02-17-2010, 10:04 PM
[size="6"]CIA spy in Indian cabinet prevented Pakistanââ¬â¢s annihilation[/size]
A minister of Indira Gandhiââ¬â¢s cabinet betrayed Indiaââ¬â¢s ââ¬Åwar objectivesââ¬Â to the Central Intelligence Agency in December 1971, causing an abrupt end to the Bangladesh war under vicious US arm twisting.
This is the highlight of the book CIAââ¬â¢s Eye on South Asia by journalist Anuj Dhar. Published by Delhi-based Manas Publications, which is facing governmentââ¬â¢s ire for coming out with a book on the R&AW, the book compiles declassified CIA records on India and her neighbours. It specifically spotlights what arguably has been Indiaââ¬â¢s biggest spy scandal.
In the run up to the 1971 India Pakistan war over what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), The New York Times first hinted at the presence of a CIA operative in the Indian government. By December The Washington Post had reported that US President Richard Nixonââ¬â¢s South Asia policy was being guided by ââ¬Åreports from a source close to Mrs. Gandhi.ââ¬Â
Records and telecons declassified recently ââ¬â but not properly explained up till now ââ¬â show that a dramatic turnaround came on December 6 when a CIA operative, whom Dhar pins down as a minister of the Indira Cabinet, leaked out Indiaââ¬â¢s ââ¬Åwar objectivesââ¬Â to the agency. Prime Minister Gandhi told Union Cabinet that apart from liberating Bangladesh, India intended to take over a strategically important part of the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and go for the total annihilation of Pakistanââ¬â¢s armed forces so that Pakistan ââ¬Ånever attempts to challenge India in the future.ââ¬Â
When he came to know of the CIA report, a furious Nixon blurted out that ââ¬Åthis woman [Indira Gandhi] suckered us,ââ¬Â thinking that Mrs. Gandhi had promised him that India wonââ¬â¢t attack East Pakistan ââ¬â not to speak of targeting West Pakistan and PoK. ââ¬ÅBut let me tell you, sheââ¬â¢s going to pay,ââ¬Â he told his National Security Advisor Dr Henry Kissinger even as he tried to leak out the CIA report to give her bad press.
The CIA went on assess that fulfillment of Indiaââ¬â¢s ââ¬Åwar objectivesââ¬Â might lead to ââ¬Åthe emergence of centrifugal forces which could shatter West Pakistan into as many as three or four separate countries.ââ¬Â
As a direct result of the operativeââ¬â¢s information, the Nixon administration went on an overdrive to save West Pakistan from a massive Indian assault. Because the President felt that ââ¬Åinternational morality will be finished ââ¬â the United Nations will be finished ââ¬â if you adopt the principle that because a country is democratic and big it can do what the hell it pleases.ââ¬Â
Nixon personally threatened the USSR with a ââ¬Åmajor confrontationââ¬Â between the superpowers should the Soviets failed to stop the Indians from going into West Pakistan. Kissinger secretly met Chinese Permanent Representative at the UN to apprise him of the CIA operativeââ¬â¢s report and rub in that what India was planning to do with Pakistan with the Soviet backing could turn out to be a ââ¬Ådress rehearsalââ¬Â of what they might do to China.
Dhar quotes in the book the official records showing that USSRââ¬â¢s First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov visited Delhi after Nixonââ¬â¢s threat and told the ââ¬ÅIndians to confine their objectives to East Pakistanââ¬Â and ââ¬Ånot to try and take any part of West Pakistan, including Azad Kashmirââ¬Â as ââ¬ÅMoscow was concerned about the possibility of a great power confrontation over the subcontinent.ââ¬Â Kuznetsov also extracted a guarantee from Prime Minister Gandhi that India will not attack West Pakistan. This decision was promptly conveyed to Nixon. On 16 December 1971 when Nixon was told that India had declared a ceasefire, he exulted: ââ¬ÅWe have made itââ¬Â¦ itââ¬â¢s the Russians working for us.ââ¬Â Kissinger congratulated him for saving West Pakistan ââ¬â Indiaââ¬â¢s main target, as per the operativeââ¬â¢s report to the CIA.
Dhar repudiates recent assertion by a former Indian Navy chief that showing up of Americaââ¬â¢s biggest nuclear powered carrier into the Bay of Bengal during the war had something to do with the accidental destruction of a US plane in Dhaka during an Indian strafing. ââ¬ÅDeclassified records make it unambiguously clear that the month-long show of strength by the USS Enterprise and accompanying flotilla was a byproduct of the CIA operativeââ¬â¢s reports,ââ¬Â he writes, reproducing chunks from official records detailing how Nixon ordered a naval task force towards the subcontinent to ââ¬Åscare offââ¬Â India from attacking West Pakistan.
In subsequent years, former Prime Minister Morarji Desai, and two deputy PMs ââ¬â Jagjivan Ram and Y B Chavan ââ¬â were alleged to be the CIA operative active during the 1971 war. However, all such charges lacked any substantiation because there was no confirmation whether or not such an operative ever existed. As such no constructive discussion on the issue ever took off. This has changed now given the unassailable evidence in the form of US records making it clear that the CIA had a ââ¬Åreliableââ¬Â agent operating out of the Indian cabinet in 1971.
In declassified records the name of the operative has been censored because the CIA Director has ââ¬Åstatutory obligations to protect from disclosure [the Agency's] intelligence sources.ââ¬Â Dhar writes: ââ¬ÅNaming the Indian operative even after so many years will adversely impact the Indo-US relations, and hit the Agencyââ¬â¢s prospects of recruiting new informants.ââ¬Â
However, he suggests that Indian government may have known the identity of the operative. ââ¬ÅR&AW under the most capable R. N. Kao could not have missed the reference to the ââ¬â¢source close to Mrs. Gandhiââ¬â¢ and must have dug deeper,ââ¬Â he writes, adding that in 1972 Mrs. Gandhi herself charged that ââ¬Åshe had information that the CIA had become active in Indiaââ¬Â.
More pertinently, Dhar quotes from the declassified record of a 5 October 1972 meeting between Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and US Secretary of State William Rogers. During the meeting, Singh asserted that ââ¬ÅCIA has been in contact with people in India in ââ¬Ëabnormal ways.ââ¬â¢Ã¢â¬Â and that India had information that ââ¬Åproceedings of Congress Working Committee were known to US officials within two hours of meetingsââ¬Â.
A minister of Indira Gandhiââ¬â¢s cabinet betrayed Indiaââ¬â¢s ââ¬Åwar objectivesââ¬Â to the Central Intelligence Agency in December 1971, causing an abrupt end to the Bangladesh war under vicious US arm twisting.
This is the highlight of the book CIAââ¬â¢s Eye on South Asia by journalist Anuj Dhar. Published by Delhi-based Manas Publications, which is facing governmentââ¬â¢s ire for coming out with a book on the R&AW, the book compiles declassified CIA records on India and her neighbours. It specifically spotlights what arguably has been Indiaââ¬â¢s biggest spy scandal.
In the run up to the 1971 India Pakistan war over what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), The New York Times first hinted at the presence of a CIA operative in the Indian government. By December The Washington Post had reported that US President Richard Nixonââ¬â¢s South Asia policy was being guided by ââ¬Åreports from a source close to Mrs. Gandhi.ââ¬Â
Records and telecons declassified recently ââ¬â but not properly explained up till now ââ¬â show that a dramatic turnaround came on December 6 when a CIA operative, whom Dhar pins down as a minister of the Indira Cabinet, leaked out Indiaââ¬â¢s ââ¬Åwar objectivesââ¬Â to the agency. Prime Minister Gandhi told Union Cabinet that apart from liberating Bangladesh, India intended to take over a strategically important part of the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and go for the total annihilation of Pakistanââ¬â¢s armed forces so that Pakistan ââ¬Ånever attempts to challenge India in the future.ââ¬Â
When he came to know of the CIA report, a furious Nixon blurted out that ââ¬Åthis woman [Indira Gandhi] suckered us,ââ¬Â thinking that Mrs. Gandhi had promised him that India wonââ¬â¢t attack East Pakistan ââ¬â not to speak of targeting West Pakistan and PoK. ââ¬ÅBut let me tell you, sheââ¬â¢s going to pay,ââ¬Â he told his National Security Advisor Dr Henry Kissinger even as he tried to leak out the CIA report to give her bad press.
The CIA went on assess that fulfillment of Indiaââ¬â¢s ââ¬Åwar objectivesââ¬Â might lead to ââ¬Åthe emergence of centrifugal forces which could shatter West Pakistan into as many as three or four separate countries.ââ¬Â
As a direct result of the operativeââ¬â¢s information, the Nixon administration went on an overdrive to save West Pakistan from a massive Indian assault. Because the President felt that ââ¬Åinternational morality will be finished ââ¬â the United Nations will be finished ââ¬â if you adopt the principle that because a country is democratic and big it can do what the hell it pleases.ââ¬Â
Nixon personally threatened the USSR with a ââ¬Åmajor confrontationââ¬Â between the superpowers should the Soviets failed to stop the Indians from going into West Pakistan. Kissinger secretly met Chinese Permanent Representative at the UN to apprise him of the CIA operativeââ¬â¢s report and rub in that what India was planning to do with Pakistan with the Soviet backing could turn out to be a ââ¬Ådress rehearsalââ¬Â of what they might do to China.
Dhar quotes in the book the official records showing that USSRââ¬â¢s First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov visited Delhi after Nixonââ¬â¢s threat and told the ââ¬ÅIndians to confine their objectives to East Pakistanââ¬Â and ââ¬Ånot to try and take any part of West Pakistan, including Azad Kashmirââ¬Â as ââ¬ÅMoscow was concerned about the possibility of a great power confrontation over the subcontinent.ââ¬Â Kuznetsov also extracted a guarantee from Prime Minister Gandhi that India will not attack West Pakistan. This decision was promptly conveyed to Nixon. On 16 December 1971 when Nixon was told that India had declared a ceasefire, he exulted: ââ¬ÅWe have made itââ¬Â¦ itââ¬â¢s the Russians working for us.ââ¬Â Kissinger congratulated him for saving West Pakistan ââ¬â Indiaââ¬â¢s main target, as per the operativeââ¬â¢s report to the CIA.
Dhar repudiates recent assertion by a former Indian Navy chief that showing up of Americaââ¬â¢s biggest nuclear powered carrier into the Bay of Bengal during the war had something to do with the accidental destruction of a US plane in Dhaka during an Indian strafing. ââ¬ÅDeclassified records make it unambiguously clear that the month-long show of strength by the USS Enterprise and accompanying flotilla was a byproduct of the CIA operativeââ¬â¢s reports,ââ¬Â he writes, reproducing chunks from official records detailing how Nixon ordered a naval task force towards the subcontinent to ââ¬Åscare offââ¬Â India from attacking West Pakistan.
In subsequent years, former Prime Minister Morarji Desai, and two deputy PMs ââ¬â Jagjivan Ram and Y B Chavan ââ¬â were alleged to be the CIA operative active during the 1971 war. However, all such charges lacked any substantiation because there was no confirmation whether or not such an operative ever existed. As such no constructive discussion on the issue ever took off. This has changed now given the unassailable evidence in the form of US records making it clear that the CIA had a ââ¬Åreliableââ¬Â agent operating out of the Indian cabinet in 1971.
In declassified records the name of the operative has been censored because the CIA Director has ââ¬Åstatutory obligations to protect from disclosure [the Agency's] intelligence sources.ââ¬Â Dhar writes: ââ¬ÅNaming the Indian operative even after so many years will adversely impact the Indo-US relations, and hit the Agencyââ¬â¢s prospects of recruiting new informants.ââ¬Â
However, he suggests that Indian government may have known the identity of the operative. ââ¬ÅR&AW under the most capable R. N. Kao could not have missed the reference to the ââ¬â¢source close to Mrs. Gandhiââ¬â¢ and must have dug deeper,ââ¬Â he writes, adding that in 1972 Mrs. Gandhi herself charged that ââ¬Åshe had information that the CIA had become active in Indiaââ¬Â.
More pertinently, Dhar quotes from the declassified record of a 5 October 1972 meeting between Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and US Secretary of State William Rogers. During the meeting, Singh asserted that ââ¬ÅCIA has been in contact with people in India in ââ¬Ëabnormal ways.ââ¬â¢Ã¢â¬Â and that India had information that ââ¬Åproceedings of Congress Working Committee were known to US officials within two hours of meetingsââ¬Â.