07-21-2006, 12:30 PM
Ikle, Fred. Every War Must End.
By LCDR Martin Beck, USN, NOPC 2002
<b>
Without referring to either Clausewitz or Sun Tzu, Fred Charles Ikle's, Every War Must End, emphasizes their most fundamental tenants: âKnow the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered (The Art of War, pg 129), and, âTheory... demands that at the outset of war its character and scope should be determined on the basis of the political probabilities. </b>The more the belligerent states are involved and drawn in to its vortex, the clearer appear the connections between its separate actions and the more imperative the need not to take the first step without considering the last (On War, pg. 584) (emphasis added).
However, it is precisely these principles that both military and political leaders fail to evaluate in their pre-war planning and assessments. Instead, Ikle contends that the majority of the effort of military planners is directed toward how best to employ the instruments of war, rather than the political and military conditions that must be achieved in order to achieve successful war termination. Nationally defined, strategic end states are often deliberately vague leaving a great deal to the imagination of the war planner as to what environment must be established to satisfy the national objective. Consequently, the means are heavily relieved upon to provide an end.
Every War Must End contends that military leaders dedicate themselves to achieving quantitative successes, such as victory in battles and campaigns, rather than to determining the qualitative factors that give rise to and evolve during the conflict and what is required to resolve those factors in order to end the fighting. Like doctors only treating symptoms, the disease continues to thrive or enter a remission, only to manifest latter itself in another form, despite the resources and heroic endeavors of the medical profession. War, as disease, transforms so that the original therapy may be ineffective.
Ikle's work is as applicable today as when it was written in 1971. Although Ikle only uses examples from both World Wars and Korea, his descriptive concepts are relevant to the war termination deliberate planning for any contingency. However, little if any planning was dedicated to conditions for war termination in the conflicts that have followed in this century: Vietnam, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, and now, Afghanistan. The primary descriptive concepts relevant to the war planner on which Ikle focuses is arguments include: War estimates, the âknock-out blowâ as a major uncertainty, internal struggles within participating nation states, the substitutes for victory that evolve out of those struggles, escalation versus prolongation of the war effort, and âPsychological Shockâ required to influence national decision makers.
The exchange of war estimates between Japanâs Army Chief of Staff and Emperor prior to embarking in a war with the United States, were probably not much different than those exchanged between the theater commander and U.S. President at the onset of the crisis in Kosovo. Sugiyamaâs estimate to defeat the U.S. in three months was remarkably optimistic, yet similar to U.S. military estimates to defeat Serbia in three days! Military war estimates that predict how long it will take to defeat the enemy, and courses of action that will evoke capitulation, are notoriously inaccurate and optimistic, with little foundation in fact. Ikle argues, "that the aggregated estimates required to forecast the outcome of war are too large, abstract, and difficult to construct and agree upon for a government bureaucracy to successfully evaluate" (pp 22). Short war syndromes develop from poor assessments, relying on quantitative analysis of hard data such as orders of battle, industrial resources, cost, and the opponentâs ability to mobilize military forces. Unfortunately, it is the soft data, the subjective analysis of the adversaryâs political and military mindset, that is the most difficult to interpret. Consequently, decision makers rely on the means of warfare, which can be measured quantitatively, and their intuition to assign relative values to particular strategies and courses of action.
Reliance on quantitative analysis continues to permeate the decision making cycle throughout the conflict as each side searches for a means to deliver a âknock-out blowâ against the other. However, because this strategy is associated with imposing significant deprivations on the enemy either in a decisive battle or destruction of a center of gravity, it is difficult to estimate what the net, psychological effect will be. Therefore, critical uncertainty must also be recognized with the plan, and with it, great risk. As Ikle points out, World War I Germany painfully analyzed the quantitative impact of unrestricted submarine warfare on England but failed to assess the impact of drawing in the United States in response to such a course of action. Conversely, England analyzed the effects of saturation bombing Germanyâs infrastructure and civilian population during World War II, but failed to account for the resolve and hardening of the German peopleâs will in response to that bombing.
Ikle continues to propose that as courses of action are executed, declined, succeed or fail, internal struggles develop within the horizontal and vertical chains of command within each leg of the Clauswitzian trinity. This directly or indirectly impacts the ability of a nation to negotiate or may contribute to an erosion of the governmentâs power. Individual decision makers within a government, whose freedom of action is subject to the will of the people, loose or gain credibility based on the peopleâs perception of the war effort, the personal sacrifices they must make to sustain it, and the ultimate effect it will have on them if concluded successfully or otherwise. Ikle uses the example of Tsarist Russia to illustrate how a government can be replaced by strong forces operating within the population when the people are dissatisfied with the course the war has taken. In this example, the Bolshevik government made vast territorial concessions to Germany, once it gained power, in order to guarantee its survival and removal from WW I. This example also highlights Ikle's point that ending an unsuccessful war evokes an intense struggle within the nation. Debates between conservative ("hawks") and liberal ("doves") distorts perceptions of reality. Each side manipulating data to support independent agendas, ultimately contributing to inhibiting war termination.
This gives rise to a notion of assigning values to absolutes such as treason or adventurism, vice and virtue. Correctly identifying or creating the conditions to generate the desired characteristics within the population, military, and government to precipitate favorable war termination criteria is critical to the calculus of war. Consequently, as a conflict extends beyond its predicted length, governments seek substitutes for victory that are vastly different than the war aims initially envisioned. This is the crux of the argument: Predicting what conditions must be created to create "psychological shock" to the enemy's decision makers, causing them to abandon their war aims and seek alternatives to conclude the conflict. Vietnam represents an excellent case study where the United States deviated from its surrogate war against the Soviet Union to contain the spread of communism, and settled for âpeace with honorâ due to it own internal struggles brought on by a prolonged and unsuccessful war.
Ikle does not accuse either the political decision makers or military of failing to properly assess the subjective variables of war. However, he does emphasize the importance of understanding the dynamics of how to end a war before initiating it. This is even more vital today when the United States is engaged in a conflict not against nation states, but against ideas and individuals. More emphasis on understanding the fundamentals of war termination strategies is required in our war colleges rather than the mechanics of how to wage war. This is not only a strategy and policy issue, it is also a critical variable to planning successful joint military operations.
Fred Charles Ikle served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Reagan Administration from 1981-1988 and was Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Ford Administration from1973-1977. He has been a professor of political science as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Head of the Social Science Department of The Rand Corporation, and a distinguished scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has written several books on arms control, international negotiation, and socio-political issues and is author of How Nations Negotiate and The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction.
Every War Must End reflects his years of experience and insight, emphasizing the need for military planners to consistently and regularly conduct thorough assessments of not only the enemy, but of themselves. Data should be questioned to ensure we do not erroneously accept indications at face value that simply support our agenda, but may or may not be in the best interest for the country. Regrettably, Ikle does not propose any recommendations on how to resolve the dilemma of objectively sifting through the aggregate of intelligence estimates to ultimately arrive at the correct formula for successful war termination. An excellent analysis is done of identifying the variables, however, a formula to predict their interaction remains elusive. He repeatedly emphasizes, however, the need to objectively consider each of the variables prior to becoming involved in conflict and not to discount or diminish those that may be contrary to the plan.
An insightful, well written text supported with historical facts that are applicable in todayâs environment. An excellent supplemental to Clausewitzâ On War, Book VIII (War Plans) that should be mandatory reading for all military personnel who may become involved in the deliberate planning of future conflicts.
By LCDR Martin Beck, USN, NOPC 2002
<b>
Without referring to either Clausewitz or Sun Tzu, Fred Charles Ikle's, Every War Must End, emphasizes their most fundamental tenants: âKnow the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered (The Art of War, pg 129), and, âTheory... demands that at the outset of war its character and scope should be determined on the basis of the political probabilities. </b>The more the belligerent states are involved and drawn in to its vortex, the clearer appear the connections between its separate actions and the more imperative the need not to take the first step without considering the last (On War, pg. 584) (emphasis added).
However, it is precisely these principles that both military and political leaders fail to evaluate in their pre-war planning and assessments. Instead, Ikle contends that the majority of the effort of military planners is directed toward how best to employ the instruments of war, rather than the political and military conditions that must be achieved in order to achieve successful war termination. Nationally defined, strategic end states are often deliberately vague leaving a great deal to the imagination of the war planner as to what environment must be established to satisfy the national objective. Consequently, the means are heavily relieved upon to provide an end.
Every War Must End contends that military leaders dedicate themselves to achieving quantitative successes, such as victory in battles and campaigns, rather than to determining the qualitative factors that give rise to and evolve during the conflict and what is required to resolve those factors in order to end the fighting. Like doctors only treating symptoms, the disease continues to thrive or enter a remission, only to manifest latter itself in another form, despite the resources and heroic endeavors of the medical profession. War, as disease, transforms so that the original therapy may be ineffective.
Ikle's work is as applicable today as when it was written in 1971. Although Ikle only uses examples from both World Wars and Korea, his descriptive concepts are relevant to the war termination deliberate planning for any contingency. However, little if any planning was dedicated to conditions for war termination in the conflicts that have followed in this century: Vietnam, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, and now, Afghanistan. The primary descriptive concepts relevant to the war planner on which Ikle focuses is arguments include: War estimates, the âknock-out blowâ as a major uncertainty, internal struggles within participating nation states, the substitutes for victory that evolve out of those struggles, escalation versus prolongation of the war effort, and âPsychological Shockâ required to influence national decision makers.
The exchange of war estimates between Japanâs Army Chief of Staff and Emperor prior to embarking in a war with the United States, were probably not much different than those exchanged between the theater commander and U.S. President at the onset of the crisis in Kosovo. Sugiyamaâs estimate to defeat the U.S. in three months was remarkably optimistic, yet similar to U.S. military estimates to defeat Serbia in three days! Military war estimates that predict how long it will take to defeat the enemy, and courses of action that will evoke capitulation, are notoriously inaccurate and optimistic, with little foundation in fact. Ikle argues, "that the aggregated estimates required to forecast the outcome of war are too large, abstract, and difficult to construct and agree upon for a government bureaucracy to successfully evaluate" (pp 22). Short war syndromes develop from poor assessments, relying on quantitative analysis of hard data such as orders of battle, industrial resources, cost, and the opponentâs ability to mobilize military forces. Unfortunately, it is the soft data, the subjective analysis of the adversaryâs political and military mindset, that is the most difficult to interpret. Consequently, decision makers rely on the means of warfare, which can be measured quantitatively, and their intuition to assign relative values to particular strategies and courses of action.
Reliance on quantitative analysis continues to permeate the decision making cycle throughout the conflict as each side searches for a means to deliver a âknock-out blowâ against the other. However, because this strategy is associated with imposing significant deprivations on the enemy either in a decisive battle or destruction of a center of gravity, it is difficult to estimate what the net, psychological effect will be. Therefore, critical uncertainty must also be recognized with the plan, and with it, great risk. As Ikle points out, World War I Germany painfully analyzed the quantitative impact of unrestricted submarine warfare on England but failed to assess the impact of drawing in the United States in response to such a course of action. Conversely, England analyzed the effects of saturation bombing Germanyâs infrastructure and civilian population during World War II, but failed to account for the resolve and hardening of the German peopleâs will in response to that bombing.
Ikle continues to propose that as courses of action are executed, declined, succeed or fail, internal struggles develop within the horizontal and vertical chains of command within each leg of the Clauswitzian trinity. This directly or indirectly impacts the ability of a nation to negotiate or may contribute to an erosion of the governmentâs power. Individual decision makers within a government, whose freedom of action is subject to the will of the people, loose or gain credibility based on the peopleâs perception of the war effort, the personal sacrifices they must make to sustain it, and the ultimate effect it will have on them if concluded successfully or otherwise. Ikle uses the example of Tsarist Russia to illustrate how a government can be replaced by strong forces operating within the population when the people are dissatisfied with the course the war has taken. In this example, the Bolshevik government made vast territorial concessions to Germany, once it gained power, in order to guarantee its survival and removal from WW I. This example also highlights Ikle's point that ending an unsuccessful war evokes an intense struggle within the nation. Debates between conservative ("hawks") and liberal ("doves") distorts perceptions of reality. Each side manipulating data to support independent agendas, ultimately contributing to inhibiting war termination.
This gives rise to a notion of assigning values to absolutes such as treason or adventurism, vice and virtue. Correctly identifying or creating the conditions to generate the desired characteristics within the population, military, and government to precipitate favorable war termination criteria is critical to the calculus of war. Consequently, as a conflict extends beyond its predicted length, governments seek substitutes for victory that are vastly different than the war aims initially envisioned. This is the crux of the argument: Predicting what conditions must be created to create "psychological shock" to the enemy's decision makers, causing them to abandon their war aims and seek alternatives to conclude the conflict. Vietnam represents an excellent case study where the United States deviated from its surrogate war against the Soviet Union to contain the spread of communism, and settled for âpeace with honorâ due to it own internal struggles brought on by a prolonged and unsuccessful war.
Ikle does not accuse either the political decision makers or military of failing to properly assess the subjective variables of war. However, he does emphasize the importance of understanding the dynamics of how to end a war before initiating it. This is even more vital today when the United States is engaged in a conflict not against nation states, but against ideas and individuals. More emphasis on understanding the fundamentals of war termination strategies is required in our war colleges rather than the mechanics of how to wage war. This is not only a strategy and policy issue, it is also a critical variable to planning successful joint military operations.
Fred Charles Ikle served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Reagan Administration from 1981-1988 and was Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Ford Administration from1973-1977. He has been a professor of political science as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Head of the Social Science Department of The Rand Corporation, and a distinguished scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has written several books on arms control, international negotiation, and socio-political issues and is author of How Nations Negotiate and The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction.
Every War Must End reflects his years of experience and insight, emphasizing the need for military planners to consistently and regularly conduct thorough assessments of not only the enemy, but of themselves. Data should be questioned to ensure we do not erroneously accept indications at face value that simply support our agenda, but may or may not be in the best interest for the country. Regrettably, Ikle does not propose any recommendations on how to resolve the dilemma of objectively sifting through the aggregate of intelligence estimates to ultimately arrive at the correct formula for successful war termination. An excellent analysis is done of identifying the variables, however, a formula to predict their interaction remains elusive. He repeatedly emphasizes, however, the need to objectively consider each of the variables prior to becoming involved in conflict and not to discount or diminish those that may be contrary to the plan.
An insightful, well written text supported with historical facts that are applicable in todayâs environment. An excellent supplemental to Clausewitzâ On War, Book VIII (War Plans) that should be mandatory reading for all military personnel who may become involved in the deliberate planning of future conflicts.