Nuclear Thread - 3

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<b>Nuclear politics </b>
By S Viswam

External affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee’s White House interaction with US President George W. Bush has neither improved the prospects of a conclusion to the India-US nuclear deal nor caused it a setback. <b>It has only helped reinforce the stalemate that existed before the minister’s first bilateral visit to Washington.</b>

The external affairs ministry can claim Mukherjee’s visit as a success since <b>he has managed to buy some more time, a few months, perhaps, before determining whether the deal goes ahead or falls through</b>. Though pressed for time, Washington has appreciated Mr Mukherjee’s explanation for the delay on India’s part in operationalising the deal. The White House has gone out of its way to make a concession to India by taking the position that the present is not yet a “now or never” situation.

The Bush administration seems to place a heavier reliance than the Indian political class and public opinion on the <b>UPA government’s capability to bring about “national consensus” on the deal</b>. Mukherjee harped on the imperative of such a consensus in his talks with both President Bush and secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and sounded optimistic on achieving that end. Interestingly, <b>Mukherjee identified the Left parties that support the government from outside as well as the BJP as the “sections” of the political class that are impeding the consensus</b>. <b>Mukherjee did not elaborate on the qualitative differences in the opposition of the BJP and the Left to the deal, nor did he specifically hint that the UPA would initiate talks with the BJP to bring about consensus. </b>

<b>The differences have significant political connotations for the White House. </b><b>The Left is opposed to the deal since it involves the United States, and not because the deal is per se flawed or is inimical to India’s long-term strategic or security interests. </b>

The Left has said that it will have no reservations on a nuclear energy deal negotiated by India with Russia, China or France. The Left resents the US as India’s partner, but has no such resentment against China for partnering a similar deal with Washington.

The BJP, on the other hand, is not allergic at all to the US but wants some lacunae in the deal to be rectified. In other words, the BJP would like the terms of the deal modified to satisfy the party’s views on India’s strategic independence.

The government position till now has been that once the Left’s resistance is broken, other parties, including the BJP, will either fall in line or be persuaded to agree to the firming up of the deal. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s appeal to BJP leader Atal Behari Vajpayee a couple of weeks ago to convince his party of the merits of the deal fits into this hope. Clearly, the UPA does not visualise the kind of tough and uncompromising opposition to the deal from the BJP as it has encountered with the Left. <b>The Left’s position is inflexible, the BJP position is flexible. </b>

<b>It is not without significance that Mukherjee spoke of the possibility of a regime change at the Centre after the 2009 elections.</b> He hinted that it could well be a government headed by the BJP that would be required to honour the nuclear deal agreement in case the UPA rushed to conclude it before the polls. However, in a not so subtle hint to the BJP and the Left, the minister pointed out that “if the deal is subsequently not honoured by the next government it would lead to an embarrassing situation for the country.”

Implicit in that remark was a warning to the Left that if the deal is not finalised during the UPA’s tenure, it could be taken up for conclusion by the next government where the Left may have no role to play.

The important outcome of Mukherjee’s US visit is that the focus has shifted even farther away from the deal than before and beamed it on the 2009 elections. One cannot speculate the basis of Mukherjee’s confidence over creating a national consensus over the deal.

He has suggested that it is not a question of the UPA having to choose between the deal and the government. Since he has bought extra time from Washington to “work on the consensus-making process”, the need for such a choice is irrelevant because regardless of whether the deal dies or goes through, elections are to be held before May-end 2009.

<b>There is a sense of smug satisfaction in the Congress and UPA circles that the nuclear deal stalemate is being prolonged without creating a crisis </b>wherein the Left would be forced to withdraw support, and, in the process, precipitate elections ahead of May-end 2009. The Communists are presently away from the national capital attending the CPI(M) and CPI party meets, but they have no reason for a rethink on their positions following the Mukherjee-Bush-Rice meeting. The Left’s position remains unaltered.

The Left must be wondering why Mukherjee is still harping on evolving “national consensus” when he has failed to break the logjam with them. They would be justified in thinking that all Mukherjee was interested in was to secure more time for taking a final decision on the deal. The Congress and its UPA partners are definitely interested in ensuring that the Left is not given a chance to withdraw support. <b>However, Mr Mukherjee’s comments imply that the Congress and the UPA would be reconciled to the eventual collapse of the deal because of Left opposition</b>.

He admitted that the negotiating process with the Left was “time-consuming” and “taxing our patience”. His suggestion here is that there will definitely be an end to patience and that the negotiations will be dropped. There would then be no question of withdrawal or continuance of support and elections would be held as scheduled. However, national attention has already shifted away from the deal. It can be said that the nation is already on the election mode. A significant input to the creation of an election-oriented atmosphere has come from L.K. Advani, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the BJP’s officially nominated prime ministerial candidate. Mr Advani has taken the newly-assigned role quite seriously; he is going door-to-door and city to city doing a hard-sell of his autobiography.

The formal and informal launches/releases of his book give him an opportunity to project his party’s views on topical political issues.

Some of the views have turned controversial. Such controversies suit the BJP’s political interests. They help to keep the Congress focused on Advani’s weaknesses and foibles and the gaffes committed by the NDA during his deputy prime-ministerial tenure instead of concentrating on issues that have the potential of bringing the Congress long-term electoral advantages. Advani has been shrewd enough to choose specific chapters from his book for specific occasions hoping that the Congress would avidly pick holes and blow up the NDA’s negative points. The strategy is obviously succeeding. Probably, the book’s sale is also going up in tandem with the progress of the controversies.