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xposting Ramana garu's post from "colonial history thread"..

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->very relevant book review:
The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy By Randolf G.S. Cooper, Cambridge,
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First Blood
- How the west was won 

Lord Wellesley: confident in victory 
<b>The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy By Randolf G.S. Cooper,
Cambridge, Rs 695</b>

Students of Indian history at all levels are only too familiar with the Anglo-Maratha wars of the 18th and early 19th century. <b>Pitted as the ultimate test that the English East India Company had to pass for hegemony over the Indian subcontinent, these wars have been frequently recounted in depressing and mind-numbing detail to emphasize the undisputed superiority of the English fighting forces over the fractious and undisciplined Maratha army, which was perennially short of funds to pay its soldiery and chronically deficient in leadership and strategy.</b> Randolf G.S. Cooper’s work, therefore, comes as a surprise and as a corrective to conventional wisdom. <b>Giving an overview of Maratha military culture, he proceeds to contest assumptions about British military superiority and to argue that the campaigns represented the high-water mark for the Marathas. He also argues that the victory of Assaye in 1803 was determined as much by finance, politics and intelligence as by actual manoeuvres on the battlefield. </b>He is not, however, the first historian to come up with such a proposition — a number of writings have suggested the nexus between indigenous capital and imperial expansion.

For Cooper, the Maratha campaigns go far beyond the tactical game. <b>These constitute a complex contest between two cultures with contrasting perceptions of conflict and resolution. This, in turn, made assumptions about the adversary’s motives and moves, fragile and faulty. It is his contention that the Anglo-Maratha campaign of 1803 demonstrates the degree to which a Western power could misread an Asian opponent. </b>It is this gap that engages Cooper’s attention. Without discounting the fact of British victory, he proceeds to question the explanations offered for it. <b>He also turns our attention to the vitality and dynamism of Maratha military culture, which was deliberately silenced in the emerging historiography of British military superiority.</b>

<b>To understand the intricacies of Maratha military culture, Cooper focuses on the political and military economy of the 18th century.</b> This, in itself, is not a new approach. The debate on the nature of the 18th century crisis threw up, in the late Seventies and Eighties, substantial work on the functionings of regional political systems which were closely aligned to their military profile and whose consumption of and investment in military expenditure led to important economic developments. <b>More interesting and innovative is Cooper’s understanding of Maratha military entrepreneurship and its ability to negotiate multiple modes of fighting and bargaining. This involved improvizing techniques and tactics, employing mercenaries as a regular feature in the army and remaining open to the competitive advantage offered by technology as well as doctrine. The Maratha clan leaders never ignored the possibilities of financial advantage; if they could save or make money at British expense, they would. They were veteran entrepreneurs in the south Asian military economy and one way to increase potential campaign profits was to outsource ammunition needs, at the expense of an ally. This approach was, in part, the fallout of the Maratha debacle at Panipat in 1761.</b>
<b>The consequences of Panipat were momentous.</b> Not only did most of the clans lose more than one family member, but the Marathas also failed to institutionalize the training of officers.<b> Most of the leaders after 1761 hesitated to spend on a standing army and relied on mercenaries — Indians and Europeans alike. Mahadji Sindhia showed a particular flair in this department and the result was a heterogeneous army, in keeping with Maratha traditions of equal-opportunities employment. De Boigne played a singular role in modernizing the army and its financial base, whereby the regular corps were meticulous about collecting taxes in an orderly fashion and then providing security so that no transient “tax collector” could ride in and demand funds. </b>In fact, Cooper argues that the Maratha military presence in the Doab became a major adjunct to economic growth.

Cooper prefaces his detailed analysis of the 1803 campaigns with a critical reading of the English military discourse on the Marathas. <b>He argues that the Marathas not only received a bad press, but that there was also a complete misunderstanding of Maratha priorities or military culture. He reminds his readers that the Maratha military culture had a historic tendency to foster different types of forces relative to clan assets and the prevailing conditions in the military labour market.</b> Without an opportunity to see Maratha troops scattered all over the country from Tanjore to Rajasthan, British observers could not be expected to give an accurate assessment of the Maratha forces. Consequently, Arthur Wellesley was overly confident that the nation of freebooters could be brought to heel.

And he remained true to his intentions. But Cooper prefers to remind us that the victories were not inevitable, and neither were they achieved with ease. Assaye demonstrated that not all Maratha armies were composed of light horsemen and that Sindhia’s infantry knew the theory and practice of modern infantry warfare. <b>The Hindustan campaigns brought home a similar number of home truths, but only after the contest for India had been won.</b>

How was this achieved? For Cooper, traditional explanations like superior British tactics and the momentum of British victory after the Napoleonic wars are unsatisfactory and tell only half the story. <b>For him the reasons lay squarely in superior British credit which was guaranteed by trade and tariffs, bullion shipments diverted from China, and loans and donations from the Nawab of Awadh and the Nizam of Hyderabad. It also lay in their superior control over the south Asian military economy. One wishes Cooper had elaborated on how this credit actually worked and on how the British replaced the Marathas in the military market of Hindustan. Again, it is surprising that he makes no mention of the financial arrangements the Company authorities entered into with bankers in Benaras and Bombay and how the Company authorities consistently placated local bankers and persuaded them not to cross over to their adversaries.</b> These arrangements are mirrored in the series of documents that Cooper has consulted, which also speak of the haphazard nature of Maratha military organization and fiscal management. Thus, while it is important to heed Cooper’s advice to read against the grain and question the assumptions behind British accounts of the Maratha military machine, it may be worthwhile to remind him that such an exercise could apply to his selective reconstruction as well.

LAKSHMI SUBRAMANIAN
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