Nuclear Deterrence

[Arun_S]

[quote name='ramana' date='29 May 2011 - 10:40 AM' timestamp='1306645348' post='111726']

[url="http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/op-ed/bomb-pak-we-will-hit-back-961"]We will hit back[/url]

Q. Last Sunday, terrorists in Pakistan attacked the Mehran naval base near Karachi and destroyed two sophisticated maritime surveillance and attack aircraft. This has led to fears that Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile and fissile material are no longer safe from theft by militants. [color="#0000FF"]Is India at particular risk of a possible terror strike using nuclear materials? What is our response mechanism like in such a scenario?[/color]



A. [color="#0000FF"]The retaliation against terrorist organisations can be nuclear or with conventional weapons. If we have ascertained that a nuclear strike from the Pakistan side is by a terrorist outfit, and we want to hit back using nuclear weapons, then we should inform Pakistan that we are not striking at the country but only to destroy a particular group.[/color] We know the sites of the terrorist outfits. We only need to decide the strength of the nuclear weapon to be used. It will obviously be tactical, of a particular yield that does not cause damage beyond, say, a brigade strength.[color="#0000FF"] But my preference would be to use conventional force in retaliation.[/color] I think in nine out of ten cases, this should suffice. We should continue hitting them till they raise the white flag.

[/quote]

I find the above highlighted portion very disturbing.



It shows that Indian policy is INVITING nuclear strike from terrorists AND Indian nuclear force will bend down and surrender without firing a nuclear shot much less a massive retaliatory nuclear strike.



One has to be blind and an idiot to believe the oxymoron assertion that:

1. Pakistan is independent and will launch nuclear attack against India without Chinese instruction/command
2. Pakistani terrorists are independent (thus Pakistani state shall not carry sin of Paki terrorist burden) can steal nukes, capable of arming the nuclear trigger AND will nuke India without Pakistani Army/Government AND Chinese command/instructions.

[Arun_S]

[url="http://www.samachar.com/NSG-all-set-to-upend-Indias-clean-waiver-lgsfKFahjfg.html"]NSG all set to up-end India's clean waiver: NOT MUCH TO SMILE ABOUT NOW:[/url]

[size="3"]Siddharth Varadarajan

June 18, 2011 05:30 IST | Updated: June 18, 2011 06:21 IST



The Hindu NOT MUCH TO SMILE ABOUT NOW: Shivshankar Menon (left), with U.S. Under Secretary Nicholas Burns and U.S. Ambassador David C. Mulford (right), during a break in their negotiations in 2007. India feels the U.S. is now about to "derogate" from the landmark nuclear agreement. Photo: V. Sudershan Proposed restrictions on transfer of sensitive nuclear items are a 'derogation', 'rollback' of U.S. commitments, Indian officials had warned



Barring last minute objections, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is set to approve new guidelines for the transfer of “sensitive” nuclear material that will do undo the hard fought “clean” waiver India obtained in 2008 from the cartel's restrictive export rules.



At stake is India's ability to buy enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment (ENR) from NSG members. Under the terms of a landmark September 2008 agreement, the NSG waived its catch-all requirement of full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply in exchange for a concrete set of non-proliferation commitments by the Indian side. This agreement means NSG members are allowed to sell any nuclear equipment and material they want, including ENR, to India despite the fact that it does not allow international supervision over all its nuclear activities and is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.



Two months after that waiver — a product of the July 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement in which Washington committed itself to “work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India” — the Bush administration threw its weight behind a bad-faith effort to remove ENR equipment and technology from the purview of the NSG-India bargain.



It did so at least partly in order to keep a promise Condoleezza Rice made to the influential Congressman Howard Berman during the passage of the Hyde Act — that if Congress were to approve the proposal for nuclear commerce with India, the administration would get the NSG to ban the sale of ENR equipment to countries that had not signed the NPT.



Thus, under the proposed new guidelines as framed by the NSG in November 2008, ENR transfers will be allowed only if the recipient state fulfils a number of objective and subjective criteria. Top of the list is the requirement of NPT membership and full-scope safeguards. Since India is the only country outside of the NPT that NSG members are allowed to sell nuclear material to in the first place, it is obvious that these two criteria are aimed exclusively at India.



The revised NSG guidelines, known as the “clean text,” have not been adopted yet largely because a number of the 46-nation cartel's members have been objecting to some of the other proposed restrictions such as the requirement that recipient states adhere to an Additional Protocol. To push the process along, the U.S. got its G-8 partners to declare at L'Aquila in 2009 that they would abide by the “clean text” in the interim. The G-8 has sent the same message every year, most recently in Deauville. On a parallel track, U.S. diplomats have worked behind the scenes to bring each of the NSG dissenters on board. Language has been found to address the concerns of Canada, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and the Netherlands. The only holdouts until a couple of months ago were Turkey and South Africa but even they are now believed to be ready to vote for the new ENR guidelines when the NSG holds its plenary in The Hague next week.



India has objected to this unilateral redrawing of the nuclear bargain with both the U.S. and the NSG, but mostly in private and mostly without any impact on the process.



On February 3, 2009, for example, Shivshankar Menon, who was Foreign Secretary at the time, wrote to Under Secretary William Burns in the U.S. State Department that the American initiative on an ENR ban at the NSG constituted a “derogation” of the bilateral India-U.S. agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, or “123 agreement.” “Menon's February 3 letter … made a legal claim that an ENR ban would be inconsistent with Article 5.2 of the 123 Agreement itself, which provides for the possibility of amendments to the Agreement to permit ENR transfers, claiming that a ban in the NSG would eliminate the possibility of making such changes,” Ambassador David C. Mulford told Washington in a cable accessed by The Hindu through WikiLeaks dated February 12, 2009 ([url="http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/the-cables/article2113586.ece"]191725: confidential[/url]).



The U.S. envoy went on to describe the exchange he had had on the ENR subject with the Foreign Secretary on February 11 as “an un-enriching discussion of reprocessing.” The cable says that Mr. Mulford “asked what more we could say to convince Menon that this issue did not warrant the aggressive posture adopted by India. Menon expressed surprise that his letter had generated concern. He replied, “All we need is a clear statement that your position has not changed. We would like to know that what we agreed in the 123 Agreement stands.” Ambassador Mulford noted that Indian officials felt the “criteria-based approach to ENR transfers” that requires NPT membership “is discriminatory toward India and not consistent with the spirit of the Agreement.” He cited, in particular, the views of Anil Kakodkar, who was head of the Department of Atomic Energy at the time, “who professed a sense of ‘betrayal' over the issue.”



Though he noted the Indian view that U.S. policy “is not consistent with their view of assurances provided during the 123 Agreement negotiations that, while the U.S. would not transfer ENR to India, we would not stand in the way of others doing so,” Ambassador Mulford said. Mr. Menon was “vague” and “not clear how reaffirming the 123 Agreement commitments would satisfy India's concerns.” He concluded that section of his cable by commenting: “Whatever the truth behind India's concerns, a good place to start would be with a clear affirmation that the Obama administration stands by the commitments made in the 123 Agreement.”



An anodyne and ultimately pointless affirmation was made a month later by Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, but the U.S. continued to press ahead with its effort to ban ENR sales to India. The July 2009 L'Aquila statement on non-proliferation at L'Aquila took a complacent Indian establishment completely by surprise. In public, the government tried to brazen it out, denying there had been any setback. “We have a clean waiver from the NSG. We have an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We are not concerned over what position the G8 takes [on implementing the ‘clean text'],” Pranab Mukherjee told the Rajya Sabha on 13 July 2009. In private, of course, Indian officials were indeed concerned, very concerned.



During the November 2009 strategic security dialogue with the U.S., Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao reminded Under Secretary for Arms Control Ellen Tauscher that India took a dim view of the proposed ban on ENR sales at the NSG. A U.S. Embassy cable sent soon after that dialogue reported: “Rao stressed that India supported the goal of preventing transfers of … ENR in principle, but asked that the United States' position in favor of a global ban not be seen as a “roll-back” of the NSG decision that made India a partner, and that India can't be seen as “half in and half out (of the NSG).” She characterised the pending decision as an “issue of significance for Indian perceptions about the Civil Nuclear Agreement and our partnership,” said a cable dated November 27, 2009 ([url="http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/the-cables/article2113583.ece"]236981: confidential[/url]).



The cable notes that Ms. Rao “raised the politically sensitive nature of the issue again over lunch, stressing that it was an issue ‘close to the heart'” and that India was “counting on the United States to value the spirit of the Civil Nuclear Agreement in the NSG.” She concluded that India's core concern was that “the September 2008 NSG decision not be seen to be rolled back.”



The U.S. official's response to this expression of Indian concern was three-fold. “Tauscher reassured Rao that restricting ENR transfers via the NSG criteria-based approach is based upon long standing U.S. policy, that decisions are up to the consensus-based body (46 members), and that the U.S. was not targeting India.”



The cable does not record what Ms. Rao might have said to contradict Ms. Tauscher but, in fact, each of her three arguments is false.



If anything, U.S. policy on ENR transfers has been quite flexible. It sold reprocessing technology to Japan in the 1990s after making a determination that the sale of liquid metal reactor reprocessing technology “did not constitute ‘sensitive nuclear technology'” as defined by its domestic statute “since Japan already possesses extensive reprocessing technology” [Fred McGoldrick, Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology, 2011]. At the NSG level, the U.S. had no firm policy on ENR transfers until 2004. That year, George W. Bush floated a tough new proposal — which, ironically, would today suit the Indian nuclear industry better — that there should be a global ban on ENR sales to countries that do not already possess these technologies. India has reprocessing and enrichment facilities and would not be covered by such a ban; indeed, in July 2005 and September 2008, it assured the U.S. and the NSG respectively that it would be guided by such a strict approach in its own export policies. The U.S. came to embrace the “criteria-based approach” to ENR exports in the NSG only in November 2008, after the India waiver was adopted, and its policy can hardly be called “long-standing.”



Ms. Tauscher's second and third arguments — that the NSG operates by consensus and that the U.S. is not targeting India — begs the question of why Washington is actively pushing for the unilateral redrafting of the cartel's bargain with India. The waiver of September 2008 was not granted by the NSG as an act of charity. It extracted a number of non-proliferation commitments from India in return, insisting, at the eleventh hour, that the Government of India make a formal statement listing out what it was prepared to do. Several of its members also expect lucrative contracts, especially the US, which squeezed India for a Letter of Intent promising to buy 10,000 MW worth of American reactors. The Indian side has scrupulously adhered to its side of the broad bargain and has assumed the U.S. and the NSG would do the same. But if the latter are going to cherry-pick which of their own commitments they will adhere to and which they will not, India may well be tempted to examine its own options.

[/size]

[Arun_S]

This pdf is a treasure trove for careful readers.

[url="http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/dss/2010/dss2010.pdf"]DRDO SCIENCE SPECTRUM - 2010[/url]



In particular:

[url="http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/dss/2010/dss2010.pdf"]Concepts and Modelling of Deterrence for Strategic Thinking - Page 263[/url]

N. K. Jain, Institute for Systems Studies and Analyses, Delhi–110 054



Also here is another one on teh same document:



[url="http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/dss/2010/dss2010.pdf"]Successful Demonstration of Design, Development and Testing of Scramjet Combustor for HSTDV Mission of 20 s Duration

C. Chandrasekhar, Defence Research & Development Laboratory, Hyderabad-500 047[/url]

... .. .. . .

Static Testing and Performance Analysis of Scramjet Combustor for 20 s Duration

Successfully demonstrated sustained supersonic combustion of kerosene fuel in the Mach 2 vitiated air flow in the strut based scramjet combustor in the connect-pipe mode test facility using ejector system (i.e., to generate low pressure at the exit of the scramjet combustor) for 20 s test duration. Wall static pressure distribution along the length of the combustor for reacting flow with ejector operation is shown in Fig. 15. The computed thrust obtained is 484 kgf, which is meeting the HSTDV mission requirement.



The most important aspect of this test has been the survivability of the struts after 20 s duration of the test especially Stage-II fuel injection struts. Apart from achieving desired thrust the other important performance measure of success is to achieve steady mass flow rate of kerosene injection from the struts into the combustor for 20 s test duration.

... . .. . . .



1. Designed and developed the scramjet combustor for the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV).



2. Addressed the issues of fabrication to realize the fuel injection struts using Niobium C-103 alloy material and Tungsten alloy material.



3. Established the vitiated air–heater to produce high enthalpy air at 2000 K total temperature and 5 bar total pressure; the flow rate of vitiated air being 4.2 kg/s. This is the workhorse for all combustor tests at DRDL.



4. Successfully carried out 18 static tests of the strut based scramjet combustor, the results of which lead to gaining confidence in the indigenous development of scramjet combustor. The auto-ignition and sustained supersonic combustion have been proved in the connectpipe mode of static tests.



5. Successfully demonstrated sustained supersonic combustion of kerosene fuel in the Mach 2 vitiated air flow in the strut based scramjet combustor in the connect-pipe mode test facility using ejector system (i.e. to generate low pressure at the exit of the scramjet combustor) for 20 s test duration.

484 Kgf and flow rate of 4.2 Kg/s means engine ISP of around 800 to 1,000.

[Arun_S]

Sad to see stalwart go away.



My humble Salute to Dr PK Iyengar.





[url="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/PK-Iyengar-nuclear-scientist-dies-at-80/articleshow/11196563.cms?prtpage=1"]PK Iyengar, nuclear scientist, dies at 80[/url]

Dec 21, 2011, 09.59PM IST [left]

[/left] MUMBAI: Eminent [url="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/nuclear-scientist"]nuclear scientist[/url] PK Iyengar, former chairman of [url="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Atomic-%28musician%29"]Atomic[/url] Energy Commission and a key member of the team, which made possible India's first peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, passed away after a brief illness on Wednesday here, an official source said. He was 80.



He is survived by his wife Seetha, a son and a daughter.



Iyengar was renowned as a nuclear physicist with keen interest in developing [url="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Indigenous-%28musician%29"]indigenous[/url] experimental facilities.



He was the AEC chief and secretary, Department of Atomic Energy from 1990-93, his last official position before retirement. Later, he served briefly as scientific advisor to Kerala government in 1998, an official said.



A vocal opponent of the Indo-US nuclear agreement, Iyengar had been living a quiet, retired life in Mumbai's middle-class suburb of Deonar, in northeastern part of the city, since the past few years.



After graduating in physics from Trivandrum, Iyengar joined the famous Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in 1952 in Mumbai.



Three years later, he joined the then Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay and was assigned to Chalk River Laboratories of the Canadian Atomic Energy Establishment. After his return from [url="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Canada"]Canada[/url], Iyengar was involved in building several experimental facilities.



He was engaged in the design and setting up of the country's first fast reactor critical facility, Purnima-1, which achieved its first criticality May 18, 1972, paving the way for India's first peaceful nuclear experiment exactly two years later, on May 18, 1974, at Pokhran.



After serving in various capacities at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) Mumbai, Iyengar took over as its director in 1984.



During this time, he provided crucial leadership in resolving many technical challenges encountered in the commissioning of the indigenous research reactor Dhruva and directed the Indian Atomic Energy program during his tenure as AEC chairman.



Iyengar was conferred with various awards and honours in India and abroad, including the prestigious Bhatnagar Award in 1971 and the Padma Bhushan in 1975.

[Arun_S]

India has been fusriously stockpiling mil grade material for now >10 years.







[url="http://www.samachar.com/India-asks-Pakistan-to-join-FMCT-talks-lm4cKLfdcee.html?source=recommended_news"]India asks Pakistan to join FMCT talks[/url]

December 30, 2011

Sandeep Dikshit

While emphasising restraint and responsibility in the management of nuclear weapons, India has expressed the hope that Pakistan would begin talks on joining the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the next Conference on Disarmament (CD) session expected to start in the third week of January.



Pakistan is the only hold out at the CD among 65 countries in substantial talks on the FMCT, a proposed pact that will ban the production of nuclear bomb making material. The FMCT is considered by many to be a key step towards effective nuclear disarmament and even if Pakistan agrees, many differences remain to be sorted out among the major nuclear weapons states on issues of scope, verification and permissible activities.



The issue came up at the sixth round of talks on nuclear and conventional confidence-building measures (CBMs) held in Islamabad earlier this week which saw both sides expressing satisfaction with the existing set of two nuclear related CBMs – advanced notification about ballistic missile launches and nuclear accidents.



India feels the FMCT could serve as a stepping stone for a more serious global push towards disarmament. “India has been prepared for a while and Pakistan was informed that it was also ready to join the talks if Islamabad agreed,'' said sources privy to the talks.



But differences came to the fore when both sides discussed expansion of CBMs to cover other areas, though the talks were held in a cordial atmosphere. Pakistan resisted India's request to publicly enunciate its nuclear doctrine, including assurances on no-first-use of nuclear weapons (which India has done) and strict civilian control over nuclear weapons. Pakistan said it does have a minimum credible deterrent, though it is not in the public domain.



“The main elements of India's nuclear doctrine are known. We are prepared to discuss this aspect in order to add a sense of transparency and predictability to Pakistan's nuclear policy. We urged Pakistan that it is important to demonstrate in practice restraint and responsibility in the nuclear field [by publicly stating their nuclear doctrine],'' said the sources.



On the other hand, India did not accept Pakistan's suggestion for including nuclear safety and civil nuclear cooperation in the talks. “Pakistan has been asking for new measures which were not in the 1999 Lahore memorandum of understanding (MoU). We want to first exhaust the potential of the Lahore MoU of which the main outstanding point is the exchange of nuclear doctrine,'' they said.

[Arun_S]

Cross posting from Missile thread

--------------------------------------------





Regarding Indian weapons based on RGP versus WGP.

As one of my dear friend used to say "Why would a goat eat husk-feed when there is green grass all around?"



As for FBF weapon its often so loosely used that very different conclusion is reached. Those who know also know the difference between

1. Mere boosting (gas boosting) where fusion yield portion is very insignificant (solves the problem of predetonation and somewhat increase in fraction of fission fuel that actually fissions).
2. High yield Fusion design, where significant portion (~20%) of the yield is from fusion (Lithium), and the fission fuel is thoroughly consumed. Also sometimes referred to as Sloika Thermo-nuclear weapon (different from 2 stage or 3 stage fusion design that S1 shot was (In Shri. K Santhanam's writing he refers to as the S2 shot)). This type of design is much more resilient and robust

Most current Indian weapons of the latter kind and yield of between 150kt and 250kT. Yes it have not been demonstrated for unambiguous yield and deterrence, but given Indian capability, equipment and design resilience, it does not leave any doubt in calculation of any potential adversary. And yes these ones dont weight 1 tonne.



The 1 tonne types are for a special customer.



[url="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_4"]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_4[/url]

[gangajal1]

I thought that the layered design is considered as an alternative design for a TN bomb and is not FBF. At least it is a step towards a TN weapon, about half way between FBF and a pure TN weapon. The famous Russian dissident Sakharov who fathered this design seems to indicate that this design has a maximum possible yield of 500 kt.



This explains what I read sometime ago. Some Indian military figure said during the Santhanam controversy that deterrence still exists since India has the capacity to lob a 500 kt FBF. I was puzzled at that time. Now it makes sense if by FBF he meant the layered TN design.

[Arun_S]

[url="http://www.samachar.com/Indias-nuclear-doctrine-closest-in-spirit-to-Chinas-mfmaK6gdahc.html?source=recommended_news"]

‘India's nuclear doctrine closest in spirit to China's'

[/url]

Shoumojit Banerjee

May 12, 2012 00:30 IST | Updated: May 12, 2012



The nuclear deterrence between India and China was essentially stable in nature and was likely to remain so in the near future despite India and China

pursuing their nuclear programmes with increasing technological sophistication.



This was stated by National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon while speaking at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre here on Friday on the

occasion of National Technology Day.



India's nuclear doctrine was closest in spirit to China's. The Communist behemoth had never made a direct nuclear threat against India so far, he noted.



This was further augmented by the fact that the East Asian state had concentrated on the survivability of its nuclear arsenal by focussing on technological enhancements like developing multiple independent re-entry vehicles and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles — moves made by a nation that did not regard its nuclear arsenal as a “war-fighting weapon.”



Technology and its changes had always been prime drivers of the security calculus. India's nuclear capabilities were built primarily for deterrence, and not as a war-fighting weapon, he pointed out.



Nuclear blasts



Referring to India's nuclear blasts at Pokhran in Rajasthan in 1974 and 1998, he emphasised that their purpose was to build a credible minimum deterrence (by using nuclear weapons politically, than as war weapons) while wrenching free of an expensive arms race.



India was the first nuclear weapon state to publicly announce and debate a nuclear doctrine. Possession of nuclear weapons made it less vulnerable to nuclear coercion and political blackmail. On the contrary, Mr. Menon said, Pakistan's doctrine was antithetical to India's. He pointed out Islamabad's readiness to employ nuclear weapons if certain thresholds were crossed.



He also touched upon the darker effects of the information and communications technology (ICT) revolution in the post-Cold War society, drawing on the lethality of terror groups such as the al-Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).



Urging the country's think tank to start treating technology security as a national goal, he said the ICT revolution had vested non-state actors and individuals with immense power and estimated that more than 120 smaller countries in the world that viewed ICT as an equaliser had developed capabilities for waging cyber warfare.

[osman]

Deleted. Wrong thread.

[osman]

http://www.barc.ernet.in/talks/fddir08.html



Enriched uranium fuel supplied by BARC for the Light Water Reactor programme at Kalpakkam has been performing quite satisfactorily and our facility in Mysore is ready to meet the demands of our current strategic programme. There has been remarkable success in improving the separating work of our centrifuges and I have the confidence that we will be in a position to enter the uranium enrichment activity in an industrial scale within a short time.



Great strides have been made in development of advanced gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment program. The latest fourth generation design, with output 10 times the early design, has been successfully developed and an experimental cascade is in operation at BARC. These would soon be ready for induction at RMP. Third generation design, with 5 times output of early designs, are presently being inducted at RMP.



An important milestone in development of carbon fibre composit tubes for high speed rotor system, has achieved a surface speed of 600 m/sec. These rotors have the potential to provide greatly enhanced centrifuge output. These rotor systems are presently undergoing various trials.



Analysis:



Our enrichment program expansion in 2010 to a facility possibly uses this carbon fiber composite tubes with enrichment of 40SWU/year. Earlier ones were at 4 SWU/year upto 2008.In 2008 we were adding 20 SWU/Year centrifuges .



The new facility has a larger dimension of 210 x 150. The old facility was 130 x 130. This new facility will house carbon fiber composite 40 SWU/year units. (600 m/sec.) Urenco 600 m/sec is the fifth generation which enriches at 40 SWU/year. There are urenco units with 620 m/sec which produce 42 SWU/year. Seems like we are very close to the best centrifuge designs.



http://isis-online.org/publications/sout...pacity.pdf

The last paper on Indian enrichment places the future expansion in 2006 at 20000 SWU/yr to 30000 SWU/yr. Assuming this expansion covered the period upto 2008. In 2008 we added unknown quantity of 20 SWU/year centrifuges. Assuming this is 3000 as most other expansions where in phases of 3000. The 2008 expansion gave us 60000 SWU/year.



We then expanded in 2010 to these carbon fiber composites. So when the facility comes up. It's double the earlier facility. Our enrichment when it comes up only from RMP plant will be between 200,000SWU/year 500,000 SWU/year. This really is something. We have a chitradurga enrichment facility which will be additional to this. So our enrichment program is really on it's way to Industrial scale.





http://www.thehindu.com/news/internation...epage=true



We had 3000 centrifuges in 2006. Which were 2nd generation. In 2008 we added unknown quantity of 20 SWU/Year centrifuges. In 2010 we were building a facility of 210 x 150 possibly housing 40 SWU/year carbon fiber composite centrifuge. Which is essentially double the earlier program plus double the earlier output. So our uranium enrichment for submarines and other uses from only this plant are at 4 times the level in 2006 at a minimum.



No wonder we are going to use the new Chitradurga facility for civil use. Even though it's not under safeguards. It will be 600 rev/sec or 620 rev/sec and equivalent to the latest Urenco designs.



Our reprocessing on industrial scale is the problem.

[ramana]

So on way to super critical speed centrifuges.

[osman]

This is 2011. He says, enrichment is not the largest in the world. But Chitradurga will be substantial. Google images is about RMP construction. He hasn't confirmed or denied that expansion! So yes our civil industrial capacity is very good. He confirms why we need ENR. We want civil ENR for the foreign plants.



He also says our reprocessing is industrial scale! Hmmz, I wonder what gives. I think it's all about money. Chitradurga being brought up is expensive. Doing that for all our civil plants will indeed be very expensive. If we can tie new nuclear reactors to them setting up ENR it will be cheaper. Plus if we spend all the money and ENR is civil only as it will have to be for future expansion that's money time and materials wasted which we can use for the military program.

(If we keep too many facilities are military as we invest in them, the rest of the world will go crazy on the number of our weapons.)



'Enrichment capacity enough to fuel nuke subs'

New Delhi: Dr Srikumar Banerjee, chairman of Atomic Energy Commission of India (AECI), spoke to Saurav Jha, author of The Upside Down Book of Nuclear Power, recently at the former's South Bloc office on a gamut of issues concerning the state of nuclear power development in India.



Saurav Jha:Is your current enrichment capability sufficient to fuel India’s emerging nuclear submarine fleet or will that be attained only with Chitradurga? If not then will Chitradurga be used only for civilian power reactors?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Our existing site is more than adequate for feeding the fleet. And this fleet is of course more than one.





As far as the new facility in Chitradurga is concerned, it will not be a safeguarded facility. We are keeping the option open of using it for multiple roles.



Chitradurga could of course be used to produce slightly enriched uranium (SEU) with about 1.1 per cent U-235 content to fuel our pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) units which would boost the fuel burn-up to as much as 20000 MWd/tonne.



Saurav Jha:That is almost half of what new generation light water reactor technology is achieving and quite impressive.



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Yes.



Saurav Jha:Will Chitradurga also be used to create enriched uranium for powering DAE’s own indigenous 700 MWe Light Water Reactor(LWR) design which it plans to roll out by 2020?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Yes, that option is always there.



Saurav Jha:Has this indigenous design grown out of the work DAE has done for India’s nuclear submarine project?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Well a lot of work has been put into developing the 700 MWe LWR. In any case you would note that pressurised water reactor designs worldwide have essentially grown out of naval propulsion units.



Saurav Jha:Were you surprised by the recent amendment at the Nuclear Supplier’s Group that debars members from transferring enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies to non-NPT members and thereby India?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: We did have an inkling that ‘full civil nuclear cooperation’ wouldn’t really be forthcoming from all NSG members despite the atmospherics. Statements have been made from the major nuclear supplier countries that the recent NSG resolution will not affect their commitments made earlier. Take for instance, the Americans – It was never really that clear that their cooperation with us would genuinely extend to the ENR sphere. In the case of the French however, there had been statements indicating that it probably will. As far as the Russians are concerned there are some things that need to be ironed out, but they will be in all likelihood.



Now I must state categorically that reprocessing is fundamental to our closed fuel cycle philosophy which involves reprocessing of spent fuel and waste management. In the case of imported fuel, we have of course agreed to keep under safeguards and reprocess in separate dedicated facilities. We see no reason why we should be embargoed in sourcing equipment for those new safeguarded facilities. And that is the crux of the matter, it isn’t so much that we need access to ENR technologies – we have developed our own- it is that when we set up additional facilities to address safeguard requirements we shouldn’t be unnecessarily debarred from importing equipment and forced to rely only on domestic sources when we are addressing international norms, quite in keeping with our impeccable record on such matters.



Saurav Jha:So that brings us to our next question. Have our ENR technologies matured enough to be regarded as commercial grade?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Well in the case of reprocessing, certainly. We may yet not be setting up reprocessing plants as big as Rokkasho in Japan or Sellafield in UK but the new reprocessing facilities that are slated to come up in the next decade or so are going to be appreciably bigger than what we have now. Even the one that is nearing completion in Kalpakkam is a fairly large facility.



The planned integrated nuclear recycle plant for instance will be handling close to 500 tonne/year of heavy metal and will be sited at Tarapur which is in one of our existing sites. During the next plan period we will look at two more such facilities.



Talking about enrichment, we are quite happy with the progress we are making and with the new Chitradurga facility we are closing in on what you could refer to as industrial level capability. Again, this won’t be as big as the largest out there but it would be substantial.



Saurav Jha:Will the new BARC campus in Vishakapatnam be focused only on civilian research and will it also have enrichment facilities? Will it be larger than BARC, Trombay?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: To answer the second part of your question – it will be engaged in enrichment research and not in commercial grade enrichment activities. Like Trombay, it will also be a mixed facility looking at both strategic and civilian research.



To be clear, we want all our facilities to have a certain intellectual orientation and that would mean that we will simply not be looking only at product development either for military or civilian purposes. As always the intention is to foster cutting edge innovation. And you can gauge that from some of the new areas that Vishakapatnam will focus on which goes beyond the straightjacket of ‘delivery of a certain number of products’.



Vishakapatnam will therefore take up research in new areas such as concentrated solar thermal power, cutting edge energy conversion techniques, energy storage, biological systems and hydrogen based technologies. The aim is to raise the technological and research capability across the entire spectrum of energy research in India.



All this will of course be accommodated in a larger campus than what we have Trombay. The new campus is spread out over a 3 X 3.5 km area which I think is fairly large.



Saurav Jha:What are some of the new research reactors planned at the new campus?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: The need for a reactor dedicated to materials testing has been felt for sometime now. In the past we have used power reactors for experiments related to this field but it is now time that we set up a dedicated reactor for this purpose. As such the new campus will host a new multipurpose high flux reactor which besides material testing will also be used for radioisotope production. This reactor will see start of construction during the forthcoming plan period.



In 2017-18 timeframe a new research reactor like Dhruva (which is at Trombay) will also come up at the new campus.



Saurav Jha:Talking about new developmental reactors, what is the status of the AHWR and when will we actually see start of construction?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: Well, we have had site selection difficulties with the AHWR. Design and development has actually been done. It’s just a matter of finding the right site. To give you an idea of the difficulties, even Vishakapatnam is seeing the creation of a new SEZ right next to where a possible site could have been …. At the moment it seems we’ll have to settle for one of our existing sites. The matter is still in process.



As far as actual start of construction – It’ll happen sometime in this decade.



Saurav Jha:Alright, despite the delays in starting the build the AHWR, would you still say that India is a global leader in thorium research?



Oh Absolutely. There is no doubt in my mind that we are indeed a leader in thorium research worldwide.



Saurav Jha:Coming to the second stage of our programme, what is the status of the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and when can we expect to see fuel loading?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: You’ll be happy to know that work on the PFBR is progressing steadily. Physical progress is now at 82 per cent and I am confident that construction will be complete by mid-2012. But of course, commissioning a reactor is a very different game than building one. There are a number of tests that need to be run and experiments carried out. Nevertheless, I am confident that fuel loading will take place at the desired time post completion.



And I must point out, that the PFBR is one of its kind at the moment. I mean, apart from the Russians nobody at the moment operates a commercial grade Fast-breeder and nor is constructing one.



I would just like to add, that materials testing is an area where we can help the thermal power generation sector immensely. The new ultra-supercritical coal based plants need to operate at 750 degrees to achieve over 40 percent efficiency that they are designed for. This, of course, requires special steels and alloys all of which can be made better, via the kind of research being carried out at IGCAR.



Saurav Jha:This is actually an area where we are ahead of the Chinese, isn’t it?



Yes that is correct. They only recently commissioned a test reactor while we have had one for decades now.



Saurav Jha:In the area of nuclear waste disposal, have we already identified a geologic deposit? Will international collaboration be sought in this area?



Dr Srikumar Banerjee: At the moment we are setting up underground laboratories to study various facets of effectively burying waste such as percolation, diffusion etc. We have also begun aerial surveys for locating stable rock formations that could serve as geological deposits in the future.



International collaboration in this area is always a possibility and is actually easier to secure. We will of course be open to developing new technology in this area. The French for instance are saying that it may be possible to actually bury waste even in clay. So there are possibilities at this stage.

[osman]

This is 2010: He tails off on the set of: part .... It's more than 4 submarines. I wonder how many more ... Also he confirms the 2010 expansion. 2011 expansion of RMP caught on google satellite images is what I based the new estimates on. It's industrial military in RMP. Chitradurga is commercial with possible use for military if the requirement arises. It's also interesting how he uses the phrase, "We have not started doing it for large-scale commercial nuclear power stations, which require a much larger quantity of enriched uranium." i.e. we are doing it for the military where the enrichment is much much higher. Also industrial scale at RMP. We have not moved to tonnes of low enriched uranium which will happen in Chitradurga for power plants. It's a nice twist on industrial. It's industrial when the supply chain processes tonnes of fuel as opposed to SWU/yr based industrial capacity. <img src='http://www.india-forum.com/forums/public/style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/smile.gif' class='bbc_emoticon' alt='' />



The Hindu : Opinion / Op-Ed : ‘In the event of a nuclear incident, victims must get prompt compensation'



It is a year since India's nuclear-powered submarine, Arihant, was launched. Has the Light Water Reactor (LWR), using enriched uranium as fuel, on board the submarine been started up?



Our nuclear steam supply system is ready 100 per cent. From our (DAE) side, everything is ready. We are only waiting for other systems to become operational so that we can start the commissioning activity of the reactor. I really do not know when the harbour trials will be done.



The Navy will need three or four nuclear-powered submarines for this arm to be a viable force. Will you build more LWRs for these submarines?



We are already doing that. I will not be able to tell you the number, but it is a fact that we are in that game. The next nuclear steam generating plants are getting ready for future applications.



Where will the enriched uranium for these boats come from? There is only one Rare Materials Plant at Ratnahalli, near Mysore, to produce enriched uranium. Will the proposed Special Material Enrichment Facility in Chitradurga district in Karnataka be helpful?



Chitradurga will come a little later, not immediately. Our Ratnahalli plant capacity has been enhanced. But more than that, there is significant improvement in our technology. Usually, a term called Separating Work Units (SWUs) defines the technology level that we have achieved in this, and I can assure you that there has been considerable improvement in SWUs of our next generation caskets of centrifuges. The separating capacity of our centrifuges has improved. So total capacity enhancement at Ratnahalli has been done. We are confident of supplying the entire fuel for the set of….



You cannot say anymore that India does not have enrichment technology. India has its own technology and we can produce [enriched uranium]. We have not started doing it for large-scale commercial nuclear power stations, which require a much larger quantity of enriched uranium. We will be able to do that once we go to Chitradurga.

[osman]

Also all of the assessments above assume we keep the 4 SWU/yr or 20 SWU/yr stuff on line and replace them with similar units. If all 4 SWU/yr units are replaced as they breakdown, (there have been reports in early 2000's and late 90's of these breakdowns) with newer 20 SWU/yr the capacity will keep increasing without increasing floor space.

[balai_c]

Can the learned gurus here offer me an insight of the status of India's super-critical gas centrifuges? How do they fare against the contemporary state of the art centrifuges elsewhere in the world (especially EU and American technology)?

[osman]

[quote name='balai_c' date='19 May 2012 - 12:46 PM' timestamp='1337411327' post='114902']

Can the learned gurus here offer me an insight of the status of India's super-critical gas centrifuges? How do they fare against the contemporary state of the art centrifuges elsewhere in the world (especially EU and American technology)?

[/quote]



I am no expert on centrifuges. Based on the research I have done so far. I have presented this. We were tinkering with super-critical since 1992. Before that PKI said we don't have bellows which could mean sub-critical. Our centrifuge component as far back as 2005/2006 were for parts with bellows which indicate super-critical centrifuges. There were orders for longer parts with bellows. Again an indication of super-critical with possibly a thrust to increase SWU/yr or hide the number of units. I think it's the increase we were looking at. Also the induction of 3rd generation units with 20 SWU/yr was on in October 2008. These are likely super-critical. We also asked for machined bellows and not hand-made bellows. So follow on orders were assured. Tenders were likely not called for after this. This was a supplier with assured follow on orders. In 2008 we were experimenting with carbon fiber composite SWU's. And 2010 and 2011 reports indicate we enhanced the RMP in numbers and in technology. So the RMP could be running a large mix of 40 SWU/yr with some 20 SWU/yr and others of lower designation. Design life of the Russian units were 25 years. So our 2-3 SWU/yr units are long gone or near death. I am not sure about the 1992 - 2000 models, they also had ugly noise issues, or resonance problems and failures back then. So these may already be on the way out or are already discarded. The choice we have is between the "less" expensive and reasonably reliable 20 SWU/yr units and 30-40 SWU/yr carbon fiber units which are likely more expensive but more reliable. Our supply chain may be more 20 SWU/yr oriented as of 2005-2006. These are good candidates to farm out to Chitradurga. The 20 SWU/yr units in RMP may also be transferred there. If any 2-3 SWU/yr unit's of 5 or 10 year vintage exist which don't use foreign parts or with foreign parts which are working might be sent out there to work and die in Chitradurga. The Chitradurga is likely a civil facility.



Americans are far ahead of us. GE-Hitachi team had achieved industrial scale Laser separation process. SILEX. They ran a test industrial unit in 2010 or 2011. After this successful operation they have placed a request for approval for an industrial plant in US. They will produce staggering amounts of LEU for one facility. Since Hitachi is involved the Japanese might be in on it too, but I am not sure. Export controls might mean it's US only. US has exported enrichment technology to Japan in 1990. The only other country with this technology is the developer of SILEX, Australia. Austraila has no power plants using uranium and are said to be only interested in enrichment for god knows what.Maybe to keep the option alive should the world change.



The americans are also looking at supercritical centrifuge larger than T21 with the same surface speed as T21 or higher surface speed.



As far as EU goes, it's urenco technology.

Most of the installed EU units operate at 620m/sec with 40SWU/yr.(T12). There is a newer T21 units are so far experimental or deployed in only one plant so far.We are at the 4th generation urenco or 5th generation. One parameter is the surface speed, the unknown parameters are the size and dimensions of the balti in India. A larger balti, and/or longer balti at the same speed means more SWU at same surface speed. Unkil also in this area wanted to go for bigger balti at same speed as T21 or higher speed. T21 is 50x the early designs. If they are referring to 2-3 SWU/yr unit first generation we are talking 100-150SWU/yr from these T21 centrifuges. The good part is our 4th or 5th generation is composite fiber. So we can move up faster now. The metal ones are not very good at high-speed. We need to develop bigger and longer balti. In addition the reports on early centrifuges in India indicated we were using different dimensions compared to the Urenco units. These are based on component orders India made for these plants. So our design is slightly different even back in the sub-critical days of 1990. A spot on estimate is difficult.Even those early designs referred to bellows which indicates dampening and rotor breaking and noise reports. This was way back in 1992. So we were experimenting with them back then. These noise reports indicate the stage of moving past resonance in super-critical centrifuges. The real kicker is the report on carbon composite design at 600m/sec. This plus 10x indicates 30 to 40 SWU/yr super-critical. All orders after 2005 which were tendered indicate bellows. So these are super-critical.The length also increased in 2006 or so. So These again indicate longer balti. So super-critical equal to 4th or 5th generation is really good under technology denial. So we have had super-critical tests since 1992. 2008 is possibly when these have become extremely stable and one or two generations behind T21. But T21 hasn't been deployed in industrial scale except one plant. Even Urenco has hinted they will not have a new generation in another 10 years but will work on T21 to make incremental gains.



Russia is going for Generation 9 devices. These are super-critical in 2009. The Russians have adopted super-critical and sub-critical centrifuges. They operated sub-critical in large numbers due to cheaper production costs and the ease of using large numbers for civil nuclear activity until 2010. Most of this sub-critical stuff is possibly on sale. However our interest is possibly in Gen-9 which the Russians are reluctant to part with as even they have not deployed them in numbers. To be clear Russia had produced super-critical centrifuges in 1959 or so. However it's been reserved for certain uses not mass enrichment of feed stock for nuclear reactors. The capacity after smart II (1993?) was vacant so they even used the tail stock at some stage to get 0.7% uranium and export it as natural uranium. Even their Gen 9 units are not completely carbon fiber. It's carbon reinforced metal to make manufacturing cheaper and easier. This is how they work. Mass produce cheaper to get more units.



China has 2 million SWU(?) and is adding another 3.5 million SWU by 2020. They were given Gen 5 Russian units in 1990. The generation is not very clear though and open literature does not confirm the design transferred.



Areva, Urenco, Usec, and Tenex are the major western suppliers. Hitachi-GE will likely get approval in 30 months when the Russia-USA HEU pact ends in 2013. They will be a force to recon with and possibly the cheapest LEU supplier in the entire world. They will produce 2-3 million SWU by 2020 at current plans. 80 million SWU is the estimated global supply in 2020. The current world supply is close to 40 million SWU. So our goal has just shifted. Laser enrichment is possible on industrial scale. We need to get there to stay competitive.

[osman]

Chitradurga could of course be used to produce slightly enriched uranium (SEU) with about 1.1 per cent U-235 content to fuel our pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) units which would boost the fuel burn-up to as much as 20000 MWd/tonne.



Chitradurga will come a little later, not immediately. Our Ratnahalli plant capacity has been enhanced. But more than that, there is significant improvement in our technology. Usually, a term called Separating Work Units (SWUs) defines the technology level that we have achieved in this, and I can assure you that there has been considerable improvement in SWUs of our next generation caskets of centrifuges. The separating capacity of our centrifuges has improved. So total capacity enhancement at Ratnahalli has been done. We are confident of supplying the entire fuel for the set of….



You cannot say anymore that India does not have enrichment technology. India has its own technology and we can produce [enriched uranium]. We have not started doing it for large-scale commercial nuclear power stations, which require a much larger quantity of enriched uranium. We will be able to do that once we go to Chitradurga.



Taking this forward. Russians used sub-critical centrifuges for the most part up until 2010. Their philosophy was different to Urenco which wanted more SWU/yr and pushed into more expensive but more reliable carbon fiber deigns. The Russians had super-critical centrifuges from 1959 if I am not mistaken. They however used sub-critical for mass production of reactor feed. The Russians have followed this path even today. Their 2010 Super-Critical designs are still not carbon fiber only. They use metal enclosed in carbon fiber. This will help mass production, keep the costs low. So any damaged centrifuges are cheaper to replace instead of higher reliability.



If we really go with the Russian design philosophy we might have the older generation centrifuges in Chitradurga. Or we might move some of the older generation centrifuges to Chitradurga and add a mixed blend of super-critical cascades too. Our orders for the centrifuges in 2005 were for machine crafted components with bellows. These bellows indicate super-critical centrifuges. It might also make sense to give follow-on orders to these folks for the new plant given their investment to meet our initial orders. These are super-critical as well. So Chitradurga might have 20 SWU/yr units older units being moved out of RMP as well. Some carbon-fiber units might be placed there as well. carbon-fiber units are more expensive and initially I think we might just want industrial scale mass movement of SEU out of Chitradurga just like the Russians. Cutting edge isn't the concern. Getting a lot of SEU out is. So it's interesting. These older units may well be replaced if they wear out with newer ones as and when this happens and it might be cheaper given the already existing supply chain as of 2005/2006.



Of course as always these are extrapolations based on the Russian path. I am not sure what the Indian path is to SEU on a large scale. However the indications are we want cheap industrial scale civil capacity. This might well be the economical route for us. So this is a civil facility for all intends and purposes and will serve the civil program. It's out of safeguards to prevent estimates of our nuclear weapons program in numbers and the submarines planned. It's also likely that we don't want the world to see the technology used in these plants. It might looks like some other centrifuges. These designs are possibly different from the Urenco ones or quiet close to them. There may be some unique twists in our centrifuges which make them more reliable or cheaper to produce or both. So this should set those inquisitive minds at ease as to the Chitradurga being for nukes. I don't think this is for the strategic program.



We also can glean from this that RMP centrifuges have undergone a SWU enhancements and additional centrifuges. So numbers and technology So those old unit's are likely headed to Chitradurga with additional new units of unknown technology and generation. Interesting. I have tried to connect the dots. As always any mistakes are mine. I have combined two news reports to get to the base. The person who gave these interviews is the same. So this should serve as a good tea leaf read to help arrive at the capacity.



Maybe the RMP estimates are at the lower end if this numbers and technology upgrade is considered. If our nuclear weapons program isn't really HEU based this can only mean one thing ... We don't know if it is HEU dependent ...

[osman]

1KG of 30% to 40% HEU will require 90 SWU/year assuming tail out at 0.25% U235 and 0.7% NU. Airhant is said to use this 30 to 40% maal. For every 100,000 SWU you get approximately 1 ton of Arihant fuel per year.



Assuming Airhant is rated at 50,000 shp or slightly less it will require 160Kg of fuel for 10 years. (Note this higher rating is being used to provide an upper bound as much fuel as possible as opposed to an indication of real shp.) Even providing for exceptional extra maneuvering of the American variety it's 300kg of 40% HEU as fuel for 10 years. This assumes the nuclear core will last 10 years.



The largest estimate I have seen calls for 4 SSBNs and 9 SSNs. That's approximately 7 tons of fuel required over 10 years assuming a production rate of more than 1 submarine a year over 10 years.



For 90% HEU used in thermonuclear weapons it will require 210 SWU/year assuming tail out at 0.25% U235 and 0.7% NU. If it's only weapons production it's 571kg of 90% HEU. Modern thermonuclear weapons require a few tens of kgs of HEU. 5kg is a realistic estimate for the trigger and a bit on the upper end. The blanket used in Russian and American devices is also HEU. 25Kg of HEU was common in Russian devices. Depleted uranium can also be used as blanket. Using HEU as blanket will increase the explosive yield of a thermonuclear device.



When the new RMP facility comes up with 300,000 to 400,000 SWU/yr assuming 30 SWU/yr centrifuges are used. That's four tons 40% HEU of Arihant fuel a year or 1.5 tons of 90% HEU. Even on the lower end with the estimates released as of 2007 the RMP can produce 30,000 SWU/yr. Assuming a modest doubling in 2010 as reported it's 60,000 SWU/yr.



That's not all for submarines. So the only way to reconcile these numbers is to assume the rest are for thermonuclear weapons.



2.8 TN weapons a year assuming 25kg of 90% HEU with a 90% HEU blanket or 14.2 TN weapons a year assuming 5kg of 90% HEU and Depleted uranium blankets per 30,000 SWU/yr of operation and one new Arihant nuclear fuel load assuming american standards of propulsion per 30,000 SWU/yr. (Russian standard is half the requirement). Total SWU/yr being 60,000 SWU/yr.



At the higher end of the estimate with reductions for margin of safety on processing losses its:



22.4 TN weapons a year assuming 25kg of 90% HEU with a 90% HEU blanket or 113.6 TN weapons a year assuming 5kg of 90% HEU and Depleted uranium blankets for 290,000 SWU/yr of operation and one new Arihant nuclear fuel load assuming american standards of propulsion per 30,000 SWU/yr. (Russian standard is half the requirement). Total SWU/yr being 300,000 SWU/yr.



Of-course when the RMP doubling is completed these figures hold true. The estimates also assume we are at TC11 standards of 30 SWU/yr in centrifuges and this is the centrifuge used in doubling and not the earlier 20 SWU/yr centrifuge. Western analysts are not going to accept my jingo estimates. I am not worried about them. This also assumes the dimensions of our centrifuges are equal to urenco ones. We don't have any confirmation on this and we will never get it. So it's very uncertain analysis. Everyone can do it. Anyone whose business it is is doing this.



I thought a long time before posting this. If I can estimate this from the information in hindu, frontline and other online publications anyone else who needs to know has this information has this information. The estimates for further accuracy will be using software which has uncertainty analysis(I don't have the time for that so I have made back of the envelope calculations).

[osman]

Key take away from the above information is we have Thermonuclear weapons. We are weaponizing them in spite of 2008 nuclear deal's aim to cap. This is the key takeaway. We are building a first world nuclear arsenal not a third world one. I can see why US and other powers are desperate and moved to an ENR cap in 2011. It's to tie us down strategically with a nuclear supply umbilical cord. They had all this information in June 2011 before the ENR change was made. All the sources I have quoted are pre 2011. We may however still need to test to get this arsenal of Thermonuclear weapons.

[Arun_S]

I fail to see the logic that creating infrastructure for 90% HEU stockpile means India has TNW? If it was that simple our birathers would have claimed TNW 20 years ago. And NoKo and Iran will not far behind.



Yes ENR is a threat and stockpiling has been in full swing.



Not sure how you calculated Arihant's fuel requirement estimate. Please elaborate. The 160 Kg for 10 years of use seems too miniscule. Arihant's power plant should be assumed to be 190 MW thermal.



One problem that few talk about is Arihant is a toothless white elephant given that India does not have nukes that can go into the sub without endangering lives of the crew. Submarine based high yield FBF weapons as well as TNW require large stockpile/inventory of super grade pu. Apart from requiring a TNW design that is credible to potential detractors. Thanks to Chidambram, BARC weapons coffers are full of empty TNW boasts. One may ask what is R Chidambram doing at PMO at this ripe age (76 yr) where mental faculties are at best suspect if not already withered?