03-03-2006, 10:29 AM
Friday, March 03, 2006
EDITORIAL: US-India nuclear deal comes through
The nuclear deal between India and the United States has finally happened. In some ways dramatically so and in keeping with the brouhaha it had created not just in the United States â among non-proliferationists â but also in India among Left-leaning parties and the disarmament, anti-nuclear energy lobby. There was also much speculation everywhere over whether the deal would be signed during President George W Bushâs visit to India. Those opposed to it thought it would not; even those in favour of it, in India, were not prepared to stick their necks out and say it would be signed during the current visit. Instead, they said that while the deal might not be signed during the visit, it would stay on the table. In the event, Mr Bush surprised everyone when he clinched it right on the tarmac after landing in New Delhi.
Later, at a joint press conference, Mr Bush confirmed it by saying that âWe have concluded an historic agreement today on nuclear power.â Analysts had faced a tough task trying to figure out whether the deal would go through. The opposition in the US Congress had not entirely abated; Indiaâs first list of nuclear facilities given to the US was pooh-poohed by the latter as sketchy and inadequate; India, reports suggested, was facing technical problems in identifying what facilities to declare as civilian nuclear facilities and how to disentangle the military and civilian sides of the programme; political constituencies in India, even the Congressâ allies, were opposed to the deal. Lately, Indiaâs scientific enclave had jumped into the fray and cast doubts over the advantage to India of the deal (this included Anil Kakodkar, current chairman of Indiaâs Atomic Energy Commission, who said that declaring fast breeder reactors would harm Indiaâs weapons programme); and US State Department officials gave conflicting statements on the dealâs status and how much work needed to be done on Indiaâs side before it could be finalised.
Even so, analysts would have done better if they had factored in four developments, two each on both sides. On Indiaâs side, the decision by New Delhi to join the US-European camp on the issue of Iran was very significant given Indiaâs traditionally good relations with Iran; equally, if not more important, was the removal of Mani Shankar Aiyar as petroleum minister. Mr Aiyar by all accounts was one of the most efficient cabinet members. Under his charge, India had drawn out a medium- to long-term map of a regional energy grid. He was also one of the most vocal proponents of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. His removal, coupled with policy change on Iran, should have indicated the extent of Indiaâs determination (and desperation) to clinch the nuclear deal.
On the side of the US, President Bush, after coming across as a more sedate second-term president, seems to be shaking himself up. His recent threat of a showdown with the US Congress on the issue of Dubai Ports Worldâs running of six US ports is a case in point. Mr Bush is known as a president who goes out there and gets things done. It appears that, despairing of the technical bickering over the issue, he decided to just do something high profile and be done with it. The second important development on the US side was the interest shown by US big business in the deal. Big business had started lobbying for the deal, a sure-fire way of pushing things through on the Hill.
An additional factor could be the eagerness with which France cut its own nuclear deal with India during French President Jacques Chiracâs visit there last month.
What next? The deal has still to be ratified by the US Senate and the question that now presents itself to analysts is whether this will happen. In some ways, Mr Bush in speeding up the process of signing the deal with India has put the cart before the horse. In doing so, however, he has thrown the ball in Indiaâs court. India will now have to decide what it must do to satisfy US lawmakers. And it will have to do so in the teeth of opposition from allies in the ruling coalition, left-liberal lobbies in India and even the scientific enclave. The Bush administration, for its part, will wait for what India does to make it easier for it (administration) to push the Senate to ratify the deal.
Leaving this aside for a moment, it is obvious that India has just turned a major corner in the conduct of its foreign policy. Never before has the break with its Nehruvian-socialist and non-allied past been so complete. India has accepted, as it must, that in seeking to embrace the US in a strategic partnership it has to pay the price of being less independent in its relations with other states. This is the upshot of a decade-long restructuring of Indiaâs foreign and security policies. It is anachronistic for some Indian analysts to argue that India still has time to go back to an âindependentâ foreign policy. As one analyst wrote last September, â... for New Delhi to go back and reassert itself... would mean unravelling the entire structure of Indiaâs foreign and security policies as it has evolved since 1998.â
There has been some unease in Pakistan over the deal with Islamabad arguing that it must also get the same treatment as India. This is a misplaced notion for two reasons: this deal is sui generis and India has got it on the basis of factors that Pakistan lacks; secondly, Pakistan might just have got it if it had not presented itself as a state of proliferation concern to the world. This is not the time for Pakistan to try and push for it. Given the bilateral nature of the deal, Pakistan could have a similar arrangement with China. Apart from the technological upside of the deal for India, there is more political worth in it than anything else. *
EDITORIAL: US-India nuclear deal comes through
The nuclear deal between India and the United States has finally happened. In some ways dramatically so and in keeping with the brouhaha it had created not just in the United States â among non-proliferationists â but also in India among Left-leaning parties and the disarmament, anti-nuclear energy lobby. There was also much speculation everywhere over whether the deal would be signed during President George W Bushâs visit to India. Those opposed to it thought it would not; even those in favour of it, in India, were not prepared to stick their necks out and say it would be signed during the current visit. Instead, they said that while the deal might not be signed during the visit, it would stay on the table. In the event, Mr Bush surprised everyone when he clinched it right on the tarmac after landing in New Delhi.
Later, at a joint press conference, Mr Bush confirmed it by saying that âWe have concluded an historic agreement today on nuclear power.â Analysts had faced a tough task trying to figure out whether the deal would go through. The opposition in the US Congress had not entirely abated; Indiaâs first list of nuclear facilities given to the US was pooh-poohed by the latter as sketchy and inadequate; India, reports suggested, was facing technical problems in identifying what facilities to declare as civilian nuclear facilities and how to disentangle the military and civilian sides of the programme; political constituencies in India, even the Congressâ allies, were opposed to the deal. Lately, Indiaâs scientific enclave had jumped into the fray and cast doubts over the advantage to India of the deal (this included Anil Kakodkar, current chairman of Indiaâs Atomic Energy Commission, who said that declaring fast breeder reactors would harm Indiaâs weapons programme); and US State Department officials gave conflicting statements on the dealâs status and how much work needed to be done on Indiaâs side before it could be finalised.
Even so, analysts would have done better if they had factored in four developments, two each on both sides. On Indiaâs side, the decision by New Delhi to join the US-European camp on the issue of Iran was very significant given Indiaâs traditionally good relations with Iran; equally, if not more important, was the removal of Mani Shankar Aiyar as petroleum minister. Mr Aiyar by all accounts was one of the most efficient cabinet members. Under his charge, India had drawn out a medium- to long-term map of a regional energy grid. He was also one of the most vocal proponents of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. His removal, coupled with policy change on Iran, should have indicated the extent of Indiaâs determination (and desperation) to clinch the nuclear deal.
On the side of the US, President Bush, after coming across as a more sedate second-term president, seems to be shaking himself up. His recent threat of a showdown with the US Congress on the issue of Dubai Ports Worldâs running of six US ports is a case in point. Mr Bush is known as a president who goes out there and gets things done. It appears that, despairing of the technical bickering over the issue, he decided to just do something high profile and be done with it. The second important development on the US side was the interest shown by US big business in the deal. Big business had started lobbying for the deal, a sure-fire way of pushing things through on the Hill.
An additional factor could be the eagerness with which France cut its own nuclear deal with India during French President Jacques Chiracâs visit there last month.
What next? The deal has still to be ratified by the US Senate and the question that now presents itself to analysts is whether this will happen. In some ways, Mr Bush in speeding up the process of signing the deal with India has put the cart before the horse. In doing so, however, he has thrown the ball in Indiaâs court. India will now have to decide what it must do to satisfy US lawmakers. And it will have to do so in the teeth of opposition from allies in the ruling coalition, left-liberal lobbies in India and even the scientific enclave. The Bush administration, for its part, will wait for what India does to make it easier for it (administration) to push the Senate to ratify the deal.
Leaving this aside for a moment, it is obvious that India has just turned a major corner in the conduct of its foreign policy. Never before has the break with its Nehruvian-socialist and non-allied past been so complete. India has accepted, as it must, that in seeking to embrace the US in a strategic partnership it has to pay the price of being less independent in its relations with other states. This is the upshot of a decade-long restructuring of Indiaâs foreign and security policies. It is anachronistic for some Indian analysts to argue that India still has time to go back to an âindependentâ foreign policy. As one analyst wrote last September, â... for New Delhi to go back and reassert itself... would mean unravelling the entire structure of Indiaâs foreign and security policies as it has evolved since 1998.â
There has been some unease in Pakistan over the deal with Islamabad arguing that it must also get the same treatment as India. This is a misplaced notion for two reasons: this deal is sui generis and India has got it on the basis of factors that Pakistan lacks; secondly, Pakistan might just have got it if it had not presented itself as a state of proliferation concern to the world. This is not the time for Pakistan to try and push for it. Given the bilateral nature of the deal, Pakistan could have a similar arrangement with China. Apart from the technological upside of the deal for India, there is more political worth in it than anything else. *