02-19-2004, 03:04 PM
MAARIV INTERNATIONAL (ISRAELI ONLINE NEWSPAPER), FEBRUARY 17, 2004
<b>Preparing for the end game</b>
<i>Washington has gotten whatever itâs going to get out of the Iraqi campaign, and is refocusing on its core security concerns, Al Qaida and nuclear proliferation. The answer to both issues lies in Pakistan. The key allies are Israel and India. </i>
<i>Jonathan Ariel</i>
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The situation in Iraq is still far from stable. However what we are seeing is a transformation from an insurrection primarily aimed against US troops to the beginnings of the battle for control of post US Iraq.
Washington has gotten whatever itâs going to get out of the Iraqi campaign, and is refocusing on its core security concerns, Al Qaida and nuclear proliferation. The answer to both issues lies in Pakistan. The key allies are Israel and India.
Jonathan Ariel
The situation in Iraq is still far from stable. However what we are seeing is a transformation from an insurrection primarily aimed against US troops to the beginnings of the battle for control of post US Iraq.
Washington has realized that the Iraqi campaign has been no more than a partial success. Saddam is gone, and that alone justifies defining the war as being a success. Ridding the world of a gangrenous political organ like Saddam was not the sole strategic goal of the campaign. The administration had hoped that the sight of US arms parading triumphantly along the shores of the Tigris and the Euphrates would be sufficient to generate a political and cultural upheaval in the Moslem world that would rid it of militant fundamentalism. This would have also been the end of Al Qaida, which would have seen its pool of recruitable human bombs begin to evaporate.
Iraq was chosen as the opening battlefield for three reasons: military, political, and historical. The terrain was the military one, an open flat country with relatively little natural cover for guerrillas, almost made to order for maximizing the strengths and minimizing the weaknesses of US military capabilities. The US, embarking on its first unilateral major military undertaking since Vietnam, had to ensure a swift and decisive military victory. Iraq was the best place to ensure such an outcome.
The political reason was twofold. It was relatively easy to sell a war against Iraq, Saddam being Saddam. In addition, the Administration expected to uncover significant amounts of non-conventional weaponry, enabling the US to make a point that whoever develops such weapons without its tacit approval risked being ousted from power. This was especially important regarding North Korea and Iran, who together with Saddam occupied the central places in Bushâs axis of evil.
Historically Baghdad was, together with Damascus and Cairo, one of the centers of Arab power. The last Arab caliphate was ruled from Baghdad. In order to generate the kind of cultural and political whirlwind the Americans hoped to see uproot fundamentalism across Arabia, the target had to be Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, or possibly Mecca. For a variety of political considerations the most viable and convenient target was Baghdad.
However the other aims have not been achieved. The shock and awe did not resonate with sufficient force across the Shatt el Arab river separating Iraq from Iran, and the hoped for east European style peoples revolt that would rid the region of the Ayatollahs never happened. Evidence of WMD remains elusive, probably buried under the sands of the Syrian desert. The only way these aims may be achieved is via a war with Syria, as discussed in a previous article.
A US invasion of Syria or Iran is not on for now. Washington is about to go on the defensive in the Middle East theater of the war on terror. This means enough presence in Iraq to contain Iran and Syria, but no proactive measures beyond that.
From the two rivers to the Valley of the Indus
This explains the recent disclosure of Pakistanâs nuclear hanky-panky. However intelligence reports suggest that by the early nineties the CIA knew that Prof. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistanâs nuclear bomb had sold nuclear expertise to North Korea, Iran and Libya.
The most likely explanation why the Reagan, 1st Bush and Clinton administrations did nothing, despite having concrete information that Khan was peddling nuclear technology to rogue states, was that the US decided that he was carrying out Pakistani state policy. Pakistan has been a US ally since the onset of the cold war, and was the main conduit for US aid to the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet occupation forces. Even after the USSR collapsed, orthodox thinking reigned supreme in the foreign policy establishment.
It is becoming increasingly clear that policy regarding Pakistan is gong to go down in history as another great chapter of US folly. The US significantly upgraded the capabilities of the ISI (Inter-Service-Intelligence), Pakistanâs military intelligence agency, using it as its main tool in supplying the Afghan rebels. It failed to notice that the ISI itself had come under the command of militant Islamists, and had become the most influential force within the Pakistani military establishment. When Uncle Sam belatedly realized he was being had by his erstwhile allies, he preferred to bury his head in the sand rather than admit he had been played for a fool. As a result the ISI was able to effectively hijack Pakistani policy. It created the Taliban, and gave them the green light to turn Afghanistan into the base of an Islamic jihad against the West, while professing to the US that it was the sole lever of moderation over Mullah Omar.
One of the main supporters of the ISI within the Pakistani military was General Pervez Musharraf, who, it is believed, played a significant role in developing the Pakistani bomb. Just how deep a game Musharraf himself has been playing is unclear. His Indian neighbors have never trusted him, and have always maintained that he is a closet Islamic militant who actively supports Islamic terrorism in Kashmir. Their opinion is worthy of consideration.
Bush Sr. played a significant role in creating this mess, first as head of the CIA, subsequently as Vice President and President. His son is going to have to clean it up. The irony is delicious: the son, considered a foreign policy ignoramus, is having to deal with the problems created by his father, considered one of the biggest foreign policy mavens ever to occupy the White House.
To his credit, George W Bush doesnât ignore his problems. His lack of foreign policy expertise is turning out to be a blessing. Never having been part of the foreign policy establishment, he is unfettered by its conventional thinking. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that whatever cerebral abilities he does or does not have, he is capable of creative thinking out of the box.
It has become clear to him that Pakistan, ostensibly an ally in the war on terror, is more of a liability than an asset. The recent disclosures of Pakistanâs nuclear misbehavior is the first step in dealing with this. They occurred while CIA chief Tenet was in Islamabad. At the same time Israeli foreign minister Silvan Shalom was in Delhi, signing a whole range of arms deals with India, including the sale of Phalcon airborne radar, the sale of which was approved by the US. This is the same radar that is used by the Arrow ABM, enabling India to neutralize Pakistanâs nuclear threat. The message, though discreetly sent, is very clear. âThe game is up, we know who you are and what you did. Play ball or face the consequencesâ.
The price was also named. Stop pussyfooting around, and take out Al Qaida, which continues to exist and is gradually rebuilding itself in the rugged North-Western Frontier area. The US sees an opportunity to decisively eliminate Al Qaida, which is clearly relatively weak, unable to mount an offensive against the US itself. The US takes the possibility that Al Qaida has acquired some atomic devices seriously, and wants to take the movement out before it can rebuild sufficient logistical and operative capabilities to try an attack the US with one of them.
Musharraf is in a quandary. He knows that if Pakistan doesnât clean up its act, there is a real danger of a coordinated Indian-American offensive against it. However he knows that convincing his countrymen of this danger is not going to be easy, least of all in the all important North-Western frontier area. This is heavily populated with Pushtuns, many of who do not like what the US did to the Taliban, which was dominated by Pushtuns.
Either way, as soon as the spring thaw begins, things will begin to happen. Either the Pakistani military will apprehend Al Qaida terrorists, or the US military will. It may not be the cakewalk Iraq was, given the much more rugged terrain, but it is doable. If this happens, India will make sure that the Pakistan military doesnât get in the way. Any attempt by al Qaida, which has transferred many of its fighters to Iraq, to start a second front in the Middle East would require Syrian cooperation, unlikely in view of the threat from Israel. The US may be poised to go for the kill, trusting India and Israel to protect its flanks.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
The writer is Editor-in-Chief of Maariv International
<b>Preparing for the end game</b>
<i>Washington has gotten whatever itâs going to get out of the Iraqi campaign, and is refocusing on its core security concerns, Al Qaida and nuclear proliferation. The answer to both issues lies in Pakistan. The key allies are Israel and India. </i>
<i>Jonathan Ariel</i>
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The situation in Iraq is still far from stable. However what we are seeing is a transformation from an insurrection primarily aimed against US troops to the beginnings of the battle for control of post US Iraq.
Washington has gotten whatever itâs going to get out of the Iraqi campaign, and is refocusing on its core security concerns, Al Qaida and nuclear proliferation. The answer to both issues lies in Pakistan. The key allies are Israel and India.
Jonathan Ariel
The situation in Iraq is still far from stable. However what we are seeing is a transformation from an insurrection primarily aimed against US troops to the beginnings of the battle for control of post US Iraq.
Washington has realized that the Iraqi campaign has been no more than a partial success. Saddam is gone, and that alone justifies defining the war as being a success. Ridding the world of a gangrenous political organ like Saddam was not the sole strategic goal of the campaign. The administration had hoped that the sight of US arms parading triumphantly along the shores of the Tigris and the Euphrates would be sufficient to generate a political and cultural upheaval in the Moslem world that would rid it of militant fundamentalism. This would have also been the end of Al Qaida, which would have seen its pool of recruitable human bombs begin to evaporate.
Iraq was chosen as the opening battlefield for three reasons: military, political, and historical. The terrain was the military one, an open flat country with relatively little natural cover for guerrillas, almost made to order for maximizing the strengths and minimizing the weaknesses of US military capabilities. The US, embarking on its first unilateral major military undertaking since Vietnam, had to ensure a swift and decisive military victory. Iraq was the best place to ensure such an outcome.
The political reason was twofold. It was relatively easy to sell a war against Iraq, Saddam being Saddam. In addition, the Administration expected to uncover significant amounts of non-conventional weaponry, enabling the US to make a point that whoever develops such weapons without its tacit approval risked being ousted from power. This was especially important regarding North Korea and Iran, who together with Saddam occupied the central places in Bushâs axis of evil.
Historically Baghdad was, together with Damascus and Cairo, one of the centers of Arab power. The last Arab caliphate was ruled from Baghdad. In order to generate the kind of cultural and political whirlwind the Americans hoped to see uproot fundamentalism across Arabia, the target had to be Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, or possibly Mecca. For a variety of political considerations the most viable and convenient target was Baghdad.
However the other aims have not been achieved. The shock and awe did not resonate with sufficient force across the Shatt el Arab river separating Iraq from Iran, and the hoped for east European style peoples revolt that would rid the region of the Ayatollahs never happened. Evidence of WMD remains elusive, probably buried under the sands of the Syrian desert. The only way these aims may be achieved is via a war with Syria, as discussed in a previous article.
A US invasion of Syria or Iran is not on for now. Washington is about to go on the defensive in the Middle East theater of the war on terror. This means enough presence in Iraq to contain Iran and Syria, but no proactive measures beyond that.
From the two rivers to the Valley of the Indus
This explains the recent disclosure of Pakistanâs nuclear hanky-panky. However intelligence reports suggest that by the early nineties the CIA knew that Prof. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistanâs nuclear bomb had sold nuclear expertise to North Korea, Iran and Libya.
The most likely explanation why the Reagan, 1st Bush and Clinton administrations did nothing, despite having concrete information that Khan was peddling nuclear technology to rogue states, was that the US decided that he was carrying out Pakistani state policy. Pakistan has been a US ally since the onset of the cold war, and was the main conduit for US aid to the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet occupation forces. Even after the USSR collapsed, orthodox thinking reigned supreme in the foreign policy establishment.
It is becoming increasingly clear that policy regarding Pakistan is gong to go down in history as another great chapter of US folly. The US significantly upgraded the capabilities of the ISI (Inter-Service-Intelligence), Pakistanâs military intelligence agency, using it as its main tool in supplying the Afghan rebels. It failed to notice that the ISI itself had come under the command of militant Islamists, and had become the most influential force within the Pakistani military establishment. When Uncle Sam belatedly realized he was being had by his erstwhile allies, he preferred to bury his head in the sand rather than admit he had been played for a fool. As a result the ISI was able to effectively hijack Pakistani policy. It created the Taliban, and gave them the green light to turn Afghanistan into the base of an Islamic jihad against the West, while professing to the US that it was the sole lever of moderation over Mullah Omar.
One of the main supporters of the ISI within the Pakistani military was General Pervez Musharraf, who, it is believed, played a significant role in developing the Pakistani bomb. Just how deep a game Musharraf himself has been playing is unclear. His Indian neighbors have never trusted him, and have always maintained that he is a closet Islamic militant who actively supports Islamic terrorism in Kashmir. Their opinion is worthy of consideration.
Bush Sr. played a significant role in creating this mess, first as head of the CIA, subsequently as Vice President and President. His son is going to have to clean it up. The irony is delicious: the son, considered a foreign policy ignoramus, is having to deal with the problems created by his father, considered one of the biggest foreign policy mavens ever to occupy the White House.
To his credit, George W Bush doesnât ignore his problems. His lack of foreign policy expertise is turning out to be a blessing. Never having been part of the foreign policy establishment, he is unfettered by its conventional thinking. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that whatever cerebral abilities he does or does not have, he is capable of creative thinking out of the box.
It has become clear to him that Pakistan, ostensibly an ally in the war on terror, is more of a liability than an asset. The recent disclosures of Pakistanâs nuclear misbehavior is the first step in dealing with this. They occurred while CIA chief Tenet was in Islamabad. At the same time Israeli foreign minister Silvan Shalom was in Delhi, signing a whole range of arms deals with India, including the sale of Phalcon airborne radar, the sale of which was approved by the US. This is the same radar that is used by the Arrow ABM, enabling India to neutralize Pakistanâs nuclear threat. The message, though discreetly sent, is very clear. âThe game is up, we know who you are and what you did. Play ball or face the consequencesâ.
The price was also named. Stop pussyfooting around, and take out Al Qaida, which continues to exist and is gradually rebuilding itself in the rugged North-Western Frontier area. The US sees an opportunity to decisively eliminate Al Qaida, which is clearly relatively weak, unable to mount an offensive against the US itself. The US takes the possibility that Al Qaida has acquired some atomic devices seriously, and wants to take the movement out before it can rebuild sufficient logistical and operative capabilities to try an attack the US with one of them.
Musharraf is in a quandary. He knows that if Pakistan doesnât clean up its act, there is a real danger of a coordinated Indian-American offensive against it. However he knows that convincing his countrymen of this danger is not going to be easy, least of all in the all important North-Western frontier area. This is heavily populated with Pushtuns, many of who do not like what the US did to the Taliban, which was dominated by Pushtuns.
Either way, as soon as the spring thaw begins, things will begin to happen. Either the Pakistani military will apprehend Al Qaida terrorists, or the US military will. It may not be the cakewalk Iraq was, given the much more rugged terrain, but it is doable. If this happens, India will make sure that the Pakistan military doesnât get in the way. Any attempt by al Qaida, which has transferred many of its fighters to Iraq, to start a second front in the Middle East would require Syrian cooperation, unlikely in view of the threat from Israel. The US may be poised to go for the kill, trusting India and Israel to protect its flanks.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
The writer is Editor-in-Chief of Maariv International