unity expressed
and realized under a single government.
Speaking of the unifying effect of Christianity as a common religion Bryce says:
" It is on religion that the in most and deepest life of a nation rests. Because Divinity was divided,
humanity had been divided, likewise ; the doctrine of the unity of God now enforced the unity of
man, who had been created in His image. The first lesson of Christianity was love, a love that was
to join in one body those whom suspicion and prejudice and pride of race had hitherto kept apart.
There was thus formed by the new religion a community of the faithful, a Holy Empire, designed to
gather all men into its bosom, and standing opposed to the manifold polytheisms of the older world,
exactly as the universal sway of the Caesars was contrasted with the innumerable kingdoms and
city republics that had gone before it . . . . " 35[f.35]
If what Bryce has said regarding the instability of the Roman Empire and the comparatively greater
stability of its successor, the Holy Roman Empire, has any lesson for India and if the reasoning of
Bryce that the Roman Empire was unstable because it had nothing more than political unity to rely
on, and that the Holy Roman Empire was more stable, because it rested on the secure foundation of
moral and social unity, produced by the possession of a common faith, is valid reasoning and
embodies human experience, then it is obvious that there can be no possibility of a union between
Hindus and Muslims. The cementing force of a common religion is wanting. From a spiritual point
of view, Hindus and Musalmans are not merely two classes or two sects such as Protestants and
Catholics or Shaivas and Vaishnavas. They are two distinct species. In this view, neither the Hindu
nor .the Muslim can be expected to recognize that humanity is an essential quality present in them
both, and that they are not many but one and that the differences between them are no more than
accidents. For them Divinity is divided and with the division of Divinity their humanity is divided
and with the division of humanity they must remain divided. There is nothing to bring them in one
bosom.
Without social union, political unity is difficult to be achieved. If achieved, it would be as
precarious as a summer sapling, liable to be uprooted by the gust of a hostile wind. With mere
political unity, India may be a State. But to be a State is not to be a nation and a State, which is not
a nation, has small prospects of survival in the struggle for existence. This is especially true where
nationalismâthe most dynamic force of modern timesâis seeking everywhere to free itself by the
destruction and disruption of all mixed states. The danger to a mixed and composite state, therefore,
lies not so much in external aggression as in the internal resurgence of nationalities which are
fragmented, entrapped, suppressed and held against their will. Those who oppose Pakistan should
not only bear this danger in mind but should also realize that this attempt on the part of suppressed
nationalities to disrupt a mixed state and to found a separate home for themselves, instead of being
condemned, finds ethical justification from the principle of self-determination.
CHAPTER VII
MUSLIM ALTERNATIVE TO PAKISTAN
I
The Hindus say they have an alternative to Pakistan. Have the Muslims also an alternative to
Pakistan? The Hindus say yes, the Muslims say no. The Hindus believe that the Muslim proposal
for Pakistan is only a bargaining manoeuvre put forth with the object of making additions to the
communal gains already secured under the Communal Award. The Muslims repudiate the
suggestion. They say there is no equivalent to Pakistan and, therefore, they will have Pakistan and
nothing but Pakistan. It does seem that the Musalmans are devoted-to Pakistan and are determined
to have nothing else and that the Hindus in hoping for an alternative are merely indulging in
wishful thinking. But assuming that the Hindus are shrewd enough in divining what the Muslim
game is, will the Hindus be ready to welcome the Muslim alternative to Pakistan? The answer to
the question must, of course, depend upon what the Muslim alternative is.
What is the Muslim alternative to Pakistan? No one knows. The Muslims, if they have any, have
not disclosed it and perhaps will not disclose it till the day when the rival parties meet to revise and
settle the terms on which the Hindus and the Muslims are to associate with each other in the future.
To be forewarned is to be forearmed. It is, therefore, necessary for the Hindus to have some idea of
the possible Muslim alternative to enable them to meet the shock of it; for the alternative cannot be
better than the Communal Award and is sure to be many degrees worse.
In the absence of the exact alternative proposal one can only make a guess. Now one man's guess is
as good as that of another, and the party concerned has to choose on which of these he will rely.
Among the likely guesses, my guess is that the Muslims will put forth as their alternative some
such proposal as the following :â
"That the future constitution of India shall provide:
(i) That the Muslims shall have 50% representation in the Legislature, Central as well as Provincial,
through separate electorates.
(ii) That 50% of the Executive in the Centre as well as in the Provinces shall consist of Muslims.
(iii) That in the Civil Service 50% of the posts shall be assigned for the Muslims.
(iv) That in the Fighting Forces the Muslim proportion shall be one half, both in the ranks and in
the higher grades.
(v) That Muslims shall have 50% representation in all public bodies, such as councils and
commissions, created for public purposes.
(vi) That Muslims shall have 50% representation in all international organizations in which India
will participate.
(vii) That if the Prime Minister be a Hindu, the Deputy Prime Minister shall be a Muslim.
(viii) That if the Commander-in-Chief be a Hindu, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief shall be a
Muslim.
(ix) That no changes in the Provincial boundaries shall be made except with the consent of 66% of
the Muslim members of the Legislature.
(x) That no action or treaty against a Muslim country shall be valid unless the consent of 66% of
the Muslim members of the Legislature is obtained.
(xi) That no law affecting the culture or religion or religious usage of Muslims shall be made
except with the consent of 66% of the Muslim members of the Legislature.
(xii) That the national language for India shall be Urdu. (xiii) That no law prohibiting or restricting
the slaughter of cows or the propagation of and conversion to Islam shall be valid unless it is passed
with the consent of 66% of the Muslim members of the Legislature.
(viv) That no change in the constitution shall be valid unless the majority required for effecting
such changes also includes a 66% majority of the Muslim members of the Legislature.
This guess of mine is not the result of imagination let loose. It is not the result of a desire to
frighten the Hindus into an unwilling and hasty acceptance of Pakistan, If I may say so, it is really
an intelligent anticipation based upon available data coming from Muslim quarters.
An indication of what the Muslim alternative is likely to be, is obtainable from the nature of the
Constitutional Reforms which are contemplated for the Dominions of His Exalted Highness the
Nizam of Hyderabad.
The Hyderabad scheme of Reforms is a novel scheme. It rejects the scheme of communal
representation obtaining in British India. In its place is substituted what is called Functional
Representation, i.e. representation by classes and by professions. The composition of the
Legislature which is to consist of 70 members is to be as follows :â
Elected Nominated
Agricluture 12 Illakas 8
Patidars 8 Sarf-i-Khas 2
Tenants 4 Paigahs 3
Women 1
Graduates 1 Peshkari 1
University 1
Jagirdars 2 Salar Jung 1
Maashdars 1
Legal 2 Samasthans 1
Medical 2
Western 1 Officials 18
Rural Arts and Crafts 1
Oriental 1 Backward Classes 1
Teaching 1 Minor Unrepresented 3
Commerce 1 Classes.
Industries 2 Others 6
Banking 2
Indigenous 1 1
Co-operative and
Joint Stock 1 1
Organized Labour 1
Harijan 1
District Municipalities 1
City Municipality 1
Rural Boards 1
Total 33 Total . 37
Whether the scheme of functional representation will promote better harmony between the various
classes and sections than communal representation does is more than doubtful. In addition to
perpetuating existing social and religious divisions, it may quite easily intensify class struggle by
emphasizing class consciousness. The scheme appears innocuous but its real character will come
out when every class will demand representation in proportion to its numbers. Be that as it may,
functional representation is not the most significant feature of the Hyderabad scheme of Reforms.
The most significant feature of the scheme is the proposed division of seats between Hindus and
Musalmansn in the new Hyderabad Legislature. Under the scheme as approved by H. E. H. the
Nizam, communal representation is not al together banished. It is retained along with functional
representation. It is to operate through joint electorates. But there is to be equal representation for
"the two majority communities" on every 36[f.36] elective body including the legislature and no
candidate can succeed unless, he secures 40 percent, of the votes polled by-members of his
community. This principle of equal representation to Hindus and Muslims irrespective of their
numbers 37[f.37] is not only to apply to every elective body but it is to apply to both elected as
well as nominated members of the body.
In justification of this theory of equal representation it is stated that:
" The importance of the Muslim community in the state, by virtue of its historical position and its
status in the body politic, is so obvious that it cannot be reduced to the status of a minority in the
Assembly."
Quite recently there have appeared in the press 38[f.38] the proposals formulated by one Mr. Mir
Akbar Ali Khan calling himself the leader of the Nationalist Party as a means of settling the
Hindu-Muslim problem in British India. They are as follows :â
(1) The future Constitution of India must rest upon the broad foundation of adequate military
defence of the country and upon making the people reasonable military minded. The Hindus must
have the same military mindedness as the Muslims.
(2) The present moment offers a supreme opportunity for the two communities to ask for the
defence of India bang made over to them. The Indian Army must consist of an equal number of
Hindus and Muslims and no regiment should be cm a communal, as distinguished from regional
basis.
(3) The Governments in the Provinces and at the Centre should be wholly National Governments
composed of men who are reasonable military minded. Hindu and Muslim Ministers should be
equal in number in the Central as well as all Provincial cabinets; other important minorities might
wherever necessary be given special representation. This scheme will function most satisfactorily
with joint electorates, but in the present temper of the country separate electorates might be
continued. The Hindu Ministers must be elected by the Hindu members of the legislature and the
Muslim Ministers by the Muslim members.
(4) The Cabinet is to be removable only on an express vote of no-confidence, against the Cabinet
as a whole, passed by a majority of 2/3rd of the whole house which majority must be of Hindus and
Muslims taken separately.
(5) The religion, language, script and personal law of each community should be safeguarded by a
paramount constitutional check enabling the majority of members, representing that community in
the legislature to place a veto on any legislative or other measure affecting it. A similar veto must
be provided against any measure designed or calculated to affect adversely the economic
well-being of any community.
(6) An adequate communal representation in the services must be agreed to as a practical measure
of justice in administration and in the distribution patronage.
If the proposals put forth by a Muslim leader of the Nationalist Party in Hyderabad State is an
indication of the direction in which the mind of the Muslims in British India is running, then, the
guess I have made as to what is likely to be the alternative to Pakistan derives additional support.
II
It is true that in the month of April 1940 a Conference of Muslims was held in Delhi under the
grandiloquent name of " The Azad Muslim Conference." The Muslims who met in the Azad
Conference were those who were opposed to the Muslim League as well as to the Nationalist
Muslims. They were opposed to the Muslim League firstly, because of their hostility to Pakistan
and secondly because they did not want to depend upon the British Government for the protection
of their rights 39[f.39] They were also opposed to the Nationalist Musalmans (i. e. Congressites out
and out) because they were accused of indifference to the cultural and religious rights of the
Muslims. 40[f.40]
With all this the Azad Muslim Conference was hailed by the Hindus as a Conference of friends.
But the resolutions passed by the Conference leave very little to choose between it and the League.
Among the resolutions passed by the Azad Muslim Conference the following three bear directly
upon the issue in question.
The first of these runs as follows :â
" This conference, representative of Indian Muslims who desire to secure the fullest freedom of the
country, consisting of delegates and representatives of every province, after having given its fullest
and most careful consideration to all the vital questions affecting the interest of the Muslim
community and the country as a whole declares the following:â
" India will have geographical and political boundaries of an individual whole and as such is the
common homeland of all the citizens irrespective of race or religion who are joint owners of its
resources. All nooks and comers of the country are hearths and homes of Muslims who cherish the
historic eminence of their religion and culture which are dearer to them than their lives. From the
national point of view every Muslim is an Indian. The common rights of all residents of the country
and their responsibilities, in every walk of life and in every sphere of human activity are the same.
The Indian Muslim by virtue of these rights and responsibilities, is unquestionable an Indian
national and in every part of the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of every Indian
national in every sphere of governmental, economic and other national activities and in public
services. For that very reason Muslims own equal responsibilities with other Indians for striving
and making sacrifices to achieve the country's independence. This is a self-evident proposition, the
truth of which no right thinking Muslim will question. This Conference declares unequivocally and
with all emphasis at its command that the goal of Indian Muslims is complete independence along
with protection of their religion and communal rights, and that they are anxious to attain this goal
as early as possible. Inspired by this aim they have in the past made great sacrifices and are ever
ready to make greater sacrifices.
"The Conference unreservedly and strongly repudiates the baseless charge levelled against Indian
Muslims by the agents of British Imperialism and others that they are an obstacle in the path of
Indian freedom and emphatically declares that the Muslims are fully alive to their responsibilities
and consider it inconsistent with their traditions and derogatory to their honour to lag behind others
in the struggle for independence."
By this Resolution they repudiated the scheme of Pakistan. Their second Resolution was in the
following terms:â
"This is the considered view of this Conference that only that constitution for the future
Government of India would be acceptable to the people of India which is framed by the Indians
themselves elected by means of adult franchise. The constitution should fully safeguard all the
legitimate interests of the Muslims in accordance with the recommendations of the Muslim
members of the Constituent Assembly. The representatives of other communities or of an outside
power would have no right to interfere in the determination of these safeguards."
By this Resolution the Conference asserted that the safeguards for the Muslims must be determined
by the Muslims alone. Their third Resolution was as under:â
" Whereas in the future constitution of India it would be essential, in order to ensure stability of
government and preservation of security, that every citizen and community should feel satisfied,
this Conference considers it necessary that a scheme of safeguards as regards vital manors
mentioned below should be prepared to the satisfaction of the Muslims.
" This Conference appoints a board consisting of 27 persons. This board, after the fullest
investigation, consultation and consideration, shall make its recommendations for submission to the
next session of this Conference, so that the Conference may utilise the recommendations as a
means of securing a permanent national settlement of the communal question. This
recommendation should be submitted within two months. The matters referred to the board are the
following:
"1. The protection of Muslim culture, personal law and religious rights.
" 2. Political rights of Muslims and their protection.
" 3. The formation of future constitution of India to be non-unitary and federal, with absolutely
essential and unavoidable powers for the Federal Government.
"The provision of safeguards for the economic, social and cultural rights of Muslims and for their
share in public services
" The board will be empowered to fill up any vacancy in a suitable manner. The board will have the
right to co-opt other members. It will be empowered also to consult other Muslim bodies and if it
considers necessary, any responsible organisation in the country. The 27 members of the board will
be nominated by the president.
"The quorum for the meeting will be nine.
" Since the safeguards of the communal rights of different communities will be determined in the
constituent assembly referred to in the resolution which this Conference has passed, this
Conference considers it necessary to declare that Muslim members of this constituent will be
elected by Muslims themselves."
We must await the report 41[f.41] of this board to know what safeguards the Azad Muslim
Conference will devise for the safety and protection of Muslims. But there appears no reason to
hope that they will not be in favour of what I have guessed to be the likely alternative for Pakistan.
It cannot be overlooked that the Azad Muslim Conference was a body of Muslims who were not
only opposed to the Muslim League but were equally opposed to the Nationalist Muslims. There is,
therefore, no ground to trust that they will be more merciful to the Hindus than the League has been
or will be.
Supposing my guess turns out to be correct, it would be interesting to know what the Hindus will
have to say in reply. Should they prefer such an alternative to Pakistan ? Or should they rather
prefer Pakistan to such an alternative ? Those are questions which I must leave the Hindus and their
leaders to answer. All I would like to say in this connection is that the Hindus before determining
their attitude towards this question should note certain important considerations.
In particular they should note that there is a difference between Macht Politic 42 [f.42] and
Gravamin Politic 43[f.43] ; that there is a difference between Communitas Communitatum and a
nation of nations; that there is a difference between safeguards to allay apprehensions of the weak
and contrivances to satisfy the ambition for power of the strong: that there is a difference between
providing safeguards and handing over the country. Further, they should also note that what may
with safety be conceded to Gravamin Politic may not be conceded to Macht Politic. What may be
conceded with safety to a community may not be conceded to a nation and what may be conceded
with safety to the weak to be used by it as a weapon of defence may not be conceded to the strong
who may
use it as a weapon of attack.
These are important considerations and, if the Hindus overlook them, they will do so at their peril.
For the Muslim alternative is really a frightful and dangerous alternative.
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