04-18-2005, 08:22 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->C O M M E N T A R Y
<b>Facing the dragon</b>
India held up against Chinese attacks better than expected.
18 April 2005: It will take another day for a cool assessment of General Pervez Musharrafâs visit to India. Right now, it has taken on the proportions of a page 3 event. On the other hand, the concluded visit of the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, provides some insights into Chinese thinking, which is basically cutthroat diplomacy, but for once, the <b>Chinese have not been able to crack the Indian wall</b>. There was remarkable unity, for a change, on the Indian side, and the prime minister, his cabinet colleagues handling security issues, and officials, <b>including the military, were in step most of the time</b>.
To start with, an apology from our side. We misreported that in their meetings, <b>PM Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao tentatively agreed on a swap of disputed territories, China keeping Aksai Chin in the Western Sector in exchange for dropping claims on Arunachal Pradesh, Tawang, and so on in the Eastern Sector </b>(Intelligence, âSecret: PM-Jiabao agree on territory swap,â 11 April 2005). Such a proposal was made by China, presumably at the invitation or hint of someone from the Indian side, during or before Wen Jiabaoâs visit, very probably before, but such was Indian Army opposition to this, that the proposal made no progress beyond the initial rounds. There was no question of an Indian agreement on this, not after so much opposition.
<b>The Chinese, on the other hand, were pressuring for a package deal on the border dispute, not a sector-by-sector, territory-by-territory negotiation favoured by India.</b> Officials said what the Chinese hoped was to wrest Aksai Chin, where they have made massive military investments by way of a jetport and helipads, and a network of heavy roads to link Xining, their planned oil and gas hub, to the upcoming Pakistani port of Gwadar in the Arabian Sea, while in the exchanged Eastern Sector, they would haggle over tactically crucial territories, like Tawang. But obviously<b>, <span style='color:red'>the Indian military would not permit this disadvantageous swap. </span></b>
Loaded on to the Western-Sector-for-Eastern-Sector deal was Chinese extortion tactics on Indiaâs bid to become a permanent UN Security Council member with veto powers. For one, Wen Jiabao spoke in two voices, supporting Indiaâs candidature in private talks, but reverting to the Chinese position of âconsensusâ on the issue in public statements. But even in this private support, conditionalities were attached.
<b>The major conditionality was that, in return for Chinese support in getting veto power in the UN Security Council, India had to give up Aksai Chin and Tawang in the Eastern Sector, but that was not the end of it. There was no guarantee that China would not dispute the status of Arunachal Pradesh, and there was a distinct possibility of reopening the matter of Sikkimâs merger with India. âIt was all getting very hot,â confessed an insider on the negotiations. âIt looked progressively that it was not worth the effort to get Chinaâs support on a permanent Security Council membership. So very pointedly at some stage, we gave up insisting on it, and the Chinese understood there was no deal.â </b>
The Chinese tried bullying on two other issues, Tibet and Taiwan. On Tibet, as usual, they wanted a blanket ban on the Dalai Lamaâs political activity, which is anyhow nil on Indian soil, and this was told firmly to the Chinese. Second, they wanted a clampdown on the political activities of Tibetan youth, and the Indian side said there was no encouragement of this, and such activities were not to its knowledge. Finally, the Chinese wanted Indian funding to the Tibetan refugees to be heavily curtailed, and the Indian side was non-committal. The factual position is, as newer generations of Tibetans have come into trade, especially exports, the Indian funding, necessary to sustain a government in exile, to keep the Dalai Lama in his station as a head of state, and so on, has markedly reduced.
On Taiwan, the Chinese demands were as outrageous. Not only did they want all Taiwanese visitors to India discouraged and monitored for anti-Mainland activities, they also demanded that all visitors from Taiwan be previously cleared by China. In other words, if a Taiwanese delegation sought permission to visit India, the delegation had to be cleared by China. Such was the scorn the Indian side showed to this proposal, according to an official, that the Chinese knew they had failed to impress or convince. But Wen Jiabao also found a distinct lack of timidity on the Indian side during negotiations, partly because of the weight of opinion held and expressed freely by the military and intelligence institutions. For example, Wen Jiabao went into a long explanation of the quality and depth of China-Pakistan relations. While being frank that joint projects, like fighter-jet production, battle tank upgradation, establishing civilian nuclear reactors, etc, could not be abandoned, the Chinese premier said that both countries had come to each otherâs aid in times of need. Earlier, such a statement would have been accepted at face value, so as not to embarrass or upset a visitor of Wen Jiabaoâs stature.
<b>But not this time. The Indian side said that it accepted the impressive Chinese assistance to Pakistan, but it queried about Pakistani reciprocity. What had Pakistan done for China, what incredible assistance had it rendered, to gain such measure of Chinese gratitude? For once, officials recalled, the Chinese side fumbled for a response. The very unequal nature of Chinese-Pakistan relations was hammered in, and this was a change from Indian moralising, when it was ever possible, and it was a good substitute for anger, which India has never tried with China, anger being an unpredictable entity with the Chinese. âBut we sent them back with some very disturbing questions,â an official said.</b>
In other words, for the Chinese, Wen Jiabaoâs visit made no progress on contentious military and political issues, while the Indian side called to question the basic premise of Chinaâs relations with Pakistan. Through the Wen tour, India fended off Chinese attacks, without losing its cool or purpose, and the visit was dressed up a success in trade terms, <b>because this was the plea of Indian industry and business, which sees China spinning out of control after the 2008 Olympics and 2010 World Expo, when Chinese internal demand is predicted to collapse, and the bubble of the Chinese economy bursts.</b><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<b>Facing the dragon</b>
India held up against Chinese attacks better than expected.
18 April 2005: It will take another day for a cool assessment of General Pervez Musharrafâs visit to India. Right now, it has taken on the proportions of a page 3 event. On the other hand, the concluded visit of the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, provides some insights into Chinese thinking, which is basically cutthroat diplomacy, but for once, the <b>Chinese have not been able to crack the Indian wall</b>. There was remarkable unity, for a change, on the Indian side, and the prime minister, his cabinet colleagues handling security issues, and officials, <b>including the military, were in step most of the time</b>.
To start with, an apology from our side. We misreported that in their meetings, <b>PM Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao tentatively agreed on a swap of disputed territories, China keeping Aksai Chin in the Western Sector in exchange for dropping claims on Arunachal Pradesh, Tawang, and so on in the Eastern Sector </b>(Intelligence, âSecret: PM-Jiabao agree on territory swap,â 11 April 2005). Such a proposal was made by China, presumably at the invitation or hint of someone from the Indian side, during or before Wen Jiabaoâs visit, very probably before, but such was Indian Army opposition to this, that the proposal made no progress beyond the initial rounds. There was no question of an Indian agreement on this, not after so much opposition.
<b>The Chinese, on the other hand, were pressuring for a package deal on the border dispute, not a sector-by-sector, territory-by-territory negotiation favoured by India.</b> Officials said what the Chinese hoped was to wrest Aksai Chin, where they have made massive military investments by way of a jetport and helipads, and a network of heavy roads to link Xining, their planned oil and gas hub, to the upcoming Pakistani port of Gwadar in the Arabian Sea, while in the exchanged Eastern Sector, they would haggle over tactically crucial territories, like Tawang. But obviously<b>, <span style='color:red'>the Indian military would not permit this disadvantageous swap. </span></b>
Loaded on to the Western-Sector-for-Eastern-Sector deal was Chinese extortion tactics on Indiaâs bid to become a permanent UN Security Council member with veto powers. For one, Wen Jiabao spoke in two voices, supporting Indiaâs candidature in private talks, but reverting to the Chinese position of âconsensusâ on the issue in public statements. But even in this private support, conditionalities were attached.
<b>The major conditionality was that, in return for Chinese support in getting veto power in the UN Security Council, India had to give up Aksai Chin and Tawang in the Eastern Sector, but that was not the end of it. There was no guarantee that China would not dispute the status of Arunachal Pradesh, and there was a distinct possibility of reopening the matter of Sikkimâs merger with India. âIt was all getting very hot,â confessed an insider on the negotiations. âIt looked progressively that it was not worth the effort to get Chinaâs support on a permanent Security Council membership. So very pointedly at some stage, we gave up insisting on it, and the Chinese understood there was no deal.â </b>
The Chinese tried bullying on two other issues, Tibet and Taiwan. On Tibet, as usual, they wanted a blanket ban on the Dalai Lamaâs political activity, which is anyhow nil on Indian soil, and this was told firmly to the Chinese. Second, they wanted a clampdown on the political activities of Tibetan youth, and the Indian side said there was no encouragement of this, and such activities were not to its knowledge. Finally, the Chinese wanted Indian funding to the Tibetan refugees to be heavily curtailed, and the Indian side was non-committal. The factual position is, as newer generations of Tibetans have come into trade, especially exports, the Indian funding, necessary to sustain a government in exile, to keep the Dalai Lama in his station as a head of state, and so on, has markedly reduced.
On Taiwan, the Chinese demands were as outrageous. Not only did they want all Taiwanese visitors to India discouraged and monitored for anti-Mainland activities, they also demanded that all visitors from Taiwan be previously cleared by China. In other words, if a Taiwanese delegation sought permission to visit India, the delegation had to be cleared by China. Such was the scorn the Indian side showed to this proposal, according to an official, that the Chinese knew they had failed to impress or convince. But Wen Jiabao also found a distinct lack of timidity on the Indian side during negotiations, partly because of the weight of opinion held and expressed freely by the military and intelligence institutions. For example, Wen Jiabao went into a long explanation of the quality and depth of China-Pakistan relations. While being frank that joint projects, like fighter-jet production, battle tank upgradation, establishing civilian nuclear reactors, etc, could not be abandoned, the Chinese premier said that both countries had come to each otherâs aid in times of need. Earlier, such a statement would have been accepted at face value, so as not to embarrass or upset a visitor of Wen Jiabaoâs stature.
<b>But not this time. The Indian side said that it accepted the impressive Chinese assistance to Pakistan, but it queried about Pakistani reciprocity. What had Pakistan done for China, what incredible assistance had it rendered, to gain such measure of Chinese gratitude? For once, officials recalled, the Chinese side fumbled for a response. The very unequal nature of Chinese-Pakistan relations was hammered in, and this was a change from Indian moralising, when it was ever possible, and it was a good substitute for anger, which India has never tried with China, anger being an unpredictable entity with the Chinese. âBut we sent them back with some very disturbing questions,â an official said.</b>
In other words, for the Chinese, Wen Jiabaoâs visit made no progress on contentious military and political issues, while the Indian side called to question the basic premise of Chinaâs relations with Pakistan. Through the Wen tour, India fended off Chinese attacks, without losing its cool or purpose, and the visit was dressed up a success in trade terms, <b>because this was the plea of Indian industry and business, which sees China spinning out of control after the 2008 Olympics and 2010 World Expo, when Chinese internal demand is predicted to collapse, and the bubble of the Chinese economy bursts.</b><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->