• 0 Vote(s) - 0 Average
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
Nuclear Thread - 4
Two major event -

Failure of intelligence
Kerry and Pelosi was in China.
China had sent message to US.
North Korea fired another missile.
They are enjoying new freedom. <!--emo&Big Grin--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->
'Indo-US fuel reprocessing agreement by August 2010'

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The US expects to reach an agreement with India on reprocessing of fuel by August of next year, Ellen Tauscher, nominated by President Barack Obama as the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, informed lawmakers today.

"We expect to complete negotiations with India and reach agreement on reprocessing related arrangements and procedures within the 12 months time period allowed for negotiations as set forth in Article 6(iii) (of the 123 agreement)," Tauscher said in a written statement at her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

She said on Feb 3 India requested for consultations to start on arrangements and procedures under which reprocessing or other alteration in form or content could take place.

"We have acknowledged the Indian request and have affirmed our intention to begin consultations within the six-month period referenced in Article 6(iii) i.E by August 2, 2009," she said.

Tauscher said the US administration was in the process of determining what provisions should be contained in such an agreement.

"Once we have an inter-agency agreement on a proposed text, and have consulted with the IAEA on its needs, we will forward a draft text to the Indian side for comment and will offer to open consultations on a specific date," she said. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--emo&:blink:--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/blink.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='blink.gif' /><!--endemo--> "The truth is now uncontestable. Global analysts were completely wrong in seeing the Indo-US nuclear deal as a commercial triumph for the US military-industrial complex. In India, the Left Front said the nuclear deal would make India a junior partner of the US. Yet, this was always untrue. It was always true that India would get most of its nuclear supplies from Russia and France."

<b>Exelon delays plan for Texas nuclear plant</b>
<i>Exelon postpones plan for nuclear plant in Texas over economic worries </i>
<b>G8 blocks ‘full’ nuclear trade with India </b>
Siddharth Varadarajan
Adopts rules making fuel cycle transfers conditional on NPT

New Delhi: Less than a year after the Nuclear Suppliers Group waived its export rules to allow the sale of nuclear equipment, fuel and technology to India, <b>the United States has persuaded the G8 to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items to countries which have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including India.</b>

<b>The move, which effectively negates the promise of “full” civil nuclear cooperation lying at the heart of the 2005 India-U.S. nuclear agreement, took the Indian establishment by surprise with officials unaware that the G8 was even adopting such a measure at L’Aquila, Italy.</b> That this was done at a summit in which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an invited guest is likely to add insult to injury when the full implications of the latest decision fully sink in.

The ban, buried deep within a separate G8 statement on non-proliferation, commits the eight countries to implement on a “national basis” the “useful and constructive proposals” on ways of strengthening controls on ENR items and technology “contained in the NSG’s ‘clean text’ developed at the 20 November 2008 Consultative Group meeting.”

<b>Minimum criteria</b>

Though the “clean text” is not a public document, a senior diplomat from a G8 country confirmed to The Hindu that the eight countries had agreed to certain minimum criteria — including adherence to the main instruments of nonproliferation — as a condition for the sale of equipment and technology destined for safeguarded ENR activities in a recipient country.

In the run-up to the final NSG plenary on India last September, Washington sought to get New Delhi to agree that the nuclear cartel’s rule waiver would not cover ENR transfers. But with the Indian side sticking to its guns, the NSG finally agreed to a clean exemption allowing nuclear exports of all kinds, including sensitive fuel-cycle-related items and technologies, provided they were under safeguards.

Under pressure from the Bush administration, the NSG subsequently debated new ENR rules last November but failed to evolve a consensus because of opposition from countries like Brazil, Canada and Spain to restrictions that would go beyond what the NPT itself provided for.

With consensus proving elusive during the recent June meeting of the 45-nation club, the Obama administration decided to decouple the question of ENR sales to India from the NSG process — something the latest G8 agreement on interim implementation of a national-level ban effectively does.

India’s ability to purchase nuclear fuel and reactors from the G8 or NSG countries will be unaffected by the latest ban. Unless, of course, the new decision becomes the trigger for attempts to further dilute or qualify the core bargain contained in the ‘India exception’ last year.
<b>A new challenge on the nuclear front</b>

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Siddharth Varadarajan

<i>The G8 decision on enrichment and reprocessing-related trade is a wake-up call for the Indian establishment.

The government needs to realise that the problem will not go away just because one pretends it does not exist</i>

India should have pressed its case when the Bush administration announced its intention of seeking NPT conditionality for ENR sale
It is one thing to try and spin one’s way out of domestic criticism but if the Manmohan Singh government really believes the recent G8 ban on sensitive nuclear technology sales is no big deal then the situation is much more alarming than I first thought.</b>

Two weeks before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s scheduled arrival date in New Delhi, the State Department spokesman said that the U.S. hoped India would be in a position to identify the physical sites where American companies will get to locate their multi-billion dollar nuclear reactors. <b>The final reprocessing arrangements and procedures have yet to be negotiated but the U.S. is keen to mark its territory. </b>Yet, the <b>Indian government baulks from publicly expressing its concern about the manner in which Washington is going about unilaterally seeking to alter the terms of the July 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement under which those reactors will be sold to us in the first place</b>.

<b>Not only that, senior officials who should know better have sought to downplay the significance of last week’s G8 statement on nonproliferation.</b> When reporters sought a government reaction on the interim ban the eight countries announced on enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items and technology sales to India, Pakistan and Israel, what they got were comforting but spurious arguments.

Prior to September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group — the 45-nation cartel of nuclear exporters — had a blanket ban on all nuclear sales to these three countries, currently the only ones still outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. But on September 4, 2008, the NSG agreed to the U.S. proposal to exempt India from this ban. This U.S. proposal was part of the full civil nuclear energy cooperation commitments the White House made in exchange for getting India to agree to separate its military and civilian nuclear programmes and place the latter under international safeguards.


<b> India not concerned over G8 nuclear stance </b>

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Mon, Jul 13 02:29 PM

New Delhi, July 13 (IANS) Pointing to the 'clean waiver' obtained from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), India Monday declared that it was 'not concerned over what position the G8 takes' on not transferring nuclear technology unless India signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

'We have a clean waiver from the NSG. We have an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). We are not concerned over what position the G8 takes (on nuclear commerce with India),' Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee declared during zero hour in the Rajya Sabha.

'Every individual country (that is a member of the NSG) can trade with us. Is G8 the right forum for discussing the terms of nuclear trade with India? It is not the relevant and appropriate authority.

'Therefore, we are not deeply concerned,' Mukherjee maintained, in the first public remarks by the Indian government on the G8 declaration Friday at the conclusion of its L'Aquila summit 'to curb transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology' to countries that have not signed the NPT.

'To reduce the proliferation risks associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment and technology, we welcome the progress that continues to be made by the NSG on mechanisms to strengthen controls on transfers of such enrichment and reprocessing items and technology,' the declaration said.

The declaration, however, commits these countries to implement on a 'national basis' the 'useful and constructive proposals' on ways of strengthening controls on ENR items and technology 'contained in the NSG's 'clean text' developed at the 20 November 2008 Consultative Group meeting'.

The declaration at the end of the G8 summit, which was also attended by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, called upon all countries to sign the NPT while deciding to step up efforts for a swift conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The message, according to observers, was aimed at India - the only NPT holdout at the summit.

The NSG, the global grouping that controls international nuclear trade, made an exception for India Sep 6, 2008 by rewriting its rules to allow the nuclear suppliers to resume civil nuclear business with New Delhi after a gap of 34 years.

With India insisting on 'clean and unconditional waiver', including its right of access to the ENR technolgy, the NSG, while granting the waiver, had stated that 'participating governments may transfer nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities'.

Raising the G8 resolution during zero hour, Najma Heptullah (of the Bharatiya Janata Party) asked whether India had been consulted before it was passed.

'If not, then India's sensitivities are being ignored. India is being subjected to additional conditionalities that are not acceptable. The prime minister had said in this house that we would get a full waiver. Full means full.

'The matter is very serious and that is why we are raising it in the house. The government should clarify,' Heptullah added.

Deputy Chairman K. Rahman Khan did not agree with her.

'It is for the government to say. I can't ask the government to react to what you have raised. It is for the government to react,' Khan said while the BJP and other opposition members raised a din on the issue.

'Why is the house being kept in the dark?' demanded Brinda Karat (of the Communist Party of India-Marxist), adding: 'It's not just a matter of the government. It was an assurance given to the house (that no conditions would be imposed on India).'
<b>The nuclear games begin</b>

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->As many skeptics had suspected, the 123 Agreement was not going to be the end of India's quest for recognition in the global order. Indeed, it was very clear to many, from the start, that the 123 Agreement was part of an attempt to bring India into the non-proliferation tent. Thanks to the diligent efforts of Siddharth Vardarajan (who alone superbly uncovered goings on at the G-8) it has now become clear that India's quest for nuclear recognition is far from over. <b>The recently concluded G-8 statement on non-proliferation opens up the possibility that India will be denied crucial enrichment and processing items. To be sure, it cannot be categorically concluded that India will be denied ENR. The relationship between the G-8 declaration and NSG still has to be worked out. But certainly the developments at the G-8 are worrying for India. If followed through the G-8 will make mockery of that rather simple phrase "full civilian and nuclear cooperation."</b>

There is no doubt that there is great pressure to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. India will be under great pressure not just to sign the CTBT, but the NPT and FMCT as well. But the simple fact is that while non-proliferation and even possible disarmament is gaining greater ideological legitimacy, there is still no sign that the existing nuclear powers are willing to give up their special privileges and perpetuate a nuclear order that is patently discriminatory. While the US and Russia have been talking about significant reduction in their arsenals, the simple fact is that the great powers are still a long way off from delegitimising nuclear weapons as part of their strategic doctrines. <b>None of them will be willing to go by the International Court of Justice's suggestion that the mere threat of nuclear weapons be regarded as a crime against humanity. And Britain and France, let alone China are still modernising their arsenals. It is very difficult not to shake of the view that all the current talk of non-proliferation and disarmament will do nothing to alter the structure of discrimination in the international order that led to proliferation in the first place.
To be very honest, India does need a far reaching domestic debate on its nuclear programme: both the civilian and military aspects. As often happens in our discourse, we convert a means into an end. The 123 Agreement was supposed to be an instrument that enabled our nuclear programme to be recognised and for it to flourish. But we have to be very clear about what our own expectations from our nuclear programme are, and the sort of resources we are willing to commit to it. Is the civilian programme merely about energy or is it also about potentially being a technological leader? If so, what impact does the G-8 position on ENR have on our research ambitions? On the military side, we need clarity over the conditions under which signing the CTBT or FMCT will have little or no impact on our deterrence capabilities.

The only circumstances under which it makes sense for India to sign these treaties is if there is a clear path to global disarmament. In fact, that could be made more than a mere promissory note. The validity of these treaties could be made conditional on concrete steps towards disarmament. If those steps are not met, the treaties become null and void. The possibility of this happening is remote. But it will at least call the bluff of major powers who still want to use the nuclear issue to maintain a hierarchical and discriminatory world order.

<b>The Obama Administration is once again dominated by traditional non-proliferation types; there are efforts underway to ensure that only a few countries can participate and control the fuel cycle. India's position in the global nuclear order is not as unambiguously accepted as we pretend after the 123 Agreement. We will once again need to be diligent and clear headed about what we want and how to get it.</b>
<b>The US may have no nuclear trade with India</b><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->But the latest indication from Washington is that the US may not be interested in supplying nuclear material and reactors to India under the new dispensation. This is emerging as a matter of policy as well as a practical measure. President Obama does not want to stand in the way of the implementation of the 123 Agreement, but he is sensitive to the criticism that he is willing to dilute his commitment to non-proliferation for the sake of commercial advantages.

He has, therefore, embarked on a path to do the minimum necessary to let the deal run its course without the US itself contributing to the growth of the nuclear strength of India. He wishes to remain committed to the universalisation of the NPT, while pursuing the vision of a nuclear weapon free world in the long term.

The new men and women in charge of non-proliferation in Washington do believe that the nuclear deal is not in the interest of non-proliferation and they want to curb it to the extent possible without appearing to back off from it.

The US is also reconciled to Russia and France supplying fuel and equipment under the terms of the NSG waiver. It may not be averse to indirect participation in the French deals, if such opportunities arise, but it is gradually preparing the industry to close their options to open nuclear trade with India.

The compensation that the US expects is in terms of defence deals with India, which have as much potential, if not more, for job creation and overall growth in trade. The US has, therefore, been diligent about pursuing the end user agreement, without which defence deals would not be possible under the US laws.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Babus and politicians who had taken bribe, Now my question, which India's estate they will sell to US?
For babus, next round of bribe through defense deals.
<b>India receives uranium for Kudankulam second unit</b><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->India has received the first consignment of uranium for the second unit of the 2,000-MW Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project in Tamil Nadu <b>from Russia</b>, a top official of the project developer has said.
"This is the first consignment of the light enriched uranium for the second unit of the Kudankulam project. Several more consignments of the fuel will come from Russia for the project," SK Jain, chairman and managing director of Nuclear Power Corp of India Ltd (NPCIL), told IANS from Mumbai on phone.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
K. Santhanam the foremr test site director of POKII has told TOI that the Shakti I did not work per expectations.
<b>No CTBT, India needs more nuclear tests: Pokhran II coordinator
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->A former top official who coordinated India's nuclear weapons programme has cautioned that India should not be "railroaded" into signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as the 1998 Pokhran tests were not sufficient from the security point of view.

<b>"We can't get into a stampede to sign CTBT. We should conduct more nuclear tests which are necessary from the point of view of security," K. Santhanam </b>told IANS here.

"We should not get railroaded into signing the CTBT," Santhanam said when asked about reports of the US pressuring India to sign the CTBT and fresh efforts by the Obama administration to revive non-proliferation activism.

Santhanam, a former official with the Defence Research and Development Organisation, said that the thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb tests - <b>the first and most powerful of the three tests conducted on May 11, 1998 - did not produce the desired yield.</b>

Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) chief R. Chidambaram is on record as saying that the bombs yield was 45 kilotons (45,000 tonnes of conventional explosive).

Santhanam's remarks are set to create a flutter in the non-proliferation establishment in the US and may raise doubts about the future of the India-US nuclear deal which will unravel if New Delhi were to test again.

Santhanam's assessment is set to bolster India's opposition to signing the CTBT - an issue that may figure in the discussions when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh goes to the US in November. India has opposed CTBT on grounds that it is discriminatory and tends to divide the world into the nuclear haves and have-nots. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-ramana+Aug 27 2009, 02:45 AM-->QUOTE(ramana @ Aug 27 2009, 02:45 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->K. Santhanam the foremr test site director of POKII has told TOI that the Shakti I did not work per expectations.
Say Thanks to some NRI-desi who are doing Gods job abroad <!--emo&Big Grin--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo--> .
<b>US nuclear gurus see signs of more Indian nuclear tests</b>

Say thanks again, meeting God's foot solider was amazing and eye-opening. <!--emo&Big Grin--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->
<b>Pokhran II row: Sethna slams Kalam, Iyenger says nuclear test done in haste</b><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Homi Sethna, a former top atomic boss, on Tuesday waded into the 1998 Pokhran row when he backed ex-DRDO scientist K Santhanam's assessment that the nuclear test was not a full success and slammed former President APJ Abdul Kalam for rubbishing the claim.
"I fully support Santhanam and I stand by his statement that India needs more nuke tests to be conducted ," Sethna, the guiding force behind India's first nuclear test in 1974, told PTI.

Sethna now in his eighties suggested that Kalam, who was heading the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) when Santhanam was coordinating Pokhran-II, suggested that the missile man was no qualified authority to rubbish his former colleague's claim.

Simultaneously, another former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) P K Iyengar alleged that the 1998 tests were done in haste at the bidding of the government of the day. A BJP-led NDA government headed by Atal Behari Vajpayee had just assumed office when India conducted the tests.

The comments by Sethna, who was the AEC chairman in 1974 came notwithstanding Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Kalam setting at rest the controversy over the 1998 nuclear tests.

<b>Kalam said the only thermonuclear device (hydrogen bomb) tested produced the "desired yield".</b>

But Sethna said "former president APJ Abdul Kalam was not a scientist and Santhanam is a physicist and he knew what he was talking.

<b>"What does Kalam understand about physics. He can say anything as he was the President and a politician?."</b>

"What Santhanam said was absolutely correct," he added.

<b>"What did he (Kalam) know about extracting, making explosive grade? He didn't know a thing.</b> By being a president he appeared to wear the stature. He relied on atomic energy to gain additional stature," said Sethna about Kalam while talking to a TV channel.

<b>"I don't like politicians to interfere specially lay politicians to interfere any more. I firmly believe that they should stay out. When we did the test... The first test there was no politician. It was a raw one. We were lucky that the whole thing collapsed," </b>said Sethna, who in his days in the atomic establishment had the reputation of being a blunt, plainspeaking organisational leader.

<b>Kalam had on August 27 said Pokhran II was a success rubbishing Santhanam's claim that the tests were a "fizzle".</b>

Iyengar, who was among the three top atomic scientists who oversaw the 1974 tests, has already shared Santhanam's assessment and questioned official claims of success.

<b>Iyengar suggested that in March 1998, two months before Pokhran-II, India's intelligence must have found out that the Pakistanis were about to test and that they were serious.

"Therfore, they (the new government in India) asked these people (scientists) to hurry up, do as fast as possible in all this extra pressure to be one up politically because BJP had just come to power," he said.

"If Pakistan fired an explosion before India what a common man in India would have thought," Iyengar added.</b>

The Principal Scientific advisor of Government of India Dr R Chidambaram, who led the team of scientists for Pokhran-II, denied Santhanam's statement and said he had to explain scientifically why the tests were not fully successful.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Congress stooges are trying to take credit from BJP, when BJP is busy with its infighting.
<!--QuoteBegin-ramana+Aug 27 2009, 02:45 AM-->QUOTE(ramana @ Aug 27 2009, 02:45 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->K. Santhanam the foremr test site director of POKII has told TOI that the Shakti I did not work per expectations.

Concentrate only on Canada and France, rest all are dud.

Will talk to u later.
Will call you later.
The way out is for India to solidly have France and Russia on its side by giving them special access to Indian market, military and nuclear plants/fuel purchase.

With that India can do what is necessary to preserve option to test and prove TN warheads before deciding to give any commitment on CTBT.

Now testing will mean US will not have any further nuclear business w/India, but the deal with NSG will stay intact as long as we have Russia, French on our side. Chacha can take a hike.


Next four years chacha will be busy with small budding N-powers. France is best option for India. China will shout from roof top.

US is out of Nuclear business after Gipper days. How many Universities are offering degree in Nuclear Sc in US ?
How many Labs are doing studies in Nukes?
Majority of funding is now dedicated to Yucca Mountain.

this year they have reduced programme and majority will go for Green stuff or cleaning/clearing existing waste.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->DOE funded 71 university-led research and development proposals worth approximately <b>$44 million</b> in fiscal year 2009. It also provided approximately <b>$6 million in infrastructure and equipment grants </b>to U.S. universities and colleges, and nearly<b> $3 million in scholarships and fellowships to students in nuclear-related fields.</b> Similar funding is planned for FY 2010<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Tiny budget.
India should work with France and follow their strategy by making all Nuclear plant with same design, unlike US.


Forum Jump:

Users browsing this thread: 1 Guest(s)