04-27-2006, 03:53 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 6 <b>ABHAYSING IN GUJRAT </b>
(I) Gujarat During 1720 A.D. To 1725 A.D.
Khanderao Dabhade was appointed âSenapatiâ (1) by Chhatraati Shahu on 11th of January 1717 A.D., and was assigned the province of Gujarat and parts of Khandesh as the sphere of his activities. Kanthaji Kadam Bande, Damaji Gayakwad, his nephew Pilaji Gayakwad (from 1719 A.D.onwards) were his famous commanders, who established by almost annual incursions into Gujarat, the Maratha claim to âChauthâ of Gujarat. But it was the civil war for a year (1724 â25 A.D.), waged in defiance of the commands of the Central Government, by the Nizamâs deputy Himid Khan, that really helped them to exact âChauthâ from all the paraganas North (2) of the Mahi river.
The fall of Sayyad brothers was an act of great consequences that affected the Mughal administration in Malwa and Gujarat particularly. Nizam-ul-Mulk, the prime actor behind the plot, naturally became the Wazir of Delhi (February 1722). He replaced Ajitsing Rathod, the Subhadar of Gujarat, being the nominee of the Sayyads, by Haidarkuli Khan and asked him to depart to his province without loss of time. But not long after wards, he himself assumed the Subhadarship of Gujarat by dimissing Haidarkuli Khan and appointed his uncle Hamid Khan to act as the deputy Subhadar of Gujarat (February 1723 A.D.)
But events followed too rapidly. The ambitious Nizam himself rebelled against the Emperor and established an independent Kingdom in Deccan after the battle of Sakhar-Kherda (30th September 1724 A.D.) (4) As a result, the Emperor deprived Him of his provinces of Malwa and Gujarat. In Gujarat, Sarbulad Khan Mubariz-ul-Mulk was appointed as Subhadar in his place. With this appointment, the above-mentioned civil war started in Gujarat.
Instigated by the Nizam, Hamid Khan (5), who represented him in Gujarat, defeated and killed Shujat Khan (17th December 1724 A.D.) the deputy of Sarbuland Khan near Ahmedabad, seeking the help of Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gayakwad. A second attempt, by the brother of Shujat Khan, also met with the same fate. Thus two armies were defeated within a short period of less than three months with the help of Marathas, who naturally profited thereby.
Realizing the gravity of danger from the Turani faction led by Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Emperor asked Sarbuland Khan to depart to his province in person. Hamid Khan at last became powerless, with the coming of Sarbuland Khan (6) in Gujarat in December 1725 A.D., but as legacy, he had left the Marathas powerful in Gujarat. It was impossible for even Sarbuland Khan, to continue the struggle with the numerous Marathas for a longer time with all his resources. He, in 1726 A.D. came, to terms with Kanthaji (7) and agreed of the river Mahi, with the exception of the Capital and Haveli paragana.
(ii)The Peshwa Enters the Politics of Gujarat :
A new addition to the complicated situation of Gujarat was made when Peshwa Bajirao invaded Gujarat in early 1725 A.D. (8) to secure the right of âChauthâ for himslef. Hereafter, the encroachment of the Peshwa through his brother Chimaji Appa and his Sardars continued (9) vigorously. In 1726 A.D., Udaji Pawar entered Gujarat from Dhar in Malwa, and tried to snatch Dabhoi (10) from Pilaji and Kanthaji, but failed. Never-the-less Peshwaâs hold on Gujarat was sufficiently established (11). In 1727 A.D. Chimaji Appa, entering Gujarat, penetrated as far as Dholke, within 25 miles of Ahmedabad. He sent his representatives to the viceroy to negotiate about the âChauthâ but for various reasons, the terms could not be settled (12).
At the end of 1729 A.D., Chimaji again entered Gujarat with a considerable force. Laying siege to the hill fort of Pavgadh in January 1730 A.D. (13), he captured it in the first week of February 1730 A.D. Some of his halts in this expedition (1729 â30 A.D.) were â Nadiyad, Dhawalake, Viramgaon, Godai, Bichwa, Sabarmati, Tarapur and Petlad (14). In May 1730 A.D., but due to the opposition of the Khanâs Counsellers, it could not (15) take place. By the end of 1729 A.D., Peshwaâs hold on Gujarat was considerable (16).
(iii)Treaty of Sarbuland Khan with the Peshwa. (1730 A.D.)
With no help from Delhi, as the monthly subsidy of three lakhs of rupees for the maintenance of his troops had been cut off, (17) the powerful army of 1725 A.D., had mostly been dispersed. Having left no resources to carry on the administration and the struggle with the Marathas, and espeically as the activities of Kanthaji and Pilaji had been supplemented by the Peshwaâs troops under Chimaji, Sarbuland Khan had no other remedy but to enter into a formal treaty (18) with the Peshwa on 23rd March 1730 A.D.
Meanwhile new changes had taken place at Delhi. To break the Turanian faction, Kamruddin Khan had been dismissed from his post, and Khan-Dauran had succeeded (19) him as Wazir. The new Wazir refused to recognize the treaty effected by Sarbuland Khan with the Peshwa granting him âChauthâ and âSardeshmukhiâ of Gujarat, and relieving him of his office appointed Abhaysing, the Maharaja of Jodhpur, in his place as he believed that the great Hindu Rajas were the proper person (20) who could effectively confront the onrush of the Marathas.
(iv) Maharaja Abhaysing Appointed as Subhadar of Gujarat :
Maharaja Abhaysing was the third ruler of Rathod dynasty to hold this imperial office. He was granted eighteen lakhs (21) of rupees from the royal treasury for his expenses. Leaving Delhi, he reached his own Capital Jodhpur and enlisted 20,000 well-trained Rathod cavalry from Marwad and Nagor. His total army consisted of 30,000 horses and 10,000 foot and his military expenses came to seven lakhs of rupees per month. With this army and accompanied by his brother Bakhtsing, and his minister Ratansing Bhandari, he advanced towards Gujarat. When the new of his arrival at Jalor reached Sarbuland Khan at Ahmedabad he prepared to resist him. A sharp battle took place between the two sides, opposite the Capital, in which Sarbuland Khan was defeated. But by the intercession of friends, a reconciliation was effected and the ex-Viceroy left the Capital on receiving from his successor a lakh of rupees for the expenses of his journey.
(v) Decline of the Mughal Rule in Gujarat :
On the departure of Sarbuland Khan, Abhaysing applied himslef to the ardous task of driving the Marathas from Gujarat. His own letter (22) to his agent Bhandari Amarsing and Purohit Vardhaman, at Delhi reveal the true picture of the devastated conditions prevailing then in Gujarat.
âNothing is left out of the Kharip crop. Nawab (Sarbuland Khan) has squeezed every pie of the income, whether it was given willingly or under pressure. As regards the income from customers, it can only be realized when the trade flourishes and that can only be collected when people will re-inhabit their homesâ¦the Nawab (Khan Dauran) is fully aware of the forces kept here and the expenditure required, while the Emperor provided us in all 15 lakhs of rupees, 40 guns, 200 maunds of gun-powder and 100 mounds of leadâ¦A person like Sarbuland Khan was the Governor of this place, who, inspite of receiving a crore of rupees as well as a large amount of military assistance from the Emperor, sat idle in the city while the enemy devastated the province, and he dared not come out, but being overpowered, and he dared not come out, but being overpowered paid âChauthâ. This shows the strength of the enemy ! They are not even satisfied by the levy of âChauthâ, but Badoda, Dabhoi, Jambusar etc., yielding a revenue of 30 lacs, have also passed under their control. Surat including 28 districts is under the away of Pilu and any remittance of their revenue depends upon his sweet-will.
Pavagadh is held by Chimana (Chimaji Appa) and the fort of Champaner is under the possession of Kantha (Kanthaji Kadam Bande). They pretend to be lords of the land, and collect âChauth, âDeshmukhiâ , âPeshkashiâ and administer some of the places also. Such is their audacity.. the enemy, if not fully crused, will again raise his head. This is the reason why we have to keep a force at an approximate cost of Rs. 5,00,000 per month and accordingly will require 40 lakhs of rupees for the coming period of 8 months. In Gujarat, the winter crop has been damaged, and the condition of the crop of rainy season has already been narrated. A dispute sbout the âChauthâ between Kantha and Chimaji is going on, hence they both will returen here.â
(vi) Peshwa â Dabhade Rivalry in Gujarat :
Khanderao Dabhade, who had retired from active service from about 1723 A.D., and his son Trimbakrao, who had been already exercising his fatherâs powers, was invested with Senapatiâs dignity on January 9, 1730 A.D. Gujarat (23) and parts of Khandesh had been assigned by the Chhatrapati, as the special sphere of activity of the Dabhades. It was they, who had taken the foremost part in the conquest of Gujarat. Their lieutenants Bandes and Gayakwads had established the right to collect âChauthâ to the North and South of âmahiâ , since the days of Hamid Khan (1725 A.D.).
Naturally Trimbakrao resented Peshwaâs interferance and the agreement between Chimaji Appa and Sarbuland Khan concluded on 23rd March 1730 A.D. His stand that the Peshwa should restrict himself to Malwa, which was assigned to him by the Chhatrapati, was based on justice. Had he insisted upon this point with the Chhatrapati, there is no reason to doubt, that the Chhatrapati would not have listened to his arguments (24). But, instead, he preferred to settle the issue, taking recourse to armed conflict, and for that entered into negotiations with the Nizam. The fact was, that the Peshwaâs interference had provided only on outward cause for the Dabhade-Peshwa conflict, which infact had been aflamed due to the personal jealousy (25) felt by Trimbakrao and many other Maratha Chiefs for the enterprising Peshwa who had forced all of them into secondary position by raising his own armies and bravely leading them against the enemies of the Marathas from success to success
(vii) The Nizam-Dabhade Combination :
Smarting under the humiliating defeat at Palkhed (28th February 1728 A.D.) the Nizam had since then regarded Bajirao as a dangerous rival (26) to his policies of consolidating Muslim rule in Deccan. Such dissensions among the chief Sardars of Shahu were a gift from heaven and as such were eagerly welcomed and encouraged by him. Thus once having got the opportunity to thrust his had into Marathaâs internal politics, the Nizam never slackened his hold but determined to utilize the opportunity to fulfill his cherished ambition of making himself the supreme authority not only in Deccan but in Malwa and Gujarat as well, by removing Bajirao from his exhaled position in Maratha politics.
With perfect diplomacy and patience of a shrewd politician the Nizam labored over the plan. Many prominent Maratha Sardars who had their personal grievances against the Peshwa, were seduced through assurances that suited the occasion. Thus besides Dabhades, the Pawars, the Bandes, the Gayakwads and many other Maratha Chiefs joined him against the Peshwa in the common front.
The Peshwa was well informed of these activites, for example in one of his reports in November 1730 A.D. writes the Peshwaâs agent to him, (27) âKanthaji, Udoji and Kanhoji are freequent visitors here and are being seduced by Anandrao Sumant who has assured the Nizam that the King Shahu would not be sorry at all if Bajirao is put down and that not a dog would bark at such a result.â He further stated, â Dabhade and Bande have wirtten to Nizam asking for assurance for shelterâ¦They contemplate making Sambhaji the Chhatrapti, Dabhade his Senapati and Kanthaji Bande his Sarlshkar⦠upon which the Nawab (Nizam-ul-Mulk) declared that such a chance has been presented to us without our asking, which of the two, Shahu or Sambhaji loses, is immaterial, one opponent will be less for us. Therefore we wonât reject the proposal.â
To ensure the success of these ambitious designs the Nizam left no stone unturned and by way of strngthening his position arranged a meeting (28) on Narmada, with Muhammad Khan Bangash who had been recently as Subhadar in Malwa, to enlist his co-operation in the coming enterprise.
Had the Peshwa hesitated in striking the blow at the most appropriate time, in all probability, this combination would have been fatal to the rising Maratha-Raj and as such Trimbakrao and his Maratha associates were playing with nothing but fire. Even though, initially truth was on his side, Trimbakrao had forfeited his claims to justice having placed personal jealousies above his duties to State. Shahuâs letter of strong remonstrance to him in which he wrote, âYou have been a loyal Hindu servant of the State and as such we have all along dealt with you most kindly. You have nevertheless deserted us, to side with the enemy, taking offence at something we are not aware of. You must know what fate traitors meet with. We urge you, therefore, to forget all wrongs and to remember how your ancestors behaved and served the State, instead of the enemy, so that the nation may be proud of your conductâ¦.you have to subdue the nationâs enemies and not to join them. You must work to extend the Maratah-raj. This warning is addressed to you in full confidence that you will remain a loyal servant of the State and not molest the poor, innocent rayats.â
The fact is that Shahu was all the while trying to settle (30) the issue amicably. At a time he thought of issuing âSanadâ in favour of Dabhade by paying some cash to the Peshwa so that he should cease to interfere in Gujarat. When (31) asked by Bajirao, Chimaji consented to such an arrangement but insisted that Dabhadeâs claims should be removed by the Chhatrapati if he joined the Nizam. Shahu sent special messengers (32) and in the long in league with the Nizam and in one of his letters through Gayas Khan (33) (1st November 1730 A.D. ) he had urged the Nizam thus, âwe do not demand any thing from you except your support, on which we shall destroy Pradhan Pant giving him a battle. If he succeeds, grant us a Jagir and Mansab. It we are successful, in that we are destroying the kingdom of Shahu declaring that it is the king who is instigating us to fight with the Peshwa. After the kingdom of Shahu is destroyed, Sambhaji should be placed on the throne and Trimbakrao and Kanthaji be made Senapati and Sarlashkar respectively. In it the fame of the Nawab (Nizam) would be enhancedâ¦â Shahu (34) seems to be ignorant of these dangerous designs of Trimbakrao, for had he known them, it is impossible to believe that he would have cancelled the Mokasa of half of Gujarat assigned by him to Chimaji and transferred it to Trimbakrao on 15th December 1730 A.D. only a fortnight before the battle of Dabhoi.
Shahuâs letter produced little effect on Trimbakrao. He was uncompromising (35) and was not prepared to lose even a village of his territory. The Nizam (36) had already left Aurangabad to follow Bajirao. Dabhade had assembled a force of 10 thousand at Talegaon and was to follow him soon. In fact he had gone too far in his plans to destroy Bajirao, to listen to any suggestion of Shahu or Bajirao. It is no wonder, hence, that the efforts of Chhatrapati Shahu to bring Dabhade in his presence at Satara met with little success (37) (December 1730 A.D.).
Bajirao could not be deaf to the reports that poured upon him from his agents about the gathering of the clouds against him and did not deem it wise to wait till they got time to burst upon him.
Along with Chimaji he marched towards Khandesh leaving Poona on 10th October 1730 A.D. Leaving Chimaji (38) to watch the movements of the Nizam in Khandesh, Bajirao proceeded to Badoda (December 1730 A.D.) . Chimaji soon joined him, having made sure that the Nizam, who had proceeded to meet Bangash, would probably bring large forces including those of Bangash to help Dabhade.
Towards the end of November 1730 A.D., (39) the Nizam started from Aurangabad to meet Bangesh on Narmada. He Informed Dabhade not to engage with Bajirao rashly until a fully concerted plan was arranged between them all (40). The meeting took place on Narmada (41) at Akbarpur ferry near the fort of Mandavgadh from 17th to 28th of March 1731. Bajiraoâs success to a greater extent depended on keeping himself fully informed of the enemies movements and hence he had posted Malharrao Holkar in the vicinity of Narmada.
Malharrao harassed the Bangash during the said conference and at the same time sent vital information to his master in Gujarat from time to time (42).
(viii) The Role of Abhaysing in the Conflict :
On his arrival near Badoda, Bajirao wrote a letter to Maharaja Abhaysing (43), who deputed the faujdar of Bhadoch to meet him on the Mahi. Thereafter the Peshwa and his brother advanced to Ahmadabad and encamped at the Chandola tank. Negotiations were carried on through Ratansing Bhandari. A meeting took place at Shahi-Bag between Bajirao and Abhaysing when terms of agreement were settled. (February 1731 A.D.). The Maharaja agreed to pay 13 lakhs of rupees in lieu of âChauthâ of Gujarat, 6 lakhs of which were paid down immediately and the remaining amount was to be paid after Kanthji and Pilaji (44) were expelled from Gujarat.
As per the agreement (45) a body of Rajputs joined Bajirao to secure Badoda from Pilaji. The combined army laid siege to Badoda fort, which was ably defended by the Gayakwadâs general. But the Peshwa could not remain there for a longer time and had to raise the siege on receiving the grave news of the arrival of the Nizam on the Narmada with his army, intending to march into Gujarat.
The Senapati with the help of Kanthaji, Pilaji and Udaji had collected an army of about 40,000 men including the Nizamâs (46) contingent of about 5,000 under Muhammad Yar Khan and Kuwar Bahadur, on the plain of Dabhoi and Bilapur. Bajirao sent his repeated messages (47) from Savli to Dabhade to proceed to Satara and have the dispute settled amicably in the presence of Chhatrapati, reminding him that it was not proper that the two prominent Servants of the king should engage in a personal contest. But Trimbakrao was in no mood to listen to such proposals. Probably he was waiting for the definite instructions from the Nizam as to the time of his action. In fact the Nizam and the Bangash needed sometime more before they were to unite their forces with those of their Maratha allies. But It would have been a dangerous folly on the part of Bajirao had he waited more. The Peshwa was too foresighted and too quick in his action to give the Nizam and his allies enough time to mature their plans. As Trimbakrao had refused his overtures of peace, the Peshwa fell upon him with a comparatively smaller force of about 20,000 horse at the village of Bhilapur, between Badoda and Dabhoi on 1st of April 1731 A.D. Dabhade fought with determination and courage, but a chance shot, probably from his maternal uncle killed him instantly. There upon his troops broke and fled, which completed the victory of the Peshwa in this civil struggle. He wrote thus about the victory to his Guru Brahmendra Swami. âDabhade with his allies came forward for an encounter on 4th Shavval. Trimbakrao himself, Jiwaji Dabhade, Maloji Pawar and Pilaji Gayakwadâs son Sabhaji were killed outright. Udaji Pawar and Chimmaji Damodhar were captured. Pilaji Gayakwad and Kuvar Bahadur escaped wounded. A large booty was secured. Out side too lost a few brave ones in the battle (48).
Before Nizam could render any help to Dabhade, Bajirao had disposed him of. He did not wait a moment after the battle but returned with all haste to Satara. On the way, he had a brush with a party of Nizamâs troops near Kador. After receiving
The news of Peshwaâs victory, the Nizam had advanced from Nandurabar upto the neighbourhood of Surat and attacked the retiring army under Bajirao, capturing some of its baggage (49). The Nizam boasts of this victory in the following way:
Asaf Jah to Abdul Nabi Khan (50) â April 1731 A.D., âImmediately on hearing rumours of the approach of the Islamic army by way of All Mohan, (the enemy) in utter bewilderment quickly crossed the Narmada and entered the limits of Deccan.
Therefore, this follower of Mustafaâs from the ford of Akbarpur, near the fort of Mandu, sent off his baggage and camp with the big guns to Burhanpur, and with great rapidity arrived at Nandurbar, and reached the environs of Surat in a few days. We surprised the Marathas when they were sleeping in great negligence and ignorance of our whereabouts and they fied away in utmost disorder. The dead were countless. Out troups made spoil of their property and the wretches suffered total losses.
The Subha of Gujarat has been freed from the disturbance created by Bajirao and the Subha of Malwa too has remained safe from that wretcheâs mischief making, and the holy port (of Surat) has been saved from falling into the cloches of the villain.â
It is to be noted that the Nizam does not make any mention of the Victory of Gujarat, on the contrary he speaks of Gujarat being, âunoccupied by defenders.â He boasts of having saved Gujarat, Malwa as well and the port of Surat from falling into the hands of the Marathas. His pretensions over Malwa and Gujarat are quite obvious from the above letter. He very conveniently connives at the great victory of Bajirao over Dabhade and puts it as if Bajirao fled from Badoda on hearing the approach of the muslim army.
Let us see the version of Abhaysing (51) about the victory of Bajirao over Dabhade. âThere was fight between the armies of Trimbakrao Dabhade and those of Bajirao and ours. Trimbakrao, Mughal Mominyar Khan the commander of Nizamâs army, and Mula Pawar were killed. Pawar Uda, Chimma (Chimanaji Damodhar) and Pandit of the side of the Nizam and Piluâs son were captured, and we were victories. You must have imparted these news to the Nawab (khan Dauran).
Pilu, Kantha, Anandrao and others have fled with their armies. Pilu fled to Dabhoi and his brother is at Barods. We have dispatched our armies to both these places and hope to get them vacated soon. As Kantha had fled to Nizam-ul-Mulk, you should ask the Nawab to inform the Emperor and get his orders issued to Nizam with a strict warning, that he should comply with the commands of the âDarbarâ (Maharaja) and should not give shelter to Kantha, Pilu and others.
The army of the Nizam too is destroyed and if he comes again to this place to avenge himself, there will be a battle with him.
This time Bajirao has rendered meritorious services to the Emperor. So a robe of honour, a âFarmanâ and an elephant should be bestowed upon him as well as Raja Shahu and a robe of honour on Chimna. Further, after explaining everything to the Nawab, also arrange for the bestowal of a âMansabâ.
Sometime back we wrote about the case of Bajirao, but owing to the verbal or written misrepresentations, the Nawab could not grasp the reality and has informed to Emperor that Bajirao, only being afraid of Trimbakrao, has joined us in this way, and therefore he could not help us in any biggest task. These days there was a large concentration of the forces of the enemy, and both the armies arrived here. When we failed to see any provision being made by adverse result, it was we who would be blamed for it, as no one would say that the Nawab did not do any thing in the matter. In these circumstances we tried hard to bring Bajirao to the side of the Emperor, and giving him every assurance dispatched him with our forces equipped with strong artillary to punish Kantha, Pilu and others. We have thus created a split among them and managed to crush the rising.
We thought that the Nawab would appreciate our action but instead of that he has written to us to punish Bajirao, drive him away and give him no help what-so-ever. It appears that the Nawab has written to us at the instigation of the Nizam. Is it fair that the Nawab should act on the advice of others when the task has been entrusted to us? Only consider that though kantha and Pilu had been usurping the land of Gujarat for the last eight years, he (Khan Dauran) favours them and gives no weight to winning Bajirao over to the side of the Emperor. Tell all these facts to the Nawab plainly and inform that we have done all this with full faith in him. But it he does not care, we are not prepared to keep this province. What advantage can one have in Gujarat these days? On the contrary though we have to bear all the expenses from the revenue of Marwad, he has neither done anything for our own jagir or for that of Rajadhiraj (Baktsing).
Recently the enemy threatened us again and therefore we managed the affair in this way. He writes to Nizam to punish Bajirao, while we brought him whole-heartedly to our side and sent him to punish the Nizam. It appears that though the Nizam wants to create misunderstanding between the Nawab, and us yet he has no courage to advance. Had he come forward, he would have been punished, and further if he thinks of advancing against us, he shall be punished.â
Top and side lines in Maharajaâs own hand writing: âMay Almighty always protect us. By the grace of God we have achieved victory. The helping force of the Nizam-ul-Mulk, which too was with the enemy has also been destroyed. But Bajirao has not been favoured with thanks and assuance for his help. If the Nizam himself comes here, we are prepared to deal with him. Also arrange to remit money soon. Here there is no source of income, and therefore, inform the Nawab and arrange to send money without fail, we belong to the Rajput race and therefore believe that whatever the Almighty desires will happens, but the Emperor will lose the province.
As Abhaysing puts it, there was no source of income for the viceroy in Gujarat. He could not continue for a long his expenses in Gujarat at the cost of revenue of Marwad. Money was the necessity without which hs was unable, âto manage the affaris of the province even for a single day.â The Maratha menace to Gujarat as Abhaysing puts it correctly, had been in existance for the past eight years i.e. from 1722 A.D. Even Sarbuland Khan was unsuccessful to face the Maratha tide. Confronted with great concentration of Maratha troops in combination with the Nizam, Abhaysing had no other means to save the province ghand to enter into an alliance with Bajirao, who had been won over to the Emperorâs side and was supplied with artillary and troops to face the enemy. But his diplomacy was not appreciated by the Nawab Khan Dauran, far from it, he had written to punish Bajirao. Abhaysing felt that it was not fair for him to write in that way. He strongly recommanded due recognition for the meritorious services rendered by Bajirao and even a âMansabâ also. Finally he wrote that if his polices were not accepted, he was not prepared to keep the province for himself.
Even though Abhaysing was conscious of the fact that by winning over Bajirao to his side, he had created a split among the Marathas, his joy over the success of Bajirao seems to be more unrest than what is warranted of a shrewd and practical diplomat. In fact, it was not he who had won over Bajirao against Dabhade, but it was due to the common interest that they both and come together. But there was something more. Even though he was not a through observer of the Maratha internal politics like the Nizam, the sense of self interest must have warned him that in the success of the Nizam Dabhade combination against Bajirao, lay a dangerous threat to his existence in Gujarat. Hence Bajiraoâs men were his men and his victory was âOur Victoryâ. His choice of the party of Bajirao was not accident. Since Ajitsing, the House of Rathod belonged to anti-Turanian group and even then Abhaysing was a partisan of Khan Dauran and as such was naturally opposed to the politicizes of Nizam whose pretensions to Gujarat under any form were jealously resented by him (52).
(ix) After Dabholi :
Being doubtful about the policy of the Emperor (53) and as per the agreement (54) with the Chhatrapati Shahu, Bajirao here after did not personally (55) interfere in the polities of Gujarat and hence Abhaysingâs alliance with the Peshwa was short-lived. But, nevertheless, it had not been barren of fruits. In main, it had put down the ambitious plans of the Nizam, which if successful, could have stirred the political atmosphere not only of Deccan but also of the whole Hindusthan. The success of the Nizam would have up set the chance of Rajput dominance as they had then, in the politics of Delhi.
After his defeat at Dabhoi at the hands of Bajirao, the reputation of Pilaji Gayakwad, suffered considerably. Nevertheless, by his hold of Songadh fort and his recent acquisitions of Badoda and the fortress of Dabhoi, he had made himself still more formidable. However, Abhaysing was determined to secure the territory lost to the Marathas. With little resources left in Gujarat, the task was beyond his power to perform. Fully realizing this, Abhaysing thought to take recourse to baser methods and managed Pilaji to be assassinated at Dakor, on 14th of April, 1732 A.D.
With satisfaction the Maharaja wrote to Amarsing Bhandari, his Vakil at Delhi, in a letter dated 26th March 1732, âBy the grace of Goddess, Pilu has been killedâ. The reason was âwithout dong away with him, we cannot take Badoda, as he would never fight a pitched battleâ. As per the details given in the letter, a contingent of two thousand selected cavalry, was specially despatched to fall upon the camp, after the treachery was successful. Pancholi Ramanand, Bhandari, Ajabsing and Inda Lakhdhir entered into negotiations with Pilaji at Dakor, the famous place of Hindu pilgrimage and when the latter had little suspicions of any foul act, affected his murder. At once, the two thousands Rathod horse fell upon the confused Maratha camp two hours after the dark. Pilajiâs brother, along with five to seven persons of note, were killed, Five hundred Marathas fell on the spot and a great amount of botty was taken, including 700 horses and a large number of heavy fire locks. The Maharaja then marched to Badoda, which was abandoned by the Marathas in confusion.
Occupying Badoda, the Maharaja laid siege to Debhoi where the Marathas had retired. But owing to the unseasonable rains he failed to capture it and subsequently retired to Ahemadabad (1732 A.D)
But by now the Marathas (56) had fully recovered from the shock. The Kolis, Bills, Waghris and other wild tribes enraged at the murder of Pilaji rose every where against the viceroy, Pilajiâs brother, Mahadaji, marched from Jambusar on Badoda and took it by storm. In 1733 A.D, Umabai Dabhade (57), widow of the Senapati Khanderao, accomapnied by Kanthji Kadam Bande and Pilajiâs able son Damaji Gayakwad, with an army of 30,000 troups approached Ahmadabad to avenge the death of Pilaji. The threatening Marathas encamped at the Shahwadi about three miles from the Jamalpur gate of Ahmadabad. Being impossible to face them, the Maharaja was foreced to pay a ransom of 80,000 rupees over and above the âChauthâ and âSardeshmukhiâ of the province (58).
Shortly after this, the Maharaja left Ahmedabad for Jodhapur leaving Ratansing Bhandari as the deputy Subhadar of Gujarat and hence during 1733 A.D to 1736 A.D his contact with the Marathas in Gujarat was through his deputy who tried to oppose them in vain.
By 1736 A.D, the Maratha hold on Gujarat was nearly complete except for the capital Ahemadabad and the seaports bhadoch. Surat and Cambay. In 1736 A.D, the Emperor appointed Momin Khan as the Successor to Maharaja Abhaysing as Subhadar of Gujarat.
The deputy Subhadar informed Abhaysing about the âFarmanâ received by Momin Khan and about his intended march to the capital with the help of the Marathas. Taking offence at his supersession, the Maharaja left the Court. As Ratnsing refused to surrender Ahemadabad, as per the orders of his master, Momin Khan and his Maratha ally Rangoji (59), the agent of Pilaji Gayakwad, laid siege to Ahemadabad. From the end of August 1736 A.D to the end of May 1737 A.D, for nine months. Ratansing with considerable capacity and resource-fulness, defended Ahmadabad against the combined strength of the enemy. But during this trying period, the Maharaja failed to send him any help in men or money. At last for lack of provisions, the Bhandari and his Rajputs abandoned the defence and left for Marawad (60) on 25th of May 1737 A.D
(x) The Relations of Abhaysing with the Marathas from 1733 A.D Onwards
Maharaja left Gujarat in 1733 A.D and went back to Jodhpur because that was the only honourable way left for him. Owing to the constant Maratha raids, the revenue of the province had dwindled and a horrible famine which ravaged the land made the economic condition all the more pitiable (61) and yet the Imperial Court did not send the expected help in men and money, even on repeated demands. Under such circumstances, the Maharaja was convinced, as he had previously written, that the province was lost to the Emperor. Hence he left his deputy to look after Gujarat affairs, as far as it was possible and returned to Jodhpur having left all interest in the defence of the Mughal Empire hereafter.
In 1734 A.D he attended the assembly of the Rajput Chiefs at Hurda along with the rulers of Jaypur, Udaypur, Kota, Bikaner and Kishangadh. All signed a pact of mutual assistance. But the pact could be of little use in prevalence of mutual jealousies among the Chiefs.
Inspite of the foul murder of Pilaji at his instance in 1732 A.D, Abhaysing was not opposed in general to Maratha cause from the point of view of his policy. He blonged to the party of Khan Dauran and hence was much more inclined (62) towards them. His moral support to Bajirao in 1731 A.D, against the combination of Kanderao Dabhade and the Nizam was definitely of consequences (63). Later on also, his participation in the campaigns against Bajirao during 1734 A.D to 1736 A.D was only nominal.
But his influence with Khan Dauran dwindled by degrees as the threats of the Marathas to the security of the Mughal Empire increased in seriousness since 1736 A.D In the longrun, Khan Dauran was disillusioned in his high opinion about the Rajput Rajas that their appointment to the Subhas of Malwas and Gujarat would effectively check the tide of Maratha aggression. With the attack of Bajirao on Delhi, the idea to call Nizam for the defence of the Empire got root, even Khan Dauran sided with it, and with the coming of the Nizam at Delhi in 1737 A.D, Abhaysing nearly lost all his interest in Delhi Politics.
He died in 1749 A.D and was definitely a strong Hindu minded ruler like his illustrious father Ajitsing.
Foot Notes (Description)
(1)Â 'New Hist.' Vol. II pp. 134 and 135.
(2) 'History of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 413.
(3) 'Munt Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 517, 518, 527.
(4) 'Munt Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, pp. 526.
(5) Ibid, pp, 528, 529.
(6) 'A Hist. of Gujarat', Vol. II, p. 424.
(7) Ibid, p. 426.
(8) S.P.D. 30-312 :- Bajirao's expedition into Gujarat. His comprador Baji Bhivrao was active in the territory of Khambayat in Feb. 1724 A.D. It is doubtful whether Bajirao personally invaded Gujarat this time. 'Pehswas' Shakawali' (M.I.S. Vol.II, p. 24) states that during January to March 1725 A.D., Bajirao was in Malwa, whereas in No. 312 to S.P.D. 30, it is clearly stated that Baji Bhivrao was in Gujarat along with Rajashri Pant Pradhan. ( ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(9) S.P.D. 30-p. 272 : Half of Bagad, in Gujarat, was assigned for expenses of the contigent of Gajaji Dewakate, under Chimaji, on 19th July 1724 A.D. Ibid, p. 277 : Malhar Govind was appointed 'Chitnis' to collect 'Sardeshmukhi' and 'Babti rights' in Gujarat by Chimaji. Ibid pp. 280, 281 : The day to day collection of 'Chauth' from Gujarat (along with Malwa) by Tryambak, agent of Pilaji Jadhao, Convinces the gradual hold of the Peshwa on Gujarat during 1725 - 26 A.D.)
(10) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 426.
(11) A circular order from Raja Shahu to Pilaji Gayakwad, Kanthaji Kadam and Ambaji Pant, (23-4-1726 A.D.) states that Ambak, Mutalik of the Peshwa, had settled with Sarbuland Khan for the surrender of 'Chauthai' and 'Sardeshmukhi' of Gujarat and directed them not to interfer with its payment to Chimaji and Trimbakrao Dabhade. Baroda I.
(12) "Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion" (1944 A.D.) p. 30, 'A Hist. of Gujarat'. Vol. II p. 426.
(13) S.P.D. 30 - entries on page 426.
(14) S.P.D. 30 - pp. 295, Itinerary of Chimaji Appa.
(15) S.P.D. 12-32 (The date of letter should be 22-5-1730 and not 22-5-1729 as the editor has wrongly stated, for the abvous reason that Chimaji had just returned from his Malwa expedition on 4th May 1729 A.D., (Itinerary of Chimaji Appa - Item No. 10, p. 6 of S.P.D. 22.).
Daniel Inners's letter, dated 25th March 1730 A.D., in Hist, of Gujarat, Vol. II, p. 427 reproduced from the 'Gaikwad of Baroda' 1-10 Reads as follows: - "The Ganims under Chimaji Raja, it is said, before they left Petlad, got from the town nearly two lakhs of rupees, whence they moved off Dholka way, they have pillaged the greatest part of it, the loss sustained cannot as yet be known but must be great multitudes say a crore of rupees, others more moderate, say half at least. "
Now compare this 'it is said' , with the reality : Letter from Chimaji Appa to Bajirao dated 22nd May 1730 A.D. from Pavgadh, - "We have returned from Viramgaon. Sarbuland Khan had agreed to a meeting with us when Anandrao Pawar had been there. But he did not come as his men opposed the meeting. We then went to Dhawalake Petlad. At present we art at Pavagadh. The provisions are to be made in the fort. Anandrao Pawar thinks of staying more. If we stay, the (captured) territory and the fort will be retained. But (if we decide to stay) how to feed this army is the great questions. No money has been recovered to pay off the creditors. Hence, the difficulty from both the sides. If we decide to stay, the bellies will have to be filled and if we leave, the territory is lost. Hence we are (still) here. After making due provisions, and making one or two, halts to have time to take further decision about our plan, we shall write (to you) definitely. "
Thus when the anxiety of Chimaji was how to retain the territory and at the same time feed his army, the contemporary writer Daniel Innes puts up the exacted ransom from a crore of rupees to 50 lakhs as a moderate estimate. There is hardly any need to add anything more in his respect!
(16) S.P.D. 30 - entries on pp. 293, 294. Dated 16th September 1729 A.D., reveal that along with other Mahals from Malwa, Udaji Pawar and Anandrao Pawar, were assigned a saranjam of 29 Mokasa-mahals in Gujarat.
(17) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 426.
(18) S.P.D. 15 - pp. 84, 85 (The date given is 9-2-1728), 'Grant Duff' - I (1921) p. 374. Bajirao I & Maratha Expansion (1944) ; pp. 32, 33.
(19) 'The Cambridge Hist. Vol. IV ; p. 351, 'A Hist. of Gujarat' , Vol. II, p. 430.
(20) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 205, 'A Hist of Gujarat' Vol. II p. 430.
(21) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 205.
(22) Relevant extract from the Maharaja's letter, dated 10th November 1730 A.D. - from 'Gloriess of Marwar' , pp. 144 to 148.
(23) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 135.
(24) S.P.D. 12-39, Letter of Chimaji to Bajirao in which the former consented to the settlement of Gujarat, proposed by Shahu.
(25) S.P.D. 14-32, Letter of Purandare to Bajirao, which reveals the jelousy felt by Fattesing Bhosale (& the Pratinidhi) who complains, "Rajashri Pradhan Pant is engaged in military exploits and therefore his name is renowned, also he has a (big) army. We have been sitting idle at home and hence have no connection with the army and thus have been disabled from every point of view."
(26) S.P.D. 10-27, 61, 65, 67 to 70, 72 to 76, S.P.D. 12-44.
(27) S.P.D. 10-72.
(28) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 251.
(29)Â S.P.D. 17-12, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 137.
(30) (A) Dr. V. G. Dighe, in his unrestrained remarks over Shahu (Peshwa Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion; pp. 33 to 35) states that "the weak and vacillating monarch who had risen to authority by the prowess of others, was incapable to pacify his warring chiefs, the more so, as he was specially indebted to Bajjirao and his father for his exalted position not hence could wield but nominal control over his activities. " (B) Writes Sardesai, "When he (Trimbakrao) found that Shahu was too soft to control Bajirao effectively, he began open preparations for an armed conflict," (New Hist. Vol. II, p. 123). These remarks save Trimbakrao from much of the blame; his treacherous conduct deserves, and places it on the powerful Peshwa who could not be controlled by the Chhatrapati as per the above remarks. But this is nothing but injustice to both the Chhatrapati and his Peshwa.
(31) S.P.D. 12-33, 39.
(32) Ibid, 35.
(33) S.P.D. 10-72.
(34) S.P.D. 30-p. 229.
(35) S.P.D. 12-42.
(36) S.P.D. 10-75
(37) S.P.D. 12-35, 42.
(38) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 139.
(39) S.P.D. 10-75.
(40) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 138.
(41) 'Later Mughals' , Vol. II, p. 251, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 139.
(42) New Hist. Vol. II, p. 139
(43) 'Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, pp. 438.
(44) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 140.
(45) S.P.D. 12-27.
(46) "What makes the action greater is that Chimaji (Bajirao) had but 15,000 or 16,000 horse and the joint force of Pilaji and Kanthaji are said to have been upwards 50,000." A letter from Daniel innes at Canebay to the Chief of the factory of Surat dated 7th April 1731, quoted in "A Hist. of Gujarat" Vol. II, p. 140.
(47) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 140, 'Kincaid and Parasnis' p. 229.
(48)Â S.P.D. 12-46, Bajirao's letter of his victory to Krishnaji Kadam of 2nd of April 1731 A.D.
(49) :"A Hist. of Gujarat" Vol. II, p. 443.
(50) 'New Hist'. Vol. II, pp. 142 and 143.
(51)Â Relevant extracts from Abhaysing's letter to his envoy at Delhi dated 10th April 1731 A.D.
(52) The Nizam was conscious of the opposition of Abhaysing to his policies. He wrote to the Emperor. "If Maharaja Abhaysing does not give protection to Bajirao and abstains from treacherous collusion, your servant (Nizam) by the help of Almighty will be able to destroy and capture. If Abhaysing acts in accordance with your Orders and undertakes to chastise the enemy in his province, the faction of Bajirao will be dispersed and he will be absolutely ruined." Citecd from - 'The porceedings of the Indian Hist. Congress' 1938, p. 617.
(53) Abhaysing wrote to his agent at Delhi from Ahmadabad, dated 10th of April, in which he has stated that, relying on the words and commands of the Maharaja (Abhaysing) he has served the Emperor whole-heartedly in the battle against Trimbakrao and others. But the Nizam-ul-Mulk has recently sent him the original ordersof the Emperor, communicated to him (Nizam) , to Bangesh and to us (Abhaysing) and informed him that while such are the orders of the Emperor, he is weakening the side of the invaders by fighting against his own men. On whose assurance is the doing all this? The Emperor has already ordered for his capture and punishment. This information has dishearted him. Though he was already getting such news from different sources, we retained him by giving assurances. At present after reading the original letters, he is perplexed and relies more on the news and intends to leave us. We had already written to the Nawab (Khan Dauran) to send a 'Farman' , but the same has not been yet received. Therefore arrange immediately to dispatch the 'Faman' etc., as was stated in our previous letter".'Glories of Marwad', pp. 162 to 164. But the good relations continued, for e.g. a letter dated 13th October 1731 A.D. (Baroda Vol. I) states that "It is essential for the Peshwa to maintain the friendly relations with Rajashri Abhaysing and hence Rajashri Yashwantrao Dabhade Senapati, Pilaji Gayakwad and Kadam Bande he informed not to molest Gujarat." It seems that after the treacherous murder of Pilaji by Abhaysing, it was impossible for Bajirao to continue the friendly relations with him.
(54) M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 62.
(55) As per S.P.D. 14-2, dated 16-3-1732 A.D. Malharrao and Ranoji had been to Gujarat, captured Champaner, provided Pavgadh and then went to Malwa.
(56) The Maharaja wrote, "All the Southern people have been hostile to us and we have left no stone untured to serve the Emperor. We have captured 24 fortressesâ¦the rest of the possessions of the enemy will be speedily takneâ¦by the grace of God the enemy does not stay within 50 miles of usâ¦." Again, "we have conquered the forts of Badoda and Jambusar and the siege of the fort of Dabhoi is in progress" - 'Glories of Marwad'.
(57) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 446.
(58) S.P.D. 14-1.
(59) M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 80.
(60) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, pp. 459 to 465, 'Glories of Marwad' pp. XLV-XLVIL.
(61) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 457. 'Glories of Marwad' Maharaja's letter p. XLIV.Â
(62) His appointment as Subhadar of Gujarat, was to detach him from the Turani party - 'later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 205.
(63) 'New Hist'. Vol. II, p. 140.
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(I) Gujarat During 1720 A.D. To 1725 A.D.
Khanderao Dabhade was appointed âSenapatiâ (1) by Chhatraati Shahu on 11th of January 1717 A.D., and was assigned the province of Gujarat and parts of Khandesh as the sphere of his activities. Kanthaji Kadam Bande, Damaji Gayakwad, his nephew Pilaji Gayakwad (from 1719 A.D.onwards) were his famous commanders, who established by almost annual incursions into Gujarat, the Maratha claim to âChauthâ of Gujarat. But it was the civil war for a year (1724 â25 A.D.), waged in defiance of the commands of the Central Government, by the Nizamâs deputy Himid Khan, that really helped them to exact âChauthâ from all the paraganas North (2) of the Mahi river.
The fall of Sayyad brothers was an act of great consequences that affected the Mughal administration in Malwa and Gujarat particularly. Nizam-ul-Mulk, the prime actor behind the plot, naturally became the Wazir of Delhi (February 1722). He replaced Ajitsing Rathod, the Subhadar of Gujarat, being the nominee of the Sayyads, by Haidarkuli Khan and asked him to depart to his province without loss of time. But not long after wards, he himself assumed the Subhadarship of Gujarat by dimissing Haidarkuli Khan and appointed his uncle Hamid Khan to act as the deputy Subhadar of Gujarat (February 1723 A.D.)
But events followed too rapidly. The ambitious Nizam himself rebelled against the Emperor and established an independent Kingdom in Deccan after the battle of Sakhar-Kherda (30th September 1724 A.D.) (4) As a result, the Emperor deprived Him of his provinces of Malwa and Gujarat. In Gujarat, Sarbulad Khan Mubariz-ul-Mulk was appointed as Subhadar in his place. With this appointment, the above-mentioned civil war started in Gujarat.
Instigated by the Nizam, Hamid Khan (5), who represented him in Gujarat, defeated and killed Shujat Khan (17th December 1724 A.D.) the deputy of Sarbuland Khan near Ahmedabad, seeking the help of Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gayakwad. A second attempt, by the brother of Shujat Khan, also met with the same fate. Thus two armies were defeated within a short period of less than three months with the help of Marathas, who naturally profited thereby.
Realizing the gravity of danger from the Turani faction led by Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Emperor asked Sarbuland Khan to depart to his province in person. Hamid Khan at last became powerless, with the coming of Sarbuland Khan (6) in Gujarat in December 1725 A.D., but as legacy, he had left the Marathas powerful in Gujarat. It was impossible for even Sarbuland Khan, to continue the struggle with the numerous Marathas for a longer time with all his resources. He, in 1726 A.D. came, to terms with Kanthaji (7) and agreed of the river Mahi, with the exception of the Capital and Haveli paragana.
(ii)The Peshwa Enters the Politics of Gujarat :
A new addition to the complicated situation of Gujarat was made when Peshwa Bajirao invaded Gujarat in early 1725 A.D. (8) to secure the right of âChauthâ for himslef. Hereafter, the encroachment of the Peshwa through his brother Chimaji Appa and his Sardars continued (9) vigorously. In 1726 A.D., Udaji Pawar entered Gujarat from Dhar in Malwa, and tried to snatch Dabhoi (10) from Pilaji and Kanthaji, but failed. Never-the-less Peshwaâs hold on Gujarat was sufficiently established (11). In 1727 A.D. Chimaji Appa, entering Gujarat, penetrated as far as Dholke, within 25 miles of Ahmedabad. He sent his representatives to the viceroy to negotiate about the âChauthâ but for various reasons, the terms could not be settled (12).
At the end of 1729 A.D., Chimaji again entered Gujarat with a considerable force. Laying siege to the hill fort of Pavgadh in January 1730 A.D. (13), he captured it in the first week of February 1730 A.D. Some of his halts in this expedition (1729 â30 A.D.) were â Nadiyad, Dhawalake, Viramgaon, Godai, Bichwa, Sabarmati, Tarapur and Petlad (14). In May 1730 A.D., but due to the opposition of the Khanâs Counsellers, it could not (15) take place. By the end of 1729 A.D., Peshwaâs hold on Gujarat was considerable (16).
(iii)Treaty of Sarbuland Khan with the Peshwa. (1730 A.D.)
With no help from Delhi, as the monthly subsidy of three lakhs of rupees for the maintenance of his troops had been cut off, (17) the powerful army of 1725 A.D., had mostly been dispersed. Having left no resources to carry on the administration and the struggle with the Marathas, and espeically as the activities of Kanthaji and Pilaji had been supplemented by the Peshwaâs troops under Chimaji, Sarbuland Khan had no other remedy but to enter into a formal treaty (18) with the Peshwa on 23rd March 1730 A.D.
Meanwhile new changes had taken place at Delhi. To break the Turanian faction, Kamruddin Khan had been dismissed from his post, and Khan-Dauran had succeeded (19) him as Wazir. The new Wazir refused to recognize the treaty effected by Sarbuland Khan with the Peshwa granting him âChauthâ and âSardeshmukhiâ of Gujarat, and relieving him of his office appointed Abhaysing, the Maharaja of Jodhpur, in his place as he believed that the great Hindu Rajas were the proper person (20) who could effectively confront the onrush of the Marathas.
(iv) Maharaja Abhaysing Appointed as Subhadar of Gujarat :
Maharaja Abhaysing was the third ruler of Rathod dynasty to hold this imperial office. He was granted eighteen lakhs (21) of rupees from the royal treasury for his expenses. Leaving Delhi, he reached his own Capital Jodhpur and enlisted 20,000 well-trained Rathod cavalry from Marwad and Nagor. His total army consisted of 30,000 horses and 10,000 foot and his military expenses came to seven lakhs of rupees per month. With this army and accompanied by his brother Bakhtsing, and his minister Ratansing Bhandari, he advanced towards Gujarat. When the new of his arrival at Jalor reached Sarbuland Khan at Ahmedabad he prepared to resist him. A sharp battle took place between the two sides, opposite the Capital, in which Sarbuland Khan was defeated. But by the intercession of friends, a reconciliation was effected and the ex-Viceroy left the Capital on receiving from his successor a lakh of rupees for the expenses of his journey.
(v) Decline of the Mughal Rule in Gujarat :
On the departure of Sarbuland Khan, Abhaysing applied himslef to the ardous task of driving the Marathas from Gujarat. His own letter (22) to his agent Bhandari Amarsing and Purohit Vardhaman, at Delhi reveal the true picture of the devastated conditions prevailing then in Gujarat.
âNothing is left out of the Kharip crop. Nawab (Sarbuland Khan) has squeezed every pie of the income, whether it was given willingly or under pressure. As regards the income from customers, it can only be realized when the trade flourishes and that can only be collected when people will re-inhabit their homesâ¦the Nawab (Khan Dauran) is fully aware of the forces kept here and the expenditure required, while the Emperor provided us in all 15 lakhs of rupees, 40 guns, 200 maunds of gun-powder and 100 mounds of leadâ¦A person like Sarbuland Khan was the Governor of this place, who, inspite of receiving a crore of rupees as well as a large amount of military assistance from the Emperor, sat idle in the city while the enemy devastated the province, and he dared not come out, but being overpowered, and he dared not come out, but being overpowered paid âChauthâ. This shows the strength of the enemy ! They are not even satisfied by the levy of âChauthâ, but Badoda, Dabhoi, Jambusar etc., yielding a revenue of 30 lacs, have also passed under their control. Surat including 28 districts is under the away of Pilu and any remittance of their revenue depends upon his sweet-will.
Pavagadh is held by Chimana (Chimaji Appa) and the fort of Champaner is under the possession of Kantha (Kanthaji Kadam Bande). They pretend to be lords of the land, and collect âChauth, âDeshmukhiâ , âPeshkashiâ and administer some of the places also. Such is their audacity.. the enemy, if not fully crused, will again raise his head. This is the reason why we have to keep a force at an approximate cost of Rs. 5,00,000 per month and accordingly will require 40 lakhs of rupees for the coming period of 8 months. In Gujarat, the winter crop has been damaged, and the condition of the crop of rainy season has already been narrated. A dispute sbout the âChauthâ between Kantha and Chimaji is going on, hence they both will returen here.â
(vi) Peshwa â Dabhade Rivalry in Gujarat :
Khanderao Dabhade, who had retired from active service from about 1723 A.D., and his son Trimbakrao, who had been already exercising his fatherâs powers, was invested with Senapatiâs dignity on January 9, 1730 A.D. Gujarat (23) and parts of Khandesh had been assigned by the Chhatrapati, as the special sphere of activity of the Dabhades. It was they, who had taken the foremost part in the conquest of Gujarat. Their lieutenants Bandes and Gayakwads had established the right to collect âChauthâ to the North and South of âmahiâ , since the days of Hamid Khan (1725 A.D.).
Naturally Trimbakrao resented Peshwaâs interferance and the agreement between Chimaji Appa and Sarbuland Khan concluded on 23rd March 1730 A.D. His stand that the Peshwa should restrict himself to Malwa, which was assigned to him by the Chhatrapati, was based on justice. Had he insisted upon this point with the Chhatrapati, there is no reason to doubt, that the Chhatrapati would not have listened to his arguments (24). But, instead, he preferred to settle the issue, taking recourse to armed conflict, and for that entered into negotiations with the Nizam. The fact was, that the Peshwaâs interference had provided only on outward cause for the Dabhade-Peshwa conflict, which infact had been aflamed due to the personal jealousy (25) felt by Trimbakrao and many other Maratha Chiefs for the enterprising Peshwa who had forced all of them into secondary position by raising his own armies and bravely leading them against the enemies of the Marathas from success to success
(vii) The Nizam-Dabhade Combination :
Smarting under the humiliating defeat at Palkhed (28th February 1728 A.D.) the Nizam had since then regarded Bajirao as a dangerous rival (26) to his policies of consolidating Muslim rule in Deccan. Such dissensions among the chief Sardars of Shahu were a gift from heaven and as such were eagerly welcomed and encouraged by him. Thus once having got the opportunity to thrust his had into Marathaâs internal politics, the Nizam never slackened his hold but determined to utilize the opportunity to fulfill his cherished ambition of making himself the supreme authority not only in Deccan but in Malwa and Gujarat as well, by removing Bajirao from his exhaled position in Maratha politics.
With perfect diplomacy and patience of a shrewd politician the Nizam labored over the plan. Many prominent Maratha Sardars who had their personal grievances against the Peshwa, were seduced through assurances that suited the occasion. Thus besides Dabhades, the Pawars, the Bandes, the Gayakwads and many other Maratha Chiefs joined him against the Peshwa in the common front.
The Peshwa was well informed of these activites, for example in one of his reports in November 1730 A.D. writes the Peshwaâs agent to him, (27) âKanthaji, Udoji and Kanhoji are freequent visitors here and are being seduced by Anandrao Sumant who has assured the Nizam that the King Shahu would not be sorry at all if Bajirao is put down and that not a dog would bark at such a result.â He further stated, â Dabhade and Bande have wirtten to Nizam asking for assurance for shelterâ¦They contemplate making Sambhaji the Chhatrapti, Dabhade his Senapati and Kanthaji Bande his Sarlshkar⦠upon which the Nawab (Nizam-ul-Mulk) declared that such a chance has been presented to us without our asking, which of the two, Shahu or Sambhaji loses, is immaterial, one opponent will be less for us. Therefore we wonât reject the proposal.â
To ensure the success of these ambitious designs the Nizam left no stone unturned and by way of strngthening his position arranged a meeting (28) on Narmada, with Muhammad Khan Bangash who had been recently as Subhadar in Malwa, to enlist his co-operation in the coming enterprise.
Had the Peshwa hesitated in striking the blow at the most appropriate time, in all probability, this combination would have been fatal to the rising Maratha-Raj and as such Trimbakrao and his Maratha associates were playing with nothing but fire. Even though, initially truth was on his side, Trimbakrao had forfeited his claims to justice having placed personal jealousies above his duties to State. Shahuâs letter of strong remonstrance to him in which he wrote, âYou have been a loyal Hindu servant of the State and as such we have all along dealt with you most kindly. You have nevertheless deserted us, to side with the enemy, taking offence at something we are not aware of. You must know what fate traitors meet with. We urge you, therefore, to forget all wrongs and to remember how your ancestors behaved and served the State, instead of the enemy, so that the nation may be proud of your conductâ¦.you have to subdue the nationâs enemies and not to join them. You must work to extend the Maratah-raj. This warning is addressed to you in full confidence that you will remain a loyal servant of the State and not molest the poor, innocent rayats.â
The fact is that Shahu was all the while trying to settle (30) the issue amicably. At a time he thought of issuing âSanadâ in favour of Dabhade by paying some cash to the Peshwa so that he should cease to interfere in Gujarat. When (31) asked by Bajirao, Chimaji consented to such an arrangement but insisted that Dabhadeâs claims should be removed by the Chhatrapati if he joined the Nizam. Shahu sent special messengers (32) and in the long in league with the Nizam and in one of his letters through Gayas Khan (33) (1st November 1730 A.D. ) he had urged the Nizam thus, âwe do not demand any thing from you except your support, on which we shall destroy Pradhan Pant giving him a battle. If he succeeds, grant us a Jagir and Mansab. It we are successful, in that we are destroying the kingdom of Shahu declaring that it is the king who is instigating us to fight with the Peshwa. After the kingdom of Shahu is destroyed, Sambhaji should be placed on the throne and Trimbakrao and Kanthaji be made Senapati and Sarlashkar respectively. In it the fame of the Nawab (Nizam) would be enhancedâ¦â Shahu (34) seems to be ignorant of these dangerous designs of Trimbakrao, for had he known them, it is impossible to believe that he would have cancelled the Mokasa of half of Gujarat assigned by him to Chimaji and transferred it to Trimbakrao on 15th December 1730 A.D. only a fortnight before the battle of Dabhoi.
Shahuâs letter produced little effect on Trimbakrao. He was uncompromising (35) and was not prepared to lose even a village of his territory. The Nizam (36) had already left Aurangabad to follow Bajirao. Dabhade had assembled a force of 10 thousand at Talegaon and was to follow him soon. In fact he had gone too far in his plans to destroy Bajirao, to listen to any suggestion of Shahu or Bajirao. It is no wonder, hence, that the efforts of Chhatrapati Shahu to bring Dabhade in his presence at Satara met with little success (37) (December 1730 A.D.).
Bajirao could not be deaf to the reports that poured upon him from his agents about the gathering of the clouds against him and did not deem it wise to wait till they got time to burst upon him.
Along with Chimaji he marched towards Khandesh leaving Poona on 10th October 1730 A.D. Leaving Chimaji (38) to watch the movements of the Nizam in Khandesh, Bajirao proceeded to Badoda (December 1730 A.D.) . Chimaji soon joined him, having made sure that the Nizam, who had proceeded to meet Bangash, would probably bring large forces including those of Bangash to help Dabhade.
Towards the end of November 1730 A.D., (39) the Nizam started from Aurangabad to meet Bangesh on Narmada. He Informed Dabhade not to engage with Bajirao rashly until a fully concerted plan was arranged between them all (40). The meeting took place on Narmada (41) at Akbarpur ferry near the fort of Mandavgadh from 17th to 28th of March 1731. Bajiraoâs success to a greater extent depended on keeping himself fully informed of the enemies movements and hence he had posted Malharrao Holkar in the vicinity of Narmada.
Malharrao harassed the Bangash during the said conference and at the same time sent vital information to his master in Gujarat from time to time (42).
(viii) The Role of Abhaysing in the Conflict :
On his arrival near Badoda, Bajirao wrote a letter to Maharaja Abhaysing (43), who deputed the faujdar of Bhadoch to meet him on the Mahi. Thereafter the Peshwa and his brother advanced to Ahmadabad and encamped at the Chandola tank. Negotiations were carried on through Ratansing Bhandari. A meeting took place at Shahi-Bag between Bajirao and Abhaysing when terms of agreement were settled. (February 1731 A.D.). The Maharaja agreed to pay 13 lakhs of rupees in lieu of âChauthâ of Gujarat, 6 lakhs of which were paid down immediately and the remaining amount was to be paid after Kanthji and Pilaji (44) were expelled from Gujarat.
As per the agreement (45) a body of Rajputs joined Bajirao to secure Badoda from Pilaji. The combined army laid siege to Badoda fort, which was ably defended by the Gayakwadâs general. But the Peshwa could not remain there for a longer time and had to raise the siege on receiving the grave news of the arrival of the Nizam on the Narmada with his army, intending to march into Gujarat.
The Senapati with the help of Kanthaji, Pilaji and Udaji had collected an army of about 40,000 men including the Nizamâs (46) contingent of about 5,000 under Muhammad Yar Khan and Kuwar Bahadur, on the plain of Dabhoi and Bilapur. Bajirao sent his repeated messages (47) from Savli to Dabhade to proceed to Satara and have the dispute settled amicably in the presence of Chhatrapati, reminding him that it was not proper that the two prominent Servants of the king should engage in a personal contest. But Trimbakrao was in no mood to listen to such proposals. Probably he was waiting for the definite instructions from the Nizam as to the time of his action. In fact the Nizam and the Bangash needed sometime more before they were to unite their forces with those of their Maratha allies. But It would have been a dangerous folly on the part of Bajirao had he waited more. The Peshwa was too foresighted and too quick in his action to give the Nizam and his allies enough time to mature their plans. As Trimbakrao had refused his overtures of peace, the Peshwa fell upon him with a comparatively smaller force of about 20,000 horse at the village of Bhilapur, between Badoda and Dabhoi on 1st of April 1731 A.D. Dabhade fought with determination and courage, but a chance shot, probably from his maternal uncle killed him instantly. There upon his troops broke and fled, which completed the victory of the Peshwa in this civil struggle. He wrote thus about the victory to his Guru Brahmendra Swami. âDabhade with his allies came forward for an encounter on 4th Shavval. Trimbakrao himself, Jiwaji Dabhade, Maloji Pawar and Pilaji Gayakwadâs son Sabhaji were killed outright. Udaji Pawar and Chimmaji Damodhar were captured. Pilaji Gayakwad and Kuvar Bahadur escaped wounded. A large booty was secured. Out side too lost a few brave ones in the battle (48).
Before Nizam could render any help to Dabhade, Bajirao had disposed him of. He did not wait a moment after the battle but returned with all haste to Satara. On the way, he had a brush with a party of Nizamâs troops near Kador. After receiving
The news of Peshwaâs victory, the Nizam had advanced from Nandurabar upto the neighbourhood of Surat and attacked the retiring army under Bajirao, capturing some of its baggage (49). The Nizam boasts of this victory in the following way:
Asaf Jah to Abdul Nabi Khan (50) â April 1731 A.D., âImmediately on hearing rumours of the approach of the Islamic army by way of All Mohan, (the enemy) in utter bewilderment quickly crossed the Narmada and entered the limits of Deccan.
Therefore, this follower of Mustafaâs from the ford of Akbarpur, near the fort of Mandu, sent off his baggage and camp with the big guns to Burhanpur, and with great rapidity arrived at Nandurbar, and reached the environs of Surat in a few days. We surprised the Marathas when they were sleeping in great negligence and ignorance of our whereabouts and they fied away in utmost disorder. The dead were countless. Out troups made spoil of their property and the wretches suffered total losses.
The Subha of Gujarat has been freed from the disturbance created by Bajirao and the Subha of Malwa too has remained safe from that wretcheâs mischief making, and the holy port (of Surat) has been saved from falling into the cloches of the villain.â
It is to be noted that the Nizam does not make any mention of the Victory of Gujarat, on the contrary he speaks of Gujarat being, âunoccupied by defenders.â He boasts of having saved Gujarat, Malwa as well and the port of Surat from falling into the hands of the Marathas. His pretensions over Malwa and Gujarat are quite obvious from the above letter. He very conveniently connives at the great victory of Bajirao over Dabhade and puts it as if Bajirao fled from Badoda on hearing the approach of the muslim army.
Let us see the version of Abhaysing (51) about the victory of Bajirao over Dabhade. âThere was fight between the armies of Trimbakrao Dabhade and those of Bajirao and ours. Trimbakrao, Mughal Mominyar Khan the commander of Nizamâs army, and Mula Pawar were killed. Pawar Uda, Chimma (Chimanaji Damodhar) and Pandit of the side of the Nizam and Piluâs son were captured, and we were victories. You must have imparted these news to the Nawab (khan Dauran).
Pilu, Kantha, Anandrao and others have fled with their armies. Pilu fled to Dabhoi and his brother is at Barods. We have dispatched our armies to both these places and hope to get them vacated soon. As Kantha had fled to Nizam-ul-Mulk, you should ask the Nawab to inform the Emperor and get his orders issued to Nizam with a strict warning, that he should comply with the commands of the âDarbarâ (Maharaja) and should not give shelter to Kantha, Pilu and others.
The army of the Nizam too is destroyed and if he comes again to this place to avenge himself, there will be a battle with him.
This time Bajirao has rendered meritorious services to the Emperor. So a robe of honour, a âFarmanâ and an elephant should be bestowed upon him as well as Raja Shahu and a robe of honour on Chimna. Further, after explaining everything to the Nawab, also arrange for the bestowal of a âMansabâ.
Sometime back we wrote about the case of Bajirao, but owing to the verbal or written misrepresentations, the Nawab could not grasp the reality and has informed to Emperor that Bajirao, only being afraid of Trimbakrao, has joined us in this way, and therefore he could not help us in any biggest task. These days there was a large concentration of the forces of the enemy, and both the armies arrived here. When we failed to see any provision being made by adverse result, it was we who would be blamed for it, as no one would say that the Nawab did not do any thing in the matter. In these circumstances we tried hard to bring Bajirao to the side of the Emperor, and giving him every assurance dispatched him with our forces equipped with strong artillary to punish Kantha, Pilu and others. We have thus created a split among them and managed to crush the rising.
We thought that the Nawab would appreciate our action but instead of that he has written to us to punish Bajirao, drive him away and give him no help what-so-ever. It appears that the Nawab has written to us at the instigation of the Nizam. Is it fair that the Nawab should act on the advice of others when the task has been entrusted to us? Only consider that though kantha and Pilu had been usurping the land of Gujarat for the last eight years, he (Khan Dauran) favours them and gives no weight to winning Bajirao over to the side of the Emperor. Tell all these facts to the Nawab plainly and inform that we have done all this with full faith in him. But it he does not care, we are not prepared to keep this province. What advantage can one have in Gujarat these days? On the contrary though we have to bear all the expenses from the revenue of Marwad, he has neither done anything for our own jagir or for that of Rajadhiraj (Baktsing).
Recently the enemy threatened us again and therefore we managed the affair in this way. He writes to Nizam to punish Bajirao, while we brought him whole-heartedly to our side and sent him to punish the Nizam. It appears that though the Nizam wants to create misunderstanding between the Nawab, and us yet he has no courage to advance. Had he come forward, he would have been punished, and further if he thinks of advancing against us, he shall be punished.â
Top and side lines in Maharajaâs own hand writing: âMay Almighty always protect us. By the grace of God we have achieved victory. The helping force of the Nizam-ul-Mulk, which too was with the enemy has also been destroyed. But Bajirao has not been favoured with thanks and assuance for his help. If the Nizam himself comes here, we are prepared to deal with him. Also arrange to remit money soon. Here there is no source of income, and therefore, inform the Nawab and arrange to send money without fail, we belong to the Rajput race and therefore believe that whatever the Almighty desires will happens, but the Emperor will lose the province.
As Abhaysing puts it, there was no source of income for the viceroy in Gujarat. He could not continue for a long his expenses in Gujarat at the cost of revenue of Marwad. Money was the necessity without which hs was unable, âto manage the affaris of the province even for a single day.â The Maratha menace to Gujarat as Abhaysing puts it correctly, had been in existance for the past eight years i.e. from 1722 A.D. Even Sarbuland Khan was unsuccessful to face the Maratha tide. Confronted with great concentration of Maratha troops in combination with the Nizam, Abhaysing had no other means to save the province ghand to enter into an alliance with Bajirao, who had been won over to the Emperorâs side and was supplied with artillary and troops to face the enemy. But his diplomacy was not appreciated by the Nawab Khan Dauran, far from it, he had written to punish Bajirao. Abhaysing felt that it was not fair for him to write in that way. He strongly recommanded due recognition for the meritorious services rendered by Bajirao and even a âMansabâ also. Finally he wrote that if his polices were not accepted, he was not prepared to keep the province for himself.
Even though Abhaysing was conscious of the fact that by winning over Bajirao to his side, he had created a split among the Marathas, his joy over the success of Bajirao seems to be more unrest than what is warranted of a shrewd and practical diplomat. In fact, it was not he who had won over Bajirao against Dabhade, but it was due to the common interest that they both and come together. But there was something more. Even though he was not a through observer of the Maratha internal politics like the Nizam, the sense of self interest must have warned him that in the success of the Nizam Dabhade combination against Bajirao, lay a dangerous threat to his existence in Gujarat. Hence Bajiraoâs men were his men and his victory was âOur Victoryâ. His choice of the party of Bajirao was not accident. Since Ajitsing, the House of Rathod belonged to anti-Turanian group and even then Abhaysing was a partisan of Khan Dauran and as such was naturally opposed to the politicizes of Nizam whose pretensions to Gujarat under any form were jealously resented by him (52).
(ix) After Dabholi :
Being doubtful about the policy of the Emperor (53) and as per the agreement (54) with the Chhatrapati Shahu, Bajirao here after did not personally (55) interfere in the polities of Gujarat and hence Abhaysingâs alliance with the Peshwa was short-lived. But, nevertheless, it had not been barren of fruits. In main, it had put down the ambitious plans of the Nizam, which if successful, could have stirred the political atmosphere not only of Deccan but also of the whole Hindusthan. The success of the Nizam would have up set the chance of Rajput dominance as they had then, in the politics of Delhi.
After his defeat at Dabhoi at the hands of Bajirao, the reputation of Pilaji Gayakwad, suffered considerably. Nevertheless, by his hold of Songadh fort and his recent acquisitions of Badoda and the fortress of Dabhoi, he had made himself still more formidable. However, Abhaysing was determined to secure the territory lost to the Marathas. With little resources left in Gujarat, the task was beyond his power to perform. Fully realizing this, Abhaysing thought to take recourse to baser methods and managed Pilaji to be assassinated at Dakor, on 14th of April, 1732 A.D.
With satisfaction the Maharaja wrote to Amarsing Bhandari, his Vakil at Delhi, in a letter dated 26th March 1732, âBy the grace of Goddess, Pilu has been killedâ. The reason was âwithout dong away with him, we cannot take Badoda, as he would never fight a pitched battleâ. As per the details given in the letter, a contingent of two thousand selected cavalry, was specially despatched to fall upon the camp, after the treachery was successful. Pancholi Ramanand, Bhandari, Ajabsing and Inda Lakhdhir entered into negotiations with Pilaji at Dakor, the famous place of Hindu pilgrimage and when the latter had little suspicions of any foul act, affected his murder. At once, the two thousands Rathod horse fell upon the confused Maratha camp two hours after the dark. Pilajiâs brother, along with five to seven persons of note, were killed, Five hundred Marathas fell on the spot and a great amount of botty was taken, including 700 horses and a large number of heavy fire locks. The Maharaja then marched to Badoda, which was abandoned by the Marathas in confusion.
Occupying Badoda, the Maharaja laid siege to Debhoi where the Marathas had retired. But owing to the unseasonable rains he failed to capture it and subsequently retired to Ahemadabad (1732 A.D)
But by now the Marathas (56) had fully recovered from the shock. The Kolis, Bills, Waghris and other wild tribes enraged at the murder of Pilaji rose every where against the viceroy, Pilajiâs brother, Mahadaji, marched from Jambusar on Badoda and took it by storm. In 1733 A.D, Umabai Dabhade (57), widow of the Senapati Khanderao, accomapnied by Kanthji Kadam Bande and Pilajiâs able son Damaji Gayakwad, with an army of 30,000 troups approached Ahmadabad to avenge the death of Pilaji. The threatening Marathas encamped at the Shahwadi about three miles from the Jamalpur gate of Ahmadabad. Being impossible to face them, the Maharaja was foreced to pay a ransom of 80,000 rupees over and above the âChauthâ and âSardeshmukhiâ of the province (58).
Shortly after this, the Maharaja left Ahmedabad for Jodhapur leaving Ratansing Bhandari as the deputy Subhadar of Gujarat and hence during 1733 A.D to 1736 A.D his contact with the Marathas in Gujarat was through his deputy who tried to oppose them in vain.
By 1736 A.D, the Maratha hold on Gujarat was nearly complete except for the capital Ahemadabad and the seaports bhadoch. Surat and Cambay. In 1736 A.D, the Emperor appointed Momin Khan as the Successor to Maharaja Abhaysing as Subhadar of Gujarat.
The deputy Subhadar informed Abhaysing about the âFarmanâ received by Momin Khan and about his intended march to the capital with the help of the Marathas. Taking offence at his supersession, the Maharaja left the Court. As Ratnsing refused to surrender Ahemadabad, as per the orders of his master, Momin Khan and his Maratha ally Rangoji (59), the agent of Pilaji Gayakwad, laid siege to Ahemadabad. From the end of August 1736 A.D to the end of May 1737 A.D, for nine months. Ratansing with considerable capacity and resource-fulness, defended Ahmadabad against the combined strength of the enemy. But during this trying period, the Maharaja failed to send him any help in men or money. At last for lack of provisions, the Bhandari and his Rajputs abandoned the defence and left for Marawad (60) on 25th of May 1737 A.D
(x) The Relations of Abhaysing with the Marathas from 1733 A.D Onwards
Maharaja left Gujarat in 1733 A.D and went back to Jodhpur because that was the only honourable way left for him. Owing to the constant Maratha raids, the revenue of the province had dwindled and a horrible famine which ravaged the land made the economic condition all the more pitiable (61) and yet the Imperial Court did not send the expected help in men and money, even on repeated demands. Under such circumstances, the Maharaja was convinced, as he had previously written, that the province was lost to the Emperor. Hence he left his deputy to look after Gujarat affairs, as far as it was possible and returned to Jodhpur having left all interest in the defence of the Mughal Empire hereafter.
In 1734 A.D he attended the assembly of the Rajput Chiefs at Hurda along with the rulers of Jaypur, Udaypur, Kota, Bikaner and Kishangadh. All signed a pact of mutual assistance. But the pact could be of little use in prevalence of mutual jealousies among the Chiefs.
Inspite of the foul murder of Pilaji at his instance in 1732 A.D, Abhaysing was not opposed in general to Maratha cause from the point of view of his policy. He blonged to the party of Khan Dauran and hence was much more inclined (62) towards them. His moral support to Bajirao in 1731 A.D, against the combination of Kanderao Dabhade and the Nizam was definitely of consequences (63). Later on also, his participation in the campaigns against Bajirao during 1734 A.D to 1736 A.D was only nominal.
But his influence with Khan Dauran dwindled by degrees as the threats of the Marathas to the security of the Mughal Empire increased in seriousness since 1736 A.D In the longrun, Khan Dauran was disillusioned in his high opinion about the Rajput Rajas that their appointment to the Subhas of Malwas and Gujarat would effectively check the tide of Maratha aggression. With the attack of Bajirao on Delhi, the idea to call Nizam for the defence of the Empire got root, even Khan Dauran sided with it, and with the coming of the Nizam at Delhi in 1737 A.D, Abhaysing nearly lost all his interest in Delhi Politics.
He died in 1749 A.D and was definitely a strong Hindu minded ruler like his illustrious father Ajitsing.
Foot Notes (Description)
(1)Â 'New Hist.' Vol. II pp. 134 and 135.
(2) 'History of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 413.
(3) 'Munt Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 517, 518, 527.
(4) 'Munt Lubab' in E.D. Vol. VII, pp. 526.
(5) Ibid, pp, 528, 529.
(6) 'A Hist. of Gujarat', Vol. II, p. 424.
(7) Ibid, p. 426.
(8) S.P.D. 30-312 :- Bajirao's expedition into Gujarat. His comprador Baji Bhivrao was active in the territory of Khambayat in Feb. 1724 A.D. It is doubtful whether Bajirao personally invaded Gujarat this time. 'Pehswas' Shakawali' (M.I.S. Vol.II, p. 24) states that during January to March 1725 A.D., Bajirao was in Malwa, whereas in No. 312 to S.P.D. 30, it is clearly stated that Baji Bhivrao was in Gujarat along with Rajashri Pant Pradhan. ( ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(9) S.P.D. 30-p. 272 : Half of Bagad, in Gujarat, was assigned for expenses of the contigent of Gajaji Dewakate, under Chimaji, on 19th July 1724 A.D. Ibid, p. 277 : Malhar Govind was appointed 'Chitnis' to collect 'Sardeshmukhi' and 'Babti rights' in Gujarat by Chimaji. Ibid pp. 280, 281 : The day to day collection of 'Chauth' from Gujarat (along with Malwa) by Tryambak, agent of Pilaji Jadhao, Convinces the gradual hold of the Peshwa on Gujarat during 1725 - 26 A.D.)
(10) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 426.
(11) A circular order from Raja Shahu to Pilaji Gayakwad, Kanthaji Kadam and Ambaji Pant, (23-4-1726 A.D.) states that Ambak, Mutalik of the Peshwa, had settled with Sarbuland Khan for the surrender of 'Chauthai' and 'Sardeshmukhi' of Gujarat and directed them not to interfer with its payment to Chimaji and Trimbakrao Dabhade. Baroda I.
(12) "Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion" (1944 A.D.) p. 30, 'A Hist. of Gujarat'. Vol. II p. 426.
(13) S.P.D. 30 - entries on page 426.
(14) S.P.D. 30 - pp. 295, Itinerary of Chimaji Appa.
(15) S.P.D. 12-32 (The date of letter should be 22-5-1730 and not 22-5-1729 as the editor has wrongly stated, for the abvous reason that Chimaji had just returned from his Malwa expedition on 4th May 1729 A.D., (Itinerary of Chimaji Appa - Item No. 10, p. 6 of S.P.D. 22.).
Daniel Inners's letter, dated 25th March 1730 A.D., in Hist, of Gujarat, Vol. II, p. 427 reproduced from the 'Gaikwad of Baroda' 1-10 Reads as follows: - "The Ganims under Chimaji Raja, it is said, before they left Petlad, got from the town nearly two lakhs of rupees, whence they moved off Dholka way, they have pillaged the greatest part of it, the loss sustained cannot as yet be known but must be great multitudes say a crore of rupees, others more moderate, say half at least. "
Now compare this 'it is said' , with the reality : Letter from Chimaji Appa to Bajirao dated 22nd May 1730 A.D. from Pavgadh, - "We have returned from Viramgaon. Sarbuland Khan had agreed to a meeting with us when Anandrao Pawar had been there. But he did not come as his men opposed the meeting. We then went to Dhawalake Petlad. At present we art at Pavagadh. The provisions are to be made in the fort. Anandrao Pawar thinks of staying more. If we stay, the (captured) territory and the fort will be retained. But (if we decide to stay) how to feed this army is the great questions. No money has been recovered to pay off the creditors. Hence, the difficulty from both the sides. If we decide to stay, the bellies will have to be filled and if we leave, the territory is lost. Hence we are (still) here. After making due provisions, and making one or two, halts to have time to take further decision about our plan, we shall write (to you) definitely. "
Thus when the anxiety of Chimaji was how to retain the territory and at the same time feed his army, the contemporary writer Daniel Innes puts up the exacted ransom from a crore of rupees to 50 lakhs as a moderate estimate. There is hardly any need to add anything more in his respect!
(16) S.P.D. 30 - entries on pp. 293, 294. Dated 16th September 1729 A.D., reveal that along with other Mahals from Malwa, Udaji Pawar and Anandrao Pawar, were assigned a saranjam of 29 Mokasa-mahals in Gujarat.
(17) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 426.
(18) S.P.D. 15 - pp. 84, 85 (The date given is 9-2-1728), 'Grant Duff' - I (1921) p. 374. Bajirao I & Maratha Expansion (1944) ; pp. 32, 33.
(19) 'The Cambridge Hist. Vol. IV ; p. 351, 'A Hist. of Gujarat' , Vol. II, p. 430.
(20) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 205, 'A Hist of Gujarat' Vol. II p. 430.
(21) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 205.
(22) Relevant extract from the Maharaja's letter, dated 10th November 1730 A.D. - from 'Gloriess of Marwar' , pp. 144 to 148.
(23) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 135.
(24) S.P.D. 12-39, Letter of Chimaji to Bajirao in which the former consented to the settlement of Gujarat, proposed by Shahu.
(25) S.P.D. 14-32, Letter of Purandare to Bajirao, which reveals the jelousy felt by Fattesing Bhosale (& the Pratinidhi) who complains, "Rajashri Pradhan Pant is engaged in military exploits and therefore his name is renowned, also he has a (big) army. We have been sitting idle at home and hence have no connection with the army and thus have been disabled from every point of view."
(26) S.P.D. 10-27, 61, 65, 67 to 70, 72 to 76, S.P.D. 12-44.
(27) S.P.D. 10-72.
(28) 'Later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 251.
(29)Â S.P.D. 17-12, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 137.
(30) (A) Dr. V. G. Dighe, in his unrestrained remarks over Shahu (Peshwa Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion; pp. 33 to 35) states that "the weak and vacillating monarch who had risen to authority by the prowess of others, was incapable to pacify his warring chiefs, the more so, as he was specially indebted to Bajjirao and his father for his exalted position not hence could wield but nominal control over his activities. " (B) Writes Sardesai, "When he (Trimbakrao) found that Shahu was too soft to control Bajirao effectively, he began open preparations for an armed conflict," (New Hist. Vol. II, p. 123). These remarks save Trimbakrao from much of the blame; his treacherous conduct deserves, and places it on the powerful Peshwa who could not be controlled by the Chhatrapati as per the above remarks. But this is nothing but injustice to both the Chhatrapati and his Peshwa.
(31) S.P.D. 12-33, 39.
(32) Ibid, 35.
(33) S.P.D. 10-72.
(34) S.P.D. 30-p. 229.
(35) S.P.D. 12-42.
(36) S.P.D. 10-75
(37) S.P.D. 12-35, 42.
(38) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 139.
(39) S.P.D. 10-75.
(40) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 138.
(41) 'Later Mughals' , Vol. II, p. 251, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 139.
(42) New Hist. Vol. II, p. 139
(43) 'Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, pp. 438.
(44) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 140.
(45) S.P.D. 12-27.
(46) "What makes the action greater is that Chimaji (Bajirao) had but 15,000 or 16,000 horse and the joint force of Pilaji and Kanthaji are said to have been upwards 50,000." A letter from Daniel innes at Canebay to the Chief of the factory of Surat dated 7th April 1731, quoted in "A Hist. of Gujarat" Vol. II, p. 140.
(47) 'New Hist.' Vol. II, p. 140, 'Kincaid and Parasnis' p. 229.
(48)Â S.P.D. 12-46, Bajirao's letter of his victory to Krishnaji Kadam of 2nd of April 1731 A.D.
(49) :"A Hist. of Gujarat" Vol. II, p. 443.
(50) 'New Hist'. Vol. II, pp. 142 and 143.
(51)Â Relevant extracts from Abhaysing's letter to his envoy at Delhi dated 10th April 1731 A.D.
(52) The Nizam was conscious of the opposition of Abhaysing to his policies. He wrote to the Emperor. "If Maharaja Abhaysing does not give protection to Bajirao and abstains from treacherous collusion, your servant (Nizam) by the help of Almighty will be able to destroy and capture. If Abhaysing acts in accordance with your Orders and undertakes to chastise the enemy in his province, the faction of Bajirao will be dispersed and he will be absolutely ruined." Citecd from - 'The porceedings of the Indian Hist. Congress' 1938, p. 617.
(53) Abhaysing wrote to his agent at Delhi from Ahmadabad, dated 10th of April, in which he has stated that, relying on the words and commands of the Maharaja (Abhaysing) he has served the Emperor whole-heartedly in the battle against Trimbakrao and others. But the Nizam-ul-Mulk has recently sent him the original ordersof the Emperor, communicated to him (Nizam) , to Bangesh and to us (Abhaysing) and informed him that while such are the orders of the Emperor, he is weakening the side of the invaders by fighting against his own men. On whose assurance is the doing all this? The Emperor has already ordered for his capture and punishment. This information has dishearted him. Though he was already getting such news from different sources, we retained him by giving assurances. At present after reading the original letters, he is perplexed and relies more on the news and intends to leave us. We had already written to the Nawab (Khan Dauran) to send a 'Farman' , but the same has not been yet received. Therefore arrange immediately to dispatch the 'Faman' etc., as was stated in our previous letter".'Glories of Marwad', pp. 162 to 164. But the good relations continued, for e.g. a letter dated 13th October 1731 A.D. (Baroda Vol. I) states that "It is essential for the Peshwa to maintain the friendly relations with Rajashri Abhaysing and hence Rajashri Yashwantrao Dabhade Senapati, Pilaji Gayakwad and Kadam Bande he informed not to molest Gujarat." It seems that after the treacherous murder of Pilaji by Abhaysing, it was impossible for Bajirao to continue the friendly relations with him.
(54) M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 62.
(55) As per S.P.D. 14-2, dated 16-3-1732 A.D. Malharrao and Ranoji had been to Gujarat, captured Champaner, provided Pavgadh and then went to Malwa.
(56) The Maharaja wrote, "All the Southern people have been hostile to us and we have left no stone untured to serve the Emperor. We have captured 24 fortressesâ¦the rest of the possessions of the enemy will be speedily takneâ¦by the grace of God the enemy does not stay within 50 miles of usâ¦." Again, "we have conquered the forts of Badoda and Jambusar and the siege of the fort of Dabhoi is in progress" - 'Glories of Marwad'.
(57) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 446.
(58) S.P.D. 14-1.
(59) M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 80.
(60) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, pp. 459 to 465, 'Glories of Marwad' pp. XLV-XLVIL.
(61) 'A Hist. of Gujarat' Vol. II, p. 457. 'Glories of Marwad' Maharaja's letter p. XLIV.Â
(62) His appointment as Subhadar of Gujarat, was to detach him from the Turani party - 'later Mughals' Vol. II, p. 205.
(63) 'New Hist'. Vol. II, p. 140.
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