06-22-2007, 05:17 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->SCENARIO: Pakistan after Musharraf  FT.com
<b>A democratic âmomentâ? </b>
Dr Ayesha Siddiqa
One thing is clear from a study of Pakistani politics and the military: no substantive change can happen unless there is a change in the leadership of the country. The control of the elite cannot produce better results than what we witnessed during Musharraf's periodÂ
When I heard the news of General Zia-ul Haqâs death in the mysterious plane crash in August 1988, like many others I could not believe that a decisive change had taken place. Today, in June 2007, it is difficult for me to think of a Pakistan without General Pervez Musharraf.
Even so, we shall assume that the democratic movement, which began with the attempt to dismiss the Chief Justice of Pakistan, did finally manage to push General Musharraf out. Does the moment herald the dawn of a new democratic era? Do I see a substantial change in the political environment of the country?
There are two possible scenarios of what might happen. One is that âmanagedâ elections are held and a civilian government put into place, the stress on managed being important. According to the Freedom House checklist for human rights and civil liberties, presented in Charles Tillyâs latest book on democracy, one of the criterions for assessing the quality of a polity is whether the people are free from the influence of the military, religious parties, oligarchs and totalitarian leaders and whether elections are held without the influence of the these power players. Since the next elections will be held in sub-normal conditions, the military and its intelligence agencies will continue to play a significant role in the election and we will see such people and parties win that are favourable to the armed forces.
This scenario does not see clear majority for any one party. There will be a coalition government in which the likely partners will be the Pakistan Peopleâs Party, the Mutahidda Qaumi Movement, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl), Awami National Party, and elements from the Pakistan Muslim League-Q. Such a coalition will result in two possibilities: first, the country will dive into another battle between the seemingly secular, pro-West forces and anti-West ones (in reality, all parties are highly conservative and non-secular but the battle will be on a pro- versus anti-West agenda); second, a conflict which might ensue after the elections will further complicate an already bad situation and create greater problems of political stability for whoever forms the government.
It must be remembered that more than seven years of military rule have eroded the capacity of civilian institutions to perform. Combined with this incapacity will be the eagerness of the followers of different political parties to ask for rewards. Pakistanâs political system is patronage-based and followers demand rewards. This will happen post-election also. At this point, the generals will be all too delighted to show the world and the people that civilians are highly inept and cannot perform. Hence, the country will be back to the unstable political cycle of the 1990s, unless the GHQ decides to follow General Musharrafâs concept of replacing the prime minister while retaining the cabinet and the Parliament.
It is also possible that Nawaz Sharif and his brother manage to sort out their differences with the army in the next couple of years and return to rule after the post-Musharraf civilian regime has failed.
Another possible scenario, given the nature of the movement that ousted Musharraf, is that the next government will be put on the spot by the seemingly alert civil society since people will reject authoritarianism in both civilian and military garbs.
But this may not happen. Pakistan is seeing a crucial âdemocratic momentâ that could easily be lost or will pass after some cosmetic changes. Once a moment is lost, it is very difficult to regain it. Lawyers or other communities will not find it possible to come out on the streets frequently.
What is most certain is the fact that the post-Musharraf scenario does not necessarily mean any substantial reduction in the influence of the army. Numerous political parties are eager to have a convenient arrangement with the GHQ, which basically means that their leaders will make compromises on political space from the word go. Such covert negotiations carry the seed of future political instability. This is precisely what happened during the 1990s when important political parties eagerly struck secret deals with the army. In fact, the deals of the 1990s were less sinister than what will happen after Musharraf. The potential deals would be made more consciously with a fair concern for not overstepping into the domain of the armed forces.
The judiciary will also be unable to play the role it played after the reference against the chief justice. The crisis was tiring and the judiciary might want to play it safe, as in the past. Future judges might not want to take on the military and would probably be averse to a crisis similar to the one they experienced at the fag-end of Musharrafâs rule. This would allow the military again to come out as a powerful player. Musharrafâs departure has not meant the military has lost out on its cronies and clients.
This is certainly a pessimistic picture and may hopefully prove incorrect. But one thing is clear from a study of Pakistani politics and the military: no substantive change can happen unless there is a change in the leadership of the country. The control of the elite cannot produce better results than what we witnessed during Musharrafâs period.
<i>The writer is an Islamabad-based independent defence analyst. She is the
author of a book on Pakistanâs arms procurement decision-making. Her
latest book is Military Inc, Inside Pakistanâs Military Economy</i><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<b>A democratic âmomentâ? </b>
Dr Ayesha Siddiqa
One thing is clear from a study of Pakistani politics and the military: no substantive change can happen unless there is a change in the leadership of the country. The control of the elite cannot produce better results than what we witnessed during Musharraf's periodÂ
When I heard the news of General Zia-ul Haqâs death in the mysterious plane crash in August 1988, like many others I could not believe that a decisive change had taken place. Today, in June 2007, it is difficult for me to think of a Pakistan without General Pervez Musharraf.
Even so, we shall assume that the democratic movement, which began with the attempt to dismiss the Chief Justice of Pakistan, did finally manage to push General Musharraf out. Does the moment herald the dawn of a new democratic era? Do I see a substantial change in the political environment of the country?
There are two possible scenarios of what might happen. One is that âmanagedâ elections are held and a civilian government put into place, the stress on managed being important. According to the Freedom House checklist for human rights and civil liberties, presented in Charles Tillyâs latest book on democracy, one of the criterions for assessing the quality of a polity is whether the people are free from the influence of the military, religious parties, oligarchs and totalitarian leaders and whether elections are held without the influence of the these power players. Since the next elections will be held in sub-normal conditions, the military and its intelligence agencies will continue to play a significant role in the election and we will see such people and parties win that are favourable to the armed forces.
This scenario does not see clear majority for any one party. There will be a coalition government in which the likely partners will be the Pakistan Peopleâs Party, the Mutahidda Qaumi Movement, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl), Awami National Party, and elements from the Pakistan Muslim League-Q. Such a coalition will result in two possibilities: first, the country will dive into another battle between the seemingly secular, pro-West forces and anti-West ones (in reality, all parties are highly conservative and non-secular but the battle will be on a pro- versus anti-West agenda); second, a conflict which might ensue after the elections will further complicate an already bad situation and create greater problems of political stability for whoever forms the government.
It must be remembered that more than seven years of military rule have eroded the capacity of civilian institutions to perform. Combined with this incapacity will be the eagerness of the followers of different political parties to ask for rewards. Pakistanâs political system is patronage-based and followers demand rewards. This will happen post-election also. At this point, the generals will be all too delighted to show the world and the people that civilians are highly inept and cannot perform. Hence, the country will be back to the unstable political cycle of the 1990s, unless the GHQ decides to follow General Musharrafâs concept of replacing the prime minister while retaining the cabinet and the Parliament.
It is also possible that Nawaz Sharif and his brother manage to sort out their differences with the army in the next couple of years and return to rule after the post-Musharraf civilian regime has failed.
Another possible scenario, given the nature of the movement that ousted Musharraf, is that the next government will be put on the spot by the seemingly alert civil society since people will reject authoritarianism in both civilian and military garbs.
But this may not happen. Pakistan is seeing a crucial âdemocratic momentâ that could easily be lost or will pass after some cosmetic changes. Once a moment is lost, it is very difficult to regain it. Lawyers or other communities will not find it possible to come out on the streets frequently.
What is most certain is the fact that the post-Musharraf scenario does not necessarily mean any substantial reduction in the influence of the army. Numerous political parties are eager to have a convenient arrangement with the GHQ, which basically means that their leaders will make compromises on political space from the word go. Such covert negotiations carry the seed of future political instability. This is precisely what happened during the 1990s when important political parties eagerly struck secret deals with the army. In fact, the deals of the 1990s were less sinister than what will happen after Musharraf. The potential deals would be made more consciously with a fair concern for not overstepping into the domain of the armed forces.
The judiciary will also be unable to play the role it played after the reference against the chief justice. The crisis was tiring and the judiciary might want to play it safe, as in the past. Future judges might not want to take on the military and would probably be averse to a crisis similar to the one they experienced at the fag-end of Musharrafâs rule. This would allow the military again to come out as a powerful player. Musharrafâs departure has not meant the military has lost out on its cronies and clients.
This is certainly a pessimistic picture and may hopefully prove incorrect. But one thing is clear from a study of Pakistani politics and the military: no substantive change can happen unless there is a change in the leadership of the country. The control of the elite cannot produce better results than what we witnessed during Musharrafâs period.
<i>The writer is an Islamabad-based independent defence analyst. She is the
author of a book on Pakistanâs arms procurement decision-making. Her
latest book is Military Inc, Inside Pakistanâs Military Economy</i><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->