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Demographic Politics And Population Growth - 2

You might want to get this paper for your research, from ." Population and Development Review 28: 515-538".


<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Muslim and Non- Muslim differences in female autonomy and fertility: evidence from four Asian countries

by S. Philip Morgan , Sharon Stash , Herbert L. Smith , Karen Oppenheim Mason

On the basis of research on paired Muslim and non- Muslim communities selected in <b>India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines</b>, the authors test the hypothesis that greater observed Muslim pronatalism can be explained by<b> less power or lower autonomy among Muslim women.</b> Indeed, wives in the Muslim communities, compared to the non- Muslim ones: <b>1) had more children, 2) were more likely to desire additional children, and 3) if they desired no more children, were less likely to be using contraception.</b> However, the authors <b>do not find that Muslim communities consistently score lower on dimensions of women's power/autonomy. </b>Thus, aggregate-level comparisons provide little evidence of a relationship between lower autonomy and higher fertility. Individual level multivariate analysis of married women in these paired settings similarly suggests that women's autonomy differentials do not account for the higher fertility, demand for more children, and less use of contraception among Muslim wives. <b>These results suggest th at explanations for Muslim/non- Muslim fertility differences lie <i>elsewhere</i></b>. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

Therein lies the rub.. Demographic warfare for Political goals (elsewhere)
<!--QuoteBegin-G.Subramaniam+Mar 5 2005, 07:49 AM-->QUOTE(G.Subramaniam @ Mar 5 2005, 07:49 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin--> So why dont hindu women do the same
A knife for a knife, a baby for a baby

All these women are half xtian <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Hello G Subra,

Back to 'an eye for an eye', eh! I though we were dun wit it 2 millenia ago, no?

As I said a year ago, you have correctly analysed the problem, but your solution is impractical. Hindu women are never going to have 3-5 kids. Those in the RSS and VHP who suggest that are buffoons, fighting Indian policy. The women are not half christian.

Any other solutions? What about evangelising and converting Indian muslims to Hinduism? Why do you think this will not work? PIO Hindus are doing this right now, as we speak, wherever they live. Bush is taking the islamic ummah to the 21st century. Do you feel the Indian Hindus are not ballsy enough to convert the muslims to Hinduism? If so, why dont you get to the point and just say so!

And why dont you(who have misrepresented me to the VHP) stand aside and let us do the job.

(I dont know why this thread exists as no new info or idea has emerged in more than a year.) Do you have any new ideas, G. Subra?

Regards. <!--emo&Smile--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/smile.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='smile.gif' /><!--endemo-->

Per evangelical websites
Islam is a biological problem
They breed too fast to be converted
By the time you reconvert 1 muslim, they breed 100
Breeding is what we know how 'to do'. We are the worlds' experts. As of now the subcontinent is more populated than China - we passed that threshold in 1999. In 2025 India will be singularly more populous than China and water will be a scarce commodity over which even Indian states will go to war!

Breeding time is over. Technology says so.

Muslims will first be converted to uphold democracy and human rights (Bush/Rice agenda), then Hindus will/must convert them to abandon 'religious exclusivism', then 'convert the willing' to Hinduism. We are looking to convert whole societies at a time and the Balinese have to told me that Java with 130 million people will be the first.

In Malaysia, we have already convinced them that worship of the Kaaba is not sanctioned in the Koran, it is unislamic, and that the Kaaba did not exist during the reign of Muhammad and there is no way it could have been mentioned in the Koran or sunnah. In short, they are realising they are idol worshippers, like us yindoos. <!--emo&Smile--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/smile.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='smile.gif' /><!--endemo-->

Muslims are like tall grass; will sway where the wind blows. See Egypt, Pakistan, Syria, etc. They need to be shown 'who kicks asses", not who breeds.

And the PIOs' HAVE the balls to do it.

Thanks G. Subra. Now you tell VHP you were wrong.


Regarding VHP
I just pointed them to this forum to see your comments on arrest of JS

Beyond that I have nothing to do

Further this is a diversion of this demographic thread

Penicillins versus the Tetracyclines

These are 2 separate families of anti-biotics

They destroy bacteria by separate methods

Penicillins actually kill the bacteria
whereas the tetracyclines, slow down the reproduction of the bacteria and gives time for the natural defenses of the body to slowly destroy the bacteria

Counter-breeding comes in the Tetracycline category

Another analogy I can use is Cholera
In cholera, there is no medication, what is used is called Oral Rehydration Therapy
A solution of Salt+Sugar+water is given in large enough quantities to the infected person to make up for the fluid loss caused by the infection
When the fluid balance is contained for a few days, cholera slowly vanishes

See the analogy with counter-breeding

In his book, "World of Fatwas' , Shourie clearly argues that being a muslim is stressful by itself and being forced to live as a muslim minority is 100 times more stressful.
For example, Islam has rules that ban use of urinals
There are islamic rules on using stones to wipe themselves after going to the bathroom
( These islamic rules are called istinja )
Any time a muslim uses a urinal he is violating islam
Once you seal the pressure cooker by counter breeding, you set up the stage for implosion
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Hindu women are never going to have 3-5 kids.

Who said so?

My neighbour has 4 kids already.

I am planning at least 5.
Having an average of 4 kids mean the birth rate rises from 1.7 % to 2.7%, which means a population of approximately 2.1 billion by 2050.

Is this what we want? Having 2 Indias by then?

Can the Indian farmers feed this population? Anymore arable land left? Will there be enough water? The energy requirements would push oil prices to $200 per barrel or more, leaving more people in poverty. Has India discovered vast new mineral and water resources in the 20th century?

Please think carefully before making rash advice.

1. Ashok Chowgule is a reasonable man not taken to selective hate mail. And it is understood that he may not be able to influence the VHP much.

2. Arun Gandhi is a Hindu, an ecumenist perhaps, but at the higher levels Hindus do want to interact with christians and muslims on common issues.
Do the muslims care that they will have an ecologically ravaged country when they manage to take over by breeding
Against this breeding mentality, you have to get down to their levels
It is like mud-wrestling with a pig

When ecological saturation occurs and islam is still below critical mass
it cant expand and will explode

Having 2.1 billion will dilute islam to 15% in residual India and prevent civil war

Next we can copy the muslims and ship the excess by illegal immigration to the demographically dying west

We also have the example of Malaysia where even Dr.Mahathir breeded 7 kids
and muslims grew from 45% in 1900 to 65% today and have imposed second class citizenship on non-muslims

Another example is Bangladesh, which was hindu majority in 1757,
The bengali hindus cut back on fertility whereas the muslims were willing to live like goats and breed 7 kids and became majority and grabbed the property and women of the less fertile hindus

A hindu who is unwilling to sacrifice some standard of living to protect his property and his women, by simply breeding 5 kids,
will definitely be not have the willingness to defend against a jihadi

Regarding VHP and Arun Gandhi, those belong to other threads and not to the demographic thread

Islam is a darwinian threat, and needs to be treated accordingly
Author: Dina Nath Mishra
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: February 27, 2005
In Bihar, Muslims comprise 16.5 per cent of the
population and have been the sole determinants of
power for 15 years.

Muslims have played a major role in shaping Indian
politics. They form 13.4 per cent of our population.
States where Muslims account for more than 10 per cent
of the population are Lashkadweep (95.5 per cent), J&K
(67 per cent), Assam (31 per cent), W Bengal (25 per
cent), Kerala (24.7 per cent), Bihar (16.5 per cent),
Jharkhand (13.8 per cent), Karnataka (12.2 per cent),
Uttaranchal (11.9 per cent), Delhi (11.7 per cent) and
Maharashtra (10.6 per cent).

Muslims are concentrated in UP, Bihar, West Bengal and
Assam, especially in districts bordering Nepal.
Western UP has been witnessing a demography change for
some time .

When Nationalist forces rang alarm bells just after
the release of the 2001 Census figures, the secular
brigade derided it as a saffron propaganda. Left wing
Economic and Political Weekly of January 29, 2005,
devoted an entire issue to it. By their hair-splitting
arguments about fertility differentials by religion
literacy and female-to-male ratio, they pooh-poohed
the "saffron propaganda".

A decade back, former IB chief T V Rajeshwar wrote an
alarming piece about religious demographic changes in
certain parts of India and warned the country that the
threat of another Partition is looming large. He is
former Uttar Pradesh Governor Vishnu Kant Shastri.
When the UPA Government came to power, the so-called
saffronite governor was summarily dismissed and
Rajeshwar was brought in his place.

Most writers and researchers who have flexed their
intellectual muscles to disapprove the so-called
saffron propaganda have banked on Muslim illiteracy
for the rise in Muslim population. This impression is
quite erroneous.

Dr Omar Khalidi was born in Hyderabad and emigrated to
the US in 1977. He did his masters from Harvard
University and PhD from the University of Wales.
Currently, he is teaching in the Massachusetts
University of Technology as a staff member of the Agha
Khan programme.

In his interview to Radiance Views, a Jamaat-e-Islami
weekly, he said: "We need Muslim-majority districts
for three reasons. First, concentrated areas provide
security. Second, they provide an environment that is
conducive to our cultural independence. Third, they
provide a political base through which our people can
be elected. At present, constituencies have been
created in a way that our numbers don't add up to
elect adequate legislators.... Hyderabad and
Rangareddy in Andhra Pradesh and Gulbarga and certain
talukas could be merged to create a Deccan province.
Similarly in Bihar, the regions of Katihar, Kishanganj
and Purniya can be made into an Urdu-speaking province
or a Union Territory. There are regions in Bengal and
UP where Muslims can be in majority. Though, a large
number of Muslims would still be left out, having
these strongholds is important for their future. This
would ensure proper political representation in States
and we would have our voice in Parliament.... A decade
ago, it was not fashionable to talk about reservation
for Muslims. Today, Muslims have reservation in Kerala
and Karnataka. In Andhra, too, we are likely to get
reservation. Don't judge everything from what's
happening today. Huq liye jaten hain pesh nahin kiye

The cat is out of the bag. The ummah has to Islamise
the whole world. Jehadis are fighting for it. In
India, they, too, have an agenda. Dr Khalidi has just
put it in words and has, in fact, given a clarion
call. Jinnah propounded the 'Two-Nation Theory' and
carved out a nation of Dar-ul-Islam (land of
believers). The rest of India is Dar-ul-Harb (land of
non-believers) which needs to be conquered.

Our brand of secularism has not just partitioned
India, but several other countries as well. Those who
do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it.
Indians don't mind a Barkatullah as Chief Minister of
Rajasthan. In fact, most Indians celebrated the rise
of Dr APJ Abdul Kalam as President. It was his merit
not religion that enabled him to reach the position.
But Muslim appeasement by political parties must be

Our intellectuals and secular parties have an ostrich
like altitude. Indians failed to understand Islam, an
expansionist political religion. Even now, our
intellectuals cry foul whenever the question of
demographic aggression and high percentage of increase
in Muslim population is raised.

Delimitation: Malappuram gets 4 more constituencies
KA Antony/ Thiruvanthapuram

The election authorities have released the final draft for delimitation of 20 Parliament and 140 Legislative Assembly constituencies in Kerala reflecting demographic changes.

According to the proposal, South Kerala will lose seven Assembly seats to Malabar. The Muslim dominated Malappuram,which according to the latest census has a population growth of 19 percent against the State average of 9 percent, is the main beneficiary of this.

Malappuram, which had 12 constituencies gets four more, leaving one each to the northern districts of Palakkad, Kozhikode and Kannur.

As for the Southern districts, Alappuzha and Pathanamthitta lose two seats each while Kottayam, Kollam and Thrissur will have to part with one seat each.

Complaints and suggestions can be sent to the Delimitation Commission office in New Delhi before April 8. They will be considered at the Commission's sittings in Kozhikode, Kochi and Thiruvananthapuram later in the month.

The final draft was prepared after consultations with its associate members MP Gangadharan and PP George (Congress), P Rajendran (Communist Party of India-Marxist), KNA Khader (Indian Union Muslim League) and PC Thomas (NDA).

The following are the delimited/renamed Assembly constituencies: Manjeshwaram, Kasaragod, Udma, Thrikkarippur and Hosdurg (all in Kasaragod district).

Payyannur, Kalliassery, Thalipparamba, Irikkoor, Azhekode, Kannur, Dharmadham, Thalassery, Koothuparamba, Mattannur and Aralam fall in Kannur district and Mananthavady, Kalpetta and Sultan Bathery fall in Wayanad district.

While Vadakara, Kuttiadi, Nadapuram, Qoilandy, Perambra, Balussery, Elathur, Kozhikode North, Kozhikode South, Beypore, Kunnamangalam, Koduvally and Thiruvambady are in Kozhikodedistrict, Kondotty, Eranadu, Nilambur, Vandoor, Manjeri, Perinthalmanna, Mangada, Malappuram, Vengara, Chelambra, Thirurangadi, Tanur, Tirur, Kottakkal, Thavanur and Ponnani fall in (Malappuram); Thrithala, Pattambi, Shornur, Ottappalam, Kongad, Mannarcaud, Malampuzha, Palakkad, Tarur, Chittoor, Nenmara and Alathur (Palakkad).

Chelakkara, Kunnamkulam, Guruvayur, Manalur, Vadakkancherry, Ollur, Thrissur, Nattika, Kalpamangalam, Iringalakkuda, Puthukkad, Chalakkudy and Kodungalloor fall in Thrissur and Perumbavoor, Angamaly, Aluva, Kalamassery, Paravur, Pallippuram, Kochi, Thripunithura, Ernakulam, Thrikkakkara, Kunnathunadu, Piravom, Moovattupuzha and Kothamangalam fall in Ernakulam district.

Devikulam, Udumbanchola, Peerumedu, Thodupuzha and Idukki (Idukki).Pala, Kaduthuruthy, Vaikkom, Ettumanur, Kottayam, Puthuppally, Changanassery, Kanjirappaly and Poonjar (Kottayam).

Aroor, Cherthala, Alappuzha, Ambalappuzha, Kuttanadu, Harippadu, Kayamkulam, Mavelikkara and Chengannur (Alappuzha). Thiruvalla, Ranny, Aranmula, Konni, Adoor (Pathanamthitta).

Karunagappally, Chavara, Kunnathur, Kottarakkara, Pathanapuram, Punaloor, Chadayamangalam, Kundara, Kollam, Iravipuram and Chathannur (Kollam).

Varkala, Attingal, Chirayinkeezhu, Nedumangad, Vamanapuram, Kazhakkoottam, vattiyoorkkavu, Thiruvananthapuram, Nemam, Aruvikkara, Parassala, Kattakkada, Kovalam and Neyyattinkara are in Thiruvananthapuram.

Trivialising Religion

Causes of Higher Muslim Fertility

P N Mari Bhat

The collection of papers in the EPW special issue on fertility behaviour of Hindus and Muslims (January 29, 2005) has thrown up several contentious issues that need to be debated further. Although a consensus seems to have emerged that the current Hindu-Muslim fertility differential cannot wholly be explained by socio-economic or residential differences, there remains considerable disagreement on the size and trends in the fertility differential, and more so on its causes. As an author of one of the papers included in the special issue [Bhat and Zavier 2005], one last attempt is made here to explain why I disagree with the positions taken in some of the papers.

Some authors are of the view that the current difference in fertility between Hindus and Muslims is small but its scale is usually exaggerated in the media [Bhagat and Praharaj 2005; Jeffrey and Jeffrey 2005]. When Jeffrey and Jeffrey make such a claim, the reference invariably is towards propaganda materials of the Hindu nationalists. But due to their ideological leaning, Hindu nationalists would be prone to exaggeration, and thus are not the proper basis for objective assessment. In scientific works, the significance of a differential is judged in relation to others, or from its consequences. Decades of demographic research in India have shown that among the many fertility differentials studied, the Hindu-Muslim differential is one of the most enduring ones. For example, Jack Caldwell, whose micro research in south India gets strong endorsement from Jeffrey and Jeffrey, had this to say on this issue: “Perhaps because of greater pressure on the poor, especially during the Emergency, there are no significant differentials in fertility or family planning practice by socio-economic status, caste grouping, or education. There is only one important differential, and that is by religion” [Caldwell et al 1982:714]. An element of exaggeration in this statement cannot be ruled out, as no hard data on the differentials were presented. But it is unlikely that a keen observer like Caldwell would have missed much. As per NFHS-2, the difference in TFR between illiterate women and those who completed high school is 1.5 births (3.5 and 2.0, respectively). A difference of one birth per woman between Hindus and Muslims is thus equivalent to the effect of about six years of schooling.1 A decrease of only one birth per woman is needed for India to achieve the replacement level fertility. Thus a difference of one birth per woman, or roughly the order of 30 per cent, should not be dismissed as insignificant.

It is also contended that the current difference in fertility rates of Hindus and Muslims is only temporary, and soon the levels of the two would converge. But this also applies to fertility differentials by education or income. It is also likely that soon, the fertility difference between Uttar Pradesh and Kerala would disappear. So, should we be ignoring the difference by educational levels, or that between north and south India? Trivialising the religious difference is in nobody’s interest because the Hindu nationalists, who need to be convinced, would dismiss it as minority appeasement and among Muslims, it could diminish the desire for introspection.

Explaining Fertility Differential

As causes of the fertility differential, I find at least three separate lines of argument that studiously avoid implicating religion. First, the higher fertility of Muslims is attributed to their minority status, and constant threats and vilification campaign of Hindu nationalists [Bhagat and Praharaj 2005; Dharmalingam et al 2005; Jeffrey and Jeffrey 2005]. Second, it is attributed to their higher natural fertility and delayed onset of fertility decline, owing to their lower socio-economic status [James and Nair 2005; Krishnaji and James 2005]. Third, Borooah and Iyer (2005) attribute it to the lower degree of daughter aversion among Muslims. The last one, while invoking religion, highlights a positive attribute of Muslims. I shall take up these propositions in the reverse order, and argue why they lack substance.

First, it should be noted that demographers distinguish between sex preference and preference for number of children, whereas Borooah and Iyer (B&I) do not. For B&I, son preference means desiring more sons relative to that in a reference group, and daughter aversion means desiring fewer daughters than the same group. As demographers control for the effect of preference for total number of children while measuring the effect of sex preference on fertility, for them son preference and daughter aversion are one and the same. But in B&I’s terminology, they are not necessarily complementary. Besides this conceptual difference, the analysis presented by B&I in support of their daughter aversion hypothesis has a technical flaw.2 The results based on a partial sample of women who have terminated their fertility could be biased because the probability of selection into the sample is not the same for Hindus and Muslims. As non-use of contraception could also be due to sex preference, it is necessary to consider the entire sample of women in totality. Also, considering only terminal method users, as B&I do, would be a mistake in this case because religious injunctions against sterilisation could be forcing many Muslims to use temporary methods for terminating fertility.

A method devised by Arnold (1985) gets around this problem, as it uses the entire sample of women and the data on contraceptive use status by number and sex of living children. The method measures the effect of sex composition of children on contraceptive use by controlling for the effect of total number of children. As noted in our paper, this method applied to the NFHS data, showed that sex preference depressed contraceptive use among both Hindus and Muslims, but more so in the former. If one wishes to distinguish the effects of son preference from daughter aversion, the proper thing to do is to regress contraceptive use on number of sons and number of daughters. Table 1 shows the results of such a regression done using NFHS-2 data for Hindus and Muslims. The estimated odds ratios show that the odds of using contraception increase with the number of sons more rapidly in Hindus than in Muslims. That is, Muslims end up with more sons than Hindus before accepting contraception. Although the estimated rise is more muted, the same pattern is found in the case of daughters. In other words, compared to Hindus, Muslims desire more sons as well as daughters. Thus, in B&I’s terminology, fertility is higher among Muslims both on account of higher son preference and lower daughter aversion. But in demographer’s terminology, son preference (or daughter aversion) is higher among Hindus than Muslims. This is because the estimated odds ratios show that contraceptive use is determined more by the number of sons than by the number of daughters, and the sex difference in the odds ratio is higher for Hindus than for Muslims.

The argument of James et al has two interconnected parts: (i) Muslims have significantly higher natural fertility level that partly explains their higher fertility, and (ii) because of their lower socio-economic status, Muslims were not exposed to the fertility declines that occurred before the 1980s; but since then, the pace of fertility decline among them has been comparable to that of Hindus. On the first, James and Nair were unable to find confirmatory evidence, as their analysis of proximate determinants showed that total fecundity rate (a measure of biological upper limit to fertility) is lower among Muslims than Hindus. The second part of their argument too rests on shaky evidence. As per the 1984 SRS survey, the Muslim TFR was 5.6 births per woman. But the available evidence suggests that the Muslim TFR in the 1960s was more than 6.5. Clearly, significant fertility decline had occurred among Muslims before the 1980s. The pace of fertility decline during 1970-78 was, if not faster, comparable to that which occurred in the late 1980s. It is known that mass vasectomy camps conducted during and before the Emergency period played a critical part in it. It would be naive to assume that such sterilisation drives did not affect the poor (vide, the above quote from Caldwell).

The contention of James et al that Muslims have kept pace with the Hindus since the ‘accelerated’ decline in fertility began in the 1980s is also fallible. The census data on Muslim-Hindu growth rates show that the growth difference between the two increased from 0.5 per cent per annum during 1971-81 to 0.8 per cent during 1981-91. The growth difference of 1981-91 was the highest ever recorded since the census exercises began tracking this trend. Thus the birth rate difference between the two communities must have widened during the 1980s. The problem with the data presented by James et al is that the estimates of TFR they use are derived from sample surveys that did not over-sample Muslims. Such estimates provide only a rough magnitude of the religious differential in fertility for the survey date, and are highly inadequate for inferring trends in fertility differentials. There are reasons to believe that the 1984 survey had exaggerated the Muslim-Hindu fertility differential while NFHS-2 in 1998-99 had underestimated it. As per the 1984 survey, the Muslim TFR was 24 per cent higher than that of Hindus. There also was a SRS survey in 1979, which showed that the excess Muslim fertility was only of the order of 12 per cent. By all accounts, fertility levels stagnated during 1978-83 because of excesses during the Emergency. How could then the religious difference change? The only possible explanation is sampling and non-sampling errors in the two surveys. Therefore, rather than using the estimates of only one survey, if an average is taken, Muslim fertility at the beginning of 1980s exceeded the Hindu fertility by about 18 per cent. NFHS-1 conducted in 1992-93 showed that the religious difference in current fertility had increased to 34 per cent, which is consistent with the trends in census growth rates.

Understanding Survey Methods

The estimates of TFR from NFHS-2 of 1998-99 showed that the excess Muslim fertility had declined to 29 per cent. But there is evidence to suggest that NFHS-2 had considerably underestimated fertility levels in Uttar Pradesh and Assam [Retherford and Mishra 2001]. As these two states have a strong presence of Muslims, the underestimation would have influenced TFR of Muslims more than that of Hindus. Another evidence of underestimation of Muslim TFR in NFHS-2 comes from the analysis of proximate determinants made by James and Nair (2005). They find that the total fecundity rate of Muslims is 6 per cent lower than that of Hindus (10.8 and 11.5, respectively). As total fecundity rate is derived from TFR by eliminating the fertility depressing influence of proximate determinants, it would carry the same bias as the TFR.3 For the total fecundity rate of Muslims and Hindus to be equal, TFR of Muslims would have to be raised by 6 per cent vis-à-vis that of Hindus. This would make the TFR of Muslims to be 37 per cent higher than that of Hindus. Thus since the beginning of 1980s, the excess fertility of Muslims may have increased from 18 per cent to 37 per cent. This gives quite a different picture from the one painted by James et al. Further, as per their own data on TFR by standard of living index [Krishnaji and James 2005], even among the poor, Muslims lagged behind Hindus in fertility decline during this period. In the low standard of living households, as per NFHS-1, the Muslim TFR was 33 per cent higher than the Hindu TFR, and as per NFHS-2, the difference was 29 per cent. Thus the contention that because of their lower socio-economic status Muslims were unaffected by earlier changes is too contrived.

In conclusion, the Hindu-Muslim fertility difference almost certainly increased in the 1980s. But in the 1990s, there was no further widening of the difference at the all-India level because the census growth difference during 1991-2001 was about the same as that during 1981-91, and NFHS-1 and NFHS-2 have shown more or less the same fertility difference between the two communities. However, this should not be interpreted as showing that fertility decline among Muslims accelerated in the 1990s. The reason for the unchanging religious fertility differential at the national level is most probably because, fertility decline among Hindus slowed down in several south Indian states as their fertility was nearing replacement level. The narrowing differential in southern states offset the widening differential in other states. This however cannot be checked from the NFHS data because sample sizes for Muslims are inadequate to ascertain trends in the differentials. The census growth rates can throw some light on this, but because of their sensitivity to migration, they have to be interpreted carefully. Table 2 shows the average annual growth rates of population for Hindus and Muslims during 1981-91 and 1991-01. The declines in the growth rate between 1981-91 and 1991-01 were significantly more among Muslims than Hindus in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. Amongst these, in the first four states, the growth rates of Hindus have fallen below 1.4 per cent per annum, indicating the presence of low levels of Hindu fertility. The larger decline of Muslim growth rate in West Bengal could also be because of the decrease in the flow of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, or their migration to other parts of India. In Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, the growth rates of Hindus have hardly fallen, but that of Muslims have shown large declines. This is unlikely due to significant falls in their fertility. The Muslim populations in Delhi, Haryana and Punjab have shown very high growth rates (4-6 per cent per annum), suggesting that the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan are migrating to these states. Thus the trends in the census growth rates do suggest that the slowing down of fertility decline among Hindus in southern states helped Muslims to be on par with Hindus at the national level.

Table 1: Results of Logistic Regression of Current Use of Contraception on Number of Sons and Daughters for Hindus and Muslims, NFHS-2, All-India

Explanatory Variables Hindus

Odds Ratio SE Odds SE Ratio


Number of sons alive 1.831 0.015 1.238 0.030
Number of sons daughters alive 1.194 0.008 1.069 0.021
Constant 0.373 0.006 0.389 0.023
N 66,136 10,121
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.034


Table 2: Average Annual Growth Rate of Population of Hindus and Muslims during 1981-91 and 1991-2001, Major States

Average Annual Growth Rate (Per Cent)
Decline in the Difference
Country and State 1981-1991
Growth Rate

Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim ERR


India 2.05 2.84 1.82 2.59 0.23 0.25 -0.02
Andhra Pradesh 2.21 2.67 1.35 1.65 0.86 1.02 -0.16
Assam na na 1.39 2.57 na na na
Bihar 2.05 2.59 2.07 3.11 -0.02 -0.53 0.5
Delhi 4.16 6.13 3.65 6.02 0.51 0.12 0.39
Gujarat 2 2.15 2 2.42 -0.08 -0.26 0.18
Haryana 2.4 3.78 2.39 4.71 0.01 -0.93 0.94
Himachal Pradesh 1.9 2.47 1.57 2.93 0.33 -0.46 0.8
Karnataka 1.86 2.43 1.43 2.11 0.43 0.32 0.11
Kerala 1.19 2.27 0.7 1.47 0.48 0.8 -0.31
Madhya Pradesh 2.36 2.72 1.96 2.58 0.4 0.13 0.26
Maharashtra 2.25 2.73 1.96 2.97 0.3 -0.24 0.54
Orissa 1.75 3.14 1.47 2.77 0.28 0.37 -0.09
Punjab* 1.2 3.54 2.53 4.67 -1.33 -1.14 -0.19
(1.86) (1.77) (0.09) (1.05)
Rajasthan 2.48 3.47 2.46 3.06 0.01 0.41 -0.39
Tamil Nadu 1.41 1.92 1.04 1.28 0.37 0.63 -0.27
Uttar Pradesh 2.08 3.11 2.16 2.75 -0.09 0.36 -0.45
West Bengal 1.91 3.14 1.33 2.3 0.58 0.84 -0.25

Notes: * The growth rates for the combined population of Hindus and Sikhs are given in parentheses because in the 1991 Census, many Hindus were probably reported as Sikhs.
na – not available.

‘Minority Hypothesis’

Let us now examine critically the most popular of the explanations, namely, the minority hypothesis. Within this, I find three variants. First, it is argued that because they are a minority religion, Muslims are denied basic services, schooling and employment in post-independence India. The resulting social exclusion is responsible for the higher fertility of Muslims. Second, Hindu nationalists spread canards about unbridled fertility of Muslims, rampant polygynous unions and Muslims becoming a majority community within India. This tends to evoke a defensive response from the Muslims that keeps their fertility high. Third, communal riots and vilification campaigns make Muslims insecure, and desire more children for self-protection.

On the first, several papers included in EPW ’s special issue have shown that the lower socio-economic position of Muslims can explain only a small portion of their higher fertility. Therefore, for explaining higher fertility of Muslims, it hardly matters how the question of their social exclusion arose, whether from their minority status or from religious attitudes. Also, the evidence of lower mortality among Muslims indicates that the depiction of Muslims as a socially marginalised group is a bit overdone. On the second, those exposed to the propaganda of the Hindu Right, whether through print media or public meetings, would predominantly be Hindus rather than Muslims. Therefore, if at all such propaganda has a direct impact on fertility, it would be to increase Hindu fertility. However, if the argument is that such propaganda increases violence against Muslims, then it is undistinguishable from the insecurity syndrome examined below.

The argument that the sense of insecurity could lead to higher fertility of a minority group seems plausible at first sight. However, any such reaction necessarily implies a conscious effort on the part of the minority group to increase its numbers. But paradoxically, Jeffrey and Jeffrey (2005:450) state that in the villages they studied, the higher fertility of Muslims was not a result of conscious religious or political strategies by the Muslims; but Hindu groups were to some extent using fertility for collective purposes! Neither Jeffrey and Jeffrey, nor other proponents of minority-insecurity hypothesis, provide any evidence to substantiate their thesis. But there are some circumstantial evidences that seriously undermine their argument. The validity of the hypothesis can be checked by examining whether Muslim fertility increases, or declines at a slower rate, during periods when the threat perception is high, or in regions where the incidence of communal riots is more. On both counts, the evidence is to the contrary. As discussed above, the decline of fertility was slower among Muslims than Hindus until the end of 1980s but during the 1990s the pace of reduction was about the same in the two communities. But it was in the 1990s that the Hindu-nationalist forces gained political ascendancy in India, following the demolition of Babri masjid. If insecurity leads to higher fertility, fertility decline among Muslims should have slowed down during this period. Also, contrary to expectations, Hindu-Muslim fertility differences tend to be larger in states where communal riots are rare, and smaller in states where communal riots are more frequent. For example, the child-woman ratios (CWRs) from the 2001 census show that in Kerala and West Bengal Muslim CWRs are higher by 43-59 per cent, while in Gujarat, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh they are higher only by 6-14 per cent. Thus, taken at its face value, the evidence suggests that the insecurity of minority communities reduces their fertility rather than increases it.

After all, it is not only in India that Muslims have higher fertility. Throughout south-east Asia, Muslim minority groups have higher fertility than the majority community of the respective nations. Even in countries where they are in majority, Muslims are not the forerunners in fertility transition. In Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh, Chinese and Indian ethnic groups have lower fertility than the Muslims. Thus, for explaining higher fertility of Muslims, a religious basis must be sought. As shown in our paper in the special issue, the percentage of women giving religious reasons for not wanting to use contraception is significantly higher among Muslims than among either Hindus or Christians. The use of sterilisation is particularly low among Muslims. On this issue, it is pertinent to quote Caldwell again: “The pressures within the Muslim population against sterilisation are often coercive. They range from refusal to eat with sterilised, to accept food from them..., to have them as servants, or to allow them to be buried in the Muslim burial ground. The majority of Muslims state the case against sterilisation in terms of religious morality, either that it is forbidden or that Allah has committed himself to provide for children sent to this earth, while contemporary Hindu explanations are completely secular” [Caldwell et al 1982:714]. Theoretically, it is possible for conservative attitudes on fertility control to prevail in communities perceiving external aggression. But in practice, we fail to find evidence for a positive association between communal tension and Muslim fertility, as postulated. It is therefore far more likely that such beliefs are there because many influential clerics genuinely believe that family planning, especially sterilisation, is against Koranic law, and not because of any conscious plot to outnumber Hindus. It is imperative that we make this distinction. In an organised religion with a custom of issuing religious diktats, what religious leaders believe would make all the difference. But, fortunately, religious beliefs tend to lose their hold when more and more members of a community begin to use contraception.

Finally, I wish to point out an error in the procedure used for calculation of net international migration for Hindus and Muslims in the paper by Rajan (2005:440). While the census growth rates he uses are for the decade 1991-2001, the estimates of birth rate he uses are for the latter part of the decade as they were based on CWRs that had children aged 0-6 years in 2001 in the numerator. As the actual birth rates for the decade would have been higher, he overestimates the net international migration into India. Besides, there could be errors in his birth rate estimates because the level and the age pattern of mortality also affect CWRs, and the relationship between the birth rate and CWR is not necessarily linear, as he had assumed.

Email: mari@iegindia.org


1 Could be more if the relationship between fertility and years of schooling is concave rather than linear.
2 In a personal discussion, P M Kulkarni has told me that he too had noticed this flaw.
3 There is an alternative explanation, however. It is possible that not all Muslim women disclose the use of contraception to survey interviewers.


Arnold, Fred (1985): ‘Measuring the Effect of Sex Preference on Fertility: The Case of Korea’, Demography, 22(2), pp 280-88.
Bhat, P N Mari and A J Francis Zavier (2005): ‘Role of Religion in Fertility Decline: The Case of India Muslims’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(5), pp 385-402.
Bhagat, R B and Purujit Praharaj (2005): ‘Hindu-Muslim Fertility Differentials’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(5), pp 411-18.
Borooah, Vani K and Sriya Iyer (2005): ‘Religion, Literacy and the Female-to-Male Ratio’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(5), pp 419-27.
Caldwell, John C, P H Reddy and Pat Caldwell (1982): ‘The Causes of Demographic Change in Rural South India: A Micro Approach’, Population and Development Review, 8(4), pp 689-727.
Dharmalingam, A, K Navaneetham and S Philip Morgan (2005): ‘Muslim-Hindu Fertility Differences: Evidence from National Family Health Survey-II’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(5), pp 429-35.
James, K S and Sajini B Nair (2005): ‘Accelerated Decline in Fertility in India since the 1980s: Trends among Hindus and Muslims’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(5), 375-83.
Jeffery, Roger and Patricia Jeffery (2005): ‘Saffron Demography, Common Wisdom, Aspirations and Uneven Governmentalities’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(5), pp 447-53.
Krishnaji, N and K S James (2005): ‘Religion and Fertility: A Comment’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(5), pp 455-58.
Rajan, S Irudaya (2005): ‘District Level Fertility Estimates for Hindus and Muslims’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(5), pp 437-46.
Retherford, Robert D and Vinod Mishra (2001): An Evaluation of Recent Estimates of Fertility Trends in India, NFHS Subject Reports No 9, IIPS, Mumbai.
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West Bengal turning blind eye to changing religious demographic balance: Advani

KOLKATA, MARCH 26. Accusing the CPI (M)-led Left Front Government of turning `a blind eye' to the `fast-changing' religious demographic balance in the border districts of West Bengal, the BJP president, L.K. Advani, today said such change had affected the communal peace and harmony so also the native culture. ``Such a change has not only harmed communal peace and harmony but also the native culture and social ethos of the areas concerned,'' Mr. Advani said in a letter to Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee.

``We, in the BJP, view this not as a Hindu-Muslim issue, but as an issue that impinges, both in short and long term, on the unity, integrity and security of our nation,'' Mr. Advani said.

The Leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha alleged that it was regrettable that such an issue, raised by the State BJP chief, Tathagata Roy, in a letter to the State Home Secretary, was not given importance despite it being `a potent danger'.

He expressed hope that the Chief Minister would treat the issue `with the seriousness it deserves'. Mr. Advani was referring to a letter written by state BJP president to the Home Secretary about the 'change in religious demographic pattern' in West Bengal's border districts. — PTI
Educated Indian muslim openly against family planning


The Myth of population crisis

By Khalid Baig
When a hippopotamus gave birth recently, the "world famous" San Diego Zoo in California celebrated the arrival for weeks. At the zoo, it is always a joyous occasion at the birth of a panda, a kangaroo, an elephant, or what have you. You are assured that each arrival has enriched the world!

Now contrast this with the birth of a child in any LDC (Less Deserving Country?). An unbelievable assortment of "experts" would immediately tell you that it is a moment of great sorrow. That the world is somehow impoverished by the birth of each child.

It is a strange world in which the arrival of a hippo is a blessing but that of a human child is a burden. But it is even stranger that the argument given is economic. A hippo needs 100 pounds of food everyday, compared with a few pounds for human beings. Further it does not produce any of the food it consumes. No animal ever does. Only human beings produce their own food. Lions eat goats and so do human beings. But lions do not breed goats; human beings do. Jay-hawks eat chickens as do human beings. But jay-hawks do not breed chickens, human beings do. If there were an economic argument against overpopulation, you would think that it would apply to all animals except human beings.

Yet an extremely powerful propaganda machinery has been busy for more than a century in spreading the nonsense that the world faces a human "overpopulation problem." While at the micro-level, the idea had been there in many ancient jahiliyyah societies, where people even killed their children so they won't have to feed them, its introduction at the macro-level is recent. It was Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) who forcefully presented the idea that the human population would always exceed our ability to produce food by some natural law. He opined that population grows in a geometric progression (2, 4, 6, .) while production of food grows in arithmetic progression (2, 3, 4, .). Even if there is plenty of food for everyone at the beginning, in two generations there will be more people than the means to feed them. Hence the "population problem."

Malthus based his theory on very limited observations in American colonies and even more limiting assumptions about the progress of agriculture technology. The result is a theory that is totally contradicted by facts. World population has not been growing as fast as his theory suggests; African population is smaller today than it was before the European-led slave trade played havoc with it. The increase in food production, on the other hand, has been much greater than Malthus allowed. World population has more than doubled since 1950, but food supplies have more than tripled. Further, experts believe that if technology continues to improve at today's rate, it will be possible to feed ten billion people on roughly the same amount of land currently devoted to agriculture. As a result of improving crop yields, the area that is used to grow crops---about three billion acres globally---has increased little in the last two decades. Other estimates suggest that the world can support 33 billion people.

While as a work of science Malthus's theory was worthless, it was received enthusiastically for political reasons. The industrial revolution and capitalism that accompanied it, did not deliver what they had promised. It was expected that as it became easier and cheaper to produce goods, everyone would share in the resulting prosperity; the rising tide would lift all boats. It did not. Capitalism produced a small class of very rich people and a large mass at barely subsisting levels. This made many people to start questioning the system. Karl Marx's was one extreme and misguided reaction to the very real injustices. Other critics differed in their prescriptions but agreed that the issue was political and social justice. Malthus's The Essay on Population was avowedly a reply to William Godwin's Inquiry concerning Political Justice, a work asserting the principle of human equality. And its purpose was to justify existing inequality by shifting the responsibility for it from human institutions to the laws of the Creator. As Galbraith would say, his work provided a satisfactory formula for the rich to suffer the misfortunes of the poor. Malthus was a priest in the service of the East India Company and taught generations of its staffers who would then go out and plunder the colonies with the satisfaction that the plight of their victims was the result of "natural laws."

After World War II, when European powers found it difficult to maintain direct control of their colonies, they were concerned that the newly liberated colonies would develop and become economically independent and politically powerful if left to grow on their own. The current population control mafia is born of these concerns. While Malthus's original theory remains discredited, the neo-Malthusians have tried to resuscitate it with "concerns for the environment." Add to it the U. N. charlatans who are never short of fancy phrases like "reproductive rights." And you get the Population Control Bomb that has been devastating the world.

It did not have to be like this. The clear Qur'anic teachings destroy the basic assumptions of Population Control campaign.

"And the earth We have spread out (like a carpet); set thereon mountains firm and immovable; and produced therein all kinds of things in due balance. And We have provided therein means of subsistence, for you and for those for whose sustenance you are not responsible." [Hijr 15:19-20] "And there is not a thing but its (sources and) treasures (inexhaustible) are with Us; but We only send down thereof in due and ascertainable measures." [Hijr 15:21] "There is no moving creature on earth but its sustenance depends on Allah: He knows the time and place of its definite abode and its temporary deposit: all is in a clear Record." [Hud 11:6]

These verses clearly demolish any basis for use of birth control as a tool of economic policy. How can anyone who believes in the One Creator, Master, and Nourisher of the universe, entertain the idea for a moment, of limiting the number of children for fear of want? Our job is to use the resources wisely and distribute them justly. And Allah will provide for all human beings as He has promised and as only He can provide. Muslims are bound by their faith to work to dismantle the obscene birth control establishment in their lands and devote their energies to solving the problems caused by capitalism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism. «
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related post moved to Islam thread
the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines has actually started making good its threat to refuse the sacraments to government workers carrying out government birth control programs..because the church is opposed to birth control methods pushed by government.


What then after Pope John Paul II?

by Jerry Tundag
March 11, 2005

The reaction of President Arroyo on learning that the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines has actually started making good its threat to refuse the sacraments to government workers carrying out government birth control programs has been described as one of surprise.

That, of course, was for public consumption. Deep within her, we would not be surprised if Arroyo seethed. We ourselves seethed at the thought. How can the Church do that to people who have no choice?

Government workers, by force of circumstance of being employed by government, have no choice but to carry out the orders given to them. If they are told to implement the government birth control programs in every barangay, that is what they will have to do.

Of course there is a moral question involved if the workers are Roman Catholics because the church is opposed to birth control methods pushed by government. But the fact that the workers continue to push the government programs clearly shows they have made their choice.

Actually it is very easy to see why making the choice was never a dilemma to the workers despite the moral question thrown into the equation. It does not take any brains to choose between keeping and losing a job.

Of course the church could have made it easier if it offered to take in all the government workers who could get fired for refusing to carry out the work for which they are being paid to do.

But not only is the church not capable of absorbing all the displaced workers, it is also not clear if it would even be willing to take in just a token number of them. The church, after all, is an institution that is always on " the receiving end. " Now you may wonder why the church is taking it against the government workers but not against the government itself. Of course the church has been lambasting government but it has never taken any action beyond words, unlike its virtual excommunication of government workers.

The answer to that is because the church cannot lift a hand against a government that is actually one of its biggest benefactors. Several government agencies are among the biggest donors to some of the biggest charities of the church.

And that brings us to another point, which is the perceived inconsistency ( hypocrisy would have been more appropriate but let us refrain from using that word ) of the church in dealing with a number of issues.

The inconsistency, in fact, starts right here with this very issue about birth controls. While there is all hell to pay for government workers, only harsh lip service is reserved for the government itself.

Now, closely related to birth controls is the issue about sexual immorality, which catches the church in another inconsistency. While it is very vocal about sexual immorality in the general public, it is very secretive about sexual immorality within the church itself.

Catholics find this very odd because while the pope himself has repeatedly made widely publicized public apologies for the sexual abuses committed by bishops and priests, nobody lower in rank has chosen to follow suit. Everybody prefers to keep the skeletons in the closet.

That, in fact, is another inconsistency. Yet here is another. What really is the stand of the church against gambling? The question is asked because while it condemns gambling, its main charity continues to be a major beneficiary of the state's largest gambling agency.
<b>Hindus, bear more kids!: VHP </b>

DH News Service Hubli:

Predicting a Hindu Rashtra in the future, Mr Singhal said once that happened, Congress leader Sonia Gandhi would have to pack up.

“Dump the two-child norm and have lots of children.” Hindus were exhorted, thus, by Vishwa Hindu Parishat international President Ashok Singhal, who added: “The Parishat too rejects the small family norm, which is not practised by Muslims.”

The VHP leader was reacting to a question when he stated at a press conference here that in the next 55 years, the Muslim population would touch 50 per cent of the country’s populace.

“If they (Muslims) don’t want family planning, why do we (Hindus),” he countered.

Noting that there was an influx of people from Bangladesh on one hand, on the other Muslims marry three-four times and bear lots of children. “Are they not living, same way there will be no problem for food and water. Hindus should shed family planning and increase their numerical strength. By God’s grace the country will sustain itself,” Mr Singhal said.
CPI-M calls for mass breeding of muslims

----- Original Message -----
From: "Jyotishi" <jyotish2000@yahoo.com>
To: "Shakti List" <shakti-l@hinduworld.com>
Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 4:10 PM
Subject: [shakti-l] Go forth and multiply: CPM

> +-----------------------------------------+
> | Shakti-L : News, Views, and Discussion |
> | {issues that affect Hindus Worldwide} |
> +-----------------------------------------+
> Go forth and multiply: CPM
> By Udayan Namboodiri, in Indraprasth
> The Pioneer
> Saturday, April 16, 2005
> God to Adam and Eve: Be fruitful and increase in
> number; fill the earth and subdue it (Genesis 1:27-31)
> -- A generation of achievement on the population
> control front by creating near-total national
> consensus in favour of the "small family-happy family"
> objective is set to be reversed by the CPI (M). Now,
> India's principal communist party has called for a
> complete rejection of the two-child norm. Why only 2
> children?
> At the just concluded 18th Party Congress, the CPI
> (M), in its "Resolution against growing violence and
> discrimination against women" has demanded "complete
> rejection of all coercive population control measures,
> two-child norm and invasive methods of contraception".
> Superficially viewed, this appears to be a late
> reaction to the Emergency era excesses carried out in
> the name of "family planning". But insiders point out
> that the CPI (M)'s frontal organisation, the All India
> Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA) had been
> engaging in anti-small family hype for quite some time
> now. The arrival of its former chief, Brinda Karat, in
> the party's highest decision-making body, the
> Politburo, has resulted in the rhetoric creeping into
> the format of the main party.
> The AIDWA believes that the two-child norm "targets
> women and marginalises poor, Dalit and tribal women"
> and claims that this view echoes in the Cairo
> Declaration of 1994. Now that the CPI (M) has adopted
> this slogan, the political motive at the core cannot
> be overlooked. In sum and substance, this is nothing
> but minority appeasement aimed at pandering to the
> voters in Muslim ghettos who are confused over how to
> reconcile the Shariat's diktat against contraception
> and the national objective to arrest runaway
> population growth.
> What is interesting is that at the present juncture,
> no political party has been heard of complaining about
> "coercive population control measures". No government
> in recent times can be remotely accused of imitating
> the Emergency model. Yet, the proportion of the
> majority community to the total population of India
> has decreased by 2.9 per cent in the last four
> decades. While the population share of all other
> communities has remained more or less constant, the
> Muslims are the only ones to report a growth. The
> publication of the findings of the 2001 Census has led
> to a debate on the causes for this. Experts of even
> the most moderate variety have admitted that when it
> comes to adopting medical termination of pregnancy,
> the Muslims are seen as more reluctant than other
> communities.
> The CPI (M), which nurtures the Muslim vote in West
> Bengal and is actively wooing the community in Kerala
> ahead of next year's Assembly elections, may have
> played a sublime trick on the nation by undermining
> its population policy. In the border districts of West
> Bengal - Uttar Dinajpur, Dakkhin Dinajpur, Malda and
> Murshidabad, the Muslim population has grown from
> 38.89 per cent in 1951 to 52.50 per cent in 2001. In
> the state as a whole, the Muslims today make up 25.20
> per cent as compared to 19.46 in 1951. Contrast this
> with the Hindu growth rate-just 14.18 per cent between
> 1991 and 2001 compared to 25.91 per cent for Muslims.
> http://dailypioneer.com/indexn12.asp?main_...t&counter_img=4
> Jai Maharaj
> http://www.mantra.com/jyotish
> Om Shanti
This is the single most important problem for Hindus, every other problem is secondary. We can solve other problems like implementing UCC only if we remain a majority, the day we go below 60% we have no hope for survival. You can never convert Muslims, by the time u convert 1 Muslim, Muslims will create 100 more through breeding, India may have 1 billion but we don't have the highest pop density. Bangaldesh has 2000 persons per sq.km and they still survive, we can have 5 kids each and our pop density will increase but we will also survive. Hindu survival is more important than whether our kids will get college education, I would be willing to live in poverty if it means that I would help keep the Hindus in majority. As G.Subramaniam said there is only solution have 5 kids or be prepared to get sluaghtered by Muslims. In time India will become so overcrowded that even Muslims will have to cut down on their breeding, till that happens Hindus should match Muslim brith rate and should only relax after Muslims will stop breeding like pigs.

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