Pakistan News And Discussion-9

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>War at the cost of peace </b>
Iqbal Khattak
<b>The presence of a new Taliban commander manifests the complexity of the problem for Pakistan  </b>
   
The anti-NATO Pashtun tribes, now subsumed under the generic appellation, Taliban, may be in the process of effecting structural reorganisation of their forces in order to operate more effectively against NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan.

The plans to reorganise almost dovetail with divisions within the European Union on how to cope with the growing insurgency that has seen the Taliban resort to set-piece battles against entrenched troops instead of operating in small groups and relying on classic guerrilla hit-and-run tactic.

But as one military expert told TFT, the new and bolder style of warfare also demands more “emphasis on discipline among the Taliban to become operationally more competitive in combat environment”.

Analysts are unsure of what ‘impact’ the development in South Waziristan might have on North Waziristan where, on September 5, the government cut a deal with the Taliban. But they are concerned that renewed military activity which could be traced back to Pakistani tribal areas could bring more pressure on Pakistan from the coalition forces operating inside Afghanistan and currently facing intensified pressure from the insurgents. “Pakistan could be seen as helping and allowing the Taliban to reorganise and attack coalition troops,” says an analyst.

But as one insider pointed out, this would be a poor reading of a complex situation. “Pakistan is concerned primarily with keeping its tribal belt quiet. We have lost several hundred troops in trying to fight these people and this is one reason for taking the political route, making deals and keeping these people from attacking troops,” he says.

The situation is typified by the role currently being played by a certain ‘Mullah’ Muhammad Nazir, the new ameer (commander) of tribal militants/Taliban in South Waziristan. “Nazir is young, moderate and pro-Pakistan,” a tribal elder who met the militant commander in South Waziristan told TFT over the phone from Wana. Nazir’s background and story evinces the difficult choices Islamabad has to make.

Nazir, said to be in his 40s, was on the government’s most-wanted list and surrendered to the authorities in 2004. Interrogators declared him ‘white’ (clean and clear) and he was released in late 2004 at the time the top five commanders of the Nek Muhammad group inked a peace accord with the government in Shakai.

A source reveals that Nazir’s selection as ameer followed a visit by a high-powered Taliban jirga from Afghanistan. The jirga had come to stabilise the situation in South Waziristan where ‘bad guys’ camouflaged as Taliban were creating ‘bad blood’ between the jihadis and the local Wazir tribes. Targeted killings, say tribal elders, were tarnishing the Taliban image and their ‘increasingly unbecoming’ behaviour was driving the local population away. Except for one or two members from Pakistan’s tribal areas, all those who comprised the jirga were Afghans. Reports say it was sent by the Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar.

Sources say that the 2004 deal with the government created factions among the Taliban, largely along Pashtun and Uzbek/Arab lines. “The foreigners were not happy with the deal and there was a lot of tension,” says a local tribal leader.

This is corroborated by officials, one of whom told TFT that the government waited with some excitement a clash within the Taliban. The foreigners, especially Uzbeks, were attacking army troops and installations and also killing local tribesmen. Around 150 pro-government tribal elders have been killed since the November 2004 deal between militants and the government. Prominent among them was former senator Malik Faridullah Khan. With security forces’ returning to the barracks following that deal, local militants in general and foreign militants in particular gained much freedom to move around. Taliban commander Malik Khanan in Shakai Valley thus launched a campaign against the Uzbeks who, in response, made two unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Khanan.

The local population was getting increasingly impatient with the ‘misbehaviour’ of Uzbek militants. According to tribal sources, the Taliban jirga held extensive meetings with tribal commanders after which Mullah Nazir was ‘unanimously’ appointed the ameer of the mujahideen for South Waziristan. Two eight- and four-member committees were also constituted to “improve the public image of the Taliban”.

Under this arrangement, no decision taken by an eight-member committee can be executed without approval of another four-member committee, seen as the supreme body. This body includes Mullah Nazir, Haji Omar, Haji Bakhta Jan, a North Waziristan-based Afghan commander, and Usman, said to be an Uzbek. Under the new rules of engagement, executions cannot be carried out unless the four-member committee approves the guilty verdict passed by the eight-member committee.

The Taliban jirga also decided to dissolve two splinter groups led by one Ghulam Jan and a certain Iftikhar. A central office was opened in Wana for Mullah Nazir. A special committee was also constituted for donations.

Nazir, since taking over, has also banned the recruitment of children below the age of 18. “Children of school-going age should attend schools instead of waging jihad,” Nazir said when issuing directives after taking over the command of the Taliban.

The problem for the government is that Nazir has chalked out rules of engagement that rely on selective use of violence and also forbid the militants from attacking Pakistani troops. As one senior official put it: “The good thing about the new Taliban commander is that he avoids engaging Pakistani forces. He believes attacking Pakistani security forces is akin to attacking his own people.”

However, while Nazir has made it easier for Pakistan army and paramilitary troops, under his command the unified splinter groups make no bones about their intention to launch attacks across the border and establish a single chain of command to increase combat effectiveness.

“The problem is that if the government gets rid of Nazir, it may not be able to stop the Taliban from crossing over into Afghanistan but it would surely invite a new round of violence against own troops,” says this official, adding: “Also, this shows that the insurgency is now a Pashtun resistance against foreign troops in Afghanistan.”

Nazir is both a boon and a bane.
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