Book Folder

[Guest]

<b>Pakistan: Between Mosque And Military</b>by Husain Haqqani
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->“Pakistan between mosque and military” is an elegantly written, well-documented book by Husain Haqqani. It is essential reading to understand why the alliance between the mosque and the military will last in Pakistan; why America’s war on terror will be won — or possibly lost — in Pakistan; and why there cannot be a settlement to the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The religious definition of Pakistan accounts for its identity problems, its bad relations with India, which, from its viewpoint, have necessitated heavy defence spending; and its protracted and often unsuccessful attempts to enhance its influence over neighbouring Muslim countries. Haqqani, a Pakistani intellectual who works Carnegic Endowment, observes that most Muslims in British India did not know what Pakistan meant before 1947, although they voted for the Muslim League in the elections of 1945-46. Pakistan — and Islam — meant different things to different Muslims. Exploiting the incompetence of Pakistan’s civilian politicians, the military usurped power in 1958 and thereafter took the lead in defining Pakistan’s brand of Islam and implementing it. But Haqqani fails to point out that for Jinnah Pakistan always meant a sovereign state, having no relations with India except by treaty. The theme of Jinnah’s secularism has been played out by several authors, but it is hard to credit any leader with secularism if he exploits religion for political ends, at the cost of tens of thousands of human lives, as Jinnah successfully did. What possibility of agreement was there as he declared, as the communal violence raged in 1947, that the British had deliberately fostered the idea of a united India “as part of machinations for destruction and bloodshed” after their departure? Pakistan made its first attempt to sever Kashmir from India while he was Governor-General of Pakistan; evidently he found political uses to fight that particular jihad. Given that neither Jinnah nor Liaqat Ali Khan, nor the Bhuttos nor Nawaz Sharif ever dispensed with the clergy for political reasons, how can they be perceived as secular, which implies the separation of religion from state? Pakistan’s definition as a religious state, which constrained its development as a democracy, is rooted in the religious politics all its rulers pursued. Haqqani shows why religion has not forged consensus among Pakistanis. The East Pakistanis seceded in 1971 and carved out the state of Bangladesh. The Sindhis, the Balochi and the Pathans have resented the domination of the military and civil services by the Urdu-speaking Punjabis. The highly centralised government has aggravated ethnic tensions, and there are no institutional mechanisms to deal with such discontent. Constitutional provisions for provincial autonomy have been bypassed while interprovincial animosity has festered. Jinnah’s politically inept successors only aggravated Pakistan’s disunity and created a political vacuum into which the military stepped in 1958. The idea that “Islamic” Pakistan could get arms from the West emanated from Jinnah himself. Taking their inspiration from him — and in my view, from the Islamic definition he bestowed on Pakistan — the military successfully got American weapons after 1953. Islam has been the central issue in Pakistan since 1947, and it will continue to be used to paper over Pakistan’s ethnic cracks. This is not just because most Pakistanis are Muslims. In its early years as a state Pakistan was disturbed by Afghanistan’s refusal to play the same brand of religious politics and to oppose its membership of the United Nations. The problem is that Pakistan’s rulers have aligned religion with territory. The ideology of the religious nation-state hampers Pakistan’s evolution as a democracy, partly because it limits intellectual and political choice. General Musharraf will remain caught in a bind because he refuses to govern without the help of clergy. Since the late fifties the military has dominated Pakistan’s politics, creating several layers to Pakistan’s sense of insecurity by turning to the mullahs to enhance their legitimacy. This has been at the expense of relatively “secular” parties, against whom the military has waged relentless war and continually ejected from power. Meanwhile, religious parties made a strong showing in the elections of 2002. American support to the military has made it impossible for a moderate civil society to emerge. Haqqani’s statement that Pakistan is neither a friend nor a foe contrasts with that of Stephen Cohen, who regards Pakistan as “probably the most anti-American country in the world, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side to the liberals and Westernised elites on the other. Perhaps not quite: a recent Pew Global Attitudes poll revealed that just under 60 per cent of the Pakistanis viewed the US unfavourably, in comparison to more than 60 per cent of Turks (and Poles). The military-mosque alliance has been to the disadvantage of the US. The alliance has radicalised segments of the Islamic world, and pushed Pakistan to the brink of war with India. Military aid has enabled Pakistan’s military to enhance its role in politics. Zia-ul-Haq installed the client Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, but the US never controlled the mujahideen or the ISI which trained and sustained them, although it paid for the anti-Soviet operation. Waging jihad against the Soviets also enabled the ISI to wage jihad against India on Kashmir. The Americans actually have scant leverage over the military. Haqqani takes the view that the US might be able to change Pakistan’s pretence of being a Middle-Eastern country by taking it out of the area of operations of the American military’s Central Command and placing it under the Pacific Command, along with India. Is there some confusion on the American side? The State Department’s Bureau of South Asian Affairs classifies Pakistan, along with Afghanistan and India, as a South Asian country. By giving Pakistan unconditional military aid Washington contributes to increases in its defence spending, the marginalisation of moderate political parties, and the economic stagnation of Pakistan. The US should not ignore Pakistan’s state sponsorship of Islamic militants, its pursuit of nuclear weapons at the expense of education, healthcare and democratisation. Each of these issues is linked to the future of Islamic radicalism and its negative impact on America’s war on terror. The US has acquired some short-term gains, but it is time for the US and Pakistani rulers to transform Pakistan from an ideological state into a functional one. The real issue that needs to be resolved is: “Who controls Pakistan”? Unfortunately, this reviewer does not see any leadership that can transform Pakistan from an ideological to a functional state. That is why the military and the mosque will continue to dominate Pakistan’s politics; that is why the stalemate over Kashmir will last; that is why Pakistan could yet spike America’s guns against terrorism.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->