Nuclear Thread - 4

[ramana]

Those two Prithvi tests be SFC might be related to assuring themselves and TSP all is OK. Otherwise dont make sense.

[Guest]

I think MMS is trying to show his manhood before US visit. Plus tell Indians, don't worry about change Pakistan will receive for next five years.
Anyway, he will do whatever Bambi will ask him to do.

[dhu]

<b>Nuclear strategy built on a lie</b>

<i>No crater, only fizzle: Site of the failed thermonuclear test at Pokhran in May, 1998.
P K Iyengar</i>

[dhu]

Another "nuke deal" being offered by the same characters, this time to Iran. Of course, there is no need to hide intentions since iranians are not dumb like Indoos.

Iran Waffles on Nuke Deal

..The US and other nations hope the deal will stymie Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions, which it denies having...

[gangajal]

Iyengar in his article, "Non-Fissile Doubts" in the Outlook makes 2 excellent points (apart from other points):

1. He writes, <b>"Taking the Pokhran I yield as close to 8 kt as I know it as its project head .."</b> . This is a direct challenge to RC and AK's assertion that there is an international agreement about the Pokhran I yield.

2. He asks about the depth of the S1 device. What is the need for secrecy about the depth since it does not have anything to do with the weapon design? The only reason for keeping the depth a secret is to hide the failure of the device to generate the design yield.

[gangajal]

It is not very difficult to trouble shoot the TN device. The FBF trigger worked. I am sure BARC has a simulation code that yields the spectrum of gamma rays yielded from such a weapon. This is simply bread and butter radiation hydrodynamics and I have no doubt that BARC has experts on such codes.

The problem is how to convert the super high energy Gamma rays to X-rays and develop uniform pressure on the LiD material. Why is that needed? A straight forward application of Gamma rays on the LiD sample will not work because the radiation pressure of the Gamma rays will not <b>uniformly </b> squeeze the LiD sample and cause the material to fuse. You want to surround that LiD with some fluid like material that will transmit the pressure due to the Gamma rays uniformly. It is like what happens to a submarine when it is fully submerged in water. The submarine hull feels the water pressure from all directions. Thus you must surround the LiD material by some material that will be converted to a dense plasma which will behave like water. Then the LiD material surrounded by this dense fluid like plasma will feel a uniform pressure and will fuse.

That means you have to estimate the rise of the temperature of the material surrounding the LiD material. You will have to know how quickly the temperature rises. You will have to know the time frame in which the material surrounding the LiD material becomes a plasma and squeezes the LiD material uniformly. Time is of the essence because the blast wave of matter from the trigger will disassemble the LiD part of the weapon in an extremely short time.

So you need to know the cross section of Gamma Rays (wavelength of the order of 1 Angstrom) hitting the material surrounding the LiD sample. You also have to know the variation of this cross section with the spectrum of Gamma rays. You need to know how the thickness of the material surrounding the LID sample affects the rise in temperature and plasma formation. You can know all this quite straight forwardly by firing pulsed extremely energetic laser at such materials (with out the LiD sample). The pulse will simulate the FBF trigger.

So fixing the problem with the S1 TN device is not difficult. It seems quite clear that the fission trigger disassembled the LiD and the material surrounding it before the LiD could be squeezed by the surrounding material plasma. My guess is that one could probably make a TN device by learning the requisite cross sections. The problem is that plasma simulation codes are not very reliable. Physicists really do not understand the behaviour of plasma. So testing is needed to check the reliability of a TN weapon.

[ramana]

Can it be done without field proofing?

[gangajal]

There will always be doubt about the yield. The bottleneck is the lack of understanding of plasma Physics. Just take a look at the 50 years of fusion research. Plasma is a an ill-understood area of Physics. Even US and other advanced country researchers do not fully understand the plasma physics underlying the TN explosion although their understanding is obviously better than BARC. Only thing one can say is that the probability is high that the next test by BARC of a TN device will show better result. The problem is to know how much better.

Certainly weaponisation is not possible without testing. That is why India seems to be relying on 100 kt boosted fission weapons for deterrence.

[Guest]

<b>India’s nuclear deterrence: myth and reality</b>

Saurav Basu

22 October 2009

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->

The nuclear deal was heralded as a great leap for India, and an end to India’s nuclear apartheid, and the perfect answer to India’s growing energy needs. Yet,  one year later, in a sobering article, Brahma Chellaney, noted security analyst, considers the deal to have “divided the country like no other strategic issue since Indian independence, with the deteriorating national discourse reaching a new low,” He also laments the subversion of the Indian parliament which was reduced to a “mere spectator.”



More disturbing is what he perceives as “the creeping politicisation of top scientists…<b>The top atomic leadership made scripted political statements in support of deal-related moves, only to be rewarded with special post-superannuation extensions beyond established norms” (Counting the costs of vaunted deal, The Hindu, 9.10.2009) The national awards bestowed on these pro-establishment scientists coinciding with the clinching of the deal raised a few eyebrows</b>.

.........
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[ramana]

I agree with B Chellaney that the IUCNA divided the country like no other issue. However the roots of the division are in the ambigous results of POKII. What this did was to knock the scientific-strategists from their pedestal and allowed the political-strategists to come to the top and drive the policy without understanding the science. The test results re-arranged the existing groups into different lots and politicised the entire process. I wrote about this in my short note on the "Indian Strategic Elite and the Nuclear question".

Meanwhile x-post....

<!--QuoteBegin-"Sanatanan"+-->QUOTE("Sanatanan")<!--QuoteEBegin-->I believe this link has not been posted before:

<b>Pokharan II: The Incestuous Debate</b>(October 2009, Vol. 2 , No. 10) by PR Chari, Research Professor, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

<!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Santhanam’s disclosure that the thermonuclear (hydrogen bomb) test in 1998 failed to reach expectations was known earlier. Initial doubts emerged among weapons designers abroad whether Indian nuclear scientists could have contained the yield of the thermonuclear (TN) device at 45 kilotons (KT) in it its very first test. Scientific opinion in the West was divided on this question with skeptics claiming that this containment of the yield was very difficult in the first TN test; others urged that the passage of years and availability of open data had enabled Indian scientists to fashion a low-yield TN device; it was triggered by a fission core with a fissile ‘blanket’ around it to provide the second stage fusion reaction. Chidambaram had initially denied that a boosted fission device had been used, but later informed that it had, indeed, been the trigger for the TN device. These technical details about the bomb design must be recollected, since doubts have surfaced regarding the occurrence of a TN explosion and its actual yield.

It was estimated in the West that around a 25 kiloton yield had accrued based on seismic data. What the author heard from privileged sources at the time was that the first-stage boosted fission trigger functioned, but the second stage fusion reaction did not occur, resulting in a low yield of 20-25 KT being recorded. This unhappy fact is now being aired by Santhanam. The scientific community has ranged itself on both sides of the argument. Some others have not taken a stand on these technical issues, preferring to highlight the irrelevance of yield considerations for providing the matrix of nuclear deterrence

The question whether the TN device malfunctioned and its yield was far lower than the designed yield has to be satisfactorily resolved. Two sets of data exist with the DAE and DRDO. They need to be placed before a peer group from India and/or abroad to ascertain the truth, which is the accepted tradition to resolve scientific controversies. This however, may not happen. Why? The 1998 nuclear tests were conducted during the NDA regime with the BJP milking this event for its political dividends. But the successor UPA regime has remained content to let sleeping dogs lie, without trying to appreciate the strategic significance of a possibly failed TN device. Unfortunately, both the national strategic and political leadership in India are ‘babes in the wood’ as Santhanam colorfully described MK Narayanan

Reverting to the scientific inquiry for estimating the yield of the TN device, the accepted methodologies used are seismic evaluations and radiochemical analysis. It is alleged that DRDO relied only on the seismic method (close-inacceleration), since radiochemical analysis was done by the DAE. In a PIB handout Chidambaram said, “the DRDO data had anomalies and had to be rejected.” Santhanam argues that the DRDO estimated the yield of all the five nuclear devices tested during Pokharan II. The DAE accepted all these estimates, except for the TN device, suggesting selectivity in utilizing the DRDO data. Santhanam further argues that the crater formed by the TN device was 25 meters in diameter, consistent with a 25 KT nuclear explosion; in fact, he has also said that only a small depression was formed in the shaft mouth. Chidambaram explains that the crater size depends “on the depth of burial and the rock medium around the shot point, and the rock medium and the shot point.” How did these obvious facts escape the attention of DRDO?

Coming to radiochemical analysis, which is the most reliable method available, Santhanam only quotes what other DAE scientists informed him. As stated earlier, radiochemical analysis was only carried out by the DAE. Why DRDO did not undertake this analysis is a mystery. Chidambaram informs that sharp increases in the isotopes Mn-54 and Na- 22 were found in rock samples taken from the TN test site, suggesting a thermonuclear reaction occurring. Besides, the Mn-54/Ce-144 ratio was consistent with a fission-fusion reaction. Without access to the spectroscopic data, assertions in this regard can only be speculative.

There is another aspect to this matter. The yield of the Pokharan-I device is believed to have benchmarked the yields of the Pokharan-II devices. Raja Ramanna and Chidambaram estimated its yield to be 12 kilotons in January 1975, but serious doubts emerged about this claim, with a yield as low as 2 kilotons being suggested. Radiochemical analysis was apparently conducted, but the results were not made public. This controversy is significant since the seismological data from Pokharan-I was used to calibrate the yield of the Pokharan-II devices. Inflating the Pokharan-I yield would naturally affect the Pokharan-II test results.

This multitude of doubts, in fairness, requires an independent analysis of the TN test yield. A RTI application could be filed. It would be interesting to see if the Government denies this information on the ‘national security’ pretext. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd--><!--QuoteEnd--></div><!--QuoteEEnd-->


I earlier thought PR Chari was a peacenik and now I see he wants a peer review just as the scientific-strategists. Hats off to him for standing up for the right thing. Right after POKII he has been holding seminars and discussions at his institute IPCS which were the best open source evaluations.

This pdf clears a lot of fog on his mindset.

[gangajal]

There is an interesting article in today's expressbuzz:
www.expressbuzz.com.

The article is titled,"Scientists readying to testfire Agni-II" by Hemant Kumar Rout.

The interesting part is:

Agni-II is a ready-to-fire missile with a launch time of about 15 minutes. Experts said having South China as the main target, the missile is designed to carry a one-tonne weapon based on the boosted fission device exploded in Pokhran in 1998.

I ton means 1000 kgs. A 60-80 kt 1998 vintage boosted fission weapon will weigh 300 kgs. So a 1000 kg Fusion boosted fission weapon will probably have a yield of 200 kts. So is this why RC keeps saying that India has deterrence up to 200 kts?

[ramana]

From WOF by Kalam, that was the baseline requirment for the Agni from the initial IGMP days onwards. Guess who was the AEC head at that time who is being disparaged nowadays?

[gangajal]

RC and GOI's claim that India does not need any further tests creates the ridiculous situation that
even Thailand and Philippines prod India to sign CTBT.

******************************************************************************
www.telegraphindia.com/1091027/jsp/nation/story_11661398.jsp

CTBT prod to Delhi
OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

New Delhi, Oct. 26: India came under fresh pressure to sign the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty before a May 2010 global review of nuclear non-proliferation
but Delhi dismissed such ?overtures? as discriminatory.

A source in the foreign ministry said it was India that had put global
disarmament ?at the forefront before nations? when Rajiv Gandhi was Prime
Minister. ?We stand by it. But regimes such as the CTBT discriminate against
the nuclear have-nots.?

The prod to sign the CTBT came at the East Asia Summit that Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh attended yesterday.

?We encourage those EAS (East Asia Summit) participating countries that have
not acceded to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? to do so as it would serve
as an impetus for having a successful NPT Review Conference,? Thailand Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said in a statement.
.......
Vejjajiva, who chaired the fourth summit of the 16 Asia-Pacific countries,
also noted that the Philippines intended to start wide and transparent
consultations ahead of the May NPT Review Conference.

[ramana]

X-posted from BRF.

Philip wrote.....

(Cross posted exceprt from the China thread.)

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Interestingly on the BBC's Hard Talk this morning,Richard Perle and Ambassador Burke were exchanging their different viewpoints on Obama's international nuclear disarmement plans,with neo-con Perle saying that it was impossible to achieve (total N-disarmament by 2030).The Pak,India ,China N-triangle was discussed and the fear of states like Pak,having their nukes ending up in terrorist hands.Burke was firmly of the view that the two superpowers,the US and Russia could start the process by reducing their arsenals (possessing 94% of the world's N-weapons),which could see a possible cap on the N-ambitions of the other N-powers.If there was no progress on this front,in anotherd ecade or two we could see about 20 N-weapon states emerging.

This was also a feature of the latest USNI proceedings magazine (Oct.issue),where the "two Normans",Polmar and Friedman wrote on the IN's new toy,the Arihant and its significance.One view expressed was that the N-sub without a credible TN warhead (Santy's doubts analysed) on its missiles,could not be considered a successful strategic asset as modern cities were not made of wood like Hiroshima and Nagasaki,which is why large TN warheads were developed and deployed by the two superpowers and major N-powers with warheads "ten or more times their explosive power".The dilemma of India which definitely needed to test again to validate its TN designs (as it did not have access to the vast data that the US,Russia,China and others had which allowed them simulation capabilities while designing their weapons),without upsetting growing relations the US,etc.,was analysed.One view was that Pak actually had an advantage over India in this situation.We are at a signal disadvantage against China in strategic terms and the synergy of the Sino-Pak nuclear nexus has put us in an extremeley dangerous state of vulnerability.It appears therefore that to truly protect ourselves against attack from China,we must conduct a series of N-tests to validate our TN warhead designs for use on various sized missiles before we embark upon joining any international N-weapons cap,cutback,FMCT or test ban treaty.

Interestingly the ambassador mentioned "the father of the Indian bomb,KSub.",as saying that our acquisition of a N=deterrent did not bring with it the desired results vis-a-vis Pak,because Pak's N-weapons nullified India's conventional military superiority."

*I don't find this alleged viewpoint of KSwholly accurate as the Indian deterrent is also a guarantee against the PRC and that despite both sides having N-weapons,it was India's conventional military superiority that defeated Pakistan at Kargil!"

Has KS in the evning of his life gone over in his N-philosophy to the US side?
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

Norman Friedman:"A Great Equalizer?"

Friedman says that India's N-weapons have "Not enough Bang".

"The Indian scientists correctly described the1998 tests as a beginning rather than the achievement of full technical maturity."

"The problem for the Indians is that the current US govt. takes nuclear non-rpoliferation verys eriously.It is trying to convince countries not to test N-weapons.Although computer simulation may suffice for experuienced US and Russian wepaons deisgners,they certainly will not for those without much experience and without access to the sort of secrets US and Soviet (and Chinese) designers have learned."

*Now this means that the US and NATO nuclear weapon nations AND the Chinese have full access to TN warhead design secrets,but that India does NOT.It places us at a decided disadvantage,when China can launch a pre-emptive TN strike against us,safe in the knowledge that our missiles do not have TN warheads and cannot cause massive damage.

"They face a cruel dilemma because the US sees India as a key future ally,it is willing ,in theory,to sell the country much current technology.However,the equalizer against China,which the new submarine symbolises (ATV Arihant),requires exactly that kind of technology needing tests that would in turn cut off US non-nuclear weapons".

"Pakistan's advantage":

Pak has modified US supplied Harpoon missiles.The US has supplied Pak with weaponry to fight terrorism,ignoring Pak's very real ENMITY towards India and their desire at least to maintain a deterrence against India.

"In this test of will the Pakistanis enjoy an interesting advantage."
Mentioned as the supply corridor by land through Pak for the US/NATO forces to fight the war in Afghanistan.
"Just how much leverage does the US have as it tries to eliminate what the Pakistanis see as a vital equalizer against India,with which the country has fought four wars?"

Friedman also mentions Burma's N-ambitions and says that Burma is acquiring from and following the NoKO method of becoming a N-weapon state burying most of its N-installations in tunnels.

Truly we are on the horns of a dilemma.We want modern military tech,from the US if possible too.If we test this tech will become unavailable,but we will be at far greater risk from the Sino-Pak-NoKO nuclear proliferation axis where they have access to TN designs from China, while we cannot without testing validate our designs.

Therefore,there is no alternative to India having to test further in the future,a series of tests that can give us a variety of TN designs with which to arm our delivery systems.Without a credible TN warhead,the ATV/Arihant is in reality the equivalent of a stunted strategic dwarf!

To overcome any future US sanctions,we must therefore NOT rely on US military technology for major weapon systems for the future and acquire what we want from elsewhere.Russia,Israel and other EU nations might be less worried about an Indian TN testing event.The speed with which the O-Team is bent upon ushering in a N-free world and wants progress on the CTBT,FMCT,NPT etc,etc.,armtwisting nations into falling in line,means that the window of opportunity for India to test again is rapidly closing.

[ramana]

Philip, the problem is the small weight high yield payload. That might need confirmation.

However if they go for a higher weight high yield payload that can be achieved by India which is afterall not NoKo or TSP. Its the packing two -three genrations of design in one go inot S-1 that led to undesired outcome.

What the two Normans/strat experts are saying is psy-ops to deny Indian capability. One failure or partial success doesnt mean that all is lost.

The current brouhaha has cleared the options very well for Indians. Its better to rely on what is credible. And deploy as required for far away challengers.

[ramana]

I have been racking my brains to think why did the Indian scientist -strategists think nukes were a political weapon. The early years the consensus was between the scientist and political strategists that these were political symbols. The military strategists were silenced till the later emergence of Gen. Sunderji.


I have been reading the evolution of the nuke doctrine in UK and France and find the same mind-set.

Most likely the Indian elite picked the ideas from the Western Europeans: UK and British and that can be seen by the close contact they had with those two countries. Even the political strategists had their education at LSE and Kings College.

So these two former Empires came up with their own reasons for nukes while still being under US umbrella and India picked up those arguements to justify her own quest. And due to the contradictions, India is confronted with dual nuke threats on its borders while those two had the former Soviet Union as a threat with US backing them and retain their weapons even after the Soviets vanished.

[gangajal]

The reason for treating nukes as political weapons might be due to the influence of the UK-France mind-set. It might also be due to the belief that no country would actually want millions of its own people to die.

[ramana]

So unclear on the nuclear front

K. Santhanam & Ashok Parthasarathi

Nov 11, 2009.

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->G. Balachandran's article `Splitting atoms, not hairs' (Sept 23) on the yield of Pokhran Il s thermonuclear (Sept 23) on the yield of Pokhran II's thermonuclear (TN) device (hydrogen bomb) tested on May 11, 1998, requires several corrections and detailed comments. Balachandran wrote that there was "no confusion about the design/planned yield of 1998-TN test: it was 45 kilotons". This is not in dispute. <b>What is in dispute if whether the TN device actually recorded the designed yield.</b>

<b>The US National Security Agency and US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) weapons laboratories placed the yield at 20-25 KiloTonnes, not 45 KT (1 KT is the energy release equal to 1,000 tonnes of TNT).</b> Balachandran is totally unaware that apart from yield measurements made by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team led by Santhanam, comprehensive experimental data was collected by the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), a highly specialised science and technology agency of the government. <b>The ARC used its state-of-the-art seismic array, tailor-made for detecting and measuring the yield of nuclear tests. Independent of both the DRDO and the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (Barc), the ARC unambiguously established in its classified report to the government the following: 1) the yield of th TN device was substantially lower than 45 KT; 2) An atom bomb, also separately tested and the first stage `trigger' of the TN device, had a yield of 20-25 KT. Thus, the TN device yield would, at best, be 20 KT only.</b>

A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and R. Chidambaram officially designated the DRDO to be solely responsible for all-site instrumentation for yield measurement of the Pokhran II tests.

The DRDO's instrumentation fully met international standards. Barc was fully satisfied with its performance. On no occasion did Barc express any doubts. <b>Barc also gave the DRDO its expected ground acceleration and movement figures from the TN test to measure against. Unfortunately, measurements conclusively proved that the TN yield was substantially lower than Barc-projected pre-test figures.</b> So Balachandran's statement that Barc questioned the sensitivity of the DRDO instrumentation is baseless. This came up only after Santhanam questioned the yield of the TN device as an afterthought to defend the indefensible.

<b>The DRDO's site instrumentation included its own CORRTEX system, accelerometers, ground motion sensors and high-speed imaging systems. Recording and processing of readings from this comprehensive instrumentation package was undertaken by special DRDO computers. The CORRTEX system also gave a far lower TN yield than the Barc claimed figure of 45 KT.</b>

As for Balachandran's Barc­fed contention of radiochemical (RC) method-based analysis being the most accurate method of estimating the yield of a device,<b> the considered view of nuclear experts is that any estimation of yield made by the mass spectrometry (MS) method is far superior to the RC method. Raja Ramanna insisted that MS be used in the 1974 Pokhran I test yield analysis. The head of the RC Division in Barc gave a detailed report to Ramanna personally showing that the Pokhran I yield was lower than claimed by Barc.</b>

Ramanna had accepted the report's scientific results -- but not its politics. He admitted this to Parthasarathi in 1994.

Thus, the report was quickly and quietly buried.

Why was the MS method not used by Barc in Pokhran II? Or was it used and its results again suppressed -- this time by Chidambaram because they were `inconvenient'?
Balachandran says the DRDO used only the seismic method in its yield measurements. We conclusively rebut this. He also states that "<b>the DAE had used all six methods of nuclear yield estimation</b>, whereas the DRDO used only one." The <b>methods used by Barc were 1) two seismic methods for ground acceleration and ground movement 2) CORRTEX 3) Radiochemical. That's four methods. What about the other two?</b> The truth is that no other methods were used. <b>Santhanam's team saw no Barc-CORRTEX system anywhere at the site</b>.

<b>The DRDO used two seismic methods, plus CORRTEX and FORRTEX.</b> This also adds up to four methods, not six. <b>Further, both alleged Barc seismic methods were undertaken using a 30-year-old seismic array at Gauribidanur in Karnataka, over 1,500 miles away from Pokhran. Both the DRDO's seismic methods involved `close in-field' (right close up to the TN device-containing shaft).</b>

Balachandran then says that no critic presented any scientific argument in support of their case. This is false. <b>As early as end-1998, Santhanam's DRDO team presented a detailed, classified report to the government, including a telling comparative table of Barc-predicted ground acceleration and movement numbers against actually measured ones.</b>

<b>The NDA government and its successor the UPA blindly endorsed -- and continue to endorse -- the Barc claim.</b> This attitude has seriously compromised our national security.

Balachandran also conveniently `forgot' to mention that Barc used data from DRDO's instrumentation for its estimate of yield of the atom bomb. However, when the same instrumentation showed the yield of the TN device was far lower than Barc readings, he chooses to claim that the instrumentation was faulty! Barc speaks with a forked tongue.

<i>K. Santhanam was Chief Adviser (Technology), DRDO and Programme Director, Pokhran II Ashok Parthasarathi was Science and Technology Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi The views expressed by the authors are personal.</i>
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

1) The most clear statement is that the Fission weapon and the primary of the TN are about the same in yield ~ 25kt. So if the TN had worked what was the expected yield? It would definitely be more than (25+25).

2)BARC says Fission weapon was 15 kt and the TN gave the rest.

3) Santhanam and Parthasarathy are saying that total yield was 25 kt+ 20-25 kt = 45-50kt. The whole controversy is that the TN was supposed to be more. How much more?

I think it was 25 kt (S-2) + 45 kt (S-1) = 70kt total.

[ramana]

X-post

<!--QuoteBegin-"Rudradev"+-->QUOTE("Rudradev")<!--QuoteEBegin--><!--QuoteBegin-"Jarita"+--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE("Jarita")<!--QuoteEBegin-->Wondering what is the bulls eye for India? We have multiple enemies but from a prioritization perspective, where do we focus to unravel the ball of wool?
Weakening CHina will weaken Pakistan and the red menace in India for sure.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

Jarita, one bit of good news for us. The Chinese do overmatch us in terms of their nuclear arsenal BUT they need their nuclear arsenal to deter (and possibly fight) several potential enemies. They need to conserve their longest range warheads for the US, Russia and possibly European capitals; and many of their short and medium-range warheads for Russian Central Asia/Far East, American assets in Japan and South Korea, and possibly Taiwan. India is just one of the targets they have to keep in mind ... so, they too have multiple enemies and a finite number of strategic assets.

Meanwhile, we today have only two potential enemies with whom we would consider fighting a nuclear war... China itself, and Pakistan.

If we simply start increasing our nuclear arsenal in terms of number and yields of warheads to pressure China, they will probably respond by proliferating to Bangladesh, Myanmar and other governments in our neighbourhood so that we, too will have to distribute our finite arsenal among more potential targets. Giving 10-20 kt warheads to these countries is cheaper for China, than researching/designing/testing/building large numbers of MT warheads is for us.

So we do have to consider carefully what the best way is to go.

I'm a big advocate of defensive deterrence... maximizing an enemy's cost in strategic assets to cause a given quantum of damage to us.

There is reason to believe that defensive measures... ABMs, early warning systems and so on... can drastically increase the redundance an enemy must build into his offensive arsenal in order to offer us the same threat level.

For example: (from http://homepage.mac.com/msb/163x/faqs/nucl...rfare_102.html)

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Key point here on the efficiency of defenses. <b>In the 1950s, the UK V-bomber fleet was assigned to hit over 200 targets in the Western USSR</b>.

As the 50's turned into the 60's the <b>ability of the V-bombers to penetrate Soviet airspace came under increasing doubt. The UK shifted to Polaris -  one submarine at sea, 16 missiles, three warheads per. Total of 48 targets assigned.</b>

But the USSR started to install an <b>anti-missile system that was reasonably capable against the early Polaris-type missiles</b>.

So the UK modified Polaris in a thing called Chevaline. this took one warhead from each missile and replaced the load with decoys - then targeted all 16 missiles onto Moscow. ONE target. <b>In effect, the Soviet defenses had reduced the UK attack plan from 200 targets to one. In other words, it was 99.5 percent effective without firing a single shot (bad news for Moscow but great news for the other 199 cities with targets in them).</b>

That's why so many devices are needed - the <b>inventory evaporates very fast</b>. Thats also why defenses like ABM are so important... The defenses don't have to be very effective to work ... its the <b>complexity they throw into the planning process.</b> As long as we can assume that if we get a warhead on its way to its target, that target is going to be hit, then planning is relatively easy and the results predictable. If, however, we can't make that guarantee; <b>if we have to factor in a possibility - perhaps a good one - that the outbound warhead will be shot down, then planning becomes very uncertain. Now put yourself in the position of somebody planning a strike - do you wish to gamble your nation's change of survival on something that MIGHT work. Of course not. So Strategic Paralysis strikes again. A defense system doesn't have to work against an attack to be effective because it works on the minds of the people who make the decisions.</b>

<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

So we need a balanced mix of developing bigger and better warheads that can damage the Chinese to an equivalent extent as they can damage us. Plus, we need to massively accelerate the development and acquisition of defense systems: ABM systems like PAD and AAD and also things like Phalcon that will give us plenty of warning when something is incoming.

Defense systems, also, can be acquired and tested openly without as much trouble as it would be to develop and test nukes. They are defensive after all. Yet the act of testing them would send a message as powerful in its own way, as testing a 1MT thermonuclear device.

Such systems will put pressure on China to assign more warheads to targets in India to increase the possibility of hitting them. But on the other hand, the Chinese can't afford to point more than a very limited number of their warheads away from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Russia and other multiple enemies they must take into account. Check! Now that's what I'd call deterrence.<!--QuoteEnd--></div><!--QuoteEEnd-->

The analogy is not apt for the Russians were already covered by US posture which is a UK ally. India doesnt have such an alliance.

An umbrella only protects when there is rain. The object here is to prevent the rain.

[ramana]

This is a different version of the above article but published in Tribune:

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->A Tribune Special
To test or not to test
K. Santhanam and Ashok Parthasarathi join the scientists’ debate

WE respond to R. Ramachandran’s article, “Why There is No Case for Further Nuclear Tests” (The Hindu, September 25, 2009). <b>His main points are:</b> “technical information published by the Department of Atomic Energy does not show Pokhran-II (P-2) was unsuccessful”; (b) an assertion: there are compelling arguments against need for resuming (thermonuclear (H-bomb) device testing). Even if it was so i.e. even if the thermonuclear test was a failure © “the DAE employed different techniques to estimate test yields (i.e. power outputs); (d) yield values from other five tests “are stated to be”! (by BARC) consistent with its original estimate of 60 kilotonnes (a bomb’s output equal to 60,000 tonnes of TNT) for the two main tests on May 11, 1998, i.e. a 45-kt (thermonuclear or TN) device and a 15 kt A-bomb exploded simultaneously. Of these, post-shot Radio-Chemical Method (RCM) (of device yield measurement) considered most accurate; (e) both A-bomb “trigger” and main H-bomb produce a type of nuclear particles called Neutrons.

However, H-bomb devices, produce more Neutrons than A-bombs. This leads to considerably larger amounts of two artificially created radio-isotopes — Manganese 54 and Sodium 22 — being produced by the TN device than the A-bomb. This higher ratio of Manganese 54: Sodium22 in the H-bomb explosion does provide an “idea” of the A–vs – H-bomb/device yields (no numbers at all; only “an idea” of relative yield magnitudes); and this is supposed to be nuclear “physics”!).

The writer’s justification: “The absolute values and scale of this higher ratio, (in TN device case) withheld for “obvious” sensitivity reasons, but qualitative difference in levels is evident”. The writer’s source: a BARC Newsletter article (July 1999). It is not a peer-reviewed scientific journal.

<b> His last technical “scoring-point” is a “desperate explanation” of why and how, while the “pure” A-bomb of the BARC-claimed yield of only 15 kt – when its collaborator in P-2 – DRDO, and our top scientific institutions, as also numerous top nuclear weapons laboratories worldwide, have rated it at much higher 20-25 kt, produced a crater 25 meters in diameter — which the BARC dishonestly-claimed yield of only 15 kt could never have produced — the BARC–claimed -to-be-“successful” -H-bomb-of-45 kt, – thrice as powerful – even at BARC de-rated 15 kt yield pure ‘A’ bomb – produced no crater at all when a genuine 45 kt TN device, even common sense tell us, should have produced a gigantic crater. He says “at some low enough TN device emplacements, i.e. deep enough shafts, there would (only be) upheaval within the shaft) but no material... There would be no crater”!</b>

Here is our response. As regards Mr Ramachandran’s regurgitation of the BARC argument that it used different techniques in yield estimation, he was not personally involved in the tests. Mr Santhanam was one of the four key scientists directing P-2 from day 1. So, he can only say “45 kt fusion device and 15 kt fission bomb “are stated to be” (by BARC) “consistent with original estimates”. On what basis can he say this when those estimates are highly classified?

<b>As for post-shot RCM being “most accurate” (for nuclear explosions yield (power) estimation), former BARC Director’s Radiochemistry Division (RCD) told us: “I measured yield of (P-I) (1974) using Mass Spectrometry (MS) method. A microgram of plutonium was separated from sample taken near core of device, and its isotopic composition — which does not change with various transformations caused by nuclear tests — measured.</b>

The MS technique considered internationally the most accurate and reliable method for yield estimation even more accurate than RCM (which the writer tomtoms about, without knowing about nuclear weapon yield measurement). The MSM is far less sensitive to major weakness of the RCM. That’s why Dr Ramanna, former BARC Director, former AEC Chairman, and Mission Director P-1, insisted on the MS method for (P-1) yield estimation in 1974. <b>If the MS method was used in (P-2) also, why exclude it in the BARC’s briefing to Mr Ramachandran?</b>

Using S.B. Manohar’s article (BARC Newsletter, July 9, 1999) on RCM to determine TN device yield lacks credibility as it is an inhouse publication.

As for the BARC argument, the TN device produced “copious amounts” of Sodium-22 and Manganese-54 isotopes “characteristic of fusion reactions”, in the absence of exact numbers, it is an unsubstantiated assertion. A “fizzled” TN device also produces “copious amounts” of these isotopes.

Moreover, mere presence of isotopes is not a quantitative yield measure. It can at best be a qualitative indicator. This obfuscation becomes worse when the writer said, “…it does provide an idea of the comparative (i.e. H-bomb vis-a-vis A-bomb) yields”! As a scientist, he ought to know that precise quantified statements are core of science and scientific credibility. Using an imprecise phrase like “copious amounts” begs the question.

“The classified exact plutonium mass in the core of the (P-1) device may not have been known to the RC Division of BARC after P-1. However, RC measurements in RCD’s report indicated yield are significantly lower than Ramanna’s and Chidambaram’s claim. So, RCD’s report on yield of (P-1) was frozen by Ramanna and Chidambaram and consigned to the archives”!

<b>The writer then moves to our statement that had TN test really worked, the 120-meter deep shaft at the bottom of which the TN device was emplaced, would have been totally destroyed and its deepest portions even vapourised.</b> There would, in addition, have been enormous surface damage to even massive 2-tonne and 8-meter high tripod “A-frame” astride the shaft’s mouth. This “A-Frame” has a complex set of winches and pullies connected at their bottom to a lift-like “container” to lower and raise personnel, equipment and materials to and from the bottom of the shaft when the TN device is being assembled would have been shattered.

<b>Both were totally intact after the TN device test.</b> Mr Ramachandran has ignored this damning evidence that the TN device failed! He moves to the issue of cratering, using the BARC’s arguments on geological and TN device-related factors preventing crater formation by 45 kt yield TN device. <b>Based on 25 metre diameter crater formed by 20-25 kt “pure” A-bomb (which BARC rates at only 15 kt yield), the DRDO calculated a 60-70 meter diameter crater should have been formed by the latter fully confirmed by the ARC.</b> Thus, one needs a cogent response from Mr Ramachandran why and how such a phenomenon is supposed to have occurred.

<b>The super hi-tech ARC, independent of both BARC and DRDO with a 365 x 24 x 7 operated very large seismic array, 10-15 per cent more sensitive and accurate than DRDO’s, measured all the seismic signals from all P-2 tests. Their calculations, far more sophisticated than BARC’s, indicated a TN device yield at only 20 kt max.</b>

Mr Ramachandran then moves to the article by former DRDO chief and strategic affairs analyst, V.S. Arunachalam and K. Subramanian, respectively (The Hindu, September 21). They say, even a 25 kt A-bomb’s damage on enemy city targets with large populations would be ‘unacceptable’ to any adversary and so such A- bombs would be enough for us to deter even China having 200 deployed H- bombs of 3.3-5 megatons yields each.

<b>Surprisingly, though they argued for decades that H-bombs were central to our Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD), they suddenly say A-bombs (which cannot yield more than 80 kt max) are enough. </b>Why? Sour grapes following the TN device failure and no weaponisation for the last 11 years! China would be totally undeterred by our piffling A-bomb “arsenal” of yields.

<b>We reiterate our view, fully shared by the overwhelming majority of our nuclear scientists, strategic analysts and, above all, our military, that a sole A-bomb arsenal is grossly inadequate to be a CMD against China; only TN bombs can do so.</b> Otherwise, why did <b>four Prime Ministers (including Mr Vajpayee and his NSA Mr Brajesh Mishra) direct the top of BARC-DRDO leadership — Mr Kalam, Mr Chidambaram, Mr Santhanam and Mr Kakodkar — that one Pokhran-II test at least must be a TN device?</b>

The current “controversy” over the failure of the sole H-bomb test of P-2 is the only case of the long history of DAE, BARC being “highly economic with truth” and using such “economy” to protect themselves from public criticism of major failures in various programmes and projects. The failures have been screened from public gaze on unwarranted and secrecy grounds.

<b>Worse, the DAE has tried to hide facts from successive governments, Parliament and the people, causing damage to our nuclear programme and national security. The Prime Minister and the Union Cabinet must help stop this. The nation waits with bated breath if they can or will.</b>

K. Santhanam is a former Chief Adviser (Technologies), DRDO and Programme Director, Pokhran II; and Ashok Parthasarathi is a former Scientific and Technology Adviser to late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

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New info is that TN was buried at 120m depth. Chengappa's WOP statement of "over 200m" is incorrect.

All DAE analysis was tailored to adjust for achieved results.


A big info is that 4 PMs have insisted that a TN has to be tested. This is very critical and explains a lot of missed tests in past attributed to US pressure. Simple reason was DAE wasnt ready.

Again confirms: TN was 20kt only and S-2 was 20-25kt.