Twirp : Terrorist Wahabi Islamic Republic Pakistan 3

[Naresh]

This Article – in part – confirms my apprehension of the Taliban taking over and controlling the Pakistani Army as per my above statement Posted Today, 22-02-2009, 12:23 AM

<b>Limited capabilities : The future of the armed forces</b>

<i>The Pakistan Army will be plagued by decreased professionalism and an ongoing dependency on US and Chinese intervention.</i>

IN the past year or so, different American think tanks and research organizations have been trying to evaluate the future of the Pakistan military, an organization that is critical in the war against terror. Globally, governments are keen to know and predict what kind of management and which ideology will shape the thinking and planning of the officer cadre of Pakistan’s armed forces. The questions asked from anyone who has done some work on Pakistan’s military relate to the future stars of the military and their social background. Such research, as indicated earlier, is linked with the concern that a nuclear-weapons equipped military must not go the route it had traversed under its former army chief, General Ziaul Haq. <b>There is also the understanding that a large number of junior and middle-ranking officers, as opposed to the higher ranks, have become ideologically conservative, even bordering on being sympathetic to the Talibaan.</b> But is this assessment correct? More important, what is the future of Pakistan’s armed forces in terms of the dominant ideology, capabilities, and political ambitions?

In terms of the organization’s dominant ideology, one popular argument is that the military remains the only stable secular institution in the country and that the Zia period denotes an anomaly which will probably not revisit the institution. The nine-year reign of former General Pervez Musharraf witnessed the cleaning up of religious extremist elements. However, it is incorrect to categorize the military as secular or Islamic. The religious or secular flavours are part of the larger national ideology defined by the military itself. There are times when even the most seemingly secular generals have partnered with the militants to fulfill the military’s strategic goals in pursuance of the national ideology. These strategic interests seem to have influenced the junior officers. However, the senior management is not likely to abandon their style, popularly known as strategic pragmatism. This goes hand in hand with the reality that the senior echelons are not likely to turn obviously fundamentalist à la General Zia as it does not favor the organisation’s partnership with the US, a country considered critical for the military and the country.

The relationship with the US will remain significant less for technological reasons and more for the larger interests of the organisation and political reasons. The access to quality training of the officer cadre in the US and exposure to western military concepts, including technology and financial resources, are reasons for the continued links between the American and Pakistani militaries. The link is also critical due to the Pakistan armed force’s increasing dependence on the US to fight the war on terror. The military has reduced capacity to fight insurgency operations, which increases its dependence on American intervention, especially to fight the war in the tribal areas. But this does not necessarily mean major weapon systems for which the military is increasingly looking at China and Europe. The Pakistan Air Force, for instance, will increasingly have lesser options and would increase its technological linkages with Beijing. <b>Given the shortcomings of Chinese weapons technology, this also means that while the Pakistan military would remain a medium-sized military power, it will face increasing constraints in beefing up its conventional capabilities, especially in qualitative terms.</b>

This pattern, nonetheless, is not common amongst all three services. The Pakistan Navy, which will continue to play an insignificant role in national strategic planning, will continue with its dependence on western equipment along with diversifying through procuring some Chinese technology. Problems of erroneous planning and corruption within the military are some of the reasons for the lack of efficient weapons procurement policy.

The more important factor is the mediocrity in planning and generalship, a problem that has been the military’s fate for very long. The lack of capacity in planning also emanates from the fact that the army, which is the largest service of the armed forces, allocates less time on professional work and more on power politics. <b>Thus the claim that the military is professional hardly means anything considering that successive generals have launched military misadventures to win wars and battles.</b>

Part of the problem of compromised professionalism lies in the military’s inability to structure military decision-making and the organisation at large. The current organisational structure does not respond well to integrating the conventional and the nuclear. One popular argument is that the organisational deficiencies exist because of the weak civilian control of the armed forces. Enhancing civilian control of the military is a pipedream which might not come true, primarily because the military has emerged as an autonomous organisation that jealously guards its capacity to remain a powerful player in the country. <b>In fact, it will not be an exaggeration to argue that, in Pakistan, the military is the state rather than being a parallel state as authors such as Mazhar Aziz have stated. It will continue to play a dominant role in politics, society and economy in the foreseeable future. Despite the re-introduction of democracy in February 2008, the chances of the military re-asserting itself in politics in the future remain high.</b>

The military’s continued involvement in politics has another downside as well – it would further erode professional management at the top. The service chief, especially from the army, is selected on political grounds. In any case, it is a rarity for the selection of service chiefs, especially the army chief, to be based on the principle of seniority. Such problems influence the military’s performance and professionalism in the long run. <b>So, despite the claims by the present army chief, General Ashfaq Kiyani, that the military can face any challenges, the organisation’s capability to counter internal and external threats remains limited.</b>

<i>Dr.Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent security analyst and strategic affairs columnist for Dawn. She obtained her Doctorate from King's College London in 1996 and held the 'Pakistan Scholar' chair at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars from 2004-2005. Her most recent book, Military Inc. was released in 2007 and is considered one of the foremost academic works on the Pakistani defense establishment.</i>

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->