Islamic Nuke

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->If that happens, Franks said, “... the Western world, the free world, loses what it cherishes most, and that is freedom and liberty we’ve seen for a couple of hundred years in this grand experiment that we call democracy.”

Franks then offered “in a practical sense” what he thinks would happen in the aftermath of such an attack.

“It means the potential of a weapon of mass destruction and a terrorist, massive, casualty-producing event somewhere in the Western world – it may be in the United States of America – that causes our population to question our own Constitution and to begin to militarize our country in order to avoid a repeat of another mass, casualty-producing event. Which in fact, then begins to unravel the fabric of our Constitution. Two steps, very, very important.”<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
I agree, even after 9/11 its slowly turning into military state. Another 8 years of conservative rule can change everything.
But Europe may not change, they are too liberal now and lacks will to fight.

[Guest]

Fridaytimes.com
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>How do we disarm? Let the weather be warm, and people will discard their clothes readily</b> 
   
In a January 29 op-ed in Daily Times , “Ten reasons to doubt nuclear deterrence,” Dr Ahmad Faruqui says: “Pakistanis may disagree on many things but on one issue there is unanimity of opinion – that the country’s nuclear weapons are necessary to keep India at bay. This notion needs to be re-examined…. Today, there are at least 10 reasons to rethink Pakistan’s nuclear programme.” Faruqui then goes on to list his reasons for doubting the efficacy of deterrence and by extension the country’s nuclear-weapon programme and arsenal. Below, I shall attempt to examine his arguments one by one.

1. The Kargil crisis provides evidence that the presence of nuclear weapons emboldens one or both parties to visualise and sometimes execute limited conventional war. There is no way to determine precisely the “red lines” of the other party and such ambiguity can in fact precipitate a nuclear war.

The reference to the May-June 1999 Kargil crisis is a staple with deterrence-pessimists. If nuclear weapons were meant to, and could in fact, deter the adversaries, why did the Kargil conflict happen? Some points need to be made to clear the cobwebs on this issue.

First, the failure or success of deterrence cannot be determined on the basis of a single “deterrence episode”. Deterrence may require a series of crises or confrontations before it becomes stable. This is true as much of conventional as nuclear deterrence, though in the case of the latter, attempts by the adversaries – especially the threatener – to keep the conflict from escalating evince the presence of deterrence and the fear of crossing the red lines.

In other words, studying deterrence requires a longitudinal design rather than a snapshot view. The analyst must look at the trajectory and be prepared to bring in a host of factors to study deterrence. Nuclear weapons do not work in a vacuum; they become effective in an environment that could involve a host of factors: the nature of ongoing conflicts, geographic contiguity between adversaries, political instability and internal strife in one or both states, a desire on the part of one or both to change the status quo, the ability or otherwise of the adversaries to enter into regional or other alliances, the nature of those alliances, their impact on the military capabilities of one or both, commitments to any ideologies, the ability or otherwise of leaders on both sides to communicate and interpret signals, the absence of second-strike capabilities etc., etc.

As Elli Lieberman put it (“The Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars?” McNair Paper Number 45, October 1995): “Leaders challenge deterrence, or go to war, when there are uncertainties about the capability or will of the defender; and, once these uncertainties are reduced through the creation of specific reputations for capability and will, deterrence stability is created even when political pressures to challenge deterrence continue to exist ” [italics added]. He concludes that the phenomenon of deterrence is “temporal, dynamic, and causal” and stability requires conflict. States may need to fight wars to create deterrence stability through “reputations for capability and will”.

Second, in the case of Pakistan and India, one needs to keep in mind the two categories of deterrence and compellence and their distinction. The former is passive, the latter active. Pakistan was wedded to compellence, India to deterrence. India needed to rig the tripwire and wait; Pakistan needed to initiate the action. Deterrence is indefinite in timing, as Thomas Schelling put it in Arms and Influence . If the adversary crosses the line we shoot. When? That depends on the adversary. In classical deterrence, he mustn’t. There would be no threatener and threatened ; both would be threatened and, therefore, neither will initiate an action.

Compellence is more complex and definite in time. The action must be initiated at some point; it cannot be delayed or it will be mere posturing. At the same time, however, it must be tolerable to the initiator over whatever period of time the action is to be taken. This is important because the initiator, while compelling the adversary to act, cannot afford an all-out conflict. In the case of Pakistan, compellence was linked to sub-conventional warfare, bleeding the adversary, while seeking to deny India its advantage in an all-out war through threat of escalation to the nuclear level.

This shows an interesting dialectic between compellence and deterrence. The empirical evidence here is not that Kargil shows a failure of deterrence but that (a) India kept the conflict confined to Kargil and (b) it began to look into – and wargame – the concept of limited war. This response was very different from 1965 when India expanded the zone of conflict by attacking Lahore after Pakistan had engaged it in Kashmir and had reached within striking distance of Jammu-Katuha Road.

As for the red lines, given the non-deployment of nuclear forces, Pakistan and India need to manipulate risk within ambiguity. For Pakistan this means not spelling out a doctrine and keeping the red lines vague. In other words, ambiguity must be enhanced to deter the adversary. This paradox works the same way as deterrence generally does: to make war less and less possible by making it more and more possible. The important thing, however, is that while there must be ambiguity in relation to what kind of response may attend the crossing of a line (not spelled out), there must be no ambiguity about the capability itself and the will to use it. The ground between ambiguity about the red lines and the projection of capability and the will to use it then needs to be covered with deft signalling (Ejaz Haider, “Ambiguity and risk manipulation,” TFT , May 28-June 03, 2004, Vol. XVI, No. 14).

2. It is not clear that Pakistan’s nuclear weaponry prevented India from a pre-emptive war in Kashmir in 2002. Perhaps India was implementing coercive diplomacy and never intended to go to war. Furthermore, the importance of American influence on the antagonists cannot be underestimated.

Much of the argument in relation to Kargil also holds true for any mention of the December 2001-October 2002 standoff. After the attack on Lok Sabha, India decided to mobilise. It was a reaction to a series of events – attack on J&K parliament, Srinagar Corps HQs, hijacking of an Indian Airlines aeroplane etc. However, analyses and reports coming out of India at the time showed that the dominant thinking was to undertake operations that involved a combination of special forces and air and missile attacks without the attempt to hold territory and exploit. The fear of crossing the “ambiguous” red line was always there.

There is no gainsaying about the US factor. But the important point, as noted above, is that deterrence does not work in a vacuum. Pakistan and India do not just signal to each other; they also signal to extra-regional actors. India found a convergence of interest with the US on the issue of Islamist proxies employed by Pakistan and used the standoff to get the US and the EU involved in effecting a stand down. It was a sensible move since the threat of use of force worked better than the actual use of force would have. As for Pakistan, in this case it was the threatened party and would not have initiated any action itself. Instead, it prepared for a likely Indian offensive action and simply waited.

It is important to note that after India stretched the standoff beyond a certain point, the US State Department issued a travel advisory for the region. That decision put the squeeze on India’s economy and forced it to stand down. This point is important because it throws light on two aspects of the near-conflict: India could not have initiated a conflict on its own steam; it managed to extract some concessions from Pakistan because it was doing so also dovetailed with the US policy on Islamist proxies. Implication: deterrence worked between the two sides.

3. Pakistan’s nuclear assets have become a liability in the post-9/11 world. General Pervez Musharraf cited several reasons why he made a U-turn on Pakistan’s Afghan policy, one of which was to protect the country’s nuclear assets.

Deterrence is also a matter of outreach; how far can a country manage a strategic strike. Pakistan does not have the means to threaten the US mainland. That would require an ICBM or SSBN capability. Pakistan’s policy is not geared towards picking up a conflict with the US. In theory Pakistan could have decided to cock a snook at the US but that would have been against the basic determinant of its policy, i.e., India is the main adversary. Pakistan could not have risked being in a nutcracker. Doing so would have had a much higher cost than doing a volte-face on Afghanistan.

4. By going nuclear, Pakistan should have been able to reduce its expenditure on conventional forces and prevent the future of the country from being mortgaged.

Coming from a security analyst, this argument is surprising. Empirical evidence shows that Kenneth Waltz’ idea that nuclear forces would allow a country to spend less on conventional defence and maintain only “trip-wire” forces was flawed. The Brookings Institution’s study of the cost of US nuclear programme from the Manhattan Project to 1998 – at the dollar value of 1996 – shows that for every rise in expenditure on the strategic forces, there was a corresponding 20 percent increase in the conventional defence expenditure. Indeed, that nuclear capability compels the adversaries to spend on conventional defence to raise the nuclear threshold. There is no reason to believe that nuclear capability would have worked any differently in the case of Pakistan. As the SIPRI list indicates, India has already made its way into the club of fifteen top spenders on defence.

5. The perception that a minimum nuclear deterrent requires a constant and unchanging amount of funding is false, since the level of Pakistan’s minimum deterrent is tied to whatever India regards as its minimum deterrence. That, in turn, is tied to India’s regional ambitions, which are tied to China’s regional ambitions.

The unofficial paper put out by former foreign ministers Agha Shahi, Abdul Sattar and former Air Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan (“Responding to India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Dawn , October 5, 1999), made clear that minimum credible deterrence is not a static but a fluid concept. Pakistan does not look for symmetry, but it has to work out ratios and respond to India’s weaponisation within asymmetrical capabilities. However, it must be noted that Shahi et al wrote the paper in response to India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine, which spoke of deployment of nuclear weapons and a triad of nuclear forces based on land, sea and in the air. That scenario has not come to pass yet. In any case, one can always debate the warhead limit, especially if the country has acquired a higher conventional capability and a second-strike capability. Faruqui is correct when he says that Pakistan will constantly have to review its assessment of minimum credible deterrence and would want to acquire a second-strike capability. It is expensive, which is why Pakistan has to look for options and approaches within its resource constraints. So far, the two sides have chosen to not deploy their arsenals. The trouble is that opponents of nuclear capability use the factor of ambiguity to express fear of a war; at the same time they use the economic argument to oppose deployment and the acquisition of second-strike capability.

If the idea is that spending on defence is costly and Pakistan cannot afford it then it doesn’t need to keep an army. It could keep the police and paramilitary to quell internal troubles and outsource its security to either India or the United States.

6. Were a “do or die” situation to develop for the state of Pakistan, what would be the military value of using nuclear assets to keep territory that would become uninhabitable the moment they were used? And what about the morality of killing millions of innocent civilians merely to make a statement about the sanctity of man-made borders that came into being just half a century earlier? Seen from this vantage point, nuclear war emerges as a psychopathic nationalised projection of suicide bombing.

This is an amazing argument for two reasons: one, it changes the framework of discussion from strategy to morality; two, it completely fails to understand the fact that deterrence is about not killing the millions by a capability that works both ways. Since both can kill, neither will. As Schelling put it: “…the tripwire can threaten to blow things up out of all proportion to what is being protected [going by Faruqui’s argument, in this case the country that came into being just half-century ago], because if the threat works the thing never goes off.”

Also, while nuclear weapons have not killed anyone since Hiroshima and Nagasaki (and those cities were bombed because Japan could not deter the US), conventional weapons continue to do so. The moral argument should also involve their non-use unless we were to accept that killing of one man is less reprehensible, at least statistically, than the presumed killing of millions.

7. With nuclear weapons there is always the risk of accidental launch. Safeguards and protocols can never eliminate the risk of failure.

The best work in regard to living with high-risk technologies is Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents . The work has been flogged around the world and is the most potent weapon in the arsenal of the anti-nuclear lobby. Perrow argues, after studying a number of systems, that the risk of accident can never be eliminated. Therefore, while we cannot make do without some technologies and need to make efforts to reduce the risk associated with accidents in those systems, nuclear reactors and weapons do not fall in that category and must be eliminated.

Perrow’s argument is very convincing. However, by ignoring the fact that nuclear weapons are the currency of power in today’s world and the powerful nuclear-weapon states are not prepared to roll back the capability, he is mistaken in positing that nuclear-related systems can be eliminated simply on the basis of a moral argument. Pakistan and India are caught, beyond their own rivalry, in the vortex of a world system led by the NWSs. Under the Bush administration, we have seen non-proliferation and arms control being thrown by the wayside. The risk of living with nuclear technology, therefore, enters the complex domain of geopolitics. Also, the risk has less to do with the weapons and more to do with reactors. And reactors are not just used by NWSs but also by non-nuclear weapon states. Even so, a world sans nuclear weapons and technology would be a great world. Until that happens, even if Pakistan and India could disarm, the world could still be destroyed by the Americans, the British, the French, the Russians and the Chinese, not to speak of the Israelis. Someone needs to get them to disarm first, starting with America and Russia.

8. There would always be a risk of terrorists acquiring the weapons, especially in Pakistan’s regional environment.

This argument, like the previous one, moves away from the issue of deterrence and presents the problem of unauthorised possession and use of nuclear weapons. It builds on the scripts of Hollywood flicks about terrorists and broken arrows. But in doing so, it ignores the issue of delivery of a nuclear weapon. How would terrorists deliver the device? They could not do so without missiles or bombers or submarines. For them to acquire any of those delivery vehicles/platforms, they would either need to be sponsored by a state or capture a state to that end. However, once they do that and are on defined territory, they would be as amenable to deterrence as any state would be. The rational-choice paradigm would kick into play. If it didn’t, they would be destroyed.

On the other hand, were they to use RDD (Radioactive Dispersal Device) or the “dirty bomb”, they would not be able to make much of a difference because RDD, which packs radioactive material with conventional explosives, is unlikely to spread too much radiation, though the conventional explosives used to set off radiation may have a more lethal impact in the vicinity of the explosion (Ejaz Haider, “Nuclear weapons and terrorism,” TFT , August 12-18, 2005; Vol. XVII, No. 25).

9. Some defence analysts have argued that nuclear weapons are… a relatively painless means to prevent war, and that they will never be used. Not only is this at odds with historical practice at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is also contradicted by the recent statement of France’s Jacques Chirac in which he signalled a willingness to use them under “special” circumstances and earlier statements by leading members of the Bush administration who see military value in deploying “tactical mini-nukes”.

It is surprising that Faruqui has chosen to conflate the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the new thinking on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to make the point about the use of nuclear weapons and rubbish deterrence. The fact is that the US was unlikely to have used nuclear gravity bombs against Japan if the latter also possessed the nuclear capability. This point is so straight as to be banal and tautological.

The more important point relates to the use of TNWs. The 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review argued in favour of “forward deterrence”, the use of TNWs against targets that could not be deterred through the use or threat of use of the strategic arsenal. The policy has been bitterly criticised within the US and outside. If ever such a scenario were to come to pass, it would mean two things: a nuclear-armed adversary can only be deterred through threat of punishment in equal measure; two, the norm of non-use against non-nuclear armed adversary will be broken. In both cases, we will see a movement towards rather than away from the possession of nuclear weapons by those who do not have them right now but may fear the US or any other country. By positing this argument, Faruqui tends to strengthen the idea of deterrence rather than diluting it.

10. It is often said that poor countries have a right to nuclear weapons since the rich countries have them; not letting the former have them is reprehensible and reeks of double standards, a kind of nuclear apartheid. Such an argument is putting forward the specious proposition that rich countries should not be allowed to have a monopoly on making monstrously big mistakes.

In a world where security is scarce and where rich countries are bent upon making monstrously big mistakes, it is perhaps better to begin by convincing them to correct their follies. Before one can set the children right, the parents need to review their behaviour. As Dr Benjamin Spock argued in Dr Spock’s Baby and Childcare , by denying toy guns to your child you would be putting him in a difficult situation, especially if all his friends are going around totting guns.

We live in a dangerous world; it’s a world where powerful states determine the rules. Faruqui and other disarmament advocates are right in calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The question, however, is: How do we do it?

Salvador de Madriaga, the inter-War Chairman of the League of Nations Disarmament Commission, said about disarmament in 1973: “The trouble with disarmament was (it still is) that the problem of war is tackled upside down and at the wrong end…Nations don’t distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter. Let the weather be warm, and people will discard their clothes readily and without committees to tell them how they are to undress.”
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[Guest]

<b>A. Q. KHAN, SUDAN, IRAN & AL QAEDA</b>
<i>by B. Raman</i>

http://www.saag.org/papers17/paper1690.html

[Guest]

A Must see Documantry on A.Q. Khan it was on Times discovery. (all 20 mb)

<img src='http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/nic/074/074.jpg' border='0' alt='user posted image' />
<img src='http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-6/arya.h57.jpg' border='0' alt='user posted image' />

A.Q. Khan The nuclear Jihad
Keywords: Abdul Quadir khan, Netherlands, 1974 India atomic bomb, Khan a spy,

http://www.megaupload.com/?d=6YST2II6


Keywords: A.Q. Khan in love with himself, A.Q. Khan wanted allover west, uranium centrifuge, Pakistani c1 30 cargo plane in North Korea, Khan’s Centrifuge smuggle to Libya caught.

http://www.megaupload.com/?d=27B0TXP0
http://www.megaupload.com/?d=QPOTTXYM


Key words: Hamid Gul, Sultan Bashir mahmood,

http://www.megaupload.com/?d=QZIFXYSL


KeyWord: Iran’s nuclear progress

http://www.megaupload.com/?d=LFTIGL7F

[Guest]

From FT
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Through the nuclear prism </b>
Moeed Yusuf
Just like the Indian disapora, the huge number of Pakistani expatriates in the West could play a major role in rectifying misperceptions about the country's nuclear ambitions 
   
Three weeks ago, I discussed Pakistan’s proliferation scandal in light of the recent meeting of the US Congress sub-committee on terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation. In that article (“Exorcising AQ Khan,” TFT, June 16-22, 2006 ) I had stated: “…it [Pakistan] should share as much information on the measures taken and implemented on the ground [to check proliferation] as to avoid any possibility of a relapse of the problem.” Reports suggest the establishment may be taking a different approach.

The current official approach solely focuses on targeting governments in the West. Admittedly, there is an urgent requirement to do so since these governments are entities Pakistan has to face in the immediate future. However, a failure to expand the target audience could seriously limit the probability of success in attaining the ultimate objective in the long run. It is essential to extend the “convince-them” campaign to other actors.

With the current thrust, Islamabad has ended up basing the authenticity of its case on its success in convincing Washington of its non-involvement in the proliferation scandal and the robustness of its revamped counter-proliferation framework. The premise is that if the Bush administration had any reservations about Pakistan’s official position (after having been briefed on the entire affair by Islamabad), it would never have lifted diplomatic pressure on Islamabad to provide access to further information (which reportedly has now eased off considerably). The official version implies that Washington’s move to withdraw pressure means it (US) is convinced that the Pakistani state was not involved in the proliferation scandal.

The problem with building a case on the reaction of a single exogenous actor (in this case the Bush administration) should be obvious: what happens if the exogenous factor decides to reveal facts or perceptions contrary to the state’s stance any time in the future? Consider the fact that the Bush administration has agreed to keep a lid on the issue only because of its current strategic alignment with Pakistan. Individual members of the Bush administration remain extremely wary of Pakistani explanations and are liable to join the opposition camp should Pakistan-US interests diverge or if political interests of the current administration members dictate such a switch in the future. Were this realistic scenario to materialise, it will end up reinforcing already persistent calls for stringent checks on Pakistan’s nuclear activities and coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Ideally, Islamabad’s strategy should have been designed for two distinct phases, the immediate future and the longer run. The first phase, which ought to have been a campaign targeting current administrations, has been satisfied. In the second leg the focus ought to have shifted to those currently in the ‘anti-Pakistan’ camp but likely to be in positions of power in their respective countries in the future, or institutions that have an overbearing influence on public perception, i.e., the media. If the current limited strategy to cope with this issue remains unaltered, one ought not to expect the present lull in coercive diplomacy to last, especially if the ultra-critics come to power in Washington.

Admittedly, broadening the campaign to the second set of actors is a much greater challenge both in terms of identifying the particular individuals or groups to target and in devising a strategy to convince actors, most of whom are inherently biased against Pakistan, given their political interests and the misperceptions that exist about Pakistan in the West. However, Islamabad has little choice but to pursue this elaborate strategy.

To begin with, the authorities should identify the key actors who are critical of Pakistan’s role and those who are likely to be in office in case of an administration shift in Washington. In addition, kingpins in the media networks should be targeted (although interaction with the Western media takes place, to my knowledge no systematic briefings and targeted meetings have been undertaken on the proliferation issue).

Simultaneously, devising a specific plan for the kind of ‘defence’ to be put forth by the state is necessary. Pakistan’s nuclear establishment would have to analyse and determine the maximum amount of scandal-related information that can be shared with the targeted audience to convince them of the authenticity of the official position. Given that much of what are conventionally considered ‘classified’ facts are already public knowledge – due to revelations about the activities of the underground network – one can expect substantial amount of sharable information.

A step-by-step account of how AQ Khan could have managed such a feat must be provided, perhaps through hypothetical simulation (to avoid classified information from being provided). At the same time, it is imperative to prove that the revamped counter-proliferation structure ensures the episode does not recur. For example, to counter allegations of an intelligence failure in the proliferation scandal, it is not enough to highlight the macro-level steps undertaken by the establishment. Simply the establishment of new functionaries dedicated to nuclear programme-related intelligence gathering would not satisfy Western critics. As much as possible, proof of the robustness of the mechanism and the assurance of its functioning should be detailed.

It is difficult to predict the best way of defending the allegation of state involvement in nuclear hardware transfer since there is no information in the public domain of Pakistan’s current stance on the issue. However, presuming that informed authorities have proof to signal the state’s non-involvement in this regard, such evidence should be made part of the information to be presented to select Western actors.

Finally, the entire exercise to acquit Pakistan of the wrongdoing is relevant to the broader objective of improving Pakistan’s image in the Western world. While a campaign run by the establishment is recommended, to complement this there is a need for a comprehensive nuclear public policy both within and outside Pakistan. It is imperative for the nuclear establishment to ensure systematic information-sharing with Pakistani strategic experts (while the nuclear establishment has shown remarkable willingness to open up to strategic analysts, the interaction still remains sporadic) and provide incentives for them to seek placements in Western research and policy institutes.

The need for an internal nuclear public policy is premised on the oft-understated impact the diaspora tends to have on image perception of their native countries. Just like the Indian disapora, the huge number of Pakistani expatriates in the West could play a major role in rectifying the misperceptions about the country’s nuclear ambitions.

Moeed Yusuf is a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad

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<b>
ElBaradei upsets the nuclear applecart </b>
Ahmer Bilal Soofi
The implication of ElBaradei's article is that Pakistan should no longer worry about the legitimacy of its status since the NPT has not bestowed legitimacy on any state 

The June 14 op-ed in the Washington Post by Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, carries a very significant comment: “…under the NPT, there is no such thing as a ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ nuclear weapons state. The fact that five states are recognised in the treaty as holders of nuclear weapons was regarded as a matter of transition; the treaty does not in any sense confer permanent status on those states as weapons holders”.

Two weeks ago, in his TFT article (“The bell-wether of national security strategy”; June 23-29, 2006), Ejaz Haider argued that “ElBaradei dismisses the contention that the NPT bestowed legitimacy on any state’s nuclear-weapon capability…but then uses this as the basis for his argument in favour of the US-India nuclear deal. This complicates matters and undermines the importance of ElBaradei’s interpretation of ‘legitimacy’.”

I would slightly differ from Haider on this point. My contention is that by writing what he has, ElBaradei has clarified the legal position on this score and thus made the debate over the legitimacy issue – some can have the weapons while others can’t – irrelevant. By extension, this also renders irrelevant Pakistan’s quest to seek the status of a legitimate nuclear weapons state (NWS). Consider.

Winning legitimacy for the nuclear programme has been a major foreign policy objective for Pakistan, who, along with India, was painted as an illegal NWS worldwide. Pakistan had toiled hard to convince the world that it had the right to go nuclear, not only in self-defence but also because it had refused to ratify the NPT.

It has also been a popular, though flawed belief that to be recognised as legitimate NWSs, Pakistan and India should persuade the international community to amend the NPT and include them in the text of the treaty so they could get legitimacy for their de facto status. This was not possible given the very architecture of the treaty.

ElBaradei’s take on the issue has suddenly upset the entire debate on the ‘legitimacy’ issue under the NPT, making it irrelevant.

From a purely legal standpoint, ElBaradei is right. Not only because he enjoys respect as a qualified international lawyer and an expert in public international law but also because he has been an astute chief executive of the IAEA and understands well the interplay of law and diplomacy. He is legally correct in stating that the issue of recognising five states as possessors of nuclear weapons was an interim measure and “the treaty does not in any sense confer permanent status on those states as weapons holders”.

Another interesting question is whether ElBaradei has contradicted the UNSC resolution 1172 that condemned Pakistan and India for going nuclear, especially para 11 of the said UN Resolution which states that the UNSC “… recalls that in accordance with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapons state….”?

It was this paragraph which induced some analysts to mistakenly believe that Pakistan had been denied legitimacy as a nuclear weapons state on the whole. Para 11 of the UNSC Resolution, however, specifically referred to the issue “in accordance with the NPT…”

ElBaradei’s article should correct this perception in Pakistan.

It should be recalled that apart from the NPT, there is no other international legal text that determines states as lawful or unlawful nuclear states. There is no other global forum that confers legitimacy or illegitimacy on a state in respect of its nuclear programme. NPT is the only treaty that, by implication, refers to five states as nuclear weapons states. Pakistan, in any case, lay outside the legal regime of NPT. The only attraction for Pakistan to consider ratification of the NPT was to acquire legitimacy in respect of its nuclear programme. To that, ElBaradei’s comment has put paid.

The implication of ElBaradei’s article is that Pakistan should no longer worry about the legitimacy of its status since the NPT has not bestowed legitimacy on any state, not even those recognised by it as holders of such weapons.

This has also been the official Pakistani view. But there is no further reason to expend our diplomatic energies on this count.

<i>Ahmer Bilal Soofi is a practicing lawyer and President of Research Society of International Law</i>
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[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program</b>
Plant Underway Could Generate Plutonium for 40 to 50 Bombs a Year, Analysts Say
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, July 24, 2006; Page A01
Pakistan has begun building what independent analysts say is a powerful new reactor for producing plutonium, a move that, if verified, would signal a major expansion of the country's nuclear weapons capabilities and a potential new escalation in the region's arms race.

Satellite photos of Pakistan's Khushab nuclear site show what appears to be a partially completed heavy-water reactor capable of producing enough plutonium for 40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year, a 20-fold increase from Pakistan's current capabilities, according to a technical assessment by Washington-based nuclear experts.

The construction site is adjacent to Pakistan's only plutonium production reactor, a modest, 50-megawatt unit that began operating in 1998. By contrast, the dimensions of the new reactor suggest a capacity of 1,000 megawatts or more, according to the analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security. Pakistan is believed to have 30 to 50 uranium warheads, which tend to be heavier and more difficult than plutonium warheads to mount on missiles.

"South Asia may be heading for a nuclear arms race that could lead to arsenals growing into the hundreds of nuclear weapons, or at minimum, vastly expanded stockpiles of military fissile material," the institute's David Albright and Paul Brannan concluded in the technical assessment, a copy of which was provided to The Washington Post.

The assessment's key judgments were endorsed by two other independent nuclear experts who reviewed the commercially available satellite images, provided by Digital Globe, and supporting data. In Pakistan, officials would not confirm or deny the report, but a senior Pakistani official, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged that a nuclear expansion was underway.

"Pakistan's nuclear program has matured. We're now consolidating the program with further expansions," the official said. The expanded program includes "some civilian nuclear power and some military components," he said.

The development raises fresh concerns about a decades-old rivalry between Pakistan and India. Both countries already possess dozens of nuclear warheads and a variety of missiles and other means for delivering them.

Pakistan, like India, has never signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of its pioneering nuclear scientists, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who confessed two years ago to operating a network that supplied nuclear materials and know-how to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

The evidence of a possible escalation also comes as Congress prepares to debate a controversial nuclear cooperation agreement between the Bush administration and India. The agreement would grant India access to sensitive U.S. nuclear technology in return for placing its civilian nuclear reactors under tighter safeguards. No such restrictions were placed on India's military nuclear facilities. India currently has an estimated 30 to 35 nuclear warheads based on a sophisticated plutonium design. Pakistan, which uses a simpler, uranium-based warhead design, has sought for years to modernize its arsenal, and a new heavy-water reactor could allow it to do so, weapons experts say.

"With plutonium bombs, Pakistan can fully join the nuclear club," said a Europe-based diplomat and nuclear expert, speaking on condition that he not be identified by name, after reviewing the satellite evidence. He concurred with the Institute for Science and International Security assessment but offered a somewhat lower estimate -- "up to tenfold" -- for the increase in Pakistan's plutonium production. A third, U.S.-based expert concurred fully with the institute's estimates. Pakistan launched its nuclear program in the early 1970s and conducted its first successful nuclear test in 1998.
The completion of the first, 50-megawatt plutonium production reactor in Pakistan's central Khushab district was seen as a step toward modernizing the country's arsenal. The reactor is capable of producing about 10 kilograms of plutonium a year, enough for about two warheads. Construction of the larger reactor at Khushab apparently began sometime in 2000. Satellite photos taken in the spring of 2005 showed the frame of a rectangular building enclosing what appeared to be the round metal shell of a large nuclear reactor. A year later, in April 2006, the roof of the structure was still incomplete, allowing an unobstructed view of the reactor's features.
"The fact that the roof is still off strikes me as a sign that Pakistan is neither rushing nor attempting to conceal," said Albright of the institute.
The slow pace of construction could suggest difficulties in obtaining parts, or simply that other key facilities for plutonium bomb-making are not yet in place, the institute report concludes. Pakistan would probably need to expand its capacity for producing heavy water for its new reactor, as well as its ability to reprocess spent nuclear fuel to extract the plutonium, the report says.
After comparing a sequence of satellite photos, the institute analysts estimated that the new reactor was still "a few years" from completion. The diameter of the structure's metal shell suggests a very large reactor "operating in excess of 1,000 megawatts thermal,"
the report says.
"Such a reactor could produce over 200 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per year, assuming it operates at full power a modest 220 days per year," it says. "At 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon, this stock would allow the production of over 40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year."
There was no immediate reaction to the report from the Bush administration. Albright said he shared his data with government nuclear analysts, who did not dispute his conclusions and appeared to already know about the new reactor.
"If there's an increasing risk of an arms race in South Asia, why hasn't this already been introduced into the debate?" Albright asked. He said the Pakistani development adds urgency to calls for a treaty halting the production of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.
"The United States needs to push more aggressively for a fissile material cut-off treaty, and so far it has not," he said. Special correspondent Kamran Khan in Karachi, Pakistan, and researcher
Alice Crites in Washington contributed to this report.
http://tinyurl.com/s5kt3
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/so.../newkhushab.pdf ISIS
Report on Commercial Satellite Imagery Suggests Pakistan is Building a
Second, Much Larger Plutonium Production Reactor: Is South
Asia Headed for a Dramatic Buildup in Nuclear Arsenals?
By David Albright and Paul Brannan
July 24, 2006

Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)

Commercial satellite imagery from Digital Globe appears to show the construction of a second heavy water production reactor inside the Khushab complex in Pakistan (figure 1). The image shows a round, metal structure inside a square building under construction that appears to be a reactor vessel. This reactor appears much larger than the operating reactor on the site1, which went critical in 1998 and is estimated to have a power of about 50 MWth. The reactor under construction is estimated to be capable of operating in excess of 1,000 megawatts-thermal, according to analysis based on the diameter of the vessel. Such a reactor could produce over 200 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium per year, assuming it operates at full power for a modest 220 days per year. At 4-5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon, this stock would allow the production of over 40-50 nuclear weapons a year. The reactor could also be used to produce substantial amounts of tritium for boosted fission weapons.

Figure 1 Overview of the Khushab complex, in the Khushab district of Punjab.
1 See http://isis-online.org/publications/southa...habreactor.html
Figure 2 A close up of the building suspected to be a large heavy
water, plutonium production reactor. Based on a set of images, construction of the reactor started after March 2000. In the image from June 2005, a possible reactor vessel is visible within the inner portion of the building (figure 2). The support columns for the outer portion of the building are visible as well. A large crane is visible just outside the building. Situated to the west of the main building is a structure suspected to be a mosque. It is the only building within the Khushab site with walls that are not parallel to those of other buildings and appears to face Mecca. Figure 3 More recent close up of the construction site.

In an April 2006 image (figure 3), the outer portion of the building has been covered with a roof. Across the ground next to the new crane are what appear to be several arched metal rods. These pieces could be used as the frame for a roof on top of the inner structure. The linear distance between the ends of the arched rods and the distance between the east and west walls of the inside structure are both approximately 105 feet. The construction activity just above the north-east corner of the entire building could be the foundation for a stack.

The round object inside the building has a diameter of about 5 meters. This is significantly larger than the corresponding vessel in the existing reactor at this site. Based on the size of the vessel, assuming moderation by heavy water, standard values for heavy water reactors, and economical use of the volume of the vessel, this reactor is estimated to be capable of operating in excess of 1,000 megawatts-thermal. It is important to note that this estimate remains uncertain, absent any confirmatory information from Pakistan.

Based on the apparent rate of construction, the reactor could be finished within a few years. However, nothing suggests that Pakistan is moving quickly to finish this reactor.

The driving forces behind the reactor completion schedule could be a shortage of necessary reactor components or other parts of the weapons-production infrastructure,such as the rate of heavy water production, the availability of a sufficient fuel reprocessing capacity or, perhaps, the availability of sufficient modern tritium recovery and packaging facilities. For example, Pakistan may not have enough heavy water for this reactor, which could require about 100-150 tonnes of heavy water. The Khushab site has a heavy water production plant2 able to produce an estimated 13 tonnes of heavy water a year, a relatively small production capability. Pakistan may not be able to reprocess all of the anticipated irradiated fuel from this reactor. It is known to process fuel to separate plutonium at the New Labs facility at Rawalpindi, and this facility was expanded between about 1998 and 2002. However, this increase in capacity was believed to be associated with the smaller, heavy water reactor.

India is likely aware of this reactor construction in Khushab. Has this influenced India to increase its own plutonium production capacity for its nuclear weapons program? India has insisted on maintaining outside of safeguards a major reprocessing facility and a large number of nuclear power reactors in the recent negotiations between the United States and India aimed at increasing peaceful nuclear cooperation.

South Asia may be heading for a nuclear arms race that could lead to arsenals growing into the hundreds of nuclear weapons, or at a minimum vastly expanded stockpiles of military fissile material. A negotiated agreement that results in a halt to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons should be a priority for the international community.

Not only are such arsenals a waste of precious resources, they increase instability in the region and could needlessly provoke China to respond by increasing the size and lethality of its own nuclear capabilities.

1 See http://isis-online.org/publications/southa...habreactor.html
2 http://isis-online.org/publications/southa...abheavyh2o.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

[Guest]

"India is reported to <b>have 69 </b> Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles - each with one warhead - plus many more bombs that can be dropped by bombers.

Pakistan is thought to <b>have 165 missiles</b> of various versions of its Hatf series of missiles - each with a warhead - plus bombs capable of being dropped by air."

<b>India has less missiles then Pakistan? when did this happen?</b>

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5209894.stm

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->India has less missiles then Pakistan? when did this happen?
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After UPA came into power. Pakistan is still buying and painting colors on weapons from Korea and China. And India is thinking with peace process we don't need weapons. Plus with reservation, they will put condition to Pakistan that they have to follow reservation quota while firing missiles in India.
Do you know who is India's Defense, Home and Prime Minister?
People like them in power, I request you all to pray for your family everyday.

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-Mudy+Jul 24 2006, 08:33 PM-->QUOTE(Mudy @ Jul 24 2006, 08:33 PM)<!--QuoteEBegin--> I request you all to pray for your family everyday.
[right][snapback]54481[/snapback][/right]
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Prayers cannot do what actions can do. If you really care about your family show it with actions. all those who are in america have more influence on the rest of the world, than they are able to use. write waht you feel. write blogs, write to abc, cnn, bbc write to sanetors, authors of anti paki books, write about what you know. who ever you think would have interest in your point of view write to them.

Times are tough they will get tougher, don't be afraid, don't give up. write , write write.

[Guest]

Our stoic acceptance of terrorism on our soil isn't one bit affected by missile count. If political will is missing, does it matter that India has 69 missile and Pakis have 69000 or vice versa?

[Guest]

<b>'F-16s+N-reactor to Pak=disaster'</b>

[Guest]

let us contact Gary Ackerman and express our support for his fight for sanity. let us provide him arsenal to put his strong points in front of the Congressional Caucus. let us help him convince people why it is dangerous for pakistan to have those F-16. It doesnot have to be some thing revolutionary, just simple letter expressing your honest opinion. We can't sit quitly simple letters like these may just save our family from becoming the next victims.

Gary Ackerman

[Guest]

This was the mail i send to congressman Gary Ackerman who is opposing the sale of F-16s to Pakistan.

Dear Mr. Ackerman,
I would like to applaud your actions in trying to stop the arming of Pakistan with American F-16s. It is very alarming that the present government is not able to perceive the danger of this sale. In exchange of few terrorists, to improve the statistics in the war on terror, they are arming the potential terrorists with even more lethal weapons. This is just like selling the stinger missiles to the Taliban, but much much worst. America may end up creating Lebanon like situation in south Asia, were the terrorists will be armed with sophisticated weaponry and out of control of any accountable government.
Pakistan is a volatile country. Though its government is helping America currently, they could not be considered as an ‘American ally’ in the war on terror. It is no secrete that majority of Pakistani population is anti-west, anti-India and pro-extremists. They are being paid to do, what they do not have a natural inclination to do. Their loyalty is not to the cause but to the rewards that they are getting for walking with the cause for a while. As soon as the focus on terrorism gets blurred the Pakistani government would use those ‘earned rewards’ in winning its population back, by again supporting the extremist elements. And the vicious circle will start again.
The only solution to lasting peace in south Asia and the rest of the world is for world powers like America to support natural democracies like India. India like America has natural inclination towards secularism and against terrorism. India could be the budding source of spreading democracy all across south Asia. If democracy in India is strengthened the population of the rest of the south Asia would be inspired to cultivate favorable atmosphere for natural blooming of democracy. Arming of Pakistan will without doubt weaken India. It would send mixed signals to the world population about America’s commitment to strengthening and spreading of democracy. The fight for secularism and peace in the future would become ever more difficult.
Sir I am not aware what support you may have from your fellow congressman in your cause, but further arming of Pakistan with such devastating weaponry has to be prevented. If one may ask the FBI agents of the Bin Laden unit, or Dick Clark the terrorism Guru, or other members of congress, what would they do before 9/11 if they knew how crucial, the knowledge they had about the possibility of 9/11 attack, could be? My guess is they would say, they would break down every wall, teardown every door, scream at the top of their voice till their voice is heard. Unfortunately we never get the second chance to do our best. The arming of Pakistan and weakening of Indian democracy will cause dangerous instability in the region. This would eventually ensue the vicious cycle of death and destruction that would stop only when everything is in ashes. No one will have a control over the carnage than. We can only stop it now.

I therefore write you with my most humble request to do what is in your power to stop the world from plunging into the dark abyss.

With Regards and Prayers,
Jay Shastri.

[Guest]

Published this weeked:Washington secretly helping Islamabad guard n-weapons

Published by <b>Prof Komerath in 2002</b>: Has Pakistan Lost Its Nuclear Weapons?

[Guest]

<b>China tested 1st N-bomb for Pak in 1990: US arms expert</b><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Washington China had tested for Pakistan its first nuclear bomb as early as in 1990, enabling Islamabad to respond within weeks to the Indian atomic tests eight years later, a top US nuclear expert has claimed.
<b>"The Chinese did a massive training of Pakistani scientists, brought them to China for lectures, even gave them the design of the CHIC-4 device, which was a weapon that was easy to build a model for export," </b>former US Air Force Secretary Thomas Reed told American news magazine 'US News and World Report'.

Reed, who had worked at Livermore National Laboratory as a weapons designer, had co-authored a new book -- The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation -- with Danny Stillman, the former director of the technical intelligence division at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

The book makes a scathing indictment of China, alleging that it intentionally proliferated nuclear technology to ‘risky regimes’, particularly Pakistan, the magazine said.

The Chinese gave the nuclear technology to Pakistan as ‘India was China's enemy and Pakistan was India's enemy,’ Reed told the magazine.

<b>"Under Pakistani President Benazir Bhutto, the country built its first functioning nuclear weapon. We believe that during Bhutto's term in office, the People's Republic of China tested Pakistan's first bomb for her in 1990," he said.

He said there are numerous reasons to believe this, including the design of the weapon and information gathered from discussions with Chinese nuclear experts.</b>

<b>"That's why the Pakistanis were so quick to respond to the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. It only took them two weeks and three days,"</b> Reed said.
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