Nuclear Deterrence

[Arun_S]

[quote name='gangajal1' date='04 June 2010 - 11:26 AM' timestamp='1275630507' post='106720']

Expansion of India's highly enriched Uranium production is necessary for running the Nuke Sub fleet. It is highly unlikely that India will use this HEU for weapons production.

[/quote]



FYI, due to long term close proximity to warheads in cramped submarine quarters, US and other countries were forced to reduce Plutonium in fissile material to bare minimm and use Higly enriched Uranium insted for the secondary and tertiary fuel for their warheads (which are all Thermo Nukes, that gives lowest possible warhead weight and for teh limited rocket energy longest reach/range).



Given Indian TN fiasco in 1998, Arihant's MIRV nuclear missile deployment will be forced to use mixed MIRV payload of proven Fission/FBF with ostensibly debugged TN warhead with HEU tertiary (Even military grade Pu is moderately radioactive, whose radioactivity is few order more than HEU) . And for Arihant that TN design will be different design compared to Land / Air delivered Nuclear warheads. So Arihant TN will use HEU based TN, while the rest of the forces will use the debugged TN of 1998 vintage that use a concoction of various isotopes of Plutonium that are mildly radioactive.



Bottom line is that submarine based tirade leg required HEU not only for nuclear reactor but also for TN warhead. (I know in India value of life is cheap, but life of crew that bear Indian nuclear deterrence better not be cheap).

[Guest]

And on cue there is news that India is expanding the RMP.



More Boomers on the way.

[gangajal1]

[quote name='Arun_S' date='04 June 2010 - 09:55 PM' timestamp='1275668240' post='106729']

So Arihant TN will use HEU based TN, while the rest of the forces will use the debugged TN of 1998 vintage that use a concoction of various isotopes of Plutonium that are mildly radioactive.





[/quote]



How can they use a HEU based TN in Arihant since without testing even the debugged 1998 vintage TN is not reliable?

I can understand using FBFs but how can they depend on unreliable TNs.

[laltaputu]

[quote name='Gagan' date='04 June 2010 - 10:34 PM' timestamp='1275670572' post='106733']

And on cue there is news that India is expanding the RMP.



More Boomers on the way.

[/quote]



That may be write

but

if we still lag behind everyone in nuclear warheads(by SIPRI)

Then what will we have to put on those boomers

AGNI3SL with 8 MIRV means ARIHANT class will carry 32 warheads

since more 2 arihant class is in making we will need 96 warheads(also heard a navy man say that in an interview)

but according to SIPRI we have only 70-80 warheads

that not enough to deploy on the boomers

so

what will our aircrafts,other missiles carry flower petals

[laltaputu]

[quote name='Arun_S' date='04 June 2010 - 09:55 PM' timestamp='1275668240' post='106729']



Given Indian TN fiasco in 1998, Arihant's MIRV nuclear missile deployment will be forced to use mixed MIRV payload of proven Fission/FBF with ostensibly debugged TN warhead with HEU tertiary



[/quote]



Given the TN device in P2 failed and we don't have a reliable and working TN warhead and we lost our testing right after agreement with USA isn't it possible for BARC and DRDO to covertly test the TN warhead

covert testing has happened in the past so nothing new about that

or

the confidence by which mr kakodkar is saying that we have more that one tn bomb from 45-200+kt is it possible that they have all ready done a covert test

[Arun_S]

With MMS capping Indian nuclear deterrence by signing teh deal with USA, the next poor mans option is stated in this article, that will allow alternate way to build and test thermo nuclear device, (at least that will allow determining the debugged design is in really fixed or not): Keyword is



[url="http://www.indiaresearch.org/WayToACredibleDeterrent.pdf"]Way To A Credible Nuclear Deterrent -Arun Vishwakarma @ IRF[/url]

Thermo-nuclear (TN) warhead:

Also known as a multi-stage nuclear warhead. The first stage of a TN device consists of a Fission

or FBF nuclear explosive whose energy in the form of soft X-rays is used to ablate a heavy

pusher material to compress and ignite the second stage consisting of Deuterium (in the form of

Lithium Deuteride) to undergo nuclear fusion. Nuclear fusion generates highly energetic neutrons

that in turn cause fission in the surrounding third stage fissile material. The third stage fissile

material can be ordinary natural-Uranium or some other kind of enriched fissile material. Such

weapons give very high yield. Most of the yield is generated by the third stage. TN warhead have

far higher yield per unit mass of warhead, as well as consume smaller quantity of enriched fissile

material. This type of light weight warhead can be delivered over greater range even by a small

missile.



The POK-II tests demonstrated Indian mastery of fission and boosted fission nuclear weapons.

Thermonuclear experiment (Shakti-1) based credible warhead however requires confirmatory

test. Submarine compatible TN warhead also requires testing a TN design that uses only

enriched Uranium or super-grade Plutonium.



Public information and trade estimates indicate following types of Indian RV warheads:

1. Mk-4: For light weight 17Kt Fusion Boosted Fission (FBF) warhead5. Mass6: ~180 Kg7.

2. Mk-5: For 50Kt FBF or 200Kt Thermo Nuclear (TN) warhead8. Mass: ~340 Kg

3. Mk-6: For 150Kt FBF warhead9. Mass: ~550 Kg.

Table 1: Comparative destruction area



Warhead Yield Destruction w.r.t 17Kt

50 Kt 2.0

150 Kt 4.2

200 Kt 4.9

500 Kt 10.3



If India wants to accede to CTBT it must conclude following tests10 in next nuclear test series:

1. 5 to 7 tests involving FBF's and TN's warheads of 150 Kt and 300-500 Kt ranges

respectively.

2. 5 to 7 sub-Kt tests, to significantly improve the database for future ICF11 simulations.



Pending the verification of thermonuclear warhead the high-yield Boosted Fission warhead sets

the upper limit of Indian warheads, thus Indian missile range is often quoted for 1,000 Kg

payload.



“India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement” has for all practical purposes capped Indian ability to field test

and proof high yield nuclear weapons till some time in future (about 20 years) when Indian three

stage nuclear fuel cycle based on Thorium fuel matures into mainstream power production, thus

eliminating Indian dependence on imported nuclear fuel from NSG countries or if there is a

breakout in global nuclear test monitorium.



An alternative to field nuclear test for India is to test and validate the nuclear warheads by

building two or more National Ignition Test Facilities (NITF). Incidentally NIFT is also required for

stewardship of Indian Nuclear weapon.



Nuclear Stewardship and National Ignition Test Facilities

It is clear that nuclear weapons will continue to exist in world for the foreseeable future. In the

absence of underground testing, the reliability, safety, and effectiveness of the remaining

stockpile can be assured only through advanced computational capabilities and above-ground

experimental facilities.



Indian Nuclear Stewardship program will involve:

1. An organization that will stay potent and survive lifespan of today’s weapon designers,

fabricators and maintainers

2. Laser driven ICF (Inertial confinement fusion) experimental facility that strives to compress

fissile and/or fusion fuel isentropically before raising its plasma temperature to reproduce high

energy régimes encountered in boosted fission and fusion weapons. It is a potent tool in the

hands of nuclear weapons physicists.

3. Two teams of numerical modeling physicists who for a given weapon design partition and

validate weapon’s behavior model experimentally in various energy regime using ICF and

computer modeling. At least two independent teams are required keep the deterrence honest

and true12.

4. Full experimental verification of FBF and Thermonuclear designs that couldn’t be tested in

previous six years due to geo-political constrains.

5. Ensure credible enduring stockpile in spite of fissile material aging, replacement pit, newer

and safer chemicals for explosive lenses, arming and inertial containment.

6. Develop and proof test newer thermonuclear warheads using newer schemes other than

traditional TN devices using piston driven shock with a thermal precursor. P5 and other

western nations are doing these experiments, including the Chinese who have a fine laser

facility13 in Shanghai and another one for classified studies. These are the first steps to

achieving the Holy Grail – The FISSIONLESS TRIGGER.

7. Stay abreast with worldwide development of Fourth Generation weapons (Small yield fusion

nuclear weapons without fission chain reaction)14.

India requires two NITF facilities one for classified weapons programs and other for scientific

research in civil domain to unambiguously demonstrate Indian facilities and competence in high

energy physics to develop and test fusion weapons. This will make credible Indian high yield FBF

and TN weapons that are otherwise not field tested, thereby significantly increasing Indian

deterrence and at the same time reduces total number of weapons required for credible

deterrence. The NITF will cost the government about Rs.6,000 crore (US$ 1.3 billion).



Civil and Weapons Facility Separation

Indian weapons program has been intertwined with the nuclear power program to minimize cost

as well to leverage on each other, including beating US/NSG ban on export of dual use material.

“India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement” now acknowledges the Indian weapons program, yet unlike

the privileges enjoyed by other nuclear weapons states, it proscribes continued NSG enforcement

of global ban on export of dual use material/equipment to Indian classified program consisting of

not just weapons programs but also R&D of Thorium based 3 stage fuel cycle for power

generation. The continued embargo will thus impose high cost on weapons program as well as

thorium based electric power generation.



Per the separation plan most of the facilities will go to civilian side, yet the facilities in the

classified weapons side are fast approaching end of life thus requiring even more investments.

Lacking the investment of about US$ 30 billion over the next 5 years, it is clear that the nuclear

weapons program will be crippled. The above cost is for:

1. 7 -10 research reactors (150 MW modified and scaled up R-5/Dhruv design)

2. 3 - 4 heavy water plants15

3. 2 - 3 re-processing plants physically removed from the safeguarded sites

4. 2 - 3 fuel fabrication plants

5. Scientific facilities - hot cells, plutonium foundries, libraries etc.

6. Duplication and up gradation of scientific skills built on knowledge over 40 years

7. Laser Ignition ICF Facility including two independent design and review teams

8. Fast Breeder Reactor test facility

9. Physics collaboration programs in universities

[ravicv]

[quote name='laltaputu' date='03 June 2010 - 08:04 PM' timestamp='1275623807' post='106717']

http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com/2010...front.html



is this report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) credible

if it is they why are we lagging in nuclear weapons although our nuclear program started before pakistan

pakistan now have more warheads than us

[/quote]



Don't worry about this mismatch. It's a petty thing. As long as the Indians can prostrate, they'll think they are safe. That's the time tested Indian style deterrence <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/wink.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' /> . Problems might only arise if Indians start growing a spine, which isn't likely. <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' />

[ramana]

What is the significance of the oft repeated 1.5 Tonne A-II/A-III payload? What is the probable configuration?

[sai_k]

Going by the moratorium, and given that we declare our capability (not intentions) by testing.. and thus we could baseline our thoughts on such a condition that we can't be delivering a petal which has a net effect not more than 50kt [340kg each per arun ji],.. that means currently we can only do about 4 to 5 petal configuration [on a 1.5 ton payload].. and given the understanding that for each petal configuration, we can't have a target separation not more than 1k-km. {please correct my safety net vision, here} :-



Say, if I have to counter for a second strike, would it serve to take care of shangai-beijing-honkong-chengdu-shenyang.., and subsequent strikes following to take further distribution of petals to cover more targets?



If it does, then I am feeling safe. [assumption here of course, I have excluded ABM evasion technology - to be 100% perfect]

[Arun_S]

[quote name='ramana' date='11 June 2010 - 12:25 AM' timestamp='1276195676' post='106841']

What is the significance of the oft repeated 1.5 Tonne A-II/A-III payload? What is the probable configuration?

[/quote]



The oft repeated 1.5 tonne A-II payload is expected to be about 1,300 kg including decoys. Clearly indicating they have something very heavy but something they have very high confidence on.



A-III OTOH is MIRV configuration and the petal shape and size very similar to A-II albeit with somewhat lighter payload of ~700 Kg. So 1500 kg means 2 petals. So other sources have indicated A-III standard confign to be 3 petal confign with A-II like payload.

[Arun_S]

[quote name='sai_k' date='14 June 2010 - 06:48 PM' timestamp='1276521054' post='106898']that means currently we can only do about 4 to 5 petal configuration [on a 1.5 ton payload].. and given the understanding that for each petal configuration, we can't have a target separation not more than 1k-km. {please correct my safety net vision, here} :-[/quote]



With maneuvering RV the MIRV targets can be few hundred kilometers away (may be upto 1000 km if range is pared down).OTOH while hypersonic glide and maneuvering is known capability of teh RV of Agni-II, one does not yet know if that is also true for MIRV on Agni-III/V also.

[ravicv]

[quote name='Arun_S' date='14 June 2010 - 12:08 PM' timestamp='1276545649' post='106911']

With maneuvering RV the MIRV targets can be few hundred kilometers away (may be upto 1000 km if range is pared down).OTOH while hypersonic glide and maneuvering is known capability of teh RV of Agni-II, one does not yet know if that is also true for MIRV on Agni-III/V also.

[/quote]



It is true for the A-III/V in principle. It might help if the A-III/V RV's were "Shivlinga" shape like the A-2 RV.

[ravicv]

[quote name='Gagan' date='04 June 2010 - 09:04 AM' timestamp='1275670572' post='106733']

And on cue there is news that India is expanding the RMP.



More Boomers on the way.

[/quote]



That looks to be the major reason.

[Arun_S]

[quote name='laltaputu' date='05 June 2010 - 10:56 AM' timestamp='1275715134' post='106750']

the confidence by which mr kakodkar is saying that we have more that one tn bomb from 45-200+kt is it possible that they have all ready done a covert test[/quote]



Regarding covert test: Are you saying BARC did covert TN test that went un-noticed and its yield was 45-200KT or its yield was below the fizzle TN yield that R Chidambram did in 1998 with claimed yield of 45 kT?



In either case if BARC did manage to 45kt + yield ( a very big yield) unnoticed by world, then BARC's deterrence is also unnoticed and unproven by world thus deters nobody.

[Arun_S]

duplicate

[Guest]

Bharat Karnad's book "India's nuclear weapons policy" mentions things that lead me to a different take on the significance of the 1.5 ton payload of A-III/V (A-V s referred to as A-IV) by BK. Keep in mind that BK in that book is extremely skeptical about the TN test in 1998. He was probably fully aware of the "fizzle" and hints that many BARC people themselves have the same opinion regarding RC.



The facts of interest are this:



1. For the 1.5 ton payload of A-3 and A-4 (now A-5) BK mentions the following 3 configurations.

8*125kt MIRV (A-5), 3*300kt MIRV (A-3) and 1*1MT single (A-5), all TN.



2. Indeed, 8*125kt for a 1.5 ton payload represents a very high level of miniaturization (compare with what is stated in the open abt trident I, say).

3*300kt represents a lesser degree of miniaturization.



3. The 1*1mt is interesting. Of course, this is untested. However, 1MT for a 1.5 ton payload is very poor miniaturization. Look at astronautix for details on 1960's soviet missiles. I have read there that one of them had a 5MT yield for a 1.7ton payload. I have also read on nuclearweaponarchive.org of 1MT for 450-500kg being achieved by the advanced powers well in the 60's and 70's.



4. It looks like this 1MT single warhead for 1.5 ton payload is a very conservative design. Something that is very heavy but something that they (DRDO, BARC and the users) have high confidence on. Also, despite all talk about MIRV's only this single very heavy payload config of A-3 is tested, and the same will be true for A-5 as well in the near future.



5. Given Chandraguptji's estimates of 1500kg being just the payload (not accounting for decoys etc- with real throwweight being 2500+ kg), this looks all the more plausible. It also explains why A-3 is arnd 3500 km and A-5 has around 5000km range.



6. Regarding, Israel, nuclearweaponarchive.org comments that they could have pure fission and sloikas without testing, two stage thermonukes without testing too, but with the caveat that the resulting two-stage TN would be heavy and unwieldy if it is to be reliable. Boosted fission with tritium gas was mentioned as unlikely for israel in the abscence of testing.



7. Maybe in our case too, there may have been this reliable, but heavy and unwieldy TN, still missile delivered by compromising on the missile's range in order to accomodate this heavy payload....



Opinions ?

[sai_k]

Q: Did we declare a moratorium on sub-critical testing?

[ramana]

Abnormal radiation detected near Korean border

On May 15, however, the atmospheric concentration of xenon .. on the South Korean side of the inter-Korean border was found to be eight times higher than normal, according to South Korea's Science Ministry.

Is this proof of the NoKo test leaking from its bowels? isnt xenon a signature of fission?

[Arun_S]

[url="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/6103481.cms?prtpage=1"]Ending freeze, India, Canada sign N-deal[/url]

TNN, Jun 29, 2010,



NEW DELHI: By signing a new civil nuclear agreement, Canada and India have sought to wipe off a history of strained relations that goes back to India's 1974 nuclear test that resulted in Ottawa freezing nuclear cooperation with New Delhi.



As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Canadian counterpart Stephen Harper signed the ninth civil nuclear agreement that India has concluded since the Nuclear Suppliers Group gave it a waiver in 2008, [color="#0000ff"]Canada is getting ready to supply India with 2,000 tonnes of uranium to power India's existing and future reactors[/color].



The MEA said the Canada agreement would provide for cooperation in "design, construction, maintenance, sharing of operating experience and decommissioning of nuclear reactors, supply of uranium, projects in third countries, nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear waste management."



Singh and Harper said there were [color="#0000ff"]sufficient mechanisms in the new trade deal to prevent Canadian nuclear fuel or technology from being used to support India's military nuclear program.[/color]



"We did engage in extensive negotiations to deal with those issues and the Indian side was very forthcoming with the safeguards as we require to have absolute confidence in (such) matters," Harper said.



"There is absolutely no scope whatsoever of the nuclear materials or nuclear equipment in India being used for unintended purposes," Singh declared.



It is not clear whether India will be able to access enrichment and reprocessing technology as part of the agreement. India is keen to access new reprocessing technology and has already committed more than one civilian-dedicated reprocessing facility for the purpose. But apart from France, no other country has so far offered this technology. And a global regime, led by the US, is pushing nuclear supplying countries to restrict such transfers.



Hailing the agreement, Congress party spokesperson Manish Tiwari said [color="#800080"]Canada's actions should be a cue for Australia to amend its rules regarding uranium exports to India.[/color] Canada's CANDU reactors are familiar in India, being the first ones to be imported by India.



But India is on a different level today, and just as Canada exports its CANDU technology, India is keen to market its pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWR) to other countries. The PHWR that India touts is a development of how it used the designs of the original CANDU reactors, so there should be greater synergy between the two technologies. Ideally, it should provide Indians an opportunity for joint marketing.



The MEA statement said, "Taking into account their respective strengths with regards to PHWRs and CANDU reactors, there is considerable scope for joint work between the two countries."



For Canada, the deal is important because it allows its nuclear industry to expand into India's market, just like the French and Russian.



India is building a new set of PHWRs over the next few years, and given the similarities, will be able to import equipment and materials [color="#0000ff"]more quickly[/color]. With Australia still holding off supplying uranium to India, Canada is likely to emerge as one of India's major suppliers.

[ramana]

x-posted...

Raja Menon - Weapons of Mass Destruction - Options for India