08-17-2006, 03:09 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Can of worms </b>
Pioneer.com
<i>Reopening the debate over pre-1953 status for Jammu & Kashmir will revive several issues, including the basis of Partition, says Prafull Goradia </i>
If the Government of India is proposing to reinstate the pre-1953 status of Jammu & Kashmir, it should realise the corollaries. The first one is that it should be ready to go back to the logic of Partition, which was the creation of a homeland for Muslims. Evidently, Jammu would be excluded, as should be Ladakh, which are non-Muslim areas. Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference only represented the majority of the population of the Valley.
The 'non-paper', reportedly submitted by the GoI to Islamabad, concedes that the Kashmiri Muslims had taken refuge with India from the marauders from Pakistan. Call them refugees who came with territory, or call them hapless guests who had arrived with their homes with a desire to return as soon as securely possible.
Uncannily, Article 370 of the Constitution is a temporary provision. Nationalist Indians have interpreted it all along as a clause, which was to be scrapped long before, whereas the separatists have taken it as implying a guest status. The basis of Partition was division between Muslims and non-Muslims.
The territorial vivisection was only incidental. It was also in a way unimportant to the Muslim League. Or else, there would be no sense in creating a country whose two wings were separated by a thousand miles. Had Qaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah thought it otherwise, he and his party would not have insisted on an exchange of population again and again through 1946.
Jinnah had repeatedly claimed that the League alone represented Muslims, whereas the Congress had disputed this contention. In order to ascertain the truth, Viceroy Lord Wavell ordered a general election, which was held during the winter of 1945-46. The results startled the Congress. With a single-point manifesto called Partition, the League won a landslide victory. It won all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly; while in the provincial legislatures, the victory count was 446 out of 495 Muslim seats.
Prof M Mujeeb, the late vice-chancellor of Jamia Millia Islamia, later opined in his book, Islamic Influence on Indian Society, that Muslims were overwhelmingly in favour of Pakistan. Soon after the election, the Congress conceded Jinnah's claim to participate in the interim Government which earlier it was not prepared to; its erstwhile demand was for a share of the Muslim seats. In the interim Government, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had to be given a non-Muslim entitlement.
The interim Government having been formed, the League's obsession for the rest of the year was on an exchange of population whereby all the Muslims should immigrate to Pakistan and all non-Muslims should transfer to Hindustan. Sir Feroze Khan Noon, who later on went to become Prime Minister, on April 8, 1946, told his Bihar legislators that unless there was an exchange of population, the League would re-enact the murderous orgies of Changez Khan and Halaqu Khan.
Ismail Chundrigar, another Prime Minister who hailed from Godhra, had also wanted his fellow religionists to emigrate.
The Qaid-e-Azam, in a press conference held at Karachi on November 25, announced that the authorities should immediately take up the question of population exchange. Mohammad Ismail of Madras and Shaukat Hayat Khan had whole-heartedly supported the idea.
On December 3, Pir Ilahi Bux of Sind and Iftikhar Husain Khan, the Punjab League chief, in separate meetings had reiterated the demand for an exchange.
On December 4, another Sind leader, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, had repeated the demand. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan of Punjab publicly stated on December 19 that there was no alternative to a transfer of the peoples. All these details were published by Dawn, which was then published from Delhi and later transferred to Karachi.
Jinnah evidently knew the subject with the help of his long experience. The League of Nations had, with the help of a committee headed by former Viceroy Lord Curzon, worked out a detailed plan of population exchange and had implemented it in Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey during 1923. The point being made is that the League knew certainly what it was talking about.
BR Ambedkar, too, recommended an exchange as the only permanent solution to the minority problems. In subsequent years, the issue remained largely unnoticed because the Congress leaders had ignored the League demand and did not wish their mistake to gain publicity. Frustrated by the Congress indifference, Jinnah proposed his theory of reciprocal hostages.
That the Hindus in Pakistan would be treated as hostages if any harm came upon Muslims who remained in Hindustan, presumably he expected the opposite to apply as well. In a conversation, he called this theory 'tit-for-tat'. A reference in this regard can be made to his interview with Beverley Nichols (his book Verdict on India). Rafiq Zakaria, too, has mentioned the same in his book, The Man Who Divided India.
Samajwadi Party leader Azam Khan evidently expects that the Valley, if not the whole of Jammu & Kashmir, would more or less secede on communal lines. In order to answer what next communal initiative can be taken up, at the end of July at a public meeting, he demanded the creation of a Muslim Pradesh with the help of western districts of Uttar Pradesh, as reported in The Economic Times.
It is clear that neither the UPA Government nor the Samajwadi Party realises the consequences of handing over Jammu & Kashmir on a platter. Every action is known to have a reaction - equal and opposite. What will have to be seen is whether a handover would result in a demand for disenfranchisement of the community inclined to continual secession. Or else, the annulment of Articles 25 to 30 which are replete with concessions to minorities, an euphemism for Muslims. Or else what future elections could lead to especially in the background of widespread Islamist terrorism?
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Pioneer.com
<i>Reopening the debate over pre-1953 status for Jammu & Kashmir will revive several issues, including the basis of Partition, says Prafull Goradia </i>
If the Government of India is proposing to reinstate the pre-1953 status of Jammu & Kashmir, it should realise the corollaries. The first one is that it should be ready to go back to the logic of Partition, which was the creation of a homeland for Muslims. Evidently, Jammu would be excluded, as should be Ladakh, which are non-Muslim areas. Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference only represented the majority of the population of the Valley.
The 'non-paper', reportedly submitted by the GoI to Islamabad, concedes that the Kashmiri Muslims had taken refuge with India from the marauders from Pakistan. Call them refugees who came with territory, or call them hapless guests who had arrived with their homes with a desire to return as soon as securely possible.
Uncannily, Article 370 of the Constitution is a temporary provision. Nationalist Indians have interpreted it all along as a clause, which was to be scrapped long before, whereas the separatists have taken it as implying a guest status. The basis of Partition was division between Muslims and non-Muslims.
The territorial vivisection was only incidental. It was also in a way unimportant to the Muslim League. Or else, there would be no sense in creating a country whose two wings were separated by a thousand miles. Had Qaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah thought it otherwise, he and his party would not have insisted on an exchange of population again and again through 1946.
Jinnah had repeatedly claimed that the League alone represented Muslims, whereas the Congress had disputed this contention. In order to ascertain the truth, Viceroy Lord Wavell ordered a general election, which was held during the winter of 1945-46. The results startled the Congress. With a single-point manifesto called Partition, the League won a landslide victory. It won all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly; while in the provincial legislatures, the victory count was 446 out of 495 Muslim seats.
Prof M Mujeeb, the late vice-chancellor of Jamia Millia Islamia, later opined in his book, Islamic Influence on Indian Society, that Muslims were overwhelmingly in favour of Pakistan. Soon after the election, the Congress conceded Jinnah's claim to participate in the interim Government which earlier it was not prepared to; its erstwhile demand was for a share of the Muslim seats. In the interim Government, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had to be given a non-Muslim entitlement.
The interim Government having been formed, the League's obsession for the rest of the year was on an exchange of population whereby all the Muslims should immigrate to Pakistan and all non-Muslims should transfer to Hindustan. Sir Feroze Khan Noon, who later on went to become Prime Minister, on April 8, 1946, told his Bihar legislators that unless there was an exchange of population, the League would re-enact the murderous orgies of Changez Khan and Halaqu Khan.
Ismail Chundrigar, another Prime Minister who hailed from Godhra, had also wanted his fellow religionists to emigrate.
The Qaid-e-Azam, in a press conference held at Karachi on November 25, announced that the authorities should immediately take up the question of population exchange. Mohammad Ismail of Madras and Shaukat Hayat Khan had whole-heartedly supported the idea.
On December 3, Pir Ilahi Bux of Sind and Iftikhar Husain Khan, the Punjab League chief, in separate meetings had reiterated the demand for an exchange.
On December 4, another Sind leader, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, had repeated the demand. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan of Punjab publicly stated on December 19 that there was no alternative to a transfer of the peoples. All these details were published by Dawn, which was then published from Delhi and later transferred to Karachi.
Jinnah evidently knew the subject with the help of his long experience. The League of Nations had, with the help of a committee headed by former Viceroy Lord Curzon, worked out a detailed plan of population exchange and had implemented it in Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey during 1923. The point being made is that the League knew certainly what it was talking about.
BR Ambedkar, too, recommended an exchange as the only permanent solution to the minority problems. In subsequent years, the issue remained largely unnoticed because the Congress leaders had ignored the League demand and did not wish their mistake to gain publicity. Frustrated by the Congress indifference, Jinnah proposed his theory of reciprocal hostages.
That the Hindus in Pakistan would be treated as hostages if any harm came upon Muslims who remained in Hindustan, presumably he expected the opposite to apply as well. In a conversation, he called this theory 'tit-for-tat'. A reference in this regard can be made to his interview with Beverley Nichols (his book Verdict on India). Rafiq Zakaria, too, has mentioned the same in his book, The Man Who Divided India.
Samajwadi Party leader Azam Khan evidently expects that the Valley, if not the whole of Jammu & Kashmir, would more or less secede on communal lines. In order to answer what next communal initiative can be taken up, at the end of July at a public meeting, he demanded the creation of a Muslim Pradesh with the help of western districts of Uttar Pradesh, as reported in The Economic Times.
It is clear that neither the UPA Government nor the Samajwadi Party realises the consequences of handing over Jammu & Kashmir on a platter. Every action is known to have a reaction - equal and opposite. What will have to be seen is whether a handover would result in a demand for disenfranchisement of the community inclined to continual secession. Or else, the annulment of Articles 25 to 30 which are replete with concessions to minorities, an euphemism for Muslims. Or else what future elections could lead to especially in the background of widespread Islamist terrorism?
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