Nuclear Deterrence

[Guest]

Err,

When did India test and gain mastery over Boosted fission weapons?

PM ABV said 'fission device similar to the one in 74'

Arun_S says TN failed, so possibly FBF failed too. Waise, some have said that the primary was pure fission and not FBF.



Either way while it may be possible to test a fission in a subkiloton fashion, the gurus need to educate us mango junta, weather a fusion bum is really replicable in a lab or can be tested in a subkiloton fashion. Common sense tells me that apart from a mathematical and engineering theoritical model, a TN can't really be cold tested.



Need more insights.

[gangajal1]

The FBF design used by BARC is sufficiently simple (adding a layer of LiD around the fission weapon, that we know works, and immersing it in Tritium gas) that there is little doubt that the FBF design will work. There will be some boosting.



Yes, one can have no confidence on our TN weapon without hot testing.

[sai_k]

Unless, there is a new world order or a situation around that goes really erratic and chaotic, India will ever get a chance to real testing.. perhaps the only chance would be hot-testing cum destruction of our enemies. If we can be prepared for a hot-deployment cum testing, then our nuclear deterrence is sound and establishes a credible factor.



Following the already established "super power" is the best route for us now, with whatever available resources (money, material and men [3M]). LANL, LLNL, kinds of establishments are required to proceed with our future plans.

[BlessedAgni]

Arun saab, I get the feeling that the TN test back in 1998 was not a success and there is some coverup now.



I have a few questions regarding this.



First, IF indeed it was a failure, has (or do you think) there has been some work to "fix" this?



Second, is there any facility in india where nuclear explosions can be simulated using physics experiments? I know that there is atleast one in the US, where high voltage and plasma are used within a chamber on a pinhead sized area to experiment with. Is there anything similar or something to do the same?

[Arun_S]

Regarding N deterrence options available to India in current situation you may want to read[url="http://www.indiaresearch.org/WayToACredibleDeterrent.pdf"] WAY TO A CREDIBLE DETERRENT by your faithfully.[/url]



[url="http://www.indiaresearch.org/WayToACredibleDeterrent.pdf"]http://www.indiarese...leDeterrent.pdf[/url]

Nuclear Arsenal:



In summery there are three broad types of nuclear warheads



Fission warhead:



This is the earliest type of nuclear warhead in which all the yield comes from nuclear fission. This type of warhead is militarily useful for low yield application to take out enemy command and control via precision strike. With only 5 to 15% efficiency of the fissile fuel these types of warheads require large fissile material stockpile. India mastery of this type of weapon was evident from accurately controlling the yield of 3 sub-kiloton test shots on the far lower end of the yield curve at par with established nuclear powers.



Boosted Fission warhead:



Also known as Fusion Boosted Fission (FBF) warhead this type of warhead uses small amount of Tritium and Deuterium (isotopes of Hydrogen) to increase fission efficiency, converting up to about 45% of the fissile material into explosive energy, thus reducing fissile material requirement. Such warheads require lesser chemical explosives thus are lighter, as well as are more robust and lend themselves to better arming and safety mechanism. The POK-II test in 1998 demonstrated Indian mastery of this type of weapon in the form of primary stage of the Shakti-1 test shot.



Thermo-nuclear (TN) warhead:



Also known as a multi-stage nuclear warhead. The first stage of a TN device consists of a Fission or FBF nuclear explosive whose energy in the form of soft X-rays is used to ablate a heavy pusher material to compress and ignite the second stage consisting of Deuterium (in the form of Lithium Deuteride) to undergo nuclear fusion. Nuclear fusion generates highly energetic neutrons that in turn cause fission in the surrounding third stage fissile material. The third stage fissile material can be ordinary natural-Uranium or some other kind of enriched fissile material. Such weapons give very high yield. Most of the yield is generated by the third stage. TN warhead have far higher yield per unit mass of warhead, as well as consume smaller quantity of enriched fissile material. This type of light weight warhead can be delivered over greater range even by a small missile.



The POK-II tests demonstrated Indian mastery of fission and boosted fission nuclear weapons. Thermonuclear experiment (Shakti-1) based credible warhead however requires confirmatory test. Submarine compatible TN warhead also requires testing a TN design that uses only enriched Uranium or super-grade Plutonium.



Warhead

There is no real basis for distinguishing between tactical and strategic weapons. All nuclear weapons are strategic and the decision to use them is a political step on the escalation ladder. The real distinction is between low and high yield devices.



Figure 1: Field proven Indian nuclear warheads



Figure 2: High design confidence weapons, some require ICF or field test verification



Public information and trade estimates indicate following types of Indian RV warheads:



1. Mk-4: For light weight 17Kt Fusion Boosted Fission (FBF) warhead . Mass[ii]: ~180 Kg[iii].



2. Mk-5: For 50Kt FBF or 200Kt Thermo Nuclear (TN) warhead[iv]. Mass: ~340 Kg



3. Mk-6: For 150Kt FBF warhead[v]. Mass: ~550 Kg.



[center]Table 1: Comparative destruction area[/center]

If India wants to accede to CTBT it must conclude following tests[vi] in next nuclear test series:

• 5 to 7 tests involving FBF's and TN's warheads of 150 Kt and 300-500 Kt ranges respectively.
• 5 to 7 sub-Kt tests, to significantly improve the database for future ICF[vii] simulations.

Pending the verification of thermonuclear warhead the high-yield Boosted Fission warhead sets the upper limit of Indian warheads, thus Indian missile range is often quoted for 1,000 Kg payload.



“India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement” has for all practical purposes capped Indian ability to field test and proof high yield nuclear weapons till some time in future (about 20 years) when Indian three stage nuclear fuel cycle based on Thorium fuel matures into mainstream power production, thus eliminating Indian dependence on imported nuclear fuel from NSG countries or if there is a breakout in global nuclear test monitorium.



An alternative to field nuclear test for India is to test and validate the nuclear warheads by building two or more National Ignition Test Facilities (NITF). Incidentally NIFT is also required for stewardship of Indian Nuclear weapon.



Nuclear Stewardship and National Ignition Test Facilities

It is clear that nuclear weapons will continue to exist in world for the foreseeable future. In the absence of underground testing, the reliability, safety, and effectiveness of the remaining stockpile can be assured only through advanced computational capabilities and above-ground experimental facilities.



Indian Nuclear Stewardship program will involve:



1. An organization that will stay potent and survive lifespan of today’s weapon designers, fabricators and maintainers



2. Laser driven ICF (Inertial confinement fusion) experimental facility that strives to compress fissile and/or fusion fuel isentropically before raising its plasma temperature to reproduce high energy régimes encountered in boosted fission and fusion weapons. It is a potent tool in the hands of nuclear weapons physicists.



3. Two teams of numerical modeling physicists who for a given weapon design partition and validate weapon’s behavior model experimentally in various energy regime using ICF and computer modeling. At least two independent teams are required keep the deterrence honest and true[viii].



4. Full experimental verification of FBF and Thermonuclear designs that couldn’t be tested in previous six years due to geo-political constrains.



5. Ensure credible enduring stockpile in spite of fissile material aging, replacement pit, newer and safer chemicals for explosive lenses, arming and inertial containment.



6. Develop and proof test newer thermonuclear warheads using newer schemes other than traditional TN devices using piston driven shock with a thermal precursor. P5 and other western nations are doing these experiments, including the Chinese who have a fine laser facility[ix] in Shanghai and another one for classified studies. These are the first steps to achieving the Holy Grail – The FISSIONLESS TRIGGER.



7. Stay abreast with worldwide development of Fourth Generation weapons (Small yield fusion nuclear weapons without fission chain reaction)[x].



India requires two NITF facilities one for classified weapons programs and other for scientific research in civil domain to unambiguously demonstrate Indian facilities and competence in high energy physics to develop and test fusion weapons. This will make credible Indian high yield FBF and TN weapons that are otherwise not field tested, thereby significantly increasing Indian deterrence and at the same time reduces total number of weapons required for credible deterrence. The NITF will cost the government about Rs.6,000 crore (US$ 1.3 billion).



Civil and Weapons Facility Separation



Indian weapons program has been intertwined with the nuclear power program to minimize cost as well to leverage on each other, including beating US/NSG ban on export of dual use material.



“India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement” now acknowledges the Indian weapons program, yet unlike the privileges enjoyed by other nuclear weapons states, it proscribes continued NSG enforcement of global ban on export of dual use material/equipment to Indian classified program consisting of not just weapons programs but also R&D of Thorium based 3 stage fuel cycle for power generation. The continued embargo will thus impose high cost on weapons program as well as thorium based electric power generation.



Per the separation plan most of the facilities will go to civilian side, yet the facilities in the classified weapons side are fast approaching end of life thus requiring even more investments. Lacking the investment of about US$ 30 billion over the next 5 years, it is clear that the nuclear weapons program will be crippled. The above cost is for:

• 7 -10 research reactors (150 MW modified and scaled up R-5/Dhruv design)
• 3 - 4 heavy water plants[xi]
• 2 - 3 re-processing plants physically removed from the safeguarded sites
• 2 - 3 fuel fabrication plants
• Scientific facilities - hot cells, plutonium foundries, libraries etc.
• Duplication and up gradation of scientific skills built on knowledge over 40 years
• Laser Ignition ICF Facility including two independent design and review teams
• Fast Breeder Reactor test facility
• Physics collaboration programs in universities

<br clear="all"> [i] The FBF primary stage of the 1998 Shakti-1 test.



[ii] Total mass including mass of RV.

[iii] DRDO scientists appreciated for successful launch of Agni-3, Indian Express, Friday April 13 2007 "Union Minister of State for Defence MM Pallam Raju has said “the strategic payload of the missile is between 100 kg to 250 kg, and it is a two-stage solid fuel combustion system type missile."[url="http://www.newindpress.com/news.asp?ID=IEA20070413023541&Topic=&Title=&Page="]http://www.newindpre...A20070413023541[/url]

[iv] The 1998 Shakti series of nuclear test in 1998 at Pokhran unambiguously demonstrated Indian mastery of Fusion Boosted Fission weapons. The Thermonuclear experiment (Shakti-I) based credible warhead requires confirmatory/proof test or a credible Laser Ignition Facilities. While awaiting proof test Indian posture will likely field the TN warhead in compliment with missiles with FBF warheads.

[v] Ibid

[vi] Author’s estimate

[vii] ICF: Inertial confinement fusion. [url="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inertial_confinement_fusion"]http://en.wikipedia....finement_fusion[/url]. A technique of using high energy laser to compress and reproduce interaction of matter in high pressure high pressure régime. This is very unlike magnetic fusion (tokomak) design

[viii] Similar to two independent teams in USA viz. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)

[ix] The new Chinese warheads have a 150-300 kT yield, because of extensive ICF/LIF tests and simulations done at the classified laser site at Shanghai. These simulations have validated existing Chinese test data and data stolen from the US, providing them new designs. The ICF facility is integral to China's Second Artillery strategy, and has scientific personnel formally attached to the Second Artillery holding military ranks.

[x] The difference between new schemes and traditional Thermo-nuclear devices is that while the latter is a piston driven shock with a thermal precursor, the former is a radiation driven shock. Everybody is doing these experiments, including the Chinese who have a fine laser facility in Shanghai. These are the first steps to achieving the Holy Grail - The Fission-less Trigger.

[xi] assuming 1-2 are always in operation, and the rest are down for maintenance





Credibility Issues

Payload credibility aspects have been addressed in the POK-2 round of tests conducted in May 1999. Nuclear Stewardship program and National Ignition test Facilities are critical to sustain credible deterrence.[i]



Proven Indian nuclear warheads have small yield to weight ratio, thus delivery system consisting of Shourya, Agni-2 and Agni-3 are regional in nature. The old 200Kt FBF is heavy yet persuasive to skeptical challenger but results in shorter missile range. Agni-3 can carry three high yield warheads similar to Agni-2. India is likely to field Agni-3SL with a combination of FBF and TN to hedge the risk of untested TN warhead. India will require fewer missiles and warheads once Nuclear Stewardship Program is operational to make TN warhead credible. TN warhead will make Agni-3 a full range ICBM.



Figure 3: Without TN warhead Indian payload’s effectiveness rapidly drop off at longer range



For India, the nuclear stockpile number has to be formulated taking into account various factors. Some of which are-



Threat perceptions, the nature, location, and political disposition of the challengers- democratic need less deterrence while autocrats need more, the survivability of the force, and international geopolitics play great role. Indian adoption of theater missile defenses to reduce the number of in-coming payloads from regional challengers would help the minimal aspect, as the force would become more survivable. It would become very complicated to examine all these factors. A possible approach is to envision the security situation in terms of low, medium, and high risk.



Let us examine the low risk situation. In this scenario, there is the 1999 level of political situation- US and NATO primary security alliance, declining Russia, ascending but reforming China and Pakistan under representative rule.



India should have the capability to destroy 20 long range, 30 medium and 50 regional targets. These are based on ensuring enough destruction capability to deter any aggressive behavior from any quarters. If only modest numbers are available, it would mean a reverse kamikaze situation- a negligible, minuscule retaliatory strike on a challenger who has delivered excessive destruction to the Indian State in a first strike. As the Indian deterrent program is based on minimal testing and low yield devices (< 45kt)[i], it would require three times this numbers to assure destruction. These numbers could come down with further delivery vehicle tests to prove reliability and accuracy; again if credible stewardship program is established, new payload details are revealed and accepted by the challengers, the numbers could go down.



Figure 4: RV and nuclear warheads options on various Indian missiles



Add to this another hundred to ensure survival of first strike. This number could go down, if a global or bilateral no first use agreement is reached with the NWS states. Another would be if a mutual de-targeting agreement were signed with principal NWS. A NWS declaration about not expanding their doctrine to non-nuclear threats would not be of much use to India in this case as she does not intend to use such threats



Add to this about a hundred for pipeline process- weapons at lab, under replenishment, in logistic cycle, unavailable due to any reason etc. This number is not subject to any trimming or reduction.



India is not part of any global security arrangement and has to rely on itself. The numbers suggested reflect this. If it were to be accommodated in international forums and mutual threat reduction mechanisms, then participation in reduction regimes can be considered.



Medium Risk situation

An un-representative military government in Pakistan, which is in an alliance with a totalitarian, un reforming China would represent a medium risk security scenario. They could encourage insurgencies in border-states, and hold out prospects of simultaneously threatening India.



This situation would require additional delivery vehicles and weapons, which can be used in a regional context. Examples are additional lower yield weapons for battlefield use, and higher yield weapons for counter- value targets in China.



High risk situation

An aggressive Western alliance, alone or in consort with the medium risk scenario is one situation, which comes to mind. Another is a change of politics in Russia, which exhibits tendencies inimical to Indian interests. The point is, any grouping which has large numbers of nukes available to them and has inimical disposition has to be considered



Nuclear escalation with Pakistan can’t be considered in isolation. Pakistani nuclear weapons and posture is a proxy extension of China. As noted by senior Indian strategists that India-Pakistan nuclear scenario is not a two-some game. Meaning that in case of Pakistani first-strike the nuclear exchange will not be limited between India and Pakistan. A first-strike by Pakistan can only happen at Chinese behest[ii], thus an Indian retaliatory second strike will be simultaneously addressed to Pakistan and China that unfolds into a wider and destabilizing scenario. Thus a nuclear retaliatory attack on China will involve Chinese taking down other challengers that will drag USA in the expanded nuclear exchange, with growing global destabilization. This could prompt global nuclear powers to destroy Indian nuclear capability by a collective first strike before India escalates and launch a second strike[iii]. India could thus be inviting a debilitating global strike even before it manages to launch a second strike. Thus Indian counterstrike has to be large dispersed force that can handle simultaneous threats from all directions and be unusually robust against simultaneous first strike by multiple nations.



These would require more, high yield payloads and long range delivery vehicles on survivable platforms. It would require MIRV development and fielding ATV and Agni-III class systems. The challenge to Indian diplomacy and the political class is to prevent the emergence of this situation. The main limitation to handle this situation is access to fissile material and the strength of the economy. Low cost technology initiatives to maintain this option are- regular PSLV launches of multiple satellites, production facilities for advanced fusion materials, a robust command and control system, and ballistic missile nuclear submarines.



[i] As newer higher yield designs are awaiting confirmatory test.

[ii] The May Mystery, Times Of India, 7 Jan 2009, K Subrahmanyam [url="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Editorial/TOP_ARTICLE__The_May_Mystery/articleshow/3943372.cms"]http://timesofindia....how/3943372.cms[/url]

[iii] Interlinked multi-cornered nuclear weapons backed players each vying for global domination. Prisoner’s dilemma, and pre-emptive strike against India.

[Guest]

Arunji,



Read the page linked below:



http://translate.google.co.in/translate?...IN381IN383



It is a history of development of the current generation of China's strategic weapons. I will point out some thoughts:



1. We seem to be 10-11 yrs behind China as far as missiles go: the DF-31 apparently had its first success only in 2000 (though it was on a parade at Tiananmen in 1999). Our Agni V seems to be an analog of DF-31, same 2m dia, three stage maybe similar capability but currently forced to have heavier payload. This is an achievement given that we started only in 1998 while China's DF-31 started development in 1986.



2. Regarding weapons, they talk of boosted fission primaries using both LiD (for earlier heavy weapons) and using gas boosting. The latter took them some tests to perfect. They also developed advanced non-spherical gas-boosted primary by Sep 1992.



3. Bharat Karnad talks about LiD boosted spherical primaries in his book (about 40kt yield, suposed to be a straightforward dev. from pure fission device). The S-1 primary, however, going by your account, seems to be an advanced non-spherical gas boosted primary. This part worked very well for us.



4. In all such literature that I read, a miniaturized primary is portrayed as the hardest part to develop. This is interesting.



5. In that case, 2-3 more tests of the corrected S-1 (which may already be entering service though untested) would fix any remaining bugs and leave us with a TN on par with anything anyone has (as far as sophistication goes).



6. I have calculated that though the nuke deal is constraining, this is a psychological constraint: the cost we pay under this deal for testing is not as much as RC-MMS etc would have us believe: at least for the next 15 yrs, nuke power from reactors connected with this deal (even if it reaches 20000 MW by 2020, which is doubtful given how things move in Bharat) would not exceed 5% of our power generation capacity.



7. The price for testing at say, 2017 would be precisely this: reduction of power generation capacity to what it was in 2016 and restoration through coal etc of status quo by 2018 as far as power supply is concerned. This is miniscule. I put this argument before a recently retired BARC scientist whom I know, and he agreed with these estimates.



8. The price to pay for testing would be much steeper only if we purchase large quantities of conventional military equipment from the U.S. especially, if we agree to the F-16/F-18 for MMRCA. Even then, it would be worth it. If we have to starve conventional forces again for the sake of strategic forces, that should be done.

[BlessedAgni]

[quote name='Arun_S' date='13 August 2010 - 02:18 AM' timestamp='1281661815' post='107876']

Regarding N deterrence options available to India in current situation you may want to read[url="http://www.indiaresearch.org/WayToACredibleDeterrent.pdf"] WAY TO A CREDIBLE DETERRENT by your faithfully.[/url][/quote]



Arun sir, I have read the entire report. Let me first say that is brilliant and that its recommendations are commendable. I would also like to add that I have learnt quite a bit from this report. I have a few queries regarding it.



1) The report states "In the absence of underground testing, the reliability, safety, and effectiveness of the remaining stockpile can be assured only through advanced computational capabilities and above-ground experimental facilities" (such as National Ignition Test Facilities). Does India have such facilities or have plans to build such facilities since it is clear from the report that TN test cannot be taken as a complete success ("Thermonuclear experiment (Shakti-1) based credible warhead however requires confirmatory test."? What is also new to me is that the Chinese do have such a facility.



2) "Lacking the investment of about US$ 30 billion over the next 5 years, it is clear that the nuclear

weapons program will be crippled." - Are there any plans to keep the military part of our nuclear program afloat? This part is shocking to me as it highlights the fact that no investment has gone into this side of the program for a long time and is in imminent danger of collapsing.



3) "There is a false debate about the need to deploy the deterrent in a de-alerted status- separate the

payload from launch vehicles." This is absolutely true. But aren't the Indian weapons already separated? As I've understood from western sources, the warheads have not been mated with the missiles and are located at different places to prevent "accidental" mating.





What needs to be kept in mind is the fact that Pakistani weapons and missiles are bound to be more advanced than those of India. Not because of Pakistani ingenuity but because of the information flow from China (especially since China has a laser facility). This puts even more pressure on India if the TN tests are not somehow verified.

[Guest]

[url="http://www.hindustantimes.com/Oxford-Harvard-minds-helped-N-Bill/H1-Article1-593253.aspx"]Oxford, Harvard minds helped N-Bill[/url]

The contentious Nuclear Liability Bill, that was finally passed with bipartisan support in Parliament earlier this week, got a helping hand from Harvard and Oxford universities. A group of law students — all of them Indians — from the world's best institutes had briefed the Parliamentary Standing

Committee of Science and Technology with suggestions to make the nuclear damages Bill legally sound.



The suggestions impressed the MPs so much that a senior BJP leader called up a member of the group for consultation just before the final agreement with the government was struck.



The scholars were consulted on which of the four amendments being discussed with the government on clause 17 of the draft Bill would be best.



Another senior leader appreciated that the students had come to depose before the committee at their own expense: "They were here to visit the country and came readily to share their knowledge of international law with us."



Arghya Sengupta, Shivprasad Swaminathan, Sanhita Ambast and Prashant Reddy are part of the group that wants to use its legal skills to assist Indian policy-making. And their advice is free.



"There is a desire to be engaged with India and its policies," Sengupta told HT.



He feels that in the absence of bipartisan academic inputs, Indian legislators have to depend on the ideologically-coloured inputs of NGOs and industry bodies.

[ramana]

Were those chotus ever operationalized?

[HareKrishna]

India has to many nukes

20 nuke are enough.

[Arun_S]

[quote name='HareKrishna' date='06 October 2010 - 08:24 PM' timestamp='1286376369' post='108707']

India has to many nukes

20 nuke are enough.

[/quote]

You mean Too many nuke?

For seat warming Prime minister MM Singh, even one nuke is too many for India.



Sad but our "maa ka ladla" sardar ka puttar aisa hi hai". { Recall the bollywood song maa ka ladla bigad gaya}



Sonia got him there for a reason!!

[HareKrishna]

US promised that India will have safety against China if it renounce to nukes and enter the NPT.

how much can India count on such promises?

pakistan also will renounce to nukes if India will do the same.

[HareKrishna]

[quote name='Arun_S' date='07 October 2010 - 05:32 AM' timestamp='1286409256' post='108720']

You mean Too many nuke?

For seat warming Prime minister MM Singh, even one nuke is too many for India.



Sad but our "maa ka ladla" sardar ka puttar aisa hi hai". { Recall the bollywood song maa ka ladla bigad gaya}



Sonia got him there for a reason!!

[/quote]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuzMU8VXE...re=related <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/tongue.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' />

[HareKrishna]

If India will renounce to nuclear weapons and sign the NPT ,also Pakistan will renounce.

The territorial integrity of India will be assured by NATO+Russia and this will lead to a much safer world.

Nuclear weapons will be taken from the hands of religious people,the only ones that will conscious push the red button.

Only secular people and nations will have access to nukes,and secular fear death (unlike religious people) and never start a nuclear war that will end the human life on earth.

[ramana]

You got to be kidding! In 1971 SU could only stall a few days for India to clean up East Pakistan and not any more. This is what led to POK-I.



And Russia in no SU.



And most of TSP technology to make nukes came from NATO countries!

[Arun_S]

[quote name='BlessedAgni' date='13 August 2010 - 07:28 PM' timestamp='1281707402' post='107882']

Arun sir, I have read the entire report. Let me first say that is brilliant and that its recommendations are commendable. I would also like to add that I have learnt quite a bit from this report. I have a few queries regarding it.



1) The report states "In the absence of underground testing, the reliability, safety, and effectiveness of the remaining stockpile can be assured only through advanced computational capabilities and above-ground experimental facilities" (such as National Ignition Test Facilities). Does India have such facilities or have plans to build such facilities since it is clear from the report that TN test cannot be taken as a complete success ("Thermonuclear experiment (Shakti-1) based credible warhead however requires confirmatory test."? What is also new to me is that the Chinese do have such a facility.



2) "Lacking the investment of about US$ 30 billion over the next 5 years, it is clear that the nuclear

weapons program will be crippled." - Are there any plans to keep the military part of our nuclear program afloat? This part is shocking to me as it highlights the fact that no investment has gone into this side of the program for a long time and is in imminent danger of collapsing.



3) "There is a false debate about the need to deploy the deterrent in a de-alerted status- separate the

payload from launch vehicles." This is absolutely true. But aren't the Indian weapons already separated? As I've understood from western sources, the warheads have not been mated with the missiles and are located at different places to prevent "accidental" mating.[/quote]

Answer to last Q is. Irrespective of what it is now, ATV/Arihant can only carry mated weapons.

[Guest]

It is interesting to see the games NPAs play. Their "global fissile material report" claimed we hd 700+kg of WGPu from Cirus and Dhruva + 6.8 tons of RGPu in 2009...



Their 2010 report revises this to 500kg of WGPu and 3.5 tons of RGPu separated. In their count, the number of our nukes will never exceed 80-100..



OTOH,



(i) BK claims in his book that a source from the MMS PMO informed him about power reactors being systematically used for WGPu production even in the current govt. This is straight from the horses mouth. The Ratnahalli plant wll also have 10000-15000 centrifuges by 2012 or so as per his book. This will be more SWU tha NPA believe. So, we shall overtake TSP in uranium enrichment as well. More so once the Chitradurga facility is up and running



(ii) DRDO wont be so openly claiming we need MIRVs if we shall stick to the NPA mentioned small arsenal.



Of course, TSPs stocks increase massively in NPA counting...the attempts to stop TSP from blocking FMCT are being stepped up, it looks.



Maybe, we should also keep a few tons of RGPu aside for a large supply of land-based and tactical nukes..

[Arun_S]

[quote name='Kritavarma' date='24 December 2010 - 11:12 AM' timestamp='1293168877' post='109984']

Maybe, we should also keep a few tons of RGPu aside for a large supply of land-based and tactical nukes..

[/quote]

Base already covered. RgPu plays a very special role in Indian strategic weapons arsenal.

[Guest]

[quote name='Arun_S' date='24 December 2010 - 12:01 PM' timestamp='1293213230' post='109986']

Base already covered. RgPu plays a very special role in Indian strategic weapons arsenal.

[/quote]



For something better than low yield tactical weapons ? If so, NPA estimates of our arsenal are certainly nonsense.



Anyhow, this repeated revision of NPA estimates to make sure their estimates of our arsenal stay below 100 sounds very odd. Other than convincing TSP to help push thru FMCT, I see no other rationale (TSP is the sole roadblock to FMCT for now). Any other reason for these consistent low estimates ?

[Arun_S]

[quote name='Kritavarma' date='25 December 2010 - 12:26 AM' timestamp='1293216484' post='109987']

For something better than low yield tactical weapons ?

[/quote]



By 'Indian strategic weapons arsenal" I mean but quite the opposite of low yield tactical weapons. <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/smile.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' />