04-25-2006, 03:53 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 4 <b>BAJIRAO AT HIS MISSION</b>
(i)Break Down of Peace â Settlement â The Real Cause :
Hopes had been raised that if the Peshwa meant it could be possible for him to capture Hastinapur (Delhi) (1) for the Chatrapati of Satara, what actually he was promised and for what he was expecting a favourable (2) reply from Delhi, was â
(1) Five lakhs of rupees for expenses.
(2) A Sanad for, a Jagir in Malwa
(3) A âKhilatâ with the accompanying articles.
(4) A promise of asistance in the joint enterprise for the recovery of territory under the Rohilas in Malwa and
(5) A Sanad of the Subha of Malwa within 4 months.
But the Peshwa after waiting hinvain for two months had to return to Deccan to save his army from utter starvation.
The main reason for the breakdown of peace talks was not any high tone in Bajiraoâs behaviour or any excess in the demands but the unpreparedness (3) of the Delhi Court for the parting of the Subha of Malwa. Even though Malwa passed (4) under the Marathas from 1732 A.D. (excluding the forts held by the officers of the Emperor) the Turani party and the Emperor were not prepared for handling over the Subha of Malwa to Bajirao in 1736 A.D.
The appointment of Bajirao as the Subhadar of Malwa was quite a different thing from the appointment of Giridhar Bahadur in 1725 A.D., or Sawai Jaysing for the third time in 1732 A.D. or even of the Nizam in 1737 A.D. as Subhadars of Malwa. It was a legal recognition for the actual possession of the Marathas. The Emperor was not prepared yet for such a deed. Even Khan Dauran could not go beyond (5) granting a jagir to Bajirao in the territory of the Afgans, which was obiviously a shrewd policy that needs no further explanation (6). Delhi was nt prepared to grant legally the Subha of Malwa to Bajirao and hence was employing delaying tactics in order to avoid an unpleasant deed.
It was clear for Bajirao in Deccan that unless force was applied, the Court would not be ready for a compromise. On 6th July 1736 A.D., Bajirao (7) got the much eagerly awaited letter from Hingne. Yet the Sanads were under preparation. As for the expenses, the Court had sent a Hundi of a lakh rupees, which dejected Bajirao mostly as it was sufficient to meet the expenses of the Malwa-force for a week only.
How to meet the daily expenses was great question before the Maratha army in Malwa. Nothing had come out of the 5 lakhs that were expected within a fortnight. Ranoji (8) wrote Hingne that for want of money for expenses, Bajirao had gone to the South with all the army excepting himself. He asked Hingne to press with urgency for expenses, Sanad for 25 lakhs and the Sanad of Malwa as per the settlement. The real object of keeping the Maratha force in Malwa was to bring pressure on the Delhi Court for the grant of the Sanad.
June 1736 A.D. (9) came to an end. The Maratha force in Malwa had done its assigned work. The money problem was acute. The Maratha army in Mlawa required rupees 25 thousand for expenses per day. Ranoji lost patience and wrote Hingne that he should stay there only if they were really going to hand-over the Sanad of the jagir, the promised expenses, and the Sanad of the Subha or he should come back. In fact he had lost all hopes that the Mughals would keep the word.
Instead of the news of the expected Sanad, a stern warning of a new Mughal campaign against the Marathas came through the letter of Hingne. Taking offence at a (false) news received in the month of June 1736 A.D., Khan Dauran told Hingne that the Marathas, professing friendship, had captured treacherously the fort of Ujjain and hence he had cancelled sending the proposed money and the Sanad. He further warned Hingne that the Emperor had enough force and treasury to meet the treacherous (10) challenge of the Marathas.
Ranoji (11) wrote Hingne, in reply to above charges, that he should keep in mind that the Marathas had been exerting for the last two years so that he should get success. It was not in their nature either to care for or to serve anybody. God was favourable to them. In fact they were worried only in the time of peace with the Mughals. They were quite happy in a state of war. Bajirao wrote that he had already left his army in Malwa and it would not take much time for him to repair to the North again.
It was proved that the Marathas were to get nothing by a peaceful (12) settlement. For the first time they were opposing a grim determination of the Mughal Court to save Malwa from there clutches. Nothing but a repetition of the miracle performed in Malwa in 1728 A.D. was needed. Diplomacy had come to an end and they were face to face with the Malwa problem for the first time.neverth-less, they were determined to reap what they had sowed in 1728 A.D. Under such circumstances, the question of the Rajput influence in the Court of Delhi in their favour did not arise at all. The Rajput sympathy was on their side no doubt, but as Chimaji (13) had written once, it was their own strength that was to pay them in the long run. The last chapter of the battle for Malwa at the gates of Delhi had begun.
(ii)Bajiraoâs March on Delhi :
After making his full preparations Bajirao left for the North on 12th November 1736 A.D.(14), met Ranoji (15) on 5th December at Bhilsa which was under siege. After realizing dues from Bhilsa, the Peshwa moved to After which was besieged and captured. The plunder was enormous. From Ater, the Peshwa once more moved to Sironj. The Nizam was watching his activities from Makodi District, to the south (16) of Narmada.
Abhaysing (17) with an army of 15 thousand was at Maujabad. He remained aloof from the ensuing contest. On receipt of the letters from the Emperor and Sadatkha, Sawai Jaysing entered tents without going to Jaypur, and instantly proceeding 9 kos with fifteen thousand men and artillery, towards Agra, halted at Jambaroli. He was to reach Agra soon. But actually he never reached Agra but halted at Gadhasi (18) 20 kos from Jaypur. His joining the cause of the imperial army was infact a mere show. He had written everything for the knowledge of Peshwa.
Taking leave of the Peshwa (19) in the middle of October 1736 Baji Bhivrao proceeded to Datiya (20) and Orchha and realized the dues. Himmatrao and Krishnaji (21) from the Bundelas joined him with 5 to 6 thousand men. Meanwhile, he realized udes from Suklora Gujrola, Pachor, Uchat, Jatwada, and Banwar. Bhadawar (22) was given a warning to clear off everything. He sent an expedition with the Bundela force of 2 thousand and a half into Antarwed (23) and prepared to join Bajirao (24) with his detatchment with Hirdeshah the Bundela Chief as per the orders of the Peshwa.
By the end of January Baji Bhivrao had reached Yamuna. Delhi was not far away from him. He informed Bajirao that Khan Dauran and Jaysing were on the side of the Marathas whereas Kamruddin Khan, Turebaz Khan, Sadat Khan and Abhaysing were in league with the Nizam who was keeping constant touch with them. Delhi was most unfavourable to ways and means without marching to proper Delhi, which was taking advice of (25) its leader Nizam. The Turani party was definitely against an amicable settlement between the Emperor and Bajirao.
By March 1737, Maratha advance detachments had reached Chambal (26) . News came that Kamruddin Khan was to start from Delhi to affect a junction with Sadat Khan at Agra. By the end of March 1737, Bajirao was 8 kos away from Agra. He sent a picked force of 10 to 12 thousand men under Pilaji Kadhao(27), Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde and Baji Bhivrao across Yamuna to plunder the territory. Accordingly this force sacked completely two towns of Antarwad. But the Marathas had no idea that Sadat Khan with his main army was near at hand, about 5 kos from them. He dispatched his nephew Mansur Ali Khan with 15 to 20 thousand men. The Marathas were caught unawares. The fight was a severe one and the Marathas lost about 1000 to 1500 men in the fight and many of them were drowned while crossing back the river in haste. Fortunately for the Marathas, all the Sardars with the remaining army reached safely and joined the main army. Even though it was not a big victory as Sadat Khan reported to the Emperor, it was not an insignificant one as well.
Sadat Khan (28) had reported to the Emperor that he had destroyed the main army of the Marathas, and hence it was a point of prestige for Bajirao to show that the Marathas were still there. He dispatched the âBungasâ (camp followers) to Malwa and with 50 to 55 thousand men, he prepared himself for the dash.
Two (29) ways were open to Bajirao, either to attack Sadat Khan or to fall upon Delhi itself. But as Sadat Khan would not venture out of Agra, he took the latter course. Avoiding the main Mughal concentration near Agra, he rapidly advanced through the Mewati territory while Khan Dauran and Bangash marched towards Agra, and joined Sadat Khan on 23rd of March.
In two long marches Bajirao reached Delhi on 28th March and encamped outside the city. He wisely gave up the idea of setting fire to the adjoining Suburbs, as this wanton outrage would have cost him permanently the sympathy of the Emperor and would have further made it difficult for Khan Dauran and Jaysing to plead his case. In fact, the presence of the Maratha army itself was sufficient to strike terror in the minds of the inhabitants of Delhi. On 30th March, he crushingly defeated a force of about 8 thousand sent by the Emperor. News came that Wazir Kamrudding Khan was closing upon him. Bajiraoâs purpose was already served. He had practically desolated the environs of Delhi. While returning he was met by Kamruddin Khan and a severe fight took place on 31st March(30). But it was soon dark and the Marathas retired. News came that all the combined Mughal army was coming upon them. Bajirao, avoiding them marched towards Rewadi and kotputali. Leaving Jaypur territory then, he proceeded towards Gwalior for the collection of arrears. Such was the outcome of the great offensive.
While in Jaypur territory, he received a letter from Vyankatram (31) who wrote, I read to him (Sawai Jaysing) every word of your letter, after which he replied, âWe are the Peshwaâs loyal servants, it behooves him to take care of us in every possible way. His revered mother has given us her blessings and he must continue to do the same.â Jaysing was in his camp at Gandhhasi (32) 20 kos from Jaypur. He took no part in this compaign. Khan Dauran wrote letter after letter to Sawai Jaysing to send reinforcement. He accordingly started with a force of 15 to 16 thousand men and artillery and arrived at Basava. He intended to visit Khan Dauran. Jaysing was zealous in communicating to Bajirao that he was gratified at the brotherly attention exhibited by the latter towards him. He requested him through Vankatram, the Peshwaâs agent in his camp, not to molest his territory. He had not yet sent his army to Agra. Bajirao got supplies of grain and fodder on his way from Sawai Jaysing. From Gadhhasi, Jaysing went to Amber and then to Jaypur. He sent handiest of a lakh of rupees to Bajirao. Abhaysing was at Jodhpur.
Sadat Khan (33) went to Delhi after the Marathas had left it. He assured the Emperor that if the four Subhas of Agra. Gujarat, Malwa, and Ajmer were given to him, he would not allow the Marathas to cross Narmada. But the Emperor knew that Khan Dauran would never like this, moreover it would displease Sawai Jaysing. He feared that the Rajputs and the Marathas both being Hindus would thereby unite against him. Moreover, he knew that Khan Dauran had also sympathies for them. Hence Sadat Khanâs proposal was not accepted and he went to Oudh disappointed. Abhaysing also took leave of the Emperor (34) and was expected to see Bajirao.
But Mughal side stiffened after this onslaught of Bajirao, even though he opened negotiations with Samsamuddaula in the Capital.âBy this time (35) opinion prevailed that Nizam-ul-Mulk was the only man who could save the monarchy and steam the oncoming flood of Maratha invasion.â Even Khan Dauran became in a advocate of reconciliation with Nizam-ul-Mulk The Emperor was soon brought over to the same view and pressing letters of invitation were sent to the Nizam.
Expecting that Bajirao was coming to Agra, Bangash, Khan Dauran and Kamrudding Khan proceeded there. Nizam-ul-Mulk had started from Burhanpur after receiving the invitation of the Emperor(36) . Sawai Jaysing sent his force under Rajamalji (37) towards Agra, and also sent his munshi Mushkhas chand to the Nizam.
Nizam was jealously watching (38) the Maratha advances into the North for the last foru-five years. Meanwhile he was writing constantly to the Emperor about them. Recently (39) (Ocotober 1736 A.D.) he had sent 12 selected horses worth two and a half lakhs and jewellery worth a lakh of rupees to him. After Bajirao had proceeded to the North in October 1736 A.D., Nizam left Aurangabad for Burhanpur and waited there for further development. At the invitation of the Emperor, he proceeded to the fort of Handia (40) to cross Narmada in the month of April 1737 A.D., leaving Nasirjang at Aurangabad, he went to Sironj (41), and waited there to know by what route bajirao was coming to South, avoiding a clash with him. A shrewd diplomat, he declared (42) that he was going to Delhi to remove the blemish on his character that he had rebelled against the Emperor and that he had sided with the Marathas. Bajirao, even though, he fully knew his intentions, avoided an open clash with him in that hot season (close of May 1737 A.D.) as his troops were already worn out by the arduous campaign of several months and further were eager to reach their houses in Deccan to deposit the booty they had collected. From Sironj Nizam-ul-Mulk proceeded to Delhi. The Emperor and the whole Court accorded him a hearty welcome. The highest title that a subject could bear, that of âAsaf Jahâ, was conferred (43) upon him.
Vyankojiram wrote (44) from Delhi on 10th August 1737 A.D. âNizam-ul-Mulk had demanded from the Emperor the Government of the five Subhas in addition to a crore of rupees, for removing the Maratha pest from North India. The Emperor has freely granted him all that he asked for. His son Gazi-udding has been given the Subhas of Agra, and Malwa. The three Subhas of Allahabad, Ajmer and Gujarat are being bestowed on the nominees of the Nizam.â
       Nizam-ul-Mulk left Delhi in October 1737 A.D. with 30 thousand select-troops and a powerful park of artillery, and proceeded to Malwa. Bajirao took his departure (45) from the South on 18th October 1737 A.D., stationing Chimaji Appa at Varangaon on the Tapti to prevent Nasir Jang from proceeding beyond Burhanpur. Bajirao crossed the Narmada early n December 1737 A.D. From the beginning of December the Maratha bands started hovering about the Mughal camp, harassing them from a distance. The Maratha (46) tactics soon proved effective and the Nizam was trapped (47) in the fortified town of Bhopal. The siege commenced from 14th December and within less than a week the Nizam finding his position intolerable tried to move out with his whole camp under shelter of his guns. But after nearly a fortnight of intense pressure,he was forced to beg Bajirao for terms of peace.
       Wrote Bajirao to his brother, âFortified as the Nawab (48) was with a strong artillery and with the Bundela and the Rajput princess as his staunch allies, I accepted your advice and agreed to much lower terms than could have been exacted. You can realize what a severe mortification it must have been to Asaf Jah to sign a document with his own hand parting with Malwa and the rights therin of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi of which he never allowed even a mention till then.â
       Jaysing minister Ayamalji (49) had arrived on behalf of the Nizam with Sayyad Lashkar Khan and other agents to Bajirao to arrange terms of peace.
Nizam-ul-Mulk affixed his signature to the following terms (50)Â on 7th January 1738 A.D. at Dorahe Sarai about 84 miles north of Sironj :
(i)Â Â Â Â Â Nizam-ul-Mulk solemnly undertook to grant the Marathas a formal cession of Malwa under the imperial seal
(ii)Â Â Â Â To deliver to them all the territory between the Narmada and the yamuna and;
(iii)Â Â Â Â To pac them 50 lakhs in cash from the imperial treasury by way of expenses.
       When the negotiations were completed, Bajirao left he vicinity of Bhopal and proceeded to Kota, whence he exacted (51) 10 lakhs of rupees. He then returned to Poona.
       Even though it has been stated in âTarikhi ibrahim Khanâ that, âMalwa was bestowed on Bahirao through the mediation of Khan (52) Dauranâ, in 1738 A.D., the victory seems to be barren from the point of view of getting the âSanadâ of Malwa. What Bajirao received (53) on 8th September 1738 A.D. was a âFarmanâ with the seal of Sawai Jaysing, of a Jagir and Mansab-mahals of his âVatanâ with robes of honour with accompanying due articles. There is no record to show that Bajirao ever go âSanadâ of Malwa from the Emperor. This naturally disappointed him. He regarded the Nizam a deceitful man and one of his motives in marching on Nasir Jang (December 1739 A.D.) was to avenge his disappointment(54).
(iii)Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Invasion of Nadirshah :
The next momentous happening in the North was the invasion of Nadirshah. Lahor was lost to him on 12th January. On 13th February 1739 A.D., the imperialists attacked the persians from their base at Karnal but were easily repulsed with great slaughter(55). Khan Dauran, the Mir Bakshi, received mortal wound and died two days later. Sadat Khan was wounded and captured. Nadir Shah would have accepted 50 lakhs as offered by the Nizam on behalf of the Emperor, and would have retired, but being instigated by Sadat Khan out of jealousy for the Nizam, decided to advance on Delhi for the recovery of the proposed 20 crores.
       Making the Emperor, Kamrudding Khan and the Nizam, his captives, proceeding to Delhi, Nadirshah took possession of the city on 7th March 1739 A.D. Being pressed to procure for the Shah the promised 20 crores, Sadat Khan (56) ended his life by swallowing poison.
The Rajputs (57) not only kept aloof from the Mughal Emperor at the time of his distress, but they were happy at the discomfiture of the Mughal Empire at the hands of Nadirshah. The Rajpurts and especially Sawai Jaysing thought it a proper time to unite with the Marathas and Bundelas to assert as Hindus; Abhaysing (58) caputred Sambhar and was thinking of Communication between the Rajput Chiefs began with vigour and a creation of Hindu Monarchy flashed before the eyes of some. But soon the news came that nadirshah was too powerful and it was felt that in him a calamity had befallen the Chiefs of the North.
       The Mughal rule in Delhi collapsed completely, and with it there arose all confusion in the North. Everbody believed that the Mughal rule (59) had ended once for all. Bajirao wrote (Dated 31-3-1739 A.D.) (60) from the vicinity of Burchanpur to his brother Chimaji Appa, âApprehend the magnitude of the situation. A foreign rule is disastrous for all!â. He asked Chimaji to start preparations and expressed his determination to face nadirshah on Chambal with all the forces from Deccan and the North. It was reported that after setting affairs at Delhi, Nadirshah was to proceed towards Ajmer to visit the âPeerâ there. Hearing of it, Jaysing sent the families to Udaypur. In case Nadirshah marched, it was impossible for him to oppose him and hence in this case he would have to go to Udaypur. He started employing courageous men like Umedsing of Shahapur and called Ranaji with his army 20 kos towards Jaypur to have a juncture with the army of Jaypur. But Ranaji was not confident about the success against Nadirshah depending on the Rajput strength along. He ws ready to join after the coming of Bajirao. In case, he did not come, Ranaji contemplated to go to the hills to avert the calamity. It is very clear that being nearer to Delhi, the have created by Nadirshah had created consternation in the hearts of the Rajput Chiefs and Bajirao had become a national hero, in whom all hopes of safety for the Hindu religion were concentrated. The common danger had united the Rajputs completely with the Marathas as Hindus.
Â
(iv)Â Â Â Â A Plan to Create Hindu Empire at Delhi:
Dhondo Govind (61) wrote from Delhi to Bajirao :
âNadirshah is no God, that he could destroy the earth. He possesses sense enough and knows business. He will not break with you, but will effect a friendly understanding when he know that you are strong enough to oppose himâ¦. I donât expect actual hostilities to break between him and you⦠Jaysing and yourself aided by the Bundela Chiefs will be quite a strong Hindu front which rovidence will surely crown with success. Jaysing is anxiously waiting for your arrival to take the lead. Nizam-ul-Mulk ⦠is playing a mischivous game. Some of his spies, found roving about prying into Jaysingâs secret counsels, were captured by him. They confessed that they were deputed by Nizam-ul-Mulk â¦â¦all voices agree that the two noblesâ¦. Nizam-ul-Mulk and Sadat Khan alone induced nadirshah to undertake the invasion of Indiaâ¦victory at this moment crowns the Peshwa alon. Many here desire that the Rana of Udaypur should be seated on the throne of Delhi and made Emperor of the Hindus. The Northern Rajas are anxiously expecting the Peshwaâs arrival, a momentous change appears to be in sight.â
The question of creating a Hindu Empire took firm hold. The Rana of Udaypur was fully prepared now for this proposal, when Bajirao had undertaken to stand behind it. The Rana sent Gumansing (62) to Sawai Jaysing, who told him that Raya wished to place Ranaji on the throne of Delhi. Ranaji had told that all his wealth (for this purpose) belonged to Raya and that Raya and Sawaiji were his men of trust. Gokulchand was sent to Abhaysing and Bundelas were expected to join the union. Thus by the end of May1739 A.D., the Rajput Chiefâs prepared themselves for the drastic change and were eagerly expecting Bajiraoâs arrival in the North.
       Bajirao was at Burhanpur (63) at the time of the sack of Delhi, by Nadirshah. About the question of creating a Hindu monarchy at Delhi, Shahu informed him his sentiments in a letter dated 31st May 1739 A.D. The letter reads (64) , âthat it should be our duty to resuscitate the falling Mughal Empire, that the Chhatrapati, as you are already aware, does not aspire to secure the imperial position for himself, that he considers it a higher merit to renovate an old dilapidated edifice than to build a new one. If we attempt the other course (i.e. a Hindu monarchy) it would involve us in enmity with all our neighbors with the consequence that we would be exposed to unnecessary dangers and court a crop of trouble all round.â
Shahu was moderate in his aims and desired to secure only the administrative management for the Marathas in the capacity of the Amir-ul-Umara of the Mughal Empire. It was his desire that by supporting whole-heartedly Muhammad Shahâs regime, they should collect the revenue of the Country and after recovery of the expanses for the troops, should pay the balance into the Imperial treasury.
But even though the Peshwa complied finally with the commands of the Chhatrapati, he was really much more ambitious and definitely a Hindu State was in his mind (65).
       See the following clearly worded letter of Bajirao depicting his future plans to oppose Nadirshah by the united front of the Hindus, dated 23rd March 1739 A.D.
       âI am enjoying (66) good health till this day. You must have heard the happenings at Indraprastha (i.e. atrocities of Nadirshah). It is time for us to assert. As per the directions expressed in the letter from here, try to induce Diwanji so that he takes the cause of the protection of our religion. Otherwise, if we remain inactive overpowered by the strength of enemy, it wil be detrimental for us not only for the good (âKalyanâ) of this but for the next world also. I am very much glad to know that Diwanji is giving you importance. This is the proper time (hence) for you to exert to achieve something by serving Diwanji, so that the opportunity he gave you is well served, as well as, for me who wish to achieve the object of my life. You will know much more (about oru plans) from Ranawat Khumansing and Vijaysing and the letter we have sent toSadasiv Pandit. You should form friendship with the Rajput Chief like Sawai Jaysing and gather the armies of all the Hindus which would be a force of one and a quarter of lakh. After our (Maratha) armies unite with it, that would be a total force of two lakhs. Then we should try to defeat the enemy. If we fall in this, it would mean that the courage of the Hindus and their religion have both departed from them. You have complained about Mathar Pandit, but we shall punish Malharrao, when he comes over here. When great things are to be achieved through our friendship, what about such trifling things? Whatever you have in your mind, will be got through. â
Bajirao had to restrain his hand as the Chhatrapati aimed at only renovating the fallen edifice. However he was determined not to allow Nadirshah (67) to cross Chambal if he intened to march South. For that he called Chimaji Appa after finishing off the business at Wasai. But fortunately Nadirshah departed to his native land on 1st of May 1739 A.D., issuing emphatic commands to India potentates to render obedience to Muhammad Shah (68) whom he had restored to the throne of Delhi.
(v)The Nizamâs Move :
It was well-known, then, to the political circle (69) that the Nizam and Sadat Khan were responsible for Nadirshahâs invasion of Delhi. Even though Muhammad Shah was still on the throne, the invasion had terribly shaken the foundation of the Mughal Empire which lost all the glory and with it the remaining strength to preserve it. From this moment the Chiefs began to treat themselves as semi-independent, besides, the Nizam, the cause of the whole ruin, was still there in Delhi.
Khan Dauran, throughout his career as Mir Bakshi, successfully opposed the Nizam and never gave him a chance to dominate the Delhi politics. But he was killed and even Sadat Khan was no more. Having at his back the Wazir kamrudding Khan and the Turani party, the ground was thus clear for the Nizam to dominate.
Even though the Nizam had always professed to the true to the salt of the Emperor, it was he who had openly rebelled against the Emperor and had carved out an independent State in the Deccan. He had never lost touch with the politics of Delhi. His ambition (70) was a threat to the existence of Muhammad Shah as Emperor, who was warned for the same by Khan Dauran during his life time and even by Nadirshah (71) .
Even though the Emperor had called him to Delhi to oppose the Marathas in 1737 A.D., he had known him fully well and after Nadirshahâs invasion, wanted to chestise (72) him for the damage he had done to the Empire.
From his letter and actions, it is very clear that the Nizam detested the Marathas thoroughly and desired their complete destruction. He had tried by all means to thwart their progress but at Bhopla he learnt a lesson that it was beyond his power to subdue them. A shrewd diplomat and a worthy politician as he was, he tried to substitute diplomacy for force in his relations to the Marathas. Instead of trying to destroy them, he desired to use them as a force to secure his own ends to gain supremacy at Delhi. Only the Marathas were there to hinder him to achieve his objects. He had seen the rise in the friendly feelings of the Marathas and Rajputs he was a determined opponent of the Rajputs (73) and wanted to punish them. The Rajputs would have been nowhere, if the Nizam would have been successful in detaching the Marathas from them. For separating the Marathas he was ready to pay all that was offered by the Rajputs to the Marathas. With these objects in his view, he sent Sayyad Lashkar Khan .(74) to Bajirao who had already effected a settlement and had come to an understanding with Nasir Jang in Deccan.
       With Nasir Jang in Deccan, with the powerful force mobilized at the time of battle of Bhopal (1738 A.D.), with the full support of the Turani party at Delhi, and none to oppose, there was nothing difficult, as he wrote, for the Nizam to achieve.
(vi) The Emperor Woos Bajirao :
The Emperor and Sawai Jaysing felt anxious on hearing the move of the Nizam. But the Marathas were no auxiliary force as the Nizam thought  them to be. They had their own policy and their aims to achieve. Bajirao (75) informed Jaysing
That he was his friend. The latter with great relief (76) informed the Emperor that Bajirao had decided to accept their party. The Emperor in joy wrote back to Jaypur, that after the necessary assurance from Jaysing, the work (of Bajirao) would be done.
On receiving the letter from the Emperor, Jaysing called Bajirao to Ujjain and told the envoy that 5 lakhs out of the promised 15 lakhs would be sent forthwith, and the remaining 10 lakhs would be sent in the rainy season. He reminded the Peshwaâs envoy that in order to create a breach between the Emperor and the Peshwa, the Nizam would promise more than what was promised by the Emperor but the Peshwa should not mind it but should stick up to the Emperorâs side which would be profitable in the long run.
Jaysing told the envoy that after sending 5 lakhs of rupees with Ayamal and the envoy (Hingne) he, along with the Rana, would proceed 20 kos to meet Bajirao after which deliberations would be made on the plans approved by the Emperor.
But when his life mission was about to be fulled, when the Maratha-Rajput combination was nearing maturity, and when he was to shine as the savior of the shattering Mughal Empire, Peshwa Bajirao died suddenly on 28th of April 1740 A.D. at River on the south bank of Narmada.
(vii)Â Â Â The Life Mission of Bajirao :
 It was the lot of Chimaji Appa (77) to answer to the call of Sawai Jaysing. The following is the relevant portion from Chimaji Appaâs letter (June 1740 A.D.) to Mahadeo Bhat Hingne at Jaypur which throws ample light on the role played by Bajirao in his North Indian politics, and states clearly the aims of the Maratha rule in general.
 âRead the details of your letterâ¦The objects of the late Rao for the last eight or ten years were to please the Emperor by way of integrating the Imperial rule by bringing back to Imperial fold the Semi-Independent Amirs who cared little for the Emperorâs orders at their posts and thus to strengthen the administrative forces (resulting into peace and properity) and to gain thereby the good will of the rayat, the poor and the needy, to enhance the Imperial treasury and thus to acquire highest fame and the esteem of the Emperor. For all this he had kept constant touch with Nawab Khan Dauran thorugh Sawai Jaysing, and many schemes had been planned. The Emperor's help to meet the (daily) expenses and the repay the debts incurred, could not be received in time and hence the grand schemes envisaged could not be materialized for the lack of money, besides there were though the Nizam Asaf Jah sent Sayyad Lashkar Khan with promises (to bring him over to his side) he did not yield. It was not in his natur ot change words for a trifling gain of money, rather he was prepared to receive less (in comparison) from the Emperor and stick to his wordâ¦The Raya was to go to Malwa (as per the invitation)â¦he sent you (Hingne) to Sawai and afterwards left Burhanpurâ¦but after he crossed Rewa (Narmada) he fell ill and died at Vaishakha Shuddha Trayodashi. The Almighty did most unjust thing in this, but there is no remedy to itâ¦The late Nana (Balalji Vishwanath) aiming at the welfare of the people at large, destroyed the bad elements in the society and encouraged revalidation in the region that seemed like forestâ¦Nana died and Rao became Pradhaâ¦.Nana had to his credit the goo-will of the people and the blessings due to the establishment of Gods and Brahmins. Those blessings Nana handed over to Rao (as his legacy). Raya also aimed at the welfare of the people, the establishement of Gods and Brhamans, and renovation of the great centres of religion like Kashi. He strived hard by that path, protected, where great religious centres were renovated. His fame reached North (but he soon died). It was his desire (till last) to restore Vishweshwar at Kashi. Raya's fame shown in the world ten fold in proportion to that of Nana. Rao was brave, and a creator of new worldâ¦
The Emperor and Sawaiji desire a chastisement of the Nizam. The same will be done. But he (Sawai Jaysing) should stick to the terms settled with Raya, nay, he should do much more. This is in fact proper for him (since Bajirao is dead). He was about to send 5 lakhs out at of 15 lakhs to Raya. Manage to send the same without losing time by asking Sawaiji. After full preparation, the army and one of us (i.e. either Chimaji or Balaji) will come over to meet us with Rayamalji. Then arrange for the meeting of Sawaiji and Ranaji and if the both tof them think it proper even Abhaysing may be called. Thus after gaining strength, we shall perform whatever task the Emperor assigns us. Meanwhile, if the Nizam and the rest, thinking short-sightedly, that we have been reduced to nothing after the death of Raya, and march on us, we shall bring them round with in no time, with a lakh of army and the brave Sardars at our disposal. Sawaiji knows us too well to entertaiin any low opinion about us. He knows too what Rao stood for, and what he was striving for, we and the Sardars stand for the sameâ¦
Rao was the great asylum of the Hindus. There was none equal to him in the Deccan and the whole of Hindustan. Be as it is, but after all what did Rao carry with him? He left all behind him. The rest and we have been with the Rao from the first, and are still there. The enhancement of the success and the fame attained by Rao, is the only objective (Before us). By the grace of God, and the blessings of the strenuous and virtuous life led by Rao, we intend to punish all those who behave improperly towards the Emperor. If Sawaiji, Ranaji., Abhaysing and we are one, what is impossible there fore us that we intend to   attain ?
Foot Notes (Description)
(1)Â S.P.D. 30-134.
(2) Hingne Daftar : 1-6, M.I.S. Vol. VI - 95.
(3) S.P.D. 15-33, see Appendix - D.
(4) "Tarikh-I-Hindi" in E.D. Vol. VIII p. 50.
(5) S.P.D. 14-39.
(6) As per a Marathi saying it aimed at killing a serpant at the hands of (uninvited) guest.
(7) Even in 1741 A.D., when the Subha was finally handed over to Balajirao, the Emperor had prepared for an armed resistence, which was practically impossible for the Mughal strength then. - S.P.D. 13-4, M.I.S. Vol. VI, 97.
(8) Ibid - 95
(9) M.I.S. Vol. VI, 96, 97.
(10) 'Hingne Daftar' I-5, 7.
(11) Ibid - 7.
(12) Writes Sir Jadunath (Fall I, p. 268), "As the Delhi Court had inclined towards peace, the Marathas withdraw from Malwa-March 1737 A.D." - The truth was just the opposite.
(13) S.P.D. 12-27.
(14) S.P.D. 12-341, M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 75.
(15) S.P.D. 15-5, S.P.D. 30-192, M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 75.
(16) S.P.D. 15-31.
(17) Ibid, 18.
(18) Ibid, 29.
(19) S.P.D. 14-38.
(20) S.P.D. 15-12 to 14.
(21) Ibid, 10, 16
(22) Ibid, II, 90.
(23) Ibid, 32.
(24) Ibid, 35.
(25) S.P.D. 15-99, 91.
(26) S.P.D. 30-196.
(27) S.P.D. 30-198, S.P.D. 15-27, 28.
(28) Ibid, 22.
(29)Â "Pawar Sadhane" - 75, Letter of Bajirao to Brahmendra Swami, 'Brahmendra
(30) 'Later Mughal' Vol. II, p. 297.
(31) S.P.D. 15-23, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 167.
(32) S.P.D. 15-529, 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 298.
(33) S.P.D. 15-29.
(34) S.P.D. 15-30.
(35) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 299.
(36) S.P.D. 15-33.
(37)Â Ibid, 29.
(38) S.P.D. 10-91, 92.
(39) Ibid, 101 (Oct. 1736)
(40) S.P.D. 15-25, 26, 29.
(41) Ibid, 42
(42) S.P.D. 10-34.
(43) 'Later Mughals' Vol. Ii, p. 301.
(44) S.P.D. 15-53.
(45) S.P.D. 22-262.
(46) 'Holkar Shahi' I-34, M.I.S. Vol. VI-107, 117.
(47) S.P.D. 30-207, 'New hist.' Vol. II, p. 170.
(48)Â M.I.S. Vol. VI-114, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 172.
(49) Later Mughals Vol. II, p. 366.
(50) S.P.D. 15-p, 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 306, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 171.
(51)Â S.P.D. 15-68.
(52) "Tarikhi Ibrahim Khan' in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 262.
(53) S.P.D. 15-p. 86.
(54) M.I.S. Vol. VI, p. 85.
(55) S.P.D. 15-71, 75.
(56) S.P.D. 30-229, 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 356.
(57) 'Itihasa Sangraha' - Letters of Dhondo Govind.
(58) 'Satara Hist. Papers' Vol. II, 270.
(59) S.P.D. 15-75, 'Purandare Daftar' III - 183. M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 133, 134, 'Satara Hist. Papers' Vol. II-266.
(60) S.P.D. 15-72.
(61) 'Itihasa Sangrah, Aitihasik Charitra' - 4, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 178, 179.
(62) 'Itihasa Sangrah - Aitihasik Charitra' - 7.
(63) 'Brahmendra Swami Charitra' - p. 118, S.P.D. 15-72, 75, S.P.D. 30-229 M.I.S. Vol. VI, - 133, 134..
(64) 'Satara Hist.Papers' Vol II-268, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 180.
(65)
For the present Tohmast Kuli (Nadirshah) has won the fight. But if all the Hindus take to courage (and unite) and if our greaty armies reach North (it is a lime) for the Hindu Empire to come into existence. " 'Brahmendra Swami Charitra', p. 118.
(66) From Bajirao Ballal Pandit Pradhan to Dhayabhai, dt. 23-3-1739, B.I.S.M. (July 1920), from the collection of letters from the family of Vyas of Udaypur.
(67)Â 'Brahmendra Swami charitra' , p. 118.
(68) S.P.D. 15-80.
(69) 'Itihasa Sangraha, Atitihasik Charitra' 3., S.P.D. 15-75.
(70) "Nizam-ul-Mulk was a very ambitious person. In addition to the extensive province of the Deccan, he at one time controlled the provinces of Gujarat, Malwa and Agra, either directly or through his kinsmen. He was even at is revealed in his letters.There is no doubt, that if he had had his way, Nizamulmulk would have ended by becoming the dictotor of the entire Mughal Empire. " - p. Setu Madhava Rao in Preface of 'Eithteenth Century Deccan' , p. ix.
(71) "The Cambridge Hist, of India' , Vol. IV, pp. 362. 363.
(72) "The Emperor and Sawai Jaysing desire a severe chastisement to the Nizam. It will take place accordingly" - From the letter of Chimaji Appa in 'Hingne Daftar' I-15.
(73)Â Ibid, 19
(74)Â 'Hingne Daftar' - I-13, 15.
(75) Ibid, 13, 15
(76)Â 'Satara Hist. Papers' , Vol. II - 264.
(77)Â 'Hingane Daftar', I -15
http://www.maratharajputrelations.com/4fp.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
(i)Break Down of Peace â Settlement â The Real Cause :
Hopes had been raised that if the Peshwa meant it could be possible for him to capture Hastinapur (Delhi) (1) for the Chatrapati of Satara, what actually he was promised and for what he was expecting a favourable (2) reply from Delhi, was â
(1) Five lakhs of rupees for expenses.
(2) A Sanad for, a Jagir in Malwa
(3) A âKhilatâ with the accompanying articles.
(4) A promise of asistance in the joint enterprise for the recovery of territory under the Rohilas in Malwa and
(5) A Sanad of the Subha of Malwa within 4 months.
But the Peshwa after waiting hinvain for two months had to return to Deccan to save his army from utter starvation.
The main reason for the breakdown of peace talks was not any high tone in Bajiraoâs behaviour or any excess in the demands but the unpreparedness (3) of the Delhi Court for the parting of the Subha of Malwa. Even though Malwa passed (4) under the Marathas from 1732 A.D. (excluding the forts held by the officers of the Emperor) the Turani party and the Emperor were not prepared for handling over the Subha of Malwa to Bajirao in 1736 A.D.
The appointment of Bajirao as the Subhadar of Malwa was quite a different thing from the appointment of Giridhar Bahadur in 1725 A.D., or Sawai Jaysing for the third time in 1732 A.D. or even of the Nizam in 1737 A.D. as Subhadars of Malwa. It was a legal recognition for the actual possession of the Marathas. The Emperor was not prepared yet for such a deed. Even Khan Dauran could not go beyond (5) granting a jagir to Bajirao in the territory of the Afgans, which was obiviously a shrewd policy that needs no further explanation (6). Delhi was nt prepared to grant legally the Subha of Malwa to Bajirao and hence was employing delaying tactics in order to avoid an unpleasant deed.
It was clear for Bajirao in Deccan that unless force was applied, the Court would not be ready for a compromise. On 6th July 1736 A.D., Bajirao (7) got the much eagerly awaited letter from Hingne. Yet the Sanads were under preparation. As for the expenses, the Court had sent a Hundi of a lakh rupees, which dejected Bajirao mostly as it was sufficient to meet the expenses of the Malwa-force for a week only.
How to meet the daily expenses was great question before the Maratha army in Malwa. Nothing had come out of the 5 lakhs that were expected within a fortnight. Ranoji (8) wrote Hingne that for want of money for expenses, Bajirao had gone to the South with all the army excepting himself. He asked Hingne to press with urgency for expenses, Sanad for 25 lakhs and the Sanad of Malwa as per the settlement. The real object of keeping the Maratha force in Malwa was to bring pressure on the Delhi Court for the grant of the Sanad.
June 1736 A.D. (9) came to an end. The Maratha force in Malwa had done its assigned work. The money problem was acute. The Maratha army in Mlawa required rupees 25 thousand for expenses per day. Ranoji lost patience and wrote Hingne that he should stay there only if they were really going to hand-over the Sanad of the jagir, the promised expenses, and the Sanad of the Subha or he should come back. In fact he had lost all hopes that the Mughals would keep the word.
Instead of the news of the expected Sanad, a stern warning of a new Mughal campaign against the Marathas came through the letter of Hingne. Taking offence at a (false) news received in the month of June 1736 A.D., Khan Dauran told Hingne that the Marathas, professing friendship, had captured treacherously the fort of Ujjain and hence he had cancelled sending the proposed money and the Sanad. He further warned Hingne that the Emperor had enough force and treasury to meet the treacherous (10) challenge of the Marathas.
Ranoji (11) wrote Hingne, in reply to above charges, that he should keep in mind that the Marathas had been exerting for the last two years so that he should get success. It was not in their nature either to care for or to serve anybody. God was favourable to them. In fact they were worried only in the time of peace with the Mughals. They were quite happy in a state of war. Bajirao wrote that he had already left his army in Malwa and it would not take much time for him to repair to the North again.
It was proved that the Marathas were to get nothing by a peaceful (12) settlement. For the first time they were opposing a grim determination of the Mughal Court to save Malwa from there clutches. Nothing but a repetition of the miracle performed in Malwa in 1728 A.D. was needed. Diplomacy had come to an end and they were face to face with the Malwa problem for the first time.neverth-less, they were determined to reap what they had sowed in 1728 A.D. Under such circumstances, the question of the Rajput influence in the Court of Delhi in their favour did not arise at all. The Rajput sympathy was on their side no doubt, but as Chimaji (13) had written once, it was their own strength that was to pay them in the long run. The last chapter of the battle for Malwa at the gates of Delhi had begun.
(ii)Bajiraoâs March on Delhi :
After making his full preparations Bajirao left for the North on 12th November 1736 A.D.(14), met Ranoji (15) on 5th December at Bhilsa which was under siege. After realizing dues from Bhilsa, the Peshwa moved to After which was besieged and captured. The plunder was enormous. From Ater, the Peshwa once more moved to Sironj. The Nizam was watching his activities from Makodi District, to the south (16) of Narmada.
Abhaysing (17) with an army of 15 thousand was at Maujabad. He remained aloof from the ensuing contest. On receipt of the letters from the Emperor and Sadatkha, Sawai Jaysing entered tents without going to Jaypur, and instantly proceeding 9 kos with fifteen thousand men and artillery, towards Agra, halted at Jambaroli. He was to reach Agra soon. But actually he never reached Agra but halted at Gadhasi (18) 20 kos from Jaypur. His joining the cause of the imperial army was infact a mere show. He had written everything for the knowledge of Peshwa.
Taking leave of the Peshwa (19) in the middle of October 1736 Baji Bhivrao proceeded to Datiya (20) and Orchha and realized the dues. Himmatrao and Krishnaji (21) from the Bundelas joined him with 5 to 6 thousand men. Meanwhile, he realized udes from Suklora Gujrola, Pachor, Uchat, Jatwada, and Banwar. Bhadawar (22) was given a warning to clear off everything. He sent an expedition with the Bundela force of 2 thousand and a half into Antarwed (23) and prepared to join Bajirao (24) with his detatchment with Hirdeshah the Bundela Chief as per the orders of the Peshwa.
By the end of January Baji Bhivrao had reached Yamuna. Delhi was not far away from him. He informed Bajirao that Khan Dauran and Jaysing were on the side of the Marathas whereas Kamruddin Khan, Turebaz Khan, Sadat Khan and Abhaysing were in league with the Nizam who was keeping constant touch with them. Delhi was most unfavourable to ways and means without marching to proper Delhi, which was taking advice of (25) its leader Nizam. The Turani party was definitely against an amicable settlement between the Emperor and Bajirao.
By March 1737, Maratha advance detachments had reached Chambal (26) . News came that Kamruddin Khan was to start from Delhi to affect a junction with Sadat Khan at Agra. By the end of March 1737, Bajirao was 8 kos away from Agra. He sent a picked force of 10 to 12 thousand men under Pilaji Kadhao(27), Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde and Baji Bhivrao across Yamuna to plunder the territory. Accordingly this force sacked completely two towns of Antarwad. But the Marathas had no idea that Sadat Khan with his main army was near at hand, about 5 kos from them. He dispatched his nephew Mansur Ali Khan with 15 to 20 thousand men. The Marathas were caught unawares. The fight was a severe one and the Marathas lost about 1000 to 1500 men in the fight and many of them were drowned while crossing back the river in haste. Fortunately for the Marathas, all the Sardars with the remaining army reached safely and joined the main army. Even though it was not a big victory as Sadat Khan reported to the Emperor, it was not an insignificant one as well.
Sadat Khan (28) had reported to the Emperor that he had destroyed the main army of the Marathas, and hence it was a point of prestige for Bajirao to show that the Marathas were still there. He dispatched the âBungasâ (camp followers) to Malwa and with 50 to 55 thousand men, he prepared himself for the dash.
Two (29) ways were open to Bajirao, either to attack Sadat Khan or to fall upon Delhi itself. But as Sadat Khan would not venture out of Agra, he took the latter course. Avoiding the main Mughal concentration near Agra, he rapidly advanced through the Mewati territory while Khan Dauran and Bangash marched towards Agra, and joined Sadat Khan on 23rd of March.
In two long marches Bajirao reached Delhi on 28th March and encamped outside the city. He wisely gave up the idea of setting fire to the adjoining Suburbs, as this wanton outrage would have cost him permanently the sympathy of the Emperor and would have further made it difficult for Khan Dauran and Jaysing to plead his case. In fact, the presence of the Maratha army itself was sufficient to strike terror in the minds of the inhabitants of Delhi. On 30th March, he crushingly defeated a force of about 8 thousand sent by the Emperor. News came that Wazir Kamrudding Khan was closing upon him. Bajiraoâs purpose was already served. He had practically desolated the environs of Delhi. While returning he was met by Kamruddin Khan and a severe fight took place on 31st March(30). But it was soon dark and the Marathas retired. News came that all the combined Mughal army was coming upon them. Bajirao, avoiding them marched towards Rewadi and kotputali. Leaving Jaypur territory then, he proceeded towards Gwalior for the collection of arrears. Such was the outcome of the great offensive.
While in Jaypur territory, he received a letter from Vyankatram (31) who wrote, I read to him (Sawai Jaysing) every word of your letter, after which he replied, âWe are the Peshwaâs loyal servants, it behooves him to take care of us in every possible way. His revered mother has given us her blessings and he must continue to do the same.â Jaysing was in his camp at Gandhhasi (32) 20 kos from Jaypur. He took no part in this compaign. Khan Dauran wrote letter after letter to Sawai Jaysing to send reinforcement. He accordingly started with a force of 15 to 16 thousand men and artillery and arrived at Basava. He intended to visit Khan Dauran. Jaysing was zealous in communicating to Bajirao that he was gratified at the brotherly attention exhibited by the latter towards him. He requested him through Vankatram, the Peshwaâs agent in his camp, not to molest his territory. He had not yet sent his army to Agra. Bajirao got supplies of grain and fodder on his way from Sawai Jaysing. From Gadhhasi, Jaysing went to Amber and then to Jaypur. He sent handiest of a lakh of rupees to Bajirao. Abhaysing was at Jodhpur.
Sadat Khan (33) went to Delhi after the Marathas had left it. He assured the Emperor that if the four Subhas of Agra. Gujarat, Malwa, and Ajmer were given to him, he would not allow the Marathas to cross Narmada. But the Emperor knew that Khan Dauran would never like this, moreover it would displease Sawai Jaysing. He feared that the Rajputs and the Marathas both being Hindus would thereby unite against him. Moreover, he knew that Khan Dauran had also sympathies for them. Hence Sadat Khanâs proposal was not accepted and he went to Oudh disappointed. Abhaysing also took leave of the Emperor (34) and was expected to see Bajirao.
But Mughal side stiffened after this onslaught of Bajirao, even though he opened negotiations with Samsamuddaula in the Capital.âBy this time (35) opinion prevailed that Nizam-ul-Mulk was the only man who could save the monarchy and steam the oncoming flood of Maratha invasion.â Even Khan Dauran became in a advocate of reconciliation with Nizam-ul-Mulk The Emperor was soon brought over to the same view and pressing letters of invitation were sent to the Nizam.
Expecting that Bajirao was coming to Agra, Bangash, Khan Dauran and Kamrudding Khan proceeded there. Nizam-ul-Mulk had started from Burhanpur after receiving the invitation of the Emperor(36) . Sawai Jaysing sent his force under Rajamalji (37) towards Agra, and also sent his munshi Mushkhas chand to the Nizam.
Nizam was jealously watching (38) the Maratha advances into the North for the last foru-five years. Meanwhile he was writing constantly to the Emperor about them. Recently (39) (Ocotober 1736 A.D.) he had sent 12 selected horses worth two and a half lakhs and jewellery worth a lakh of rupees to him. After Bajirao had proceeded to the North in October 1736 A.D., Nizam left Aurangabad for Burhanpur and waited there for further development. At the invitation of the Emperor, he proceeded to the fort of Handia (40) to cross Narmada in the month of April 1737 A.D., leaving Nasirjang at Aurangabad, he went to Sironj (41), and waited there to know by what route bajirao was coming to South, avoiding a clash with him. A shrewd diplomat, he declared (42) that he was going to Delhi to remove the blemish on his character that he had rebelled against the Emperor and that he had sided with the Marathas. Bajirao, even though, he fully knew his intentions, avoided an open clash with him in that hot season (close of May 1737 A.D.) as his troops were already worn out by the arduous campaign of several months and further were eager to reach their houses in Deccan to deposit the booty they had collected. From Sironj Nizam-ul-Mulk proceeded to Delhi. The Emperor and the whole Court accorded him a hearty welcome. The highest title that a subject could bear, that of âAsaf Jahâ, was conferred (43) upon him.
Vyankojiram wrote (44) from Delhi on 10th August 1737 A.D. âNizam-ul-Mulk had demanded from the Emperor the Government of the five Subhas in addition to a crore of rupees, for removing the Maratha pest from North India. The Emperor has freely granted him all that he asked for. His son Gazi-udding has been given the Subhas of Agra, and Malwa. The three Subhas of Allahabad, Ajmer and Gujarat are being bestowed on the nominees of the Nizam.â
       Nizam-ul-Mulk left Delhi in October 1737 A.D. with 30 thousand select-troops and a powerful park of artillery, and proceeded to Malwa. Bajirao took his departure (45) from the South on 18th October 1737 A.D., stationing Chimaji Appa at Varangaon on the Tapti to prevent Nasir Jang from proceeding beyond Burhanpur. Bajirao crossed the Narmada early n December 1737 A.D. From the beginning of December the Maratha bands started hovering about the Mughal camp, harassing them from a distance. The Maratha (46) tactics soon proved effective and the Nizam was trapped (47) in the fortified town of Bhopal. The siege commenced from 14th December and within less than a week the Nizam finding his position intolerable tried to move out with his whole camp under shelter of his guns. But after nearly a fortnight of intense pressure,he was forced to beg Bajirao for terms of peace.
       Wrote Bajirao to his brother, âFortified as the Nawab (48) was with a strong artillery and with the Bundela and the Rajput princess as his staunch allies, I accepted your advice and agreed to much lower terms than could have been exacted. You can realize what a severe mortification it must have been to Asaf Jah to sign a document with his own hand parting with Malwa and the rights therin of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi of which he never allowed even a mention till then.â
       Jaysing minister Ayamalji (49) had arrived on behalf of the Nizam with Sayyad Lashkar Khan and other agents to Bajirao to arrange terms of peace.
Nizam-ul-Mulk affixed his signature to the following terms (50)Â on 7th January 1738 A.D. at Dorahe Sarai about 84 miles north of Sironj :
(i)Â Â Â Â Â Nizam-ul-Mulk solemnly undertook to grant the Marathas a formal cession of Malwa under the imperial seal
(ii)Â Â Â Â To deliver to them all the territory between the Narmada and the yamuna and;
(iii)Â Â Â Â To pac them 50 lakhs in cash from the imperial treasury by way of expenses.
       When the negotiations were completed, Bajirao left he vicinity of Bhopal and proceeded to Kota, whence he exacted (51) 10 lakhs of rupees. He then returned to Poona.
       Even though it has been stated in âTarikhi ibrahim Khanâ that, âMalwa was bestowed on Bahirao through the mediation of Khan (52) Dauranâ, in 1738 A.D., the victory seems to be barren from the point of view of getting the âSanadâ of Malwa. What Bajirao received (53) on 8th September 1738 A.D. was a âFarmanâ with the seal of Sawai Jaysing, of a Jagir and Mansab-mahals of his âVatanâ with robes of honour with accompanying due articles. There is no record to show that Bajirao ever go âSanadâ of Malwa from the Emperor. This naturally disappointed him. He regarded the Nizam a deceitful man and one of his motives in marching on Nasir Jang (December 1739 A.D.) was to avenge his disappointment(54).
(iii)Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Invasion of Nadirshah :
The next momentous happening in the North was the invasion of Nadirshah. Lahor was lost to him on 12th January. On 13th February 1739 A.D., the imperialists attacked the persians from their base at Karnal but were easily repulsed with great slaughter(55). Khan Dauran, the Mir Bakshi, received mortal wound and died two days later. Sadat Khan was wounded and captured. Nadir Shah would have accepted 50 lakhs as offered by the Nizam on behalf of the Emperor, and would have retired, but being instigated by Sadat Khan out of jealousy for the Nizam, decided to advance on Delhi for the recovery of the proposed 20 crores.
       Making the Emperor, Kamrudding Khan and the Nizam, his captives, proceeding to Delhi, Nadirshah took possession of the city on 7th March 1739 A.D. Being pressed to procure for the Shah the promised 20 crores, Sadat Khan (56) ended his life by swallowing poison.
The Rajputs (57) not only kept aloof from the Mughal Emperor at the time of his distress, but they were happy at the discomfiture of the Mughal Empire at the hands of Nadirshah. The Rajpurts and especially Sawai Jaysing thought it a proper time to unite with the Marathas and Bundelas to assert as Hindus; Abhaysing (58) caputred Sambhar and was thinking of Communication between the Rajput Chiefs began with vigour and a creation of Hindu Monarchy flashed before the eyes of some. But soon the news came that nadirshah was too powerful and it was felt that in him a calamity had befallen the Chiefs of the North.
       The Mughal rule in Delhi collapsed completely, and with it there arose all confusion in the North. Everbody believed that the Mughal rule (59) had ended once for all. Bajirao wrote (Dated 31-3-1739 A.D.) (60) from the vicinity of Burchanpur to his brother Chimaji Appa, âApprehend the magnitude of the situation. A foreign rule is disastrous for all!â. He asked Chimaji to start preparations and expressed his determination to face nadirshah on Chambal with all the forces from Deccan and the North. It was reported that after setting affairs at Delhi, Nadirshah was to proceed towards Ajmer to visit the âPeerâ there. Hearing of it, Jaysing sent the families to Udaypur. In case Nadirshah marched, it was impossible for him to oppose him and hence in this case he would have to go to Udaypur. He started employing courageous men like Umedsing of Shahapur and called Ranaji with his army 20 kos towards Jaypur to have a juncture with the army of Jaypur. But Ranaji was not confident about the success against Nadirshah depending on the Rajput strength along. He ws ready to join after the coming of Bajirao. In case, he did not come, Ranaji contemplated to go to the hills to avert the calamity. It is very clear that being nearer to Delhi, the have created by Nadirshah had created consternation in the hearts of the Rajput Chiefs and Bajirao had become a national hero, in whom all hopes of safety for the Hindu religion were concentrated. The common danger had united the Rajputs completely with the Marathas as Hindus.
Â
(iv)Â Â Â Â A Plan to Create Hindu Empire at Delhi:
Dhondo Govind (61) wrote from Delhi to Bajirao :
âNadirshah is no God, that he could destroy the earth. He possesses sense enough and knows business. He will not break with you, but will effect a friendly understanding when he know that you are strong enough to oppose himâ¦. I donât expect actual hostilities to break between him and you⦠Jaysing and yourself aided by the Bundela Chiefs will be quite a strong Hindu front which rovidence will surely crown with success. Jaysing is anxiously waiting for your arrival to take the lead. Nizam-ul-Mulk ⦠is playing a mischivous game. Some of his spies, found roving about prying into Jaysingâs secret counsels, were captured by him. They confessed that they were deputed by Nizam-ul-Mulk â¦â¦all voices agree that the two noblesâ¦. Nizam-ul-Mulk and Sadat Khan alone induced nadirshah to undertake the invasion of Indiaâ¦victory at this moment crowns the Peshwa alon. Many here desire that the Rana of Udaypur should be seated on the throne of Delhi and made Emperor of the Hindus. The Northern Rajas are anxiously expecting the Peshwaâs arrival, a momentous change appears to be in sight.â
The question of creating a Hindu Empire took firm hold. The Rana of Udaypur was fully prepared now for this proposal, when Bajirao had undertaken to stand behind it. The Rana sent Gumansing (62) to Sawai Jaysing, who told him that Raya wished to place Ranaji on the throne of Delhi. Ranaji had told that all his wealth (for this purpose) belonged to Raya and that Raya and Sawaiji were his men of trust. Gokulchand was sent to Abhaysing and Bundelas were expected to join the union. Thus by the end of May1739 A.D., the Rajput Chiefâs prepared themselves for the drastic change and were eagerly expecting Bajiraoâs arrival in the North.
       Bajirao was at Burhanpur (63) at the time of the sack of Delhi, by Nadirshah. About the question of creating a Hindu monarchy at Delhi, Shahu informed him his sentiments in a letter dated 31st May 1739 A.D. The letter reads (64) , âthat it should be our duty to resuscitate the falling Mughal Empire, that the Chhatrapati, as you are already aware, does not aspire to secure the imperial position for himself, that he considers it a higher merit to renovate an old dilapidated edifice than to build a new one. If we attempt the other course (i.e. a Hindu monarchy) it would involve us in enmity with all our neighbors with the consequence that we would be exposed to unnecessary dangers and court a crop of trouble all round.â
Shahu was moderate in his aims and desired to secure only the administrative management for the Marathas in the capacity of the Amir-ul-Umara of the Mughal Empire. It was his desire that by supporting whole-heartedly Muhammad Shahâs regime, they should collect the revenue of the Country and after recovery of the expanses for the troops, should pay the balance into the Imperial treasury.
But even though the Peshwa complied finally with the commands of the Chhatrapati, he was really much more ambitious and definitely a Hindu State was in his mind (65).
       See the following clearly worded letter of Bajirao depicting his future plans to oppose Nadirshah by the united front of the Hindus, dated 23rd March 1739 A.D.
       âI am enjoying (66) good health till this day. You must have heard the happenings at Indraprastha (i.e. atrocities of Nadirshah). It is time for us to assert. As per the directions expressed in the letter from here, try to induce Diwanji so that he takes the cause of the protection of our religion. Otherwise, if we remain inactive overpowered by the strength of enemy, it wil be detrimental for us not only for the good (âKalyanâ) of this but for the next world also. I am very much glad to know that Diwanji is giving you importance. This is the proper time (hence) for you to exert to achieve something by serving Diwanji, so that the opportunity he gave you is well served, as well as, for me who wish to achieve the object of my life. You will know much more (about oru plans) from Ranawat Khumansing and Vijaysing and the letter we have sent toSadasiv Pandit. You should form friendship with the Rajput Chief like Sawai Jaysing and gather the armies of all the Hindus which would be a force of one and a quarter of lakh. After our (Maratha) armies unite with it, that would be a total force of two lakhs. Then we should try to defeat the enemy. If we fall in this, it would mean that the courage of the Hindus and their religion have both departed from them. You have complained about Mathar Pandit, but we shall punish Malharrao, when he comes over here. When great things are to be achieved through our friendship, what about such trifling things? Whatever you have in your mind, will be got through. â
Bajirao had to restrain his hand as the Chhatrapati aimed at only renovating the fallen edifice. However he was determined not to allow Nadirshah (67) to cross Chambal if he intened to march South. For that he called Chimaji Appa after finishing off the business at Wasai. But fortunately Nadirshah departed to his native land on 1st of May 1739 A.D., issuing emphatic commands to India potentates to render obedience to Muhammad Shah (68) whom he had restored to the throne of Delhi.
(v)The Nizamâs Move :
It was well-known, then, to the political circle (69) that the Nizam and Sadat Khan were responsible for Nadirshahâs invasion of Delhi. Even though Muhammad Shah was still on the throne, the invasion had terribly shaken the foundation of the Mughal Empire which lost all the glory and with it the remaining strength to preserve it. From this moment the Chiefs began to treat themselves as semi-independent, besides, the Nizam, the cause of the whole ruin, was still there in Delhi.
Khan Dauran, throughout his career as Mir Bakshi, successfully opposed the Nizam and never gave him a chance to dominate the Delhi politics. But he was killed and even Sadat Khan was no more. Having at his back the Wazir kamrudding Khan and the Turani party, the ground was thus clear for the Nizam to dominate.
Even though the Nizam had always professed to the true to the salt of the Emperor, it was he who had openly rebelled against the Emperor and had carved out an independent State in the Deccan. He had never lost touch with the politics of Delhi. His ambition (70) was a threat to the existence of Muhammad Shah as Emperor, who was warned for the same by Khan Dauran during his life time and even by Nadirshah (71) .
Even though the Emperor had called him to Delhi to oppose the Marathas in 1737 A.D., he had known him fully well and after Nadirshahâs invasion, wanted to chestise (72) him for the damage he had done to the Empire.
From his letter and actions, it is very clear that the Nizam detested the Marathas thoroughly and desired their complete destruction. He had tried by all means to thwart their progress but at Bhopla he learnt a lesson that it was beyond his power to subdue them. A shrewd diplomat and a worthy politician as he was, he tried to substitute diplomacy for force in his relations to the Marathas. Instead of trying to destroy them, he desired to use them as a force to secure his own ends to gain supremacy at Delhi. Only the Marathas were there to hinder him to achieve his objects. He had seen the rise in the friendly feelings of the Marathas and Rajputs he was a determined opponent of the Rajputs (73) and wanted to punish them. The Rajputs would have been nowhere, if the Nizam would have been successful in detaching the Marathas from them. For separating the Marathas he was ready to pay all that was offered by the Rajputs to the Marathas. With these objects in his view, he sent Sayyad Lashkar Khan .(74) to Bajirao who had already effected a settlement and had come to an understanding with Nasir Jang in Deccan.
       With Nasir Jang in Deccan, with the powerful force mobilized at the time of battle of Bhopal (1738 A.D.), with the full support of the Turani party at Delhi, and none to oppose, there was nothing difficult, as he wrote, for the Nizam to achieve.
(vi) The Emperor Woos Bajirao :
The Emperor and Sawai Jaysing felt anxious on hearing the move of the Nizam. But the Marathas were no auxiliary force as the Nizam thought  them to be. They had their own policy and their aims to achieve. Bajirao (75) informed Jaysing
That he was his friend. The latter with great relief (76) informed the Emperor that Bajirao had decided to accept their party. The Emperor in joy wrote back to Jaypur, that after the necessary assurance from Jaysing, the work (of Bajirao) would be done.
On receiving the letter from the Emperor, Jaysing called Bajirao to Ujjain and told the envoy that 5 lakhs out of the promised 15 lakhs would be sent forthwith, and the remaining 10 lakhs would be sent in the rainy season. He reminded the Peshwaâs envoy that in order to create a breach between the Emperor and the Peshwa, the Nizam would promise more than what was promised by the Emperor but the Peshwa should not mind it but should stick up to the Emperorâs side which would be profitable in the long run.
Jaysing told the envoy that after sending 5 lakhs of rupees with Ayamal and the envoy (Hingne) he, along with the Rana, would proceed 20 kos to meet Bajirao after which deliberations would be made on the plans approved by the Emperor.
But when his life mission was about to be fulled, when the Maratha-Rajput combination was nearing maturity, and when he was to shine as the savior of the shattering Mughal Empire, Peshwa Bajirao died suddenly on 28th of April 1740 A.D. at River on the south bank of Narmada.
(vii)Â Â Â The Life Mission of Bajirao :
 It was the lot of Chimaji Appa (77) to answer to the call of Sawai Jaysing. The following is the relevant portion from Chimaji Appaâs letter (June 1740 A.D.) to Mahadeo Bhat Hingne at Jaypur which throws ample light on the role played by Bajirao in his North Indian politics, and states clearly the aims of the Maratha rule in general.
 âRead the details of your letterâ¦The objects of the late Rao for the last eight or ten years were to please the Emperor by way of integrating the Imperial rule by bringing back to Imperial fold the Semi-Independent Amirs who cared little for the Emperorâs orders at their posts and thus to strengthen the administrative forces (resulting into peace and properity) and to gain thereby the good will of the rayat, the poor and the needy, to enhance the Imperial treasury and thus to acquire highest fame and the esteem of the Emperor. For all this he had kept constant touch with Nawab Khan Dauran thorugh Sawai Jaysing, and many schemes had been planned. The Emperor's help to meet the (daily) expenses and the repay the debts incurred, could not be received in time and hence the grand schemes envisaged could not be materialized for the lack of money, besides there were though the Nizam Asaf Jah sent Sayyad Lashkar Khan with promises (to bring him over to his side) he did not yield. It was not in his natur ot change words for a trifling gain of money, rather he was prepared to receive less (in comparison) from the Emperor and stick to his wordâ¦The Raya was to go to Malwa (as per the invitation)â¦he sent you (Hingne) to Sawai and afterwards left Burhanpurâ¦but after he crossed Rewa (Narmada) he fell ill and died at Vaishakha Shuddha Trayodashi. The Almighty did most unjust thing in this, but there is no remedy to itâ¦The late Nana (Balalji Vishwanath) aiming at the welfare of the people at large, destroyed the bad elements in the society and encouraged revalidation in the region that seemed like forestâ¦Nana died and Rao became Pradhaâ¦.Nana had to his credit the goo-will of the people and the blessings due to the establishment of Gods and Brahmins. Those blessings Nana handed over to Rao (as his legacy). Raya also aimed at the welfare of the people, the establishement of Gods and Brhamans, and renovation of the great centres of religion like Kashi. He strived hard by that path, protected, where great religious centres were renovated. His fame reached North (but he soon died). It was his desire (till last) to restore Vishweshwar at Kashi. Raya's fame shown in the world ten fold in proportion to that of Nana. Rao was brave, and a creator of new worldâ¦
The Emperor and Sawaiji desire a chastisement of the Nizam. The same will be done. But he (Sawai Jaysing) should stick to the terms settled with Raya, nay, he should do much more. This is in fact proper for him (since Bajirao is dead). He was about to send 5 lakhs out at of 15 lakhs to Raya. Manage to send the same without losing time by asking Sawaiji. After full preparation, the army and one of us (i.e. either Chimaji or Balaji) will come over to meet us with Rayamalji. Then arrange for the meeting of Sawaiji and Ranaji and if the both tof them think it proper even Abhaysing may be called. Thus after gaining strength, we shall perform whatever task the Emperor assigns us. Meanwhile, if the Nizam and the rest, thinking short-sightedly, that we have been reduced to nothing after the death of Raya, and march on us, we shall bring them round with in no time, with a lakh of army and the brave Sardars at our disposal. Sawaiji knows us too well to entertaiin any low opinion about us. He knows too what Rao stood for, and what he was striving for, we and the Sardars stand for the sameâ¦
Rao was the great asylum of the Hindus. There was none equal to him in the Deccan and the whole of Hindustan. Be as it is, but after all what did Rao carry with him? He left all behind him. The rest and we have been with the Rao from the first, and are still there. The enhancement of the success and the fame attained by Rao, is the only objective (Before us). By the grace of God, and the blessings of the strenuous and virtuous life led by Rao, we intend to punish all those who behave improperly towards the Emperor. If Sawaiji, Ranaji., Abhaysing and we are one, what is impossible there fore us that we intend to   attain ?
Foot Notes (Description)
(1)Â S.P.D. 30-134.
(2) Hingne Daftar : 1-6, M.I.S. Vol. VI - 95.
(3) S.P.D. 15-33, see Appendix - D.
(4) "Tarikh-I-Hindi" in E.D. Vol. VIII p. 50.
(5) S.P.D. 14-39.
(6) As per a Marathi saying it aimed at killing a serpant at the hands of (uninvited) guest.
(7) Even in 1741 A.D., when the Subha was finally handed over to Balajirao, the Emperor had prepared for an armed resistence, which was practically impossible for the Mughal strength then. - S.P.D. 13-4, M.I.S. Vol. VI, 97.
(8) Ibid - 95
(9) M.I.S. Vol. VI, 96, 97.
(10) 'Hingne Daftar' I-5, 7.
(11) Ibid - 7.
(12) Writes Sir Jadunath (Fall I, p. 268), "As the Delhi Court had inclined towards peace, the Marathas withdraw from Malwa-March 1737 A.D." - The truth was just the opposite.
(13) S.P.D. 12-27.
(14) S.P.D. 12-341, M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 75.
(15) S.P.D. 15-5, S.P.D. 30-192, M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 75.
(16) S.P.D. 15-31.
(17) Ibid, 18.
(18) Ibid, 29.
(19) S.P.D. 14-38.
(20) S.P.D. 15-12 to 14.
(21) Ibid, 10, 16
(22) Ibid, II, 90.
(23) Ibid, 32.
(24) Ibid, 35.
(25) S.P.D. 15-99, 91.
(26) S.P.D. 30-196.
(27) S.P.D. 30-198, S.P.D. 15-27, 28.
(28) Ibid, 22.
(29)Â "Pawar Sadhane" - 75, Letter of Bajirao to Brahmendra Swami, 'Brahmendra
(30) 'Later Mughal' Vol. II, p. 297.
(31) S.P.D. 15-23, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 167.
(32) S.P.D. 15-529, 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 298.
(33) S.P.D. 15-29.
(34) S.P.D. 15-30.
(35) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 299.
(36) S.P.D. 15-33.
(37)Â Ibid, 29.
(38) S.P.D. 10-91, 92.
(39) Ibid, 101 (Oct. 1736)
(40) S.P.D. 15-25, 26, 29.
(41) Ibid, 42
(42) S.P.D. 10-34.
(43) 'Later Mughals' Vol. Ii, p. 301.
(44) S.P.D. 15-53.
(45) S.P.D. 22-262.
(46) 'Holkar Shahi' I-34, M.I.S. Vol. VI-107, 117.
(47) S.P.D. 30-207, 'New hist.' Vol. II, p. 170.
(48)Â M.I.S. Vol. VI-114, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 172.
(49) Later Mughals Vol. II, p. 366.
(50) S.P.D. 15-p, 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 306, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 171.
(51)Â S.P.D. 15-68.
(52) "Tarikhi Ibrahim Khan' in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 262.
(53) S.P.D. 15-p. 86.
(54) M.I.S. Vol. VI, p. 85.
(55) S.P.D. 15-71, 75.
(56) S.P.D. 30-229, 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 356.
(57) 'Itihasa Sangraha' - Letters of Dhondo Govind.
(58) 'Satara Hist. Papers' Vol. II, 270.
(59) S.P.D. 15-75, 'Purandare Daftar' III - 183. M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 133, 134, 'Satara Hist. Papers' Vol. II-266.
(60) S.P.D. 15-72.
(61) 'Itihasa Sangrah, Aitihasik Charitra' - 4, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 178, 179.
(62) 'Itihasa Sangrah - Aitihasik Charitra' - 7.
(63) 'Brahmendra Swami Charitra' - p. 118, S.P.D. 15-72, 75, S.P.D. 30-229 M.I.S. Vol. VI, - 133, 134..
(64) 'Satara Hist.Papers' Vol II-268, 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 180.
(65)
For the present Tohmast Kuli (Nadirshah) has won the fight. But if all the Hindus take to courage (and unite) and if our greaty armies reach North (it is a lime) for the Hindu Empire to come into existence. " 'Brahmendra Swami Charitra', p. 118.
(66) From Bajirao Ballal Pandit Pradhan to Dhayabhai, dt. 23-3-1739, B.I.S.M. (July 1920), from the collection of letters from the family of Vyas of Udaypur.
(67)Â 'Brahmendra Swami charitra' , p. 118.
(68) S.P.D. 15-80.
(69) 'Itihasa Sangraha, Atitihasik Charitra' 3., S.P.D. 15-75.
(70) "Nizam-ul-Mulk was a very ambitious person. In addition to the extensive province of the Deccan, he at one time controlled the provinces of Gujarat, Malwa and Agra, either directly or through his kinsmen. He was even at is revealed in his letters.There is no doubt, that if he had had his way, Nizamulmulk would have ended by becoming the dictotor of the entire Mughal Empire. " - p. Setu Madhava Rao in Preface of 'Eithteenth Century Deccan' , p. ix.
(71) "The Cambridge Hist, of India' , Vol. IV, pp. 362. 363.
(72) "The Emperor and Sawai Jaysing desire a severe chastisement to the Nizam. It will take place accordingly" - From the letter of Chimaji Appa in 'Hingne Daftar' I-15.
(73)Â Ibid, 19
(74)Â 'Hingne Daftar' - I-13, 15.
(75) Ibid, 13, 15
(76)Â 'Satara Hist. Papers' , Vol. II - 264.
(77)Â 'Hingane Daftar', I -15
http://www.maratharajputrelations.com/4fp.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->