08-13-2010, 08:30 AM
Arunji,
Read the page linked below:
http://translate.google.co.in/translate?...IN381IN383
It is a history of development of the current generation of China's strategic weapons. I will point out some thoughts:
1. We seem to be 10-11 yrs behind China as far as missiles go: the DF-31 apparently had its first success only in 2000 (though it was on a parade at Tiananmen in 1999). Our Agni V seems to be an analog of DF-31, same 2m dia, three stage maybe similar capability but currently forced to have heavier payload. This is an achievement given that we started only in 1998 while China's DF-31 started development in 1986.
2. Regarding weapons, they talk of boosted fission primaries using both LiD (for earlier heavy weapons) and using gas boosting. The latter took them some tests to perfect. They also developed advanced non-spherical gas-boosted primary by Sep 1992.
3. Bharat Karnad talks about LiD boosted spherical primaries in his book (about 40kt yield, suposed to be a straightforward dev. from pure fission device). The S-1 primary, however, going by your account, seems to be an advanced non-spherical gas boosted primary. This part worked very well for us.
4. In all such literature that I read, a miniaturized primary is portrayed as the hardest part to develop. This is interesting.
5. In that case, 2-3 more tests of the corrected S-1 (which may already be entering service though untested) would fix any remaining bugs and leave us with a TN on par with anything anyone has (as far as sophistication goes).
6. I have calculated that though the nuke deal is constraining, this is a psychological constraint: the cost we pay under this deal for testing is not as much as RC-MMS etc would have us believe: at least for the next 15 yrs, nuke power from reactors connected with this deal (even if it reaches 20000 MW by 2020, which is doubtful given how things move in Bharat) would not exceed 5% of our power generation capacity.
7. The price for testing at say, 2017 would be precisely this: reduction of power generation capacity to what it was in 2016 and restoration through coal etc of status quo by 2018 as far as power supply is concerned. This is miniscule. I put this argument before a recently retired BARC scientist whom I know, and he agreed with these estimates.
8. The price to pay for testing would be much steeper only if we purchase large quantities of conventional military equipment from the U.S. especially, if we agree to the F-16/F-18 for MMRCA. Even then, it would be worth it. If we have to starve conventional forces again for the sake of strategic forces, that should be done.
Read the page linked below:
http://translate.google.co.in/translate?...IN381IN383
It is a history of development of the current generation of China's strategic weapons. I will point out some thoughts:
1. We seem to be 10-11 yrs behind China as far as missiles go: the DF-31 apparently had its first success only in 2000 (though it was on a parade at Tiananmen in 1999). Our Agni V seems to be an analog of DF-31, same 2m dia, three stage maybe similar capability but currently forced to have heavier payload. This is an achievement given that we started only in 1998 while China's DF-31 started development in 1986.
2. Regarding weapons, they talk of boosted fission primaries using both LiD (for earlier heavy weapons) and using gas boosting. The latter took them some tests to perfect. They also developed advanced non-spherical gas-boosted primary by Sep 1992.
3. Bharat Karnad talks about LiD boosted spherical primaries in his book (about 40kt yield, suposed to be a straightforward dev. from pure fission device). The S-1 primary, however, going by your account, seems to be an advanced non-spherical gas boosted primary. This part worked very well for us.
4. In all such literature that I read, a miniaturized primary is portrayed as the hardest part to develop. This is interesting.
5. In that case, 2-3 more tests of the corrected S-1 (which may already be entering service though untested) would fix any remaining bugs and leave us with a TN on par with anything anyone has (as far as sophistication goes).
6. I have calculated that though the nuke deal is constraining, this is a psychological constraint: the cost we pay under this deal for testing is not as much as RC-MMS etc would have us believe: at least for the next 15 yrs, nuke power from reactors connected with this deal (even if it reaches 20000 MW by 2020, which is doubtful given how things move in Bharat) would not exceed 5% of our power generation capacity.
7. The price for testing at say, 2017 would be precisely this: reduction of power generation capacity to what it was in 2016 and restoration through coal etc of status quo by 2018 as far as power supply is concerned. This is miniscule. I put this argument before a recently retired BARC scientist whom I know, and he agreed with these estimates.
8. The price to pay for testing would be much steeper only if we purchase large quantities of conventional military equipment from the U.S. especially, if we agree to the F-16/F-18 for MMRCA. Even then, it would be worth it. If we have to starve conventional forces again for the sake of strategic forces, that should be done.