The FBF design used by BARC is sufficiently simple (adding a layer of LiD around the fission core, that we know works, and immersing it in Tritium gas) that it will work. What is not clear is how they can be so confident that their weaponized FBF will yield 300 kt. After all they have not tested any FBF design that is even close to 300 kt. What they have tested has an yield that is only about 5% of the 300 kt figure. Moreover, Chidambaram has said that BARC can design nukes with yields up to 200 kt. So was Chidambaram understating BARC's capacity?
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Indian Missile News And Discussion
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[quote name='gangajal1' date='05 May 2012 - 09:52 AM' timestamp='1336191264' post='114803']
The FBF design used by BARC is sufficiently simple (adding a layer of LiD around the fission core, that we know works, and immersing it in Tritium gas) that it will work. What is not clear is how they can be so confident that their weaponized FBF will yield 300 kt. After all they have not tested any FBF design that is even close to 300 kt. What they have tested has an yield that is only about 5% of the 300 kt figure. Moreover, Chidambaram has said that BARC can design nukes with yields up to 200 kt. So was Chidambaram understating BARC's capacity? [/quote] http://books.google.com/books?id=nITHBdQ...kt&f=false Here is the statement and the weapons available to us according to Indian Defense Review. I can't find a one to one correspondence to the tests with the weapons listed as available weapons. What I do note is a reference to a fusion boosted fission weapon with a yield of 150 to 200 kt made from reactor grade as opposed to weapons grade material. It fits in well with the fact that our weakest element in the entire fuel supply cycle until four years ago was enrichment. It's the weapon of choice given the cost and availability of material. It also provides us with a bigger arsenal close to china's arsenal of 2500 weapons. This weapon was also a dud in our tests according to Bharath Karnad. I find that plausible, he stated it did not give out as much as we expected it to give out. So I would assume with a corrective measure applied the yield is likely to increase to 300kt and at worst it will still give us 200kt. (This of course being the 12-15 kt s3 test which Santhanam claims should have produced a 25kt bang.) (The duds were duds but not from the perspective given by wallace et all. They produced the 56kt as reported however they were not designed to be 56kt but much more, (more than 30) + 25 + 12 = north 67 kt, instead they produced 55kt or so reported (43? + 12 + .3?). (The exact breakup was the lie. The sum total wasn't a lie but the individual yields were not the right ones and it's impossible to verify except for santanam's statement that he was looking for a 25k bang.)The boosted fission was expected to be 25 kt. All the secondaries were empty/only enough to proof the fusion. These tests were proof enough that the secondary worked but not to the extent we expected them to pop. Inefficient yes, making miniaturization difficult with sufficient confidence. The MIRV warhead is stated to be 500kg each with a yield of 200kt(?). This is probably a sacrifice in weight to be get a more assured warhead. A dial-able warhead is one where we have the least confidence. Could also explain the 11 different configurations waiting tests. Indian Defence Review: Jul-Sep 2010 has another article on the Shakti test series where the shakti 1 shot is reportedly as being a third generation device with a dial-able yield of 50kt, 150kt or 500kt. Deutrium-Deutrium-Lithium weapon. If indeed the test attempted was such a 3rd generation test and radio chemical analysis produced shows there was fusion in s1 with a hollowed out secondary, we may have all the data we need to have a reasonably secure thermonuclear device. However all of this as Bharath Karnad and a lot of other folks feel is a simulated deterrent as opposed to a demonstrated deterrent. Our entire nuclear program right now is in simulated deterrent mode and all the weapons fielded are simulated weapons with a few correctives. The only weapon we really did perfect was the 1974 test of a simple fission weapon. The sub kiloton tests 3 of them were significant and possibly Chidambaram who prefers simulations fancies the data is enough to create u-233 devices as well when the time is right. A large number of these tests seem to be centered around our primary problems we had until a few years ago with ramping up enrichment to an industrial scale. This as suggested explains the delays in the thermonuclear weapons for MIRV. We are just as slow progressing from Agni I to Agni V as we are on enriched fissile material weapons deployment. Our sense of betrayal on the nuclear deal with ENR also stems from this aspect. The nuclear establishment is looking towards ENR to really push us through to the third stage of the nuclear program as opposed to weapons production. India possibly plans to field more weapons which are obtained without enrichment as opposed to highly enriched weapons. This could also explain India's stand on fissile material cut off treaty. Indian fissile material is the third largest or at least the fourth largest in the world if what I have posited is true. There may never be another test for a decade or more. Edits: Refined thoughts on the breakup issue of S1, S2 and S3.
On a more optimistic note compared to the we must test post above. We can also delay the test and move ahead with the IUCNA by testing ICBMs of greater which can pepper the world, increasing the number of Submarines. Saudi Arabia can't threaten America with a blockade thanks to ICBMs. The same will apply to India with ICBMs and foreign reactors with foreign fuel. The problem still remains if as Arun suggests we can't have an operational Arihant tip.In the absence of further tests India has no choice but to project power through ICBMS with single digit CEP's reaching the corners of the earth in numbers close to those deployed by America and Russia. This could also explain our favorite weapon of choice FBF, reactor grade.
The problem is that except for ignorant Indians no one will accept the 300 kt figure for FBFs. All we know is that India has exploded a single FBF of 15 kt yield. One can not scale up the yield by a factor of 20 and then without any test claim that your scaled up FBF will yield 300 Kt. This is simply not believable. Even accurate ICBMs will not help because no one will have any confidence in the warheads.
All one can say about the 300 kt FBFs is that something will happen. No one can say with confidence the yield of such an untested weapon. Then there is the age issue. We do not know the yield of a newly fabricated '300 kt FBF'. We are even more in the dark about how the yield of such a weapon will change with age. I myself believe that BARC can probably fabricate with some confidence 50-60 kt FBF based on the 15 kt FBF tested. I am very skeptical about the 300 kt yield. It would have been more honest to simply say that we are unable to test because of the world political situation.
[quote name='gangajal1' date='06 May 2012 - 09:04 PM' timestamp='1336318009' post='114807']
The problem is that except for ignorant Indians no one will accept the 300 kt figure for FBFs. All we know is that India has exploded a single FBF of 15 kt yield. One can not scale up the yield by a factor of 20 and then without any test claim that your scaled up FBF will yield 300 Kt. This is simply not believable. Even accurate ICBMs will not help because no one will have any confidence in the warheads. All one can say about the 300 kt FBFs is that something will happen. No one can say with confidence the yield of such an untested weapon. Then there is the age issue. We do not know the yield of a newly fabricated '300 kt FBF'. We are even more in the dark about how the yield of such a weapon will change with age. I myself believe that BARC can probably fabricate with some confidence 50-60 kt FBF based on the 15 kt FBF tested. I am very skeptical about the 300 kt yield. It would have been more honest to simply say that we are unable to test because of the world political situation. [/quote] I agree on the we need to test. I am just looking at solutions without testing and a confidence interval we can hope for. Even the S1 test is a three part test, fission, boosted fission and a thermonuclear part. If we are fielding FBF's with reactor grade fuel scaled up to 300 kt the issue will be more about the delivery weight. If we assume deterioration of yield is due to radioactive decay.(Please feel free to add correctives as I am no nuclear scientist.) Reactor grade fuel is less prone to decay and hence yield with age problem is also a problem which can be identified and investigated using controlled nuclear reactions in nuclear reactors. The other element which prevents FBF's being a preferred nuclear weapon for most other states revolves around the tritium production, replacement and cost.
My refined thoughts on Agni, Nuclear deterrence and geopolitics.
I have indicated the statements supported by DRDO or other press releases directly with (s) and indirectly or with extrapolation with (i). Unverified,(?). Agni V, from the DRDO press releases will be the first IRBM (s) (a misnomer for an ICBM(i)) to carry MIRV (s) war heads. MIRV being progressively ported back to Agni iii by 2015(s). An MIRV missile with four 500kg warheads is one of the preferred configurations DRDO is working on(s). The current preferred weapon of choice at least as of 2006 was FBF with a yield of 250-300 kt(s) weighing close to a ton (s). Agni series payload capacities disclosed by DRDO are interesting in light of this disclosure(s). Agni III will be MIRV capable(s). Agni VI, all composite missile(s) will also be MIRV capable with a higher payload(i). The range of a ballistic missile increases disproportionately after the initial intercontinental velocities are reached in a test with moderate increases in fuel and weight, given that circumnavigation at 600km altitude is less constrained by gravity, air turbulence and air friction. Agni V with a "non-preferred" 500 kg war head can reach any corner of the globe(i). Agni VI(?) all-composite missile is merely an extension of the MIRV capability to the global theater.(i) Shakti nuclear tests are designed to give India the ability to field sub-kiloton, fission, fusion boosted fission and thermonuclear warheads according to a statement made by the GOI on the floor of the house in 2000, two years after the test(s). The current preferred weapon of choice at least as of 2006 was FBF with a yield of 250-300 kt(s) weighing close to a ton(s). The FBF 250-300kt weapon is a reactor grade fuel weapon(?) (s). {Indian Defense Review 2002 on weapons available as presented by GOI in 2000 in the parliament}. India unlike the p5 has access to cheap tritium (s) which makes FBF the weapon of choice(i). The use of reactor grade fuel FBF as a weapon of choice is driven by the economics(i), extant supply of fissile material(s), extant enrichment constraints(s) and numerical sufficiency(s). U-233 bombs(s) as a future replacement candidate(i). The thermonuclear weapons on the other hand require significant investment in enrichment capacity which at present is tilted towards fueling our upcoming submarine fleet(i). MIRV warheads are presumably thermonuclear weapons based on the weight being quoted(i). A nuclear test to verify the designs is unlikely(s). The nuclear tests will have to wait until we have enough MIRV capable missiles in sufficient numbers(i) The Indo-US civil nuclear deal was an attempt to emasculate the Indian deterrence by limiting tests(s). When the Americans realized their folly on emasculating India solely on the assumption that the thermonuclear tests failed and preventing future tests will cap Indian nuclear weapons they initiated the present series of ENR technology denial(s). Indian interest in ENR(s)(i) was one of the prime motivators in the nuclear deal in addition to fuel supply access(s). ENR civilian access is critical in reducing the lead time to a thorium economy(s). India has been largely unsuccessful in lobbying against the ENR technology denial regime, which is critical to our nuclear energy security and as opposed to nuclear strategic security(i). India has reconciled itself to ENR technology denial regime from the statements made by krishna menon in October(s). The ENR technology denial regime is an attempt to prevent the rise of an energy independent India by emasculating it's nuclear energy security by creating a saudi-us relationship between India and the NSG fuel supply members(i). India will be subject to nuclear fuel supply cutoffs(i). The ENR technology denial regime restricting ENR (i) is designed with an assumption that it will limit India to the India-China regional equation over the next decade(i). The G2 dependency of America might force India to project power globally and not just regionally(i). We cannot rule out the possibility of a repetition of the 1970's India China trade-off(i). A strategic response to this threat is the deployment of ICBM's which can target all corners of the globe with MIRV war heads(i). This preempts economic warfare through nuclear supply cutoffs(i). This could also be the only logical course on the table for India which has traditionally been reluctant to project power(i) to an overt military bully over the course of the next decade.
Regarding Indian weapons based on RGP versus WGP.
As one of my dear friend used to say "Why would a goat eat husk-feed when there is green grass all around?" As for FBF weapon its often so loosely used that very different conclusion is reached. Those who know also know the difference between
Most current Indian weapons of the latter kind and yield of between 150kt and 250kT. Yes it have not been demonstrated for unambiguous yield and deterrence, but given Indian capability, equipment and design resilience, it does not leave any doubt in calculation of any potential adversary. And yes these ones dont weight 1 tonne. The 1 tonne types are for a special customer. [url="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_4"]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_4[/url]
[url="http://www.samachar.com/Indias-missile-defence-shield-ready-DRDO-chief-mfgvKBfbaae.html?source=recommended_news"]India's missile defence shield ready: DRDO chief[/url]
Quote:May 06, 2012, 20:41
[quote name='Shaurya' date='01 May 2012 - 02:56 AM' timestamp='1335820698' post='114771']
Arun, came here to say Hi to you and also a question. Is Shourya's payload going to be nuclear, conventional, either or do not know? Please shed some light. I am presuming K15 that would go into the Arihant is Nuclear only. [/quote] Sorry, I missed your post. Just IMHO following assessment:
05-07-2012, 08:11 AM
[quote name='Chandragupta' date='01 May 2012 - 07:56 AM' timestamp='1335838732' post='114773']
Why is that many people comparing the CEP in BM role to that of an ASAT role? Isnt it the diff between oranges and apples? For BM role, since our phizzile nukes comes into equation and so we have to worry about accuracy in delivering what we have got, while for ASAT role, the sat will be orbiting say 20,000kmph at 600km LEO even a tiny frag will be deadly for the sat survival. So technically there is no need of having a single digit CEP for ASAT role. A blast fragmented directional warhead will do the job <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='  ' />I see A-IV as the most likely candidate for ASAT role rather than A-V. One cost being the primary factor with almost 10-15 crores diff between the two. Ans since, A-II production has been standardized and is in serial production stage,A-IV might take over utilizing the same infra/tooling with only difference being more composite motors/maraging steel. [/quote] ASAT missile are much less challanging than ABM system for IRBM class missiles. Satellites are sitting duck, because of their high altitude, repetitive orbital motion, as well as they present a very clear optical and RF target. All that is required is using a large motor of BM to carry ABM upper stages. Agni-2 Prime (A4) can take down sats in 2500 Km orbit, while A-5 based interceptor can take down 8500 km orbit sat.
05-07-2012, 08:18 AM
[quote name='RomaIndian' date='23 April 2012 - 11:15 AM' timestamp='1335159466' post='114725']
I listened in Radio and read on Internet that India tested Agni V succesfully, a intercontinental missile, im glad for it. Congrats Mother India. [/quote] Rejoice O children of Mother India, spead on all corners of earth. Truth is that which is eternal, and the radiance of Indian genius is eternal truth too. Roma people have crried a heavy burdan of the Lord's Leela (play). Thanks for remembering and pitching in.
05-07-2012, 04:14 PM
[quote name='Arun_S' date='07 May 2012 - 07:56 AM' timestamp='1336357133' post='114814']
Sorry, I missed your post. Just IMHO following assessment:
[/quote] If it does carry an N Capability don't you think adversary will respond and won't take the chance that shourya is carrying non nuclear warhead onlee before shourya reaches target. How will you communicate such matters? Via red telephone perhaps?
[quote name='shyam1' date='07 May 2012 - 04:22 PM' timestamp='1336387467' post='114823']
If it does carry an N Capability don't you think adversary will respond and won't take the chance that shourya is carrying non nuclear warhead onlee before shourya reaches target. How will you communicate such matters? Via red telephone perhaps? [/quote] Enemy with good long range radar coverage knows that land launched Shourya will arrive from certain direction, while that launched from submarine carrying fusion comes from sea side. TSP OTOH IMVHO does not have capabelity to detect and catagorise Indian missiles. Even many hours after it gets hits by a nuke, will not know if US hit it or China? or for that sake Iran or Israel? Much less the type of missile that carried the lotus bud, even much more less in real-time. Thus the oft repeated threat of first strike, because after absorbing a strike TSP nukes are useless duds whose bluff is called and may not deliver the promised yield/kahar. So the threat is more powerful then teh weapon itself.
[quote name='Arun_S' date='08 May 2012 - 01:19 PM' timestamp='1336462914' post='114829']
Enemy with good long range radar coverage knows that land launched Shourya will arrive from certain direction, while that launched from submarine carrying fusion comes from sea side. TSP OTOH IMVHO does not have capabelity to detect and catagorise Indian missiles. Even many hours after it gets hits by a nuke, will not know if US hit it or China? or for that sake Iran or Israel? Much less the type of missile that carried the lotus bud, even much more less in real-time. Thus the oft repeated threat of first strike, because after absorbing a strike TSP nukes are useless duds whose bluff is called and may not deliver the promised yield/kahar. So the threat is more powerful then teh weapon itself. [/quote] Thanks. what about our north eastern neighbour who possess the capability to get direction of missile? Will they wait and find out if shourya is carrying the N warhead or will they fire their reply as soon as they are confident that it is a nuclear capable missile. I know we have NFU, but that is just a piece of paper as far commanders are as concerned. I think this issue will be on every commanders mind. Think about it, if you are a commander I dont think he will use shourya unless there is an escalation by other side as you don't want to cause a nuclear conflict. Also, I know IA was practicing absorbing a nuclear strike by TSP when practicing CSD a few years ago. Glad they are drilling this. IMO I think TSP will only use their N warhead if IA takes over a lot of territory and likewise in 2001 or Kargil, Agni was deployed in the north east to send the message to Beijing to back off. These weapons are last case resort when suffering a big territorial loss. There is a theory that merely possessing second strike capability is enough to deter most adversaries. Arun ji, if time permits, can you also educate us more about why we didn't strike after 26/11 and why we stuck to dossiers?
05-09-2012, 05:56 AM
[quote name='shyam1' date='08 May 2012 - 10:26 PM' timestamp='1336495709' post='114830']
Thanks. what about our north eastern neighbour who possess the capability to get direction of missile? Will they wait and find out if shourya is carrying the N warhead or will they fire their reply as soon as they are confident that it is a nuclear capable missile. I know we have NFU, but that is just a piece of paper as far commanders are as concerned. I think this issue will be on every commanders mind. Think about it, if you are a commander I dont think he will use shourya unless there is an escalation by other side as you don't want to cause a nuclear conflict. Also, I know IA was practicing absorbing a nuclear strike by TSP when practicing CSD a few years ago. Glad they are drilling this. IMO I think TSP will only use their N warhead if IA takes over a lot of territory and likewise in 2001 or Kargil, Agni was deployed in the north east to send the message to Beijing to back off. These weapons are last case resort when suffering a big territorial loss. There is a theory that merely possessing second strike capability is enough to deter most adversaries. Arun ji, if time permits, can you also educate us more about why we didn't strike after 26/11 and why we stuck to dossiers? [/quote] Why we did not strike after 26/11. Nobel ambitions of MMS. Unkil pressure not to divert Pakistani attention due to Afgan War. Unkil assurances. Noo-Clear Deal. MMS legacy.
05-10-2012, 01:57 AM
[quote name='osman' date='09 May 2012 - 06:04 AM' timestamp='1336523162' post='114833']
Why we did not strike after 26/11. Nobel ambitions of MMS. Unkil pressure not to divert Pakistani attention due to Afgan War. Unkil assurances. Noo-Clear Deal. MMS legacy. [/quote] Surely not. I am sure they were ready and waiting for us to hit. ISI is not stupid to do something this big. They Wanted us to react. So we need to be extra careful.
[quote name='shyam1' date='10 May 2012 - 02:05 AM' timestamp='1336595227' post='114836']
Surely not. I am sure they were ready and waiting for us to hit. ISI is not stupid to do something this big. They Wanted us to react. So we need to be extra careful. [/quote] Well I am not sure how ISI figures in the Indian decision not to pursue a military intervention. However what it did signal and there have been many others since then at sharmel-e-sheik, the Indian embassy building not being targeted in the recent Afghan attack, the statements on Siachin from Pakistan, the Indian governments lack of a direct rebuttal to the tirade on Siachin,a move to "gift Siachin", Indian political push for diesel loco sales to Pakistan in spite of domestic supply constraints and a push for trade with a debilitated Pakistan indicates a political settlement has been worked out. Now you can look at these unconnected issues differently. ISI might have wanted us to react with a military buildup. Unkil made sure we did not. These are facts. Unkil promised action because it's citizens were killed. They hedged until India forgot about it. The NOO-Clear deal was also in the hedge bets. It's the way India is. We forget things and move on. We were lulled by these promises or the unequivocal personal desire for peace at all costs of certain individuals. It's your take. I have posted my take on this as succinctly as I could. There are other carrots Unkil could have dangled. UN Security council permanent membership support in exchange for chota sa Kashmir sellout. It was announced not too long back too. All carrots. Unless we bang the door in and enter the UN security council seat with thermo nukes, MIRV missiles, power projection capability and a large indigenous weapons design and development capability we will be given a second class seat even there.I usually like to be civil about third rate leaders who beg instead of barge in when the time is right. We have very few of good leaders.
05-10-2012, 11:12 PM
Defence Research and Development Organisation plans to equip Agni-V with multiple warhead
New Delhi: Agni-V, India's most powerful ballistic missile with a strike range of over 5,000 kms, is set to get substantially higher destruction capabilities as the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) plans to equip it with multiple warheads. Comparing Agni-V missile to the best in the world, DRDO chief Dr VK Saraswat said, "It is a game changer missile... It has taken the missile technology to the highest level and matches with the best and the current world standards. We are working in this area. It will take time for us to develop but our work is on." Known as the Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV), the missile would be capable of carrying multiple warheads to destroy several targets. Asked about the plans in that regard, he said, "Basic vehicle (missile) will remain the same. The first three stages will also remain the same and only the kill vehicle or the payload delivery system will need changes." Also Read India's missile defence shield ready: Defence Research and Development Organisation Light Combat Aircraft 'Tejas' to be inducted in Air Force this year: DRDO chief Terming it as a "force multiplier", the DRDO chief said, "If I am able to do force multiplication with this... where I was using four missiles, I may use only one missile. So it becomes a force multiplier given the damage potential." Such a capability exists only with a select few countries such as the US, Russia and China. MIRV missiles are equipped with small on-board rocket motors and computerised inertial guidance system which manoeuvres.
05-10-2012, 11:29 PM
Does this mean the conical third motor will remain the same? The kill vehicle is the MIRV housing? Does the kill vehicle re-enter and then disperse the warheads? Will each MIRV warhead have the composite shield and re-enter separately withstanding 5000C on re-entry?
Each missile getting the 250 gram inertial guidance ABM avoiding SOC and rocket motors? (The last sentence seems to indicate this goodie.)
05-11-2012, 12:28 AM
The third motor remains. The payload adapter will host itself as bus that is responsible for safe seperation of MIRVs. Unlike other ICBMs (that were all developed for dumb ballistic MIRVs) Indian ICBMS will not have MIRV bus do the job of imparting correct velocity correction for each warhead (bus will just separate the payload and decoys correctly) and each MIRV has navigation and vecocity correction package to therafter go their own way and correct any missile insertion velocity error. BTW MaRV have the same characterstic, just that MaRV also have in atmosphere manuvering capabelity.
This public press report gives first inking to the Indian MIRV payload being MaRV. |
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