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Nuclear Thread - 2
We are seeking a India-US nu-clear deal, while they are seeking a USA-India "nuke" deal.

IMHO, its not mandatory for India to go for this deal, strategically and economically speaking. If it were that we are in dire-straits, then it shows to prove that Homi Bhabas and Sarabhais were totally wrong in planning our 3 staged nuclear plan to utilize abundance of Thorium power.

Let them cry & <!--emo&:argue--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/argue.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='argue.gif' /><!--endemo--> .. we need to keep ensuring or plans are <!--emo&:bcow--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/b_cowboy.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='b_cowboy.gif' /><!--endemo--> by "us" and only "us" and not "US".
<b>N-deal stuck on US obstinacy</b>

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->ORGANISER, JUNE 17, 2007

N-deal stuck on US obstinacy
By M.D. Nalapat

<b>Although India has six times more thorium reserves than uranium deposits, a succession of pusillanimous governments in New Delhi has prevented the needed exploitation of either resource. </b>

Were the Government of India serious about meeting India’s energy needs, it would speed up the thorium-based programme and utilise more effectively the country’s stock of uranium as well as fuel feedstock, so as to enhance the country’s base inventory of plutonium.

The reality is that, given political will, India has all the elements in place to fast-track the indigenous thorium programme. Such a move would ensure that for generations to come the country does not fall prey to externally orchestrated sanctions.

<b>With the price of uranium having gone up by about 300 per cent over the last three years, it makes no sense for India to give up a much more economically viable and proliferation-resistant technology that uses thorium, in favour of imported uranium. </b>

After having promised India an equitable deal, the country is being pressured to settle for a killer agreement. With the Bush administration moving away from its initial position on the core issue of fuel supply and re-processing even before the 1-2-3 agreement is inked, clearly hoping for a dilution of the several killer conditions set by the Hyde Act would be foolish.

Among such conditions is the inspections regime mandated under the legislation. These would comprise of multiple agencies, <b>the effect of which would be to uncover every key technology that has been indigenously developed. Thanks to the proposed nuclear deal, India may find its technology taken away by the US and sold back to it!</b> With India taking the lead on global thorium technology, the inspections prescribed by the Hyde legislation and later by the IAEA would ensure that the country’s intellectual property would be taken away and even patented in other countries. This would happen as a result of the many “safeguards” enumerated by the US Congress, which <b>would permit unrestricted espionage into the Indian nuclear and missile programme, both of which are crucial to the country’s security</b>.

Interestingly, India’s own Atomic Energy Act does not permit the patenting of indigenous R&D in nuclear-related technologies, while the NPT—which applies to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS)—cannot be invoked by India in order to deny inspections on downstream facilities—an option that was exercised by Brazil to prevent ongoing theft of intellectual property. Under the terms that passed muster under the incomparable Ahluwalia and Saran, India would face all the fetters of the NPT without any of the (meagre) benefits. The same would apply to the CTBT and other international agreements of a restrictive nature, all of which India would need to comply with in order to get an annual good conduct certificate from the US Congress. It needs to be borne in mind that even the country’s space programme has come under Pentagon criticism, with analysts there openly writing that any future Indian missile “would have the US as the target”. <b>The remedy, according to them, is to choke to death the Indian rocket and space programme. This at the very time when Montek Singh Ahluwalia and other Bush boosters in India have been promising ISRO of US “help” in the space programme. Such “assistance” now seems likely to be “the way the hangman’s noose supports the hanged</b>.”

Interestingly, the US has itself consistently demanded—and secured—terms that do not compromise future potentialities. An example is the nuclear partnership with Canada initiated over five decades ago. The US atomic bomb effort was substantially facilitated by Canadian shipments of irradiated fuel to Oak Ridge without any significant conditions on re-processing. Should Manmohan Singh bind future Indian governments into continuing with restrictions that would place the population of India at a much greater risk of a nuclear attack, <b>he would be laying down conditions that would make necessary a trial for treason in his future. </b>

The reality is that, given political will, India has all the elements in place to fast-track the indigenous thorium programme. Such a move would ensure that for generations to come the country does not fall prey to externally orchestrated sanctions and to going in for less efficient uranium-based light water reactor (LWR) technologies, would makes India dependent on the cartel that controls the international uranium trade. To be fair to the US side, they have always been candid about their objectives. On the first anniversary of the July 18, 2005 statement, <b>US analyst Ashley Tellis went on record stating that in agreeing to the deal, it was a given that India had determined that its present plutonium inventory “suffices”. The fact is that current stocks are grossly inadequate for even a minimal deterrent capability, not to mention feeding the energy programme. Subsequently, Tellis also made clear that from the start, the Indian negotiators had been informed that the permitting of re-processing of spent fuel was a non-starter for the US. </b>

Tellis’s statements have only reinforced what India’s scientists have known since 2005, that the nuclear deal is being seen by the Bush administration not only as a way of getting multi-billion dollar contracts for <b>US corporations such as Bechtel </b>but is expressly designed to throttle the thorium programme as intrinsic to the three-phase cycle, which is the creation of U-233, which can also be used in weapons.

<b>The US side has worked hard to persuade India to jettison this indigenously developed technology in favour of costly and imported alternatives </b>that would place the country perpetually at the mercy of foreign suppliers for its energy and security needs, even though Tellis admits that using thorium makes “good economic sense”.

With the prices of uranium having gone up by about 300 per cent over the last three years, it makes no sense for India to give up a much more economically viable and proliferation-resistant technology that uses thorium, in favour of imported uranium. Without reprocessing rights, India would be forced to purchase enriched uranium for all its reactors at greatly enhanced cost.<b> At present, the country’s indigenously built reactors use natural uranium that retails at a fraction of the cost of enriched versions of the fuel, a point that Manmohan Singh has sought to evade. </b>

This writer was the first to point out that if India agreed to outdated American LWR imports and thereby tied the country’s nuclear industry in perpetuity to the technological relics on offer, India would be trapped into trading in the Homi Bhabha-created three-stage thorium programme for high-cost uranium imports.

The Hyde Act has taken away any vestige of hope that India would secure even a guarantee of future uranium supplies, not to mention reprocessing of spent fuel. Worse, even though thorium based alternatives exist, India would be accepting technology that presumes unlimited uranium supply with an inefficient burn-up rate of only about 0.5 per cent rather than the more efficient rate of about 10 per cent achieved with the in situ utilization of fissile material produced in the reactor itself (as conceived in the thorium-based fast breeder programme). This basic fact of reactor technology—that the greater the utilization of fuel through a high burn-up rate, the lower the costs—was overlooked during the disastrous initial phase (2005, 2006) of negotiations with the US.

That the US is itself seeking to master thorium technology is not news. AECL, among other vendors, has been researching the thorium fuel cycle application to enhanced CANDU-6 and ACR-1000 reactors. This model includes a fuel composite comprised of 5 per cent reactor grade plutonium plus thorium to achieve greater utilization at lower costs. In the case of the privately owned General Atomics Company based in California, the US government funds their R&D to the tune of over $ 400 million per year for promoting work on advanced fuels. The fact that General Atomics owns a uranium mine in Australia is an added convenience. All this while US negotiators seek to convince the Indian side that thorium is impracticable as a feedstock.

Although India has six times more thorium reserves than uranium deposits, a succession of pusillanimous governments in New Delhi has prevented the needed exploitation of either resource. There are valid technical and financial reasons for going the thorium route over uranium. In fact, both the Kakrapar-1 and -2 units were loaded with 500 kg of thorium fuel in order to improve their operation when they first achieved criticality. India has proudly claimed Kakrapar-1 as the first reactor in the world to use thorium over depleted uranium to achieve power flattening across the reactor core. Many other viable alternatives to uranium dependence also exist, although as yet, for reasons that are not transparent, such efforts have yet to be fast-tracked.

AEC chief Anil Kakodkar’s plan for the design of the advanced heavy water reactor (AHWR) needs to be given an impetus . In this system, 75 per cent of the energy would come from raw thorium alone which is abundantly available in India. Further, several theoretical studies done on home shores have shown that by using breeder reactors, the country can get considerable energy output from raw thorium, without the need to reprocess. To abandon such an effort, or not to speed it up, would be criminal folly. India would begin enjoying large-scale economic benefits, were the country to become future vendors of a combination of one of our largest natural resources and commercially viable new technology. It is India’s future self-reliance through the commercialization of thorium-based alternatives that the Hyde Act seeks to block by attempting to stop the country from reprocessing. <b>After seeing that Manmohan Singh lacks the political support needed to jettison Indian national interest entirely, the US side has begun offering the bait of “maybe permitting future re-processing”. </b>That scrawny bird in a non-existent Bush sees reason to surrender technologies and capabilities built up over half a century of facing the most restrictive technology denial regime that the US could devise.

<b>Ironically, even while vigorous R&D to develop such technology is going on in South Africa, China, Japan and other countries, India—as a leader in the field—would have to stop this work, as it would be impossible to carry out under the regime of sanctions being prepared by the US and the IAEA for India.</b> And this at a time when, within the US itself, new methods for using thorium in power reactors have been put into practice by General Atomics, which already has a operational 650 MW machine. These companies would benefit from the costless acquisition of Indian technologies secured through the intrusive inspections regime mandated by the Hyde Act

Only after a section of the Indian strategic community as well as the opposition parties began to denounce the gathering possibility of surrender did Manmohan Singh reluctantly begin to associate the scientific establishment with the details of the negotiations conducted as spadework for the deal. When the scientists saw what the Government of India was in the process of giving away, they were appalled. Some of their concerns were made public, and the resulting change in the public mood led to a hardening of the Indian position, helped by Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon replacing Shyam Saran as pointperson for the negotiations. But it was too late for the US side to change direction. Today, although he realises that such a sellout is political suicide for both Manmohan Singh and Sonia Maino Gandhi, an enfeebled George W.Bush is in no condition to go back to the US legislature for a relaxation in the numerous sovereignity-limiting conditions on India that are imposed by this alien law. <b>Of course, given his proclivity towards external interests (as first evidenced by his gift to Russia of $12 billion as a result of the rupee-rouble deal), Manmohan Singh may still be hoping to create enough confusion through a clever choice of words and an apparent deferral of certain conditions to forget the national interest, break his oath of office, and sign the one-sided agreement on offer</b>.

There are, it must be admitted, many voices within the Indian establishment who seek such surrender, and who claim that there is “no option” to the deal as presently offered. But is this correct? The reality is that only the hesitation of successive Indian governments to take needed steps in defence of the national interest has reduced the country’s leverage to an extent that <b>the US, the EU and China are still confident that they can prevent India from emerging as a technological equal with the capability of challenging the former’s dominance in space and nuclear technology</b>.

<b>Next is to investigate the background of the mysterious NGOs</b> that have succeeded in blocking proper utilisation of India’s known uranium reserves, and placing the evidence of intentional sabotage before the courts to clear away legal hurdles to increasing domestic uranium production, <b>now that Australia had made it clear that an India which is not a technological slave of other countries is unacceptable to Canberra. </b>Those who tied the hands of India’s nuclear scientists for decades did so promising that the US and its allies would finally recognise this unilateral act of good faith by integrating India into the international nuclear architecture as a state with advanced nuclear technology—the very phrase, let it be repeated, used in the July 18,2005 statement of George W.Bush and Manmohan Singh, words that quickly got belied by actual actions

When Nicholas Burns, stated that the US was surprised by the “hypersensitivity” of Indians to the US welshing on Tarapur, he needs to be reminded that much after Tarapur, Washington is doing it again.

Were the Government of India serious about meeting India’s energy needs, it would speed up the thorium-based programme and utilise more effectively the country’s stock of uranium as well as fuel feedstock, so as to enhance the country’s base inventory of plutonium. Once the fast breeder reactors are up and running, the plutonium used in them can be recovered. To be able to have uninterrupted supplies at the rate of around three tons of plutonium for a 500 MW reactor, there needs to be an expansion of the available fuel reprocessing facilities. And it is here that the spent fuel now lying toxically and expensively at Tarapur comes into the matrix. Even though the agreement governing its use (which anyway became invalid once the US unilaterally withdrew) lapsed, considerations of cost, need and safety mandated an immediate re-processing of the spent fuel. Unfortunately, a succession of timid Prime Ministers in India decided against re-processing the fuel, although India has the technology and the validity period of the bi-lateral agreement governing the spent fuel lapsed after the first 25 years. If energy security is indeed a goal, the time has come to re-process Tarapur spent fuel in campaign mode, as well as discharged fuel from all the country’s operational heavy water reactors.

Next, Russia needs to be approached for the required supply of discharged material from old weapons, which India can purchase. This material could subsequently be reprocessed under safeguards, and put to use in the thorium programme

The concept of acquiring nuclear material from international sources is not new. After all, it is well known that the present five NPT nuclear weapons states collect nuclear material under the schemes devised from time to time. With their ever-increasing (in terms of destructive ability) arsenal and continuous expansion of weapons systems within their own shores, it is anybody’s guess what percentage of imported feedstock goes directly to aid such offensive weapons programmes. In contrast, India, should some of the country’s nuclear negotiators have their way, could end up gladly contributing to the weapons stockpiles of the five at this country’s expense,through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, that relegates India to the same bracket as Chad or Laos.

In order to throw off the shackles imposed not only from outside but by the cowardice of the country’s leadership all these decades, the country needs to simultaneously increase efforts to mine indigenous uranium to meet short-term needs. Given political backing, full thorium utilization could become a reality within a decade The Atomic Energy Act needs to be amended so as to ensure public-private partnership in this critical sector

Again, it is important to remember that the higher the burn-up, the lower the costs, which is the best reason for favouring thorium-based technology. Coming back to the General Atomics Co., the US company has already demonstrated the viability of a thorium-based reactor by running the fuel to more than 500,000 MWDays per ton. India’s plutonium carbide fuel has already seen more than 150,000 MWDays per ton in the FBTR. There is therefore no technical reason for the government to abandon the thorium route as would in effect take place once the conditions imposed by the Hyde Act kick in. <b>Hopefully, nationalists within and outside the UPA will be able to prevent Manmohan Singh from going down in the history books as the saboteur of India’s nuclear and missile programme. </b>

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Deal is done, review left </b>
Arun Kumar | Washington
Two years after President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh set out on their "historic initiative", India and the US have finalised an agreement to implement their path-breaking civil nuclear deal.

The announcement came in a joint Press statement issued on Saturday. The statement said the two sides "are pleased with the substantial progress made on the outstanding issues in the 123 agreement. We will now refer the issue to our Governments for final review," confirming that the four days of hard negotiations had clinched the deal and now only await clearance at the political level.

"Both the US and India look forward to the completion of these remaining steps and to the conclusion of this historic initiative," the rather bland, carefully-drafted statement said, suggesting that all the sticky issues had been resolved following a high-level push from White House.

The joint statement did not say what the couple of tough issues stalling the agreement were or how they were resolved. Nor was an official comment forthcoming from either side. That an agreement was close at hand became apparent late Friday night when the high-level Indian team led by National Security Advisor MK Narayanan extended its stay by a day hours after he and Menon met US Vice-President Dick Cheney in the company of Indian ambassador to US Ronen Sen to get a political push from the top.

<b>Department of Atomic Energy Chairman Anil Kakodkar, whose nod was considered a must to clinch the deal, too stayed back as the two sides decided to move the talks into a second extra day amid signs that they may be close to breaking the logjam.</b>

The breakthrough came after Cheney added his weight to the impetus provided by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. Narayanan kept a parallel dialogue on with Hadley as foreign office teams led by Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns worked on the so-called 123 agreement.

India put on the table an out-of-the-box proposal for setting up a fully safeguarded stand-alone dedicated facility for reprocessing US-origin fuel as Washington would neither permit reprocessing nor was it willing to take back spent fuel.

Other sticky points included India's insistence on its right to reprocess US nuclear fuel, conduct a test and guarantees for continued supply of fuel for the 14 civil reactors it has agreed to place under international safeguards under a separation plan. Eight other reactors designated military would not be subject to inspections.

Interventions from Cheney and Rice were reflective of President Bush's keenness to get the deal done before he leaves office in January 2009, to score a major foreign policy success on par with Richard Nixon's 1972 opening up to China.

Coming after several tortuous rounds of what is euphemistically called "steady progress", the talks were considered critical in the race to beat the clock with only a small window left to present the final deal to the US Congress for an up or down vote before it goes into another election cycle.

India also needs to sign an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency and get the approval of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Meanwhile, as Menon and Burns were negotiating the last "couple of feet" to borrow another Burns phrase in their "constructive and positive" dialogue, White House spokesman Tony Snow, voicing Bush's wish, declared: "We are working with the Government of India on something that is of intense mutual concern to us. We want to get it done.

<b>"The Congress has expressed support for the President's strategic partnership with India to work for the full civil nuclear energy cooperation that was part of the Hyde Act last December,"</b> he told reporters.

At the State Department, deputy spokesman Tom Casey said going into "extra innings" indicated that both sides are very committed to reaching an agreement here.

"We believe that concluding a 123 agreement is something vital to being able to fully implement the US-India civil nuclear accord and is something that is important for both countries," he said.

<b>"Lack of an announcement of an agreement today should not be taken as anything indicating that we won't ultimately be able to have a deal and be able to move forward on this,"</b> he said by way of an escape clause hours before the joint statement.

Asked why the US was not prepared to discuss the issues involved, Casey said he could not do a "play-by-play commentary" on ongoing diplomatic negotiations but <span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>an agreement when concluded will be a public document open to scrutiny and full Congressional review. </span>
The devil, my friends, is in the details...so let us wait till more details come out regarding this deal before we can say with certainty whether this deal would be good or bad for India in the long run.
<b>123... and opposition gets ready to attack deal</b>
From Pioneer.

<b>Accepting US suzerainty </b>
Satish Chandra

<b>The 123 Agreement, along with the Hyde Act, will adversely affect the evolution of India's nuclear weapon capability. It is the precursor to several moves by the UPA Government that will enhance India's dependency on the US and take it into the American camp, making us a client state </b>

While there can be no denying that in today's unipolar world India must try and cultivate close ties with the United States, equally, every patriotic Indian would expect that this endeavour should in no way jeopardise national interest or undermine national sovereignty.

With the nuclear deal on the verge of being concluded we are at a defining moment in India-US relations. <b>The deal will not only cripple India's strategic deterrent and erode its sovereignty but will also reduce it to a client state of the US by providing the latter with requisite leverages to ensure that it never steps out of line. </b>

No matter what gloss the UPA Government puts upon the 123 Agreement, the separation plan agreed to by it will adversely affect the evolution of India's nuclear weapon capability as will the Hyde Act which is the framework legislation under which the 123 Agreement is to be operated. The Hyde Act, moreover, without permitting India the benefit of full civil nuclear cooperation, as envisaged in the July 18, 2005 understanding, <b>makes US cooperation conditional on many humiliating provisions restricting the independence of Indian foreign policy and requiring a rigorous oversight of its nuclear programme, both civilian and military. </b>

The Hyde Act also provides that India remains under constant threat of termination of cooperation if in the US assessment it has not lived up to its commitments.

Despite the groundswell of opposition to the nuclear deal in the country, the Government is clearly determined to go ahead with it. It is unfortunate that towards this end it has not hesitated to engage in an information war against its own citizens by keeping the text of the 123 Agreement secret while at the same time engaging in selective briefings designed to project it in a favourable light.

The 123 Agreement is the precursor to and, indeed, the fulcrum around which the Government is actively considering several moves that will enhance India's dependency on the US and take it irrevocably into the US camp. Some of these are an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), more frequent exercises with the US and allied military forces, increased US arms purchase arrangements, participation in the US-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), active support to a US-sponsored Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT), etc.

In mid July Gen Kohler, Director of the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency, and Admiral Wieringa, while in India reportedly finalised the text of an ACSA which now awaits Cabinet Committee on Security approval. It has been argued that ACSA is merely an arrangement to facilitate mutual logistic support during military exercises. This is too simplistic a projection. The fact is that ACSA provides US combatant commanders the means to acquire logistic support from our armed forces during training, exercises and military operations.

The US has concluded nearly 80 such agreements mainly with NATO and allied countries. While such agreements do not theoretically commit the host country to military action the very act of concluding them makes such countries aligned to the US and a party to its actions. Thus, our hosting, the USS Nimitz at our ports in early July while in active operation in connection with the Iraq situation makes us a party to US actions in that country.

The underlying philosophy of these agreements is to enhance the rapid deployment capability of US forces into theatres far removed from their bases. It is relevant to recall that Mr Douglas Feith, the former US Under Secretary of Defence, publicly indicated in December 2003 that the rapid deployability of US forces required that they "must be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations" and that for this purpose the US was inter alia "putting in place so-called cross servicing agreements so that we can rapidly reimburse countries for support they provide to our military operations."

<b>India's signing of ACSA will, therefore, mark its formal entry into the US sphere of influence and signal its willingness to allow itself to be used to usher in the American century in Asia. </b>It is ironical that this step would be undertaken by a leadership, tracing its roots to the Nehru-Gandhi family for which non-alignment was an article of faith, and by a Government relying for its survival on the Communists to whom the US is an anathema.

This craven alignment with the US even fails the test of realpolitik as the US has conferred no special benefits on India, befitting a country which it says it wants to help get great power status, such as support for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, recognition as a nuclear weapon state, or even an invitation to participate in the multi-nation naval anti terror task force in the Arabian Sea of which Pakistan has long been a member.

The conclusion of ACSA will inevitably lead to an increase, both quantitative and qualitative, in India's military exercises with the US which have for sometime been on an upward spiral. This, coupled with the alacrity with which we participated in trilateral exercises in April with the US and Japan, and have agreed to the US-Japan-Australia- Singapore-India exercises, taken together with our hesitation to participate in trilateral exercises with China and Russia and our lukewarm approach to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, will fuel suspicions that we have opted to cast our lot with the US. There is nothing per se wrong with engaging in military exercises with the US but if the scale and nature of these exercises is out of all proportion with those conducted with other countries it will naturally place in doubt our bona fide as an independent player in the region.

The grease lubricating the nuclear deal is the prospect of multi-billion-dollar contracts not just for nuclear reactors but also for arms purchases. Some of the major deals being oriented towards the US are:

<b>$ 10 billion contract for 126 multi role combat aircraft;

$ 900 million contract for 127 helicopters for the Army Aviation Corp;

Multi-billion dollar contracts for over 200 radars;

$ 2 billion to $ 3 billion contract for 8 to 16 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft;

$ 2 billion to $ 3 billion contract for equipment to promote network centricity in the Armed Forces; and,

$ 2 billion contract for 400 artillery guns. </b>

In considering the US for such massive defence orders, the Government appears to have totally discounted factors of cost, compatibility and, most important, reliability of supplies. Indeed, the US proclivity to suspend supplies at the drop of a hat on the flimsiest of excuses should have made it a non-starter for consideration for such contracts. Moreover, diversion of such orders from our traditional supplier, namely Russia, will impinge adversely on our ties with it and prompt it to find a new market in Pakistan.

It is on the cards that India will, as required under the Hyde Act, join the PSI which it has long been averse to, as well as abide by the policies of the Australia Group and the Wassenar Arrangements without enjoying the benefits of membership.

Similarly, though India traditionally only favours a FMCT with an international and effective verification mechanism, under the weight of the Hyde Act, which requires it to work "actively" with the US for early conclusion of this Treaty, it is moving towards modifying its position and going along with the US which is against the Indian position and favours verification through national technical means.

Acceptance of the US position is not in the national interest as it will deprive India of a place at the high table in operationalisation of the FMCT that would, for all practical purposes, be in the hands of the US as the country with the most advanced national technical means. An early conclusion of the FMCT would also not serve India's interest as it requires time to built up adequate stocks of fissile material for its strategic deterrent.

<b>It would be evident from the foregoing that the 123 and associated agreements, which will entail the outgo of billions of dollars, far from promoting India's emergence as a great power, will see it relegated to the status of a subsidiary state under US suzerainty.</b> While this, of course, constitutes the mother of all follies on the part of our leadership it is also a failure of the entire political class which should have done much more to avert it.

<!--QuoteBegin-k.ram+Jul 31 2007, 12:12 AM-->QUOTE(k.ram @ Jul 31 2007, 12:12 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>The deal will not only cripple India's strategic deterrent and erode its sovereignty but will also reduce it to a client state of the US by providing the latter with requisite leverages to ensure that it never steps out of line. </b>

Manmohan and other UPA clowns may be only ones who have ever taken Bush regime seriously.
<b>Top advocate of US-India nuke deal has yet to see text</b>
<b>Disturbing implications of 123 Agreement</b>
<b>A guide to the provisions of the 123 agreement</b>
<b>123: text and context </b>
By Brahma Chellaney

New Delhi, Aug. 3: The released text of the 123 agreement on civil nuclear cooperation reveals that the United States, besides upholding the primacy of its laws, has gained two absolute rights — the right to unilaterally terminate cooperation with India at will (without arranging alternative suppliers), and the right to take back all supplied items and materials.

In withholding the text for two long weeks, the US and Indian governments sought to spin reality to suit political ends. Now the facts need to be separated not just from spin, but also from wishful thinking.

This proposed bilateral agreement has at least 12 important facets:

1. It confers on the US an unfettered and uninfringeable right to terminate cooperation with India at will. Article 14(2) states: "The party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations." That would put India at the mercy of the supplier, holding all the leverage.

Even though termination is to take effect at the end of a one-year notice period, the agreement explicitly empowers the US to forthwith suspend all cooperation without much ado. The only requirement is that a "party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination".

In light of the one-sided dependency the agreement would create, such a US right will not only help bind India to the non-proliferation conditions set by the US Congress through the Hyde Act, but it also goes against the purported assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel and spare parts. Significantly, Article 14 on termination does not enjoin the withdrawing party to make alternate arrangements for supplies to the other side before it ceases all cooperation.

2. In a departure from a standard clause found in America’s 123 agreements with other states, this accord does not uphold a core principle of international law — that failure to perform a treaty or agreement cannot be justified by invoking the provisions of a domestic law. Rather, this agreement is unambiguously anchored in the supremacy of national laws and regulations (which means US laws like the Hyde Act, because there is no Indian law governing nuclear cooperation with the US or any other specific country).

Contrast this accord with the 1985 US-China 123 agreement, which in its Article 2 (1) states: "The parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Each party shall implement this agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The parties recognise, with respect to the observance of this agreement, the principle of international law that provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."

The third sentence about the non-invocation of domestic laws is tellingly missing from this agreement, even as the first two sentences find mention. This omission is because of one simple fact: Never before in US legislative history has a law been enacted imposing such numerous and onerous conditions on an avowed strategic partner to permit cooperation in just one area as the Hyde Act does.

That is why even the agreement’s Article 15, titled "Settlement of Disputes", is toothless, making no reference to the applicability of the principles of international law. It reads: "Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the parties with a view to resolving that dispute." That means the recipient state will have to listen to the supplier.

Both the US and Indian sides have publicly acknowledged that the agreement is within the legal framework of the India-specific Hyde Act, which reigns supreme in this arrangement.

3. While there is no explicit reference to nuclear testing, a test prohibition against India has been unequivocally built into the agreement’s provisions through the incorporation of the US’ right to demand the return of all supplied materials and items. India’s unilateral moratorium is being stripped of its voluntary character and turned into a bilateral legality in this manner. Through the US "right of return", the 123 agreement explicitly hangs the Damocles’ sword over India’s head.

While the Hyde Act’s Section 106 openly bans Indian testing, the 123 agreement reinforces that test ban both by upholding the applicability of national laws to govern cooperation and by incorporating the US’ "right of return".

As part of the same design to enforce permanent Indian compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — a pact the US Senate soundly rejected in 1999 — Washington has already recommended that the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) link its proposed exemption for India to a similar test ban. The NSG exemption could even come with a "right of return" being conferred on all supplier states. In other words, the test ban under the 123 agreement is to be converted into a multilateral legality through the NSG.

4. The US has an unencumbered right under the 123 agreement to terminate cooperation not only in response to an Indian test but also if India, in Washington’s judgment, fell short of the "full compliance" required of it by the Hyde Act with regard to other prescribed non-proliferation conditions. The 123 agreement does not in any way rein in the US right to unilaterally terminate cooperation.

Implicit in this agreement is India’s readiness to honour the US-set non-proliferation conditions.

5. By conceding that the US has a right to unilaterally terminate cooperate and demand the return of all equipment and fuel supplied in the past, New Delhi has lent legitimacy to what is a dubious concept in international law — that the supplier is at liberty to terminate cooperation retroactively.

The agreement states that before invoking the right of return, the concerned party would "undertake consultations with the other party". But that is nothing but public relations because such consultations would be of no consequence. The supplier-state, however, would "compensate promptly that party for the fair market value" of the items and materials it takes back.

6. While the US has the right to terminate cooperation at will and withdraw from all obligations, India has been denied the right to withdraw from all its obligations, even if the agreement was terminated at America’s instance. The agreement more than once cites the permanent nature of India’s obligation to accept international inspections on its entire civil nuclear programme, including the indigenously built facilities it is voluntarily opening to external scrutiny.

In a hypothetical situation, if the US were to terminate all cooperation and suspend all fuel and equipment transfers, India would be stuck both with everlasting IAEA inspections on its entire civil programme and with lack of access to an alternate supplier.

7. The US has also reserved its right in the 123 agreement to unilaterally suspend the reprocessing-related "arrangements and procedures" it intends to work out with New Delhi in the years ahead, once India has built a new reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards. National security adviser M.K. Narayanan has already warned that "spoilers" may nit-pick on the facility’s design and cause delays.

The text clearly shows that the US has granted India the right to reprocess only in principle. The grant of actual right would take many years, with the US retaining a veto on Indian reprocessing until then. It will take at least five years to build the new facility, after the construction of which, the agreement says, "the parties will agree on arrangements and procedures" for reprocessing "in this new facility". It goes on to say that consultations on such arrangements and procedures "will begin within six months of a request by either party and will be concluded within one year". Thereafter, the reprocessing agreement would go to the US Congress for vetting.

This entire process — from the start of work on the facility to congressional approval — would be a long haul. Yet, once in place, the US could terminate the reprocessing-related "arrangements and procedures" in yet-to-be-defined "exceptional circumstances".

8. The sugar-coated provisions in the agreement relating to "consultations" and uninterrupted fuel supply appear more to help India save face than to set out enforceable obligations. Although "consultations" are referred to repeatedly in the text, in no context does the agreement provide for consultations to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome. At best, it provides for consultations within a specified time frame in one context.

In all the specified circumstances, consultations are to be toothless and, in any event, subsidiary to the central requirement that the agreement be in accord with the provisions of national laws. The agreement gives India little say.

9. The agreement plays cleverly on words to fashion an illusion at times. For example, Article 5(4) states: "The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in reactor experiments or the loading of reactors, the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime, use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and the accomplishment of other purposes as may be agreed by the parties."

Note this provision does not allow India to build up lifetime reserves, as the Prime Minister had pledged in Parliament. It only permits fuel supply consistent with the efficient and continuous operation of reactors for their lifetime. This is just one example of how an optical illusion is sought to be created.

In fact, nowhere does the agreement specifically permit India to accumulate lifetime fuel reserves. The agreement is so cleverly worded that it refers to strategic fuel reserves in its aims and objectives, and then in Article 5(6)(a) it states that "the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations". In other words, the agreement admits that the US has yet to make the necessary adjustments in its laws that it promised in July 2005.

Then, in the very next subsection (b) of Article 5(6), it is stated as follows: "To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps: i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral US-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the US Congress." But this is the agreement under Section 123, and there is no such ironclad assurance.

10. The agreement brings out starkly that India has accepted terms that fall short of the promised "full cooperation".

In keeping with the Hyde Act’s prohibition on transfers of equipment and technology in certain areas, the 123 agreement offers this palliative in Article 5(2): "Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies."

11. In accepting this clause, India has not only acquiesced to restrictive cooperation, but also gone one step beyond its current policy to align with US policy on an important point — that any enrichment, reprocessing or heavy-water activity, even when occurring under stringent IAEA inspections, is "dual-use" in nature and thus liable to be restricted.

This is the very thrust of the US case against Iran, with Tehran being asked to forego all IAEA-safeguarded enrichment or reprocessing activity, despite Iran’s insistence that it is its lawful right to pursue such fuel cycle-related work under the provisions of the NPT. In seeking to forge an arbitrary new regime dividing the world into fuel-cycle possessors and fuel-cycle abstainers, the US has dubbed even IAEA-safeguarded enrichment and reprocessing activity as "dual use".

In addition to ensuring IAEA inspections on all aspects of India’s civilian nuclear programme, the US had staked an unparalleled double prerogative: the right to statutorily establish its own end-use monitoring, as called for in the Hyde Act Section 104(d)(5)(B)(i); and the right to institute "fallback safeguards" in case of "budget or personnel strains in the IAEA". The fallback option, stipulated in Hyde Act’s Section 104 (d)(5)(B)(iii), is to ensure that India is subject to intrusive, challenge inspections of the type the IAEA applies in non-nuclear states.

In the 123 agreement, the US has succeeded in subtly asserting its prerogatives on both fronts.

The provision for fallback safeguards finds mention in the agreement’s Article 10(4), which states, "If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures." That complies with the Hyde Act stipulation.

End-use US monitoring (to which India is committed through an earlier bilateral agreement on high-tech imports) is reflected in the agreement’s Article 12(3): "When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United States organisations requires exchanges of experts, the parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices".

12. While the US has managed to fully uphold all its laws, including the India-targeting Hyde Act, with New Delhi’s own admitted support, it is manifest from the released text that the Indian government has been unable to fully uphold even the Prime Minister’s solemn assurances to Parliament.

History is repeating itself. Ignoring the egregious way America cut off all fuel supply for Tarapur in the 1970s in material breach of the 123 agreement it signed in 1963, India is entering into new arrangements with its wings clipped (like on nuclear testing) as well as ambiguity or uncertainty on key issues. Even the actual grant of and continuation of the reprocessing right is to be contingent on India’s good behaviour.

Creating a US-monitored energy dependency through imported reactors dependent on imported fuel through a fresh 123 agreement loaded in favour of the supplier-state is to ask for trouble, especially when the new 123 accord is not half as protective of Indian interests as the 1963 agreement.

<i>(Brahma Chellaney, a strategic-affairs expert, is the author of Nuclear Proliferation: The US-India Conflict.)</i>
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>95% units to be in safeguard in 25 yrs </b>
  From Deccan Chronicle

New Delhi, Aug. 3: <b>India has voluntarily agreed to place “90 to 95 per cent” of its nuclear establishment under safeguards within 25 years if the civilian nuclear energy agreement comes into effect</b>. US undersecretary of state for political affairs Nicholas Burns, the American pointperson for the nuclear deal, in a revealing interview to the Council on Foreign Relations, said that it had been an easy “strategic” choice for Washington when faced with the question: should we isolate India for the next 35 years or bring it in partially now and nearly totally in the future.

The text of the 123 agreement released on Friday bears this out, <b>making it apparent that India had lost its right to conduct nuclear tests as any such move would allow the US to terminate the agreement</b>. A question on whether the US would help India find other sources of fuel while delaying its own nuclear supplies was countered by Mr Burns with a categorical: “<b>That’s absolutely false. I negotiated the agreement and we preserved intact the responsibility of the President under the Atomic Energy Act 1954 that if India or any other country conducts a nuclear test, the President will have the right to ask for the return of nuclear fuel or nuclear technologies that have been transferred by American firms.</b>

That right is preserved wholly in the agreement.” Significantly, Mr Burns also pinned the government down on Iran. When asked specifically whether the deal addressed US concerns that India would support efforts to pressure Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons programme, he said while this was not mentioned in the “technical” 123 agreement, “we have been very actively involved in counselling the Indian government that they should remain with the rest of the international community in arguing to the Iranians that they should not become a nuclear weapons power.” He made it apparent that Iran was not an extraneous issue, and <b>“we hope very much that India will not conclude any long-term oil and gas agreements with Iran.” This was a direct reference to the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, which will clearly have to go into cold storage now if the government wants the 123 agreement to go through the US Congress.</b>

Mr Burns pointed out that India had voted with the US at the IAEA board of governors against Iran on two occasions. “And so I trust the Indians will maintain this policy of not in any way, shape, or form assisting the Iranian government in its nuclear plans, and in giving the right advice to the Iranian government that we would expect any democratic country to give.” The Hyde Act has set out the bottomline on Iran, with several US congressmen and senators subsequently following up on this specific issue through strongly-worded letters, of which at least one was directly addressed to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, warning him against any cooperation with Iran.

Iran is the big issue in the US, with Washington determined to use all the influence it has globally and through the UN Security Council to, as Mr Burns put it, “to drive up the cost to Iran of its current intransigence.” He said he was currently working with the Russians, the Chinese and the Europeans on a draft Security Council resolution against Iran.

He spoke of the “broad international coalition”, including India, “where countries are sanctioning Iran and speaking out against its nuclear programme ... and against what Mr Burns described as the “motley gang of four” (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria and Belarus) supporting Iran. India is now expected to support what he said would be a “trend of increasingly tough international action against Iran, because they refuse to negotiate and they refuse to slow down their nuclear efforts.”<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

India, US reach 123 Agreement

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Fact Sheet as issued by the State Department.

The United States and India have reached a historic milestone in their strategic partnership by completing negotiations on the bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, also known as the 123 Agreement. This agreement will govern civil nuclear trade between our two countries and open the door for American and Indian firms to participate in each other’s civil nuclear energy sector.

The completed text of the proposed 123 Agreement is respectful of both the July 18, 2005, and March 2, 2006 Joint Statements issued by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. In addition, it is consistent with applicable U.S. law.

This agreement, about which the Administration briefed Congress regularly, establishes the framework for full civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India.

Key features of the agreement:

•Confirms the desire of both countries to engage in full civil nuclear cooperation, including research and development; nuclear safety; and commercial trade in nuclear reactors, technology, and fuel;
•Affirms the fuel supply assurances made to India by President Bush on March 2, 2006, including creating the necessary conditions to allow India access to the international fuel market, and by supporting the creation of an Indian strategic fuel reserve;
•Grants consent to India for certain nuclear fuel cycle activities. In particular, grants consent to reprocessing, with such right being brought into effect by India establishing a new national facility under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material, and our two countries agreeing on arrangements and procedures under which reprocessing will take place;
•Commits India to appropriate safeguards on all civil nuclear material and equipment subject to the agreement and to assuring that nuclear items subject to the agreement will be used only for peaceful purposes, including through a reaffirmation of India’s commitments to safeguards in perpetuity;
•Reinforces the commitment of both countries to global nonproliferation efforts;
•Preserves the rights of both countries to terminate cooperation and request the return of transferred items under appropriate circumstances; and
•Creates the legal basis for the United States to be a stable, reliable, and predictable supplier for India’s civil nuclear energy market.

<b>Next Steps</b>

The conclusion of negotiations on the 123 agreement opens the door for the completion of the remaining steps in the broader U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative.These steps include:

•Conclusion of a safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency applicable to India’s separated civil nuclear sector and progress toward an Additional Protocol;
•Achievement of a consensus decision in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to make an India-specific exception to the full-scope safeguards requirement of the Group’s export guidelines; and
•Approval of the 123 Agreement by the U.S. Congress.
Moron Singh will make India again a slave nation.
<b>BJP to review 123 agreement if voted to power</b> <!--emo&:cool--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/specool.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='specool.gif' /><!--endemo--> <!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->"We protested strongly when the Hyde Act was passed by the US Congress. We have consistently opposed the deal in Parliament whenever discussions on this deal have taken place," the two former ministers claimed.

Shourie claimed that he had asked for the expenditure involved in entire exercise from Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh but so far he has got answer.

"The BJP is of the clear view that this agreement is an assault on our nuclear sovereignty and our foreign policy options. We are, therefore, unable to accept this agreement as finalised.

"We demand that a Joint Parliamentary Committee be set up to examine the text in detail; that, after it has submitted its report, parliamentary approval be secured before this deal is signed; and that all further action on it should be suspended until this sequence is completed.

"The manner in which this agreement has been pushed through, leads us to further demand that appropriate amendments be made in the Constitution and laws to ensure that all agreements which affect the country's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security shall be ratified by Parliament," Sinha said.

He said that the United States has asked for the right to inspect the Indian nuclear and civil project and send in their inspectors in the garb of experts. It would also intervene into the bilateral talks between India and IAEA. He wondered why the Indian government is not resorting to mining of uranium in India, which is available in abundance.

He claimed that in the separation plan under the surveillance of US, two thirds of our reactors will be put in the civilian category under safe guards. With shutting of Cyrun reactor this will go up to 90 per cent.
<!--QuoteBegin-Mudy+Aug 4 2007, 10:44 PM-->QUOTE(Mudy @ Aug 4 2007, 10:44 PM)<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>BJP to review 123 agreement if voted to power</b>  <!--emo&:cool--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/specool.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='specool.gif' /><!--endemo--> <!--QuoteBegin--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->"We protested strongly when the Hyde Act was passed by the US Congress. We have consistently opposed the deal in Parliament whenever discussions on this deal have taken place," the two former ministers claimed.


I don't buy anything BJP has to sell anymore. Not on this not on anything... <!--emo&Big Grin--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->
August 04, 2007

Press Statement issued by Shri Yashwant Sinha & Shri Arun Shourie on Indo-US nuclear deal

Preliminary comments of the BJP on the Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the USA concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

1. The BJP has been expressing its reservations regarding the Indo-US nuclear deal from the very beginning. When the Joint Statement was issued at the end of the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington in July 2005, Shri Vajpayee issued a statement in which he expressed his reservations about the deal, specially with regard to its impact on our strategic nuclear programme. He had expressed his apprehension at the proposed separation plan of our nuclear facilities between civilian and military. Later, when the separation plan was presented to Parliament, we expressed our opposition to it. We warned the Government of India when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee of the US Congress adopted the draft bills for enabling this cooperation between the two countries. We protested strongly when the Hyde Act was passed by the US Congress. We have consistently opposed the deal in Parliament whenever discussions on this deal have taken place.

None of our fears and apprehensions was ever given serious consideration by the Government of India. No effort was ever made by it to evolve a national consensus on this vital issue of national concern before making commitments to the US.

The text of the bilateral 123 Agreement has been made public on Friday, August 3, 2007. We have looked at the text and our preliminary comments are as follows:

(i) Each party is required to implement this Agreement in accordance with its national laws and regulations and its licence requirements. There is no doubt, therefore, that the implementation of this Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of the Hyde Act of 2006, the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which are its national laws on this subject, and its licensing requirements relating to the supply of nuclear materials to India {article 2(1)}. The confidence with which US officials have asserted that the Agreement is Hyde act bound flows from this provision. Which act will India enforce on the US?

(ii) The Agreement is supposed to lead to full civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries yet article 2(2)(d) talks of cooperation relating to "aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle". Aspects mean parts and hence all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle are not covered under this Agreement.

(iii) According to article 5(2) of the Agreement sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities and major critical components of such facilities can be transferred to India only after an amendment to this Agreement has been carried out. The provision for such transfer should have been included in this Agreement itself instead of leaving it to a future amendment. It is a peculiar arrangement.

Under the same provision, the US will retain the right of end-use verification of all its supplies. This will ensure that American inspectors will "roam around our nuclear installations", a fear which was completely discounted by the Prime Minister while replying to the Rajya Sabha debate on 17.8.2006.

(iv) As far as fuel supplies are concerned, the commitment of the US in the Agreement is vague and futuristic. "The US is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws". This assurance in article 5(6)(a) of the Agreement and the assurances contained in article 5(6)(b) of the Agreement is not only bad drafting but deliberately repeats an old assurance given by the US at the time of the separation plan and remains as evasive as it was then. According to article 5(6)©, the India specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA is to be negotiated on the basis of these evasive assurances and requires India to place its civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards in perpetuity.

(v) India is required under this Agreement to establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. If it is an agreement between two equal parties with reciprocal commitments, is the US accepting a similar provision for its reprocessing facilities? Is any such facility being created in any country belonging to the Nuclear Five?

(vi) Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement either party shall have the right to require the return by the other party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. {article 14(4)} Thus, notwithstanding the sugar-coated language which has been used in the Agreement to soften the blow, the fact remains that the US retains the right to recall all the supplies that it has made to India under this Agreement. What is worse is that under article 16(3) despite the termination of this Agreement, the safeguards in perpetuity will continue to apply so long as any material or equipment or any of the by products thereof remain on Indian soil.

Clearly, therefore, with regard to fuel supplies, reprocessing rights and the right to recall the equipments supplied, the US has maintained its position as in the Hyde Act. India, on the other hand, has accepted legally enforceable commitments in perpetuity.

There is nothing in the Agreement regarding the reprocessing of the spent fuel of Tarapur which has accumulated over the last 33 years.

Nuclear testing has not been mentioned in the Agreement. According to the Government of India this is a matter of great comfort for us. This view is entirely untenable. When national laws apply, which includes the NPT, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Hyde Act of 2006 which specifically forbid nuclear tests, where is the question of India having the freedom to test once we enter into this agreement? In other words, we are being forced to accept a bilateral CTBT with more stringent provisions than the multilateral CTBT.

In his very first statement in 2005, Shri Vajpayee had raised the issue of the financial cost of separation of our facilities between civilian and military. The Government of India has kept mum on this. To this cost has now been added the cost of setting up a dedicated reprocessing facility, the cost of holding strategic fuel supplies for the life time of all our future reactors and the cost of mammoth and intrusive IAEA inspections.

In the separation plan prepared under the surveillance of the US, two thirds of our reactors will be put in the civilian category under safeguards. The recently refurbished CYRUS reactor will be shut down. In course of time, 90% of our reactors will be in the civilian category. In the ongoing negotiations in the Committee of Disarmament in Geneva, we have agreed to work together with the US for the early conclusion of the FMCT. We appear to have given up our insistence on international verification and all countries complying. All these, along with the intrusive provisions of the Hyde Act are bound to have a stultifying effect on our strategic nuclear programme.

The BJP is of the clear view that this Agreement is an assault on our nuclear sovereignty and our foreign policy options. We are, therefore, unable to accept this Agreement as finalised.

We demand that a Joint Parliamentary Committee be set up to examine the text in detail; that, after it has submitted its report, parliamentary approval be secured before this deal is signed; and that all further action on it should be suspended until this sequence is completed.

The manner in which this agreement has been pushed through, leads us to further demand that appropriate amendments be made in the Constitution and laws to ensure that all agreements which affect the country's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security shall be ratified by Parliament.

(Shyam Jaju)
Office Incharge

<b>Nuclear deal treats India as 'special and exceptional'</b>
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->I don't buy anything BJP has to sell anymore. Not on this not on anything... <!--emo&Big Grin--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo--> <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Only one guarantee with this party that President is not foreigner and they have couple of true nationalist leaders. Not like congress whose President is Italian, PM is more sincere towards World Bank or Saudi or others who are providing his pension then Indian citizens or country India where he breathe. Atleast BJP will not use Indian Embassy to rescue Italian friends of COngress President, ofcourse they they will use MEA to rescue half breed from US airport. <!--emo&Big Grin--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->
<b>Opposition gears up to corner Govt on nuclear deal </b><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Declaring its opposition to the just concluded Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, the BJP has sent a notice to Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee seeking a vote in the House on the issue when Parliament’s monsoon session begins on August 10.

The move came after former Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee, L K Advani, Jaswant Singh, Yashwant Sinha and other BJP leaders came to the conclusion that the deal would restrict India's nuclear testing programme.

The BJP has already demanded setting up of a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) to examine the draft agreement, and asked the government to suspend all further action on the civil nuclear deal till the JPC submits its report, which secures the approval of Parliament.

BJP’s deputy leader VK Malhotra said on Sunday that <b>"We have made the request to the Speaker to take up a discussion under Rule 184 which ends with as a vote. "</b>


The BJP’s strategy is to force the Left too to come out against the deal though the two Communist parties have reserved judgment till completion of their discussion with experts.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

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