Maratha-Rajput Relations (1720-1795 A.d.)

[Bharatvarsh]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Chapter 3
MAHADAJI ENTRAPPED IN JAYPUR

(I ) Mahadaji Enters Delhi Politics :

As a result of the murder of Peshwa Narayanrao at Poona on 30th August 1773, the Marathas who had restored Shah Alam II to the throne of his ancestors, (January 1772) retired to the South. They were soon involved in a vexatious was with the English resulting out of the ambition of Raghunathrao, the uncle of the late Peshwa, that continued consuming their whole energies for seven years, till the treaty of Salbai in May 1782.

During these years Delhi was  ably administered by Najib Khan, who had gained supreme position in the Emperor’s Councils and retained it till his death on 22nd April 1782. Thus when the Marathas (and especially Mahadaji) had freed themselves from the said war, a favourable position for their re-entry in to the politics had been created at Delhi, where a scene of confusion and treachery had set in due to the quarrels amongst Mirza Shafi, Mohammad Beg Hamdani, Afrasiyab Khan and Najaf Kuli, the disciples of the late Najaf Khan.

And yet, there was another power that was equally anxious to bring Delhi under its sway and it was that of the English. They had tried to frustrate the Maratha plans in 1771 and now having been freed from the engagement with the Marathas, their diplomacy was active at Delhi where a section of the Courtiers was always favourable to them. Even the Emperor (1) was contemplating seriously to put the administration in their-hands after the murder of Mirza Shafi (23rd September 1783), having been disguested completely with the followers of Najaf Khan. Warren Hastings (2) had come to Lucknow for the same purpose with a force of thirty thousand men and had sent letters to the Kings of Jaypur, Jodhpur and Mewad and the rest. (March end 1784).

Mahadaji had already met Mirza Shafi (3) on 9th September 1782, but then he had no serious thought of entering Delhi politics before subduing his enemies on his road to Delhi. Before that he wanted to secure a firm base in Bundelkhand. But he was with suspician watching the English efforts towards Delhi. Nana Fadnis (4) was constantly urging him not to allow the English (5) to enter Delhi, for once they got hold of it, he feared that no place would be left for the Indian powers. Mahadaji had already kept contacts with Afrasiyab Khan, the successor to Mirza Shafi, through Anupgir Gosavi who was then the staunch opponent of the English and they had decided to give no quarters to the English by even controlling the Emperor. By the end of February 1784 the Rana of Gohad (6) surrendered and Mahadaji was free to meet the Emperor who had now inclined towards him as the English (7) had seduced a Prince and had kept him with them.

But Mahdaji’s embarrassing problem was money, even in 1782, before he was engaged with Gwalior and Gohad, his pressing need was thirty two lakhs of rupees. After two years of continuous campaigning and when the need to prevent the English from gaining control over Delhi arose, the situation had aggravated further. Mahadaji wrote to Nana (8), “The Monetary – difficulties here are not such as can be explained by writing. I have been continuously busy in campaigning for the last five years since I came from Deccan and hence money has been scarce. (If I take the new venture in may hand) the Emperor will have to be paid monthly for his expenses and his countries will have to be brought round by keeping them pleased, the Sikhs and the rest will have to be subdued as per the desire of the Emperor. No money can be realized here due to draught. If others are not to be allowed to enter Delhi politics, Money is the foremost requirement. If arrangements for the same are made by the Government, I shall not fail in may duties.”

But no arrangement was possible in this respect from Poona as after his treaty with the English at Manglor (11th March 1784), Tipu (9) had turned towards the  Marathas for the part they had played against him and an army needed to be despatched against him (September 1784). Mahadaji was to see the Emperor and his was a stand against the English and hence a probability to stand to face them had to be taken in to consideration. And for this a new army was badly need (10). But from where was the money to come for that? As he wrote helplessly (11) “he could neither withdraw his step nor had he any strength to step forward.” He reminded (12) finally that if the Government did not send sufficient help, we would have to leave the Emperor to his fate.”

(ii) Mahadaji Accepts the Post of Vakil-Ul-Mutlak :

Mahadaji’s visit with the Emperor (13) was a success (13th November 1784). Shaking off his connections with the Englishsh the Emperor appointed Mahadaji as the Nayab (14) of the Peshwa to exercise the post of Vakil-ul-Mutalk and Mir Bakshi.

The gain of the most of Vakil-ul-Mutlak (15) was an achievement in itself,  Mahadaji was empowered to remove even Wazir and Mir Bakshi and could confer dignities on any one he chose. Delhi was thus brought under the Marathas sway who began to dream again to reach Atak by capturing Lahor. But looking at the tremendous tasks the post imposed and the jealous atmosphere the Maratha success had created, the acceptance of the post on the part of Maratha was nothing but a rash daring as compared to his small number of Deccani force (16), worn out by constant warfare and non-payment of salaries.

It was the force of circumstances (17) that Mahadaji had to rely on the Mughila force with questionable loyalty to his cause. Further, for want of ready money he was compelled to assign ‘Saranjams’ to his Chiefs (18). The Emperor questioned him how he would be able to pay his monthly salary if he disposed off thus the small territory left with him. But there was no alternative. The provinces (19) he administered on behalf of the Emperor were all desolate, no crop could be seen from Chambal to Mathura due to shortage of rain for the last three or four years. Thousands had died and were dying of hunger. No money hence could be procured. And inspite of this the adminstration had to be run (20) . By June 1785 he was indebted to the amount of (21) eighthly to eighty  five lakhs of rupees. All his personal money of about twenty  five lakhs was spent up and no further debt wad available. The Emperor’s salary (22) had begun to fall into arrears (February 1785) and he was angry for that with Mahadaji. To retain his position at Delhi, money was the foremost concern of Mahadaji.

His eyes very naturally fell on the Rajput States of Jaypur and Jodhpur who had paid nothing of the Emperor since the death of Najaf Khan and to the Marathas since 1769. Mahadaji had particular reason to be angry with the Jaypur king (23) who had killed Mahadaji’s Sardar Yashwantrao Wable with his son. Maratha detatchments were hence sent to Jaypur and after the damage of territory for a month, the king of Jaypur through Anupgir Gosavi agreed to pay as the ‘Nazar’ of the Emperor (24). Two lakhs were paid in cash, two lakhs were paid in jewels and six lakhs were to be realized from the Pataits’ (Chiefs) along with the expenses on army for realization, and for remaining ten lakhs the Mahals of the king of Jaypur were assigned till the money was recovered (25). (Januray 1785).

Kruparam Joshi (26) and Lalji Meheta, were the Vakils of Jodhpur with Mahadaji. He was pressing them for arrears. The king therefore sent a hundi of two lakhs of rupees and a lakh in ‘Bharna’ (i.e. in camels, horses, jewellery worth fifteen thousand rupees and cloth). Agra fort was then under siege, hence the Vakils withheld the payment. But when the fort was captured on 26th March 1785, they had no alternative but to submit. Mahadaji asked them to pay all the previous arrears and the new payment for the month of Vaishakh (May) or they would be driven out of the camp. The Vakils informed their king that Patil Baba was in this ascendancy and would hear nothing. Mahadaji got information through Bhawaniram Bhandari, the Vakil of Mewad, about the intentions of Jodhpur King to avoid payment.

(iii) The Divided State of Jaypur and the Raoraja of Machhedi :

The region of Madhaosing (27) came to a close after his glorious victory over the all-dreaded Jawaharsing Jat and his throne passed to his elder son Prithvising, a boy of about six years. (6th March 1768). The regency was held by his widowed queen, a daughter of Jaswantsing Chundawat of Deogadh in Mewad, who also came to Jaypur after the death of Madhaosing and began to wield the regency with his daughter on behalf of his grandson.

Naturally the proud Kachhwah nobles-Nathawats and Rajawats refused to accept a woman’s rule supported by an outsider and conspired to overthrow it. These factions aggravated by the rebellions of ever unruly Shekhawats created chaotic conditions that made the State an easy target of Mughal greed under Najaf Khan.

With a woman’s rule at the head and a minor king encouraging confusion due to factions, the time was favourable for any ambitious person and such awas Pratapsing of the Naruka branch of the Kachhwas, who was originally a petty vassal of Jaypur State, Rapidly seizing territories round the nucleus of his ancestral area and building a number of forts therein, he created a small kingdom for himself between Shekhawati, Mewat and the Jat-land. Then by shrewdly siding with Najaf Khan against the Jats, he secured for himself the confirmation of all his usurpations and the title of Rao Raja, a high imperial ‘Mansab’ and a formal recognition of independence of his overlord, the king of Jaypur.

He then raised his power foremost in the State by skilfully ousting the father and the brother of the queen and the rest from the management of the State. But in his rise he had very naturally made every one his enemy and hence being in danger of assassination, he had to flee from Jaypur in 1777.

But a faction of Jaypur Chiefs, who disguested with the behaviour of the new king and his friends, was always favourable to him. He was now determined to remove Pratapsing from the throne of Jaypur and enthrone Mansing, the son of late Prithvising, who was carried to Kishangadh to his – maternal grand – father’s house to save him from nay mishap. With Mahadaji’s coming to the post of Vakil-ul-Mutlak, Rao Raja thought of approaching him to seek help to fulfil his cherished ambition. In fact he had already met him once and told about the state of affairs at Jaypur (28), when Mahadaji was still in the region of Gohad (1783).

(iv) Sawai Pratapsing, the King of Jaypur :

Sawai Pratapsing (29) was a mere boy of 13 years, when he came to throne of Jaypur on 16th April 1778. In 1785, he was a youth of twenty years, fully engrossed in sensual pleasures, without any care for the administration that naturally fell into discorder.

His man of confidence was Daulatram Haldiya by caste, who was his Bakshi, He was the brother of Khushaliram Haldia who ws treacherously murdered in the imprial camp near Fatehpur Sikri on 12th of November 1784. His Chief minister was Rodji Khawas, a tailor by caste, who was formerly his personal attendent. Another minister was Khushaliram Bohra, a Brahman by caste, an opponent of Haldia, and whom Madhaosing raised to high position from his low position of waterman.

These ministers were loyal to the king, inspite of their personal rivalries especially between Haldias and Bohra, but the hereditary nobles of Jaypur king looked upon their social status with contempt and refused to either serve under them or come to the Capital to receive instructions from them and hence the king had no hereditary army behind him till 1786.

With indifferent king at the head and the ministers, devoid of any social status, the administration reached the lowest ebb, due to the inefficiency and unpopularity of the government (30) .

Hence, there was nothing as a State in Jaypur when Pratapsing of Machhedi came to Mahadaji in his camp with Najaf Khan in May 1785 (31). He convinced Mahadaji that Pratapsing was unfit to be a king, having degraded himself by his unmanly acts like dancing in woman’s dress in the ladies’ apartment and moreover he was not the rightful ruler of Jaypur. He promised to pay fifty lakhs of rupees for assistance in placing Mansing on the throne of Jaypur removing Pratapsing. There was least possibility (32) of any resistance had Mahadaji undertaken such an enterprise. Moreover the prospects of getting fifty lakhs of rupees were too much for his precarious financial position to reject the offer (33) . Acordingly Rao Raja and Najaf Khan were despatched to Jaypur (August 1785).

The king of Jaypur soon came to know of the designs of Rao Raja. He sent his men to Vijaysing of Jodhpur, his father-in-law, for help. He also sent his Vakil to Lucknow and promised (34) the English to pay twenty five lakhs in return of help against Mahadaji. It was heard in Mahadaji’s camp that Jaypur Raja and sent assassins to end his life like Jayappa and hence strict vigilence was maintained in the camp. (September 1785).

Mahadaji despatched vithoji Ingle (35) , the brother of Ambaji Ingle with two thousand force (cavalry and infantry), to help Rao and Najaf Kuli in Jaypur. All these forces began to seize territories and capture fortresses in the name of realizing the dues to be recovered as per the previous settlement. The king of Jaypur, thereupon sent a ‘Hundi’ of twenty five thousand for the time being. Rao Raja brought Mansing from Kishangadh and kept him in his camp at Sanganer and sent a word to Mahadaji to start immediately to place him on the throne of Jaypur (36). (January 1786).

(v) Mahadaji’s First Invasion of Jaypur : (March to June 1786)

Accordingly Mahdaji began his march on 3rd January 1786, taking the Emperor with him. Arriving near Dig, he halted there for over a month (10th January to 15th February). From Dig he sent four contingents of the Peshwa with him in advance under chimanaji Khanderao in the service of Shivaji Vital. While Mahadaji was at Dig, the envoys of Jodhpur came to see him, as Vijaysing knew that Mahadaji was equally angry with him. Mahadaji (37) had already sent his Vakil Ganesh Chakradeo from his camp at Gwalior to Jodhpur to realize the yearly sum of two to three lakhs of rupees imposed as a penalty for the assassination of Jayappa, that had run into arrears due to default for many years. After waiting in vain for four months he had returned without doing any thing. The king Now at Dig, the Vakils (38) paid rupees fifty thousand in cash and (April). Mahadaji then told the envoy that he was marching on Jaypur along with the Emperor and that they should not join hands with Jaypur. The envoy on Mahadaji’s insistence Jaypur. Mahadaji then leaving Dig on 15th February 1786, arrived near Lalsot on the 1st of March (39). He immediately sent his men to seize Jaypur territory. His men began to establish Maratha posts and started civil – administration by appointing Kamavisdars. Rao Raja was soon to come to visit Mahadaji who decided to place any one on the throne of Jaypur who would pay him more. (March 1786).

The king of Jaypur (40) sent Khushaliram Bohra and Balanand Mahant, the Guru of Madhosing, to Rao Raja for the settlement They stated that Jaypur had paid three lakhs in cash and for the ten lakhs they had handed over Hindaul and other Parganas. They were to pay ten lakhs no doubt and they were ready to pay the same but they demanded deductions for the damage of crops done by the men of Malak Muhammad Khan and the returen of Narnol and other Parganas seized by Rao Raja and Najaf Kuli. However, they said that they would agree to whatever Patil Baba would decide in the matter.

Khushaliram Bohra (41) , Mahant Balanand and Rao Raja Pratapsing, then came for settlement of Mahadaji’s camp at Lalso. After the formal receptions on both sides were over, the talks began in earnest. Mahadaji demanded rupees three crores and forty lakhs for the previous dues towards Jaypur. Khushaliram answered that the haveli (Palace) of the king had not even so many pebbles, how then could they pay so much. Mahadaji, thereupon, grew angry and ordered the Jaypur Vakils to be driven out of the camp. He then declared that he would directly march on Jaypur (April 1785).

(vi) The Forced Settlement:

Three or four days after the above incident, Rao Raja came again with Jaypur envoys and settled the affairs on behalf of Jaypur, at sixty lakhs and three lakhs were for Darbar expenses. The amount was to be realized in the following way :

Rupees ten lakhs in cash
Rupees ten lakhs to be paid after six months
In place of twenty lakhs, certain Parganas of the Jaypur king were to be handed over to Mahadaji.
The remaining twenty  two lakhs were to be realized from the Thakurs of the Jaypur king.
It should be borne into mind that the very Rao Raja, whose aim was to seize Jaypur kingdom by removing Pratapsing from his throne, had taken the lead in his settlement which had in fact given him all powers under © and (d) above, to seize the territories of the Jaypur king and his Thakurs for the forty two lakhs to be recovered from the land. Had the king consented to fulfill the terms of this settlement faithfully and then had he been allowed to remain on the throne, he would have been in all probability a puppet in the hands of the all powerful Rao Raja who could have then at any time removed him to place Mansing on the throne, had he tried to resist him. There was no mention by the settlement of Narnol and the rest of Parganas seized by the Rao Raja, behind this settlement, to exploit the weakness of Jaypur and the need of Mahadaji for money, to satisfy his own designs.

Khusaliram Bohra (42) and Mahant Balanand had nothing to do, at this stage, with Rao Raja’s selfish designs. They were quite sincere to the cause of the Jaypur king in agreeing to the settlement effected. They were conscious of the fallen state of affairs in Jaypur and hence wanted to save the State from the wrath of Mahadaji by coming to terms with him and faithfully following them.

But the bankrupt State of Jaypur, where trade and commerce had ceased since long, and where it was all unrest due to the presence of the Maratha armies since last year, could have hardly afforded to pay these sixty-three lakhs of rupees faithfully. Economically it would have been the ruin of Jaypur as there was no possibility of the returen of the lands seized by the Marathas or Rao Raja as per the terms of the theaty. Moreover, even that would not have settled the problem permanently for the Jaypurians knew that Mahadai viewed Jaypur only as a source of recovering money and would have liked it to be helpless for ever to serve his purpose. Hence, inspite of Khushaliram’s sincerity in his object to end anarchy in Jaypur, by satisfying Patil Baba, the prospect of peaceful life in Jaypur was impossible as long men like Rao Raja were in the counsels of Mahadaji. The question involved thus was that of the very existence of Jaypur State.

The king had no confidence in the settlement effected by Khushaliram whom he though to be the man of Rao Raja. And he had reasons for that. It was Khushaliram (43) who had carried the child, Mansing of six months to Kishanbadh and for that Pratapsing had imprisoned him and inflicted physical punishment upon him. His coming to power as the Minister of Jaypur, this time, must have been against his wish as it had close connection with the invasion of Mahadaji in Jaypur. The settlement hence was a mere farce, having no backing of the Jaypur Darbar in which Sawai Pratapsing, Daulatram Haldia and Rodji Khawas formed the nucleus. Daulatram had already sent his family beyond the Yamuna and raising a new army of ten to twelve thousand, remained with it outside the city.

Hence, when Rao Raja and Balanand Mahant sent Khushaliram (44) to Jaypur to manage for the first installment of eleven laks, and after he had explained every thing to the king, the latter answered that as he was thoroughly incharge of all the affairs, he was empowered to manage to pay the installment as he thought fit. But the very same day, Pratapsing called Daulatram Haldia and after consulting him, gave him leave to depart. He went outside the city at night, by riding a horse, remained for about two hours in the camp and then went with about four to five hundred cavalry to Jodhpur and met Viajysing there. Then with about one hundred fifty cavalrymen given by Vijaysing, he crossed Yamuna and taking his family with him, went to Lucknow. His departure was the direct result of Khushaliram’s coming to power.

Govind Purushottam Hingne (45) describes the helpless conditions of Jaypur State thus (10th of May 1786 A.D.) – “Camp Lalsot, twenty kos near Jaypur. The Emperor and Patil Baba are in the camp. The settlement with Jaypur has been effected. Out of the first installment, two lakhs in cash and jeweler worth a lakh, have only been received. To pay the rest, Khushaliram Bohra and the Ministers of Jaypur have gone with a promise to return with money within eight days. But twenty days have passed and no money has been received. Patil Baba hence advanced four kos (towards Jaypur). If the money is received within a day or two, both will return or if they take days together to pay, they will further advance to a distance of twelve kos near Jaypur. It is heard that there is no money at Jaypur and no man of influence (to raise it)… the king has no army. The Chiefs have gone to their places, having settled their affairs with Rao Raja, who attaches the territories of the rest who have not seen thim and has taken possession of the personal lands of the king. No energy is left in Jaypur State. Just as the Jat kingdom was seized by Najaf Khan, Jaypur kingdom is to face the same fate. If the camp remains here this year, Jaypur will come under (Maratha) sway without much difficulty.”

(vii) Khushaliram Saves Jaypur :

Meanwhile Khushaliram (46) had begun his administration efficiently as the Chief Minister of Jaypur. He imprisoned the Ministers that were responsible for mismanagement, released all those were imprisoned (unlawfully), opened the shops that were closed till then due to disorder and resumed trade and commerce. By forcing rich people that had amassed wealth byillegal means in previous administration, he raised about five lakhs of rupees in cash and jewels, out of the remaining eight lakhs of the first instalment, and sent the same to Patil Baba. But as Rodaji Khawas, the man of the king was still there, he was handicapped to raise any more money.

Mahadaji, in his camp, was eagerly waiting for the full compliance of the first installment. The delay in payment was adding to his difficulties. He was in arrears of the monthly salary of the Emperor for the last six months and the displeased Emperor was pressing for his march to Delhi before the commencement of rainy season. The Rohinis were over and Mahadaji infact would wait no more. He was about to start for Jaypur, when Khushaliram came to him. Four lakhs were to be paid out of the first instalment. For two lakhs Balanand Mahant stood as guarantee and for the remaining two lakhs five horses and ten elephants and some fine cloth was given. Thus the first instalment having been cleared, Khushaliram Bohra and Mahant Balanand took their leave for Jaypur. Rao Raja and Najaf Kuli also took their leave keeping Mansing with Mahadaji. They (47) were asked to remain in Jaypur territory with Rayaji Patil for the recovery of second instalment and the assignments on the Chief’s estates and ceded Districts. Thus having settled the business, Mahadaji Started his return journey on 4th of June with a decision to march again on Dasara day if the Jaypurians defaulted in the payments as per the settlement, and to place Mansing on the throne to recover all arrears from him. He reached Dig on 16th of June with the Emperor. From there he proceeded to Mathura on 22nd June.

(viii) Jaypur Attitude Stiffens :

The incapacity of the immature king at the head and dissensions among the Chiefs of the State aggravated by the selfish designs of Rao Raja, had brought the State to the brink of ruin. But with Mahadaji’s return (48) the conditions begas to change rapidly, Daulatram Haldiya’s visit to Jodhpur (May 1786 A.D.) had borne fruits and Jodhpur Darbar assured to stand by Jaypur Daulatram Haldiya had gone to Lucknow and remained there fo eight months to seek English help. And though the new English Governor General Lord Cornwallis forbade to interfere in these quarrels (and particularly as be aimed at a treaty with the Marathas against Tipu Sultan) some local English officals, being jealous of Mahadaji’s rise to power, encouraged Daulatram’s hopes and he returned to Jaypur in January 1787 A.D. at the call of Pratapsing to accept premiership. It was the signal of the end of pro-Maratha influence in Jaypur Darbar.

In the middle of January 1787 A.D. (49), the discontented and unpaid Generals of Jaypur State had agreed to open the gates of Jaypur city to admit Maratha troops for a bribe of eighty thousand rupees. But the plan cound not mature. The king of Jaypur and his anti-Maratha Ministers, seeing that Khushaliram was acting in the lines of Rao Raja and both were working in the interests of Mahadaji, ordered Ranawat a Chief of Jaypur State, to capture and kill Khushaliram when he would approach for settlement with Rayaji Patil. It was reported that Khushaliram (50) was accordingly killed. Another report was that he was imprisoned by  the same Chief. But Khushaliram was fortunate to escape unhurt to Maratha camp. Mahadaji complained of this unfriendly act on the part of Jaypur king to Jodhpur Vakil in his camp at Palwal two marches from Delhi.

With the removal of Khushaliram Bohra (51), the Pro-Maratha group in Jaypur Darbar was crushed and Daulatram Haldiya came to power (20th January 1786 A.D.) with the defensive alliance between the two States of Jodhpur and Jaypur against the Marathas, and on the strength of the rumours that the English were coming to the ehlp of Jaypur, with their threatening attitude on the Doab borders and with the assemblage of troops from all sides, the Jaypur Darbar changed its policy and the Chiefs were ordered to refuse payments assigned on them as per the last year’s treaty. This increased the difficulties of Rayaji Patil in collecting the dues. Mahadaji sent Mughliya contingents under Najaf Kuli and Muhammad Beg Hamdani to assist him. But  the Rajputs began to seduce them on payment of arrears of salaries. Rayaji Patil’s position became so hopeless that in February 1786 A.D., while assaulting the fortress of Duhi near Jaypur he lost seven hundred of his men, while the fortress was not captured. At last marching further, he divided his force and the contingents of the Peshwa with him into three section and encamped at a distance of two to three kos before the three doors of Jaypur city to stop the supply of grain. But he could be hardly successful in this attempt. The presence of the confederate armies and the common rumors made his situation so alarming that he daily urged his master to advance speedily for his support.

(ix) Mahadaji Marches into Jaypur: (March 1787 A.D.):

Mahadaji’s (52) haughty behaviour and hasty action in Jaypur case, mainly a result of his chronic financial stringency and the apparent helplessness of the State, had at last brought him into dangerous situation. He could hardly afford to march to Jaypur to assist Rayaji Patil, leaving the Emperor and Delhi unprotected with the threatening activities of the Sikhs, the apparent hostile intentions of the English whose battalions had approached Daranager and Itawa near Maratha border. But when Jaypur king had refused payments as per settlement and had shown ample signs of resistence, Mahadaji as Vakil-ul-Mutlak had no other alternative but to march. In a way he had himself hurt his case essentially “by abandoning his expedition last year (1786 A.D.) Against Jaypur (State), after he had fairly manifested his intention to reduce it and having even proclaimed a new Raja. He had thus given the Rajputs time to recover from the alarm and to unite against him.” Unlike his first invasion in the previous year, his march to Jaypur in March 1787 A.D. at the call of Rayaji Patil was the force of circumstances, that were beyond his control from the very start and Mahadaji himself must have been conscious of this fact, however bold face he put up ignoring the Emperor’s suggestion (53) not to advance beyond Dig, with the bulk of his army, lest the English would swoop down upon the defenseless Delhi, to enthrone some Prince, Mahadaji left Dig on 16th of March and making daily marches without a halt, reached Daosa (32 miles to the east of Jaypur) on 24th. From there he marched to Moti Tekdi, seven kos from Jaypur, while Rayaji Patil was at Sanganer seven miles to the South of Jaypur.

Rao Raja (54) Pratapsing of Machhedi, Khushaliram Bohra (now completely alienated to the cause of Pratapsing, King of Jaypur) and Ramkrishna Mahant came to Mahadaji. They proposed that if he handed over the fort of Daosa to them, they would stand as guarantee for the payment of ‘Khandani’ from Jaypur.

Rodmal Khawas also came from the Jaypur king. He stated that they were to pay twelve lakhs out of the previous year’s settlement. Out of that they were ready to pay four lakhs immediately but after receiving the same, he (Mahadaji should depart to Delhi, two lakhs would be then paid in Shrawan (July) and for the remaining six lakhs they were ready to hand over a few Taluqs. The Jodhpur Vakil also took part in the discussion and requested Mahadaji to accept the sum and offered themselves to stand as guarantee for the next year’s dues.

(x) Vijaysing of Jodhpur :

However earnest and polite the Jaypur and Jodhpur Vakils appeared from their talk, what they were asking Mahadaji was plainly to retire to Delhi instantly by accepting four lakhs in cash. The reason for such a hold proposal was the knowledge (55) they possessed of Mahadaji weakness and the relative strength they had gathered.

A firm union with Jodhpur was the strength of Jaypur. Vijaysing opposed Mahadaji (56) on the question of the possession of land. He told his Minister Umrao Maheshdas that “Patil Baba aims at seizing the land. For that he had destroyed two Rajas of Khichiwada and Gohad. If Jaypur is also destroyed, next term will be ours. Hence, he should be defeated in Jaypur province so that he should not come here.”

Thus to destroy Mahadaji in Jaypur territory for the protection of Jodhpur, was the strategy of Vijaysing. For that he left no stone unturned. His Vakils, alongwith the Jaypur Vakils, had already approached Zabeta Khan (before his death on 21st of February 1785 A.D.) and Shuja Uddaula and pleaded that both the Rajput kings were the rulers of the North India, but the Maratha aimed at seizing their lands. If they were thus destroyed, in that case only the Rohillas in the North and the Bengal to the East would then remain. Unless they all combined and made another Panipat, no security would remain for them. Thus the contact with all the enemies of Mahadaji was maintained by  the Rajputs and particularly by Vijaysing throughout.

He sent Dalelsing, the brother of Maheshdas of Shekhawati to Jaypur. He also wrote letters to Kachhwa Jagirdars, as a result of which the host of about twenty to thirty thousand Rajputs assembled in Jaypur to defend their motherland. He dispatched his Bakshi Bhimsing with ten thousand men – five thousand cavalry and five thousand footmen, who encamped at Sambhar in readiness to join the Jaypur force, in case Mahadaji decided to march on Jaypur. He resumed treacherous correspondence with Muhammad Beg Hamdani and Najaf Kuli, through Mogal Ali Khan, whom he promised Vazirship after the total extinction of the Marathas from the North. Finally he sent four thousand Minas, the hereditary thieves, to commit theft in the Maratha camp and if possible to make an end of Patil Baba. They performed the task excellently to make th camp life unbearable. Some of them were arrested, but they revealed nothing. They were finally executed.

(xi) The Rajputs Force a Battle on Mahadaji :

From Balabas (57), ten kos from Jaypur, Mahadaji had demanded twenty five lakhs as the arrers and current tribute and the fort of Ranthambhor, but he could have readily accepted a moderate sum, that would have not compromised his prestige as Vakil-ul-Mutlak, had the Rajputs meant to come at a settlement. But he was not slow to realize that “by their steadfast behaviour, with very low or rather insulting terms, they meant to bring the dispute to the issue of a battle”, which, they knew very well, he could hardly afford to face.

If Mahadaji was hasty and shortsighted in his first invasion of Jaypur, he was cautious (58) this time. He could not be blind to his innumerable difficulties and shortcomings. He was anxious for the safety of the fickle-minded Emperor who was displeased with him for the nonpayment of his arrears for the past six months. His anxiety was further aggravated by the threatening activities of the English on the Doab border. He knew that the very base of his power, his army, was displeased (59) with him for the delay in paying their arrears. Moreover, the very small proportion of the Deccanis, were worn out by the constant warfare, as compared to the large number of the North Indians, who could hardly be trusted, in his army. Especially the artillery and the trained battalions could be hardly trusted. There was, besides, no immediate possibility (60) of any kind of help-monetary or military – from the Deccan where the most difficult and expensive campaign against the powerful Tipu had been just completed, taxing the resources of the Poona Darbar (March 1787 A.D.) Under such circumstances, had he chosen to engage himself with the Rajputs, then there was every likelihood of losing Delhi, where he had a few friends and many enemies, especially the Nazar, Raja Dayaram and Maulavi Attaulla, the men about the person of the Emperor. They were desirous of Mahadaji’s ruin with the threatening Sikhs (61) at the gates of Delhi and the ever watching Gulam Kadar, who was ever-ready to take advantage of his slightest discomfiture.

But the more Mahadaji was desirous (62) of withdrawing from the disadvantageous situation the more the Rajputs made low and restricted offers to make it impossible for him to dislodge himself with honour from the situation. It was the Rajputs (63) in fact this time, which were dictating Mahadaji either to accept whatever terms they proposed and return or be ready for a fight.

On 7th of April Balanand Mahant (64) with the Vakil of Jaypur and Jodhpur slipped away from Mahadaji’s camp without coming to any settlement or even taking any formal leave. Mahadaji in anger expelled every Jaypur agent and news writer from his camp and next day made a rapid march west-wards to Bhankri, only thirteen miles from Jaypur, to overawe the Jaypurside. Rayaji Patil advanced from his post of Sanganer to the gates of Jaypur.

But this demonstration of force failed to produce any desired effect on the Rajputs and Mahadaji stooped down to invite Jaypur envoys back to his camp at Bhankri. They came on 17th of April and offered to pay the first installment immediately but stated that they would pay the remaining balance of the tribute after Khushaliram Bohra was surrendered to them. This meant the final breakdown of the peace settlement. Mahadaji refused to deduct any thing on the ground of damage or to surrender khushaliram Bohra. The Rajputs were thus successful in forcing a battle on Mahadaji.

(xii) Mahadaji FacesCritical Situation : (May, June 1787 A.D.)

The Rajputs (65) now boldly came out of the city and encamped the South of it (1st of May 1787 A.D.). The Jaypur king also joined the camp next day. Bhimsen Bakshi from Jodhpur also joined the Jaypur force. Judging it unsafe to remain near the city, recalling Rayaji Patil from Sanganer, Mahadaji fell back from Bhankri to Sawali, some twenty miles to the South and twenty miles to the West of Lalsot. Moving further, seizing fortresses of Nawai and Jhilai and reducing them to dust, realizing contributions, he reached Banas river, near Sarsop close to Bundi frontier. Meanwhile his Hindusthani and Mughalia troops who were seduced by Daulatram Haldiya, being bitter at Mahadaji for their unpaid salaries, began to desert him every day in small numbers. On 6th of May, Zulfikar Ali Khan and Mansur Ali Khan, the two eminent captains also went over to Rajput side with their forces.

Seeing Mahadaji (66) retreating before them, the Rajputs advancing from Sanganer, spread throughout the territory of Rao Raja and the territories then under the Marathas and began to capture the posts. The whole country was in tumult. All roads leading to the Maratha camp become unsafe and the caravans carying grain began to be looted on the way.

Mahadaji (67) position was shaken still further by the defection of the renowned Mughalia General of the day – Muhamad Beg Hamdani, who joined the Rajputs on 25th May. He was promised a daily allowance of rupees three thousand a day. Mahadaji could not trust a single Hindusthani soldier hereafter. The Rajputs thus had created a critical situation for him. A thought of retreat was impossible for him as that would have been an end of his newly created power. He sent away the families of his Chiefs and that of Chetsing of Banaras with surplus bag and big guns to Gwalior under the charge of Vithoji Shinde by the route of Karaulic. He issued urgent calls to Khanderao Hari in Bundelkhand (68) and Ambaji Ingle in Karnal District, in Punjab and appealed to the Emperor to join his camp to lend prestige to his Regent’s action. He then marched to Lalso paragana (15th of June), cleared the ghats and put them in charge of Afzal Khan Rohilla, the uncle of Zbita Khan and ordered his men to attack the foraging parties of Jaypur.

Vijaysing had corresponded (69) with Hamdani and Najaf Kuli through Mughal Ali Khan. After Hamdani joined the king of Jaypur, Vijaysing was very much pleased with Mughal Ali Khan whom he promised Vazirship after the final defeat of the Deccanis. He boasted of ending their rule from all the provinces of Hindusthan. He suggested Pratapsing (70) to distribute the four – five lakhs of rupees that he had laid aside to pay as tribute to Mahadaji. This suggestion was followed faithfully to seduce the Mughalia and Hindusthani troops of Mahadaji. For example Malik Muhammad Khan, a Mughalia Sardar coming from Rewadi, at Mahadaji’s call, went off from the way and joined the Jaypur army on receiving a letter from Hamdani. He got a ‘Hundi’ of ten thousand rupees for expenses and was granted a daily allowance of rupees ninety by the king of Jaypur. At the same time all the supplies of Mahadaji’s camp were looted on the way to starve him in his camp. A Rajput force reached Jhilai and set up their control there, while Lalji, the foster brother of Jaypur king, with ten thousand horse, arrived in paragana Hindaun and set up his out posts and began to plunder the lands under Maratha rule to stop Mahadaji’s provision of supplies. On 10th of June the Rajputs occupied Madhaogadh, seventeen miles North-West of Lalsot. Two days later, they despatched a strong detachment towards Daosa. With this stroke, they cut Mahadaji’s connections with Agra and Delhi, via Balahari and Dig and at the same time laid the kingdom of Rao Raja, Mahadaji’s friend, utterly defenceless.

From 25th of May, till 23rd of June, when Khanderao Hari’s divisions from Bundelkhand, consisting of ten thousand veterans, was expected to join him i.e. for a month, Mahadaji was facing the most critical time of his life. It is in times of distress that his excellent qualities of leadership shone brilliantly. Being completely enveloped by the Rajputs who were superior in number and strength, and with the untrustworthy Hindustani soldiers in his camp, he was simply biding his time by firmly keeping back his Generals from engaging with the enemies. This was in fact the best chance that was afforded for the Rajputs to strike at Mahadaji before reinforcement reached him. But they lost it. They (71) on their part were planning to deliver the battle on rainy day, when the gun powder would be less effective. Another alternative that was discussed by them was that five thousand Rathods, vowed to court death, should fall upon to load again. It was clear that even though they were superior to Mahadaji during these critical days, they dreaded his artillery most.

Foot Notes (Description)
(1)  Hist. Paper - 270. Per. Records I pp. 120, 126, 147 to 149.
(2) Hist. Papers - 285, 292, 294, 297, 316.
(3) Hist. Papers - 339, 350.
(4) Ibid - 311, 318.
(5) P.R.C. I - p. 20.
(6) Hist. Papers - 283.
(7) Ibid - 313, 318.
(8) Hist. Papers - 297, 318.
(9) "Tipu being freed from the British pressure and elated by his success, now undertook the task of punishing the Marathas for having deserted his cause." New Hist. III - p. 177.

(10) While condemning Nana for not helping Mahadaji in times of his need Sardesai goes to the extent of saying that Nana purposely sent armies on Tipu to bring Mahadji in troubles (Mar. Riya, U.V. II-p. 112). But he forgets that he himself, wrote in the same book "Poona Darbar despatched forces towards Tipu's border as per the instance of Mahadaji." Thus Tipu's threatening the Marathas was really the effect Mahadaji's presisting Nana to despatch forces on Tipu - (Mar. Riya, U.V. II-pp. 163, 263. )

The fact is clearly stated in Nana's letter which reads as follow - "Letters from Patil Baba were received stating that force ought to be despatched (from Poona) on Tipu otherwise the (Mahadaji) would have to go with the English and hence (as per his wishes) force has been sent. The Government has to pay much as arrears of pay to the soldiers. There is no money. Borrowing as much as was possible something was raised and they were dispatched" early 1784 - Hist. Papers - 335.

(11) Sadashio Dinkar states "Due to four years' campaigning, the army is totally unfit to stand - Men have been starving even in this campaign, they have been compelled even to sell their clothes. They will, it seems, make an uproar for money-it is very difficult to say, how (Patil Baba) would stand in the coming Delhi affairs! (May 1784 ) Hist. Papers - 322, also 323, 339.

(12) Ibid - 339, Dil, Raj. I-137.
(13) Per, Records I-pp. 149, 150, M.B. II-78, Satara Hist, Papers II-238.
(14) Dil. Raj. I-106, Hist. Papers - 401.
(15) Dil. Raj. I-128, 133, 152, Hist. Papers-342, Satara Hist. Papers I-91, 93.
(16) The turbulant Sikhs were threatening Delhi and Antarwed, the Mughalia Chiefs wre too strong with powerful force and artillery and with Saranjams to maintain them and could not be either removed or relied upon, the disappointed English, whose plan to bring the Emperor under their sway was frustrated by Mahadaji, were intriguing with Anupgir Gosavi and Narayandas Kashmiri the Diwan of late Afrasiyab Khan, whom Mahadaji treated as his Counsellors much against the wish of the Emperor, the forts of Agra and Aligadh were still held by the previous Muslim officers who refused to surrender them, being backed by the sympathies of the Muslim world along with the Emperor who felt that they had lost every thing to the Hindus and lastly there was trouble with the Khichis, that barred the way from Deccan towards Agra Dil. Raj. I-131, 134, 140, 147, 171, Hist. Papers - 351, 352, 363, 370, 381, Satara Hist. Papers I-96, M.B. II-89.

(17) Hist. Papers - 339, Dil. Raj. I-131, 137.
(18) Hist. Papers - 358, 412, 607, Satara Hist. Papers I-98.
(19) Hist. Papers - 406, Per. Records I-p. 137, Satara Hist. Papers I-96.
(20) Ambuji Ingle was sent against the Sikhs at Panipat in February. After a severe siege Agra fort was captured in March. Khanderao Hari was despatched to Bundelkhand in April. In October, besides Panipat, his four armies were engaged in Khichiwada, Bundelkhand, Jaypur and Ramgadh respectively. Dil. Raj. I-131, 140, Hist. Papers -352, 354, 265, 407, 411.

(21) Ibid-391.
(22) Per. Records I-p. 152.
(23) Hist. Papers - 406, 351.
(24) Hist. Papers - 406, 351.
(25) Sadashiv Dinkar remarks "For the present this much could be done, in future if (Patil Baba) gets chance, he is determined to destroy Jaypur. This has been known even to them." Hist. Papers - 351.
(26) Jodhpur letters - 2.
(27) Fall III-pp. 230 to 234.
(28) Jodhpur Letters - (S) 2.
(29)  Dil. I-165, 173, Per. Records - 149. 150.
(30) Sadashio Dinkar reported Nana Fadnis in his letter that the king's friends killed the rich men of the city at the night to rob them of their riches - Mar. Riya. U.V. II-p. 116.

Hingne in his letter (11th April 1787) to Nana describes how Nawab Salarjang and his grandson from Oudh were robbed of their jeweler worth 7 to 8 lakhs of rupees at the instigation of the king of Jaypur - Dil. Raj. I-209.

(31) Hist. Papers - 381, 411, 432, 439, 470, 476, Dil. Raj. I-162, 176, M.D.I. 19. Mar. Riyasat (Uttar vibag-II), p. 115.

(32) The maternal grand-father of Mansing, Birdhising, who was opposed to Vijaysing and Pratapsing, also had written Mahadaji to oust Pratapsing. Mahadaji had many sources from Rajput side to know the exact state of affairs in Jaypur. His estimate of the probable reaction failed finally as the Rajputs and particularly Vijaysing, took alarm thinking that if Mahadaji was once successful in Jaypur, took alarm thinking that if Mahadaji was once successful in Jaypur, no place would have been left any where for them. - Jodhpur letters - 3.

(33) "Selfishness blinds even the intelligents to facts and they even go by the route wishful thinking. His (Mahadaji's) own finances are extremely embarrassed and he finds great difficult in satisfying July 1786, P.R.C. I-p. 24.

(34) Satara Hist. Papers - I - 60, Hist. papers - 411, 415.
(35) Satara Hist. Papers - II - 243.
(36) Jadunath Sarkar, writes in a way to suggest as if Mahadaji marched into Jaypur after having tried from Dig "to secure a peaceful settlement through the mediation of Naruka and Bohra." He invaded Jaypur (as per Jadunath) because "throughout the year 1785, the Jaypur Raja paid only three lakhs, when he saw Mahadaji fully absorbed in a struggle with the refractory officers of Afrasiyab Khan and not yet firmly established as the executive head of Delhi Government". (Fall III-p. 241.)

But this is not the real case; Sadashio Dinkar clearly states (Hist. Papers - 315, 358) that even at the time of the Nazar (January 1785) Mahadaji's aim was to destroy Jaypur. His marching into Jaypur was clearly as per the instigation of Rao Raja. Jaypur was in no position in 1785, either to refuse Mahadaji or to take the advantage of his engagements in other fields. In fact Mahadaji's armies under Rao Raja, Najaf Khan Kuli and Balaji Ingle had been already active and were devastating Jaypour territory. Reports James Anderson - P.R.C.-13. "Patil Baba and the king of Jaypur have differences on the mode of payment on the part of the later. The king is ready to pay Rs. 25 lakhs whereas Patil Baba demands 30 lakhs and the Paraganas as were given to Holkar."

(37)  Hist. Papers - 351.
(38) Dil. Raj I-155. Jodhpur Hath Bahi 2-p. 139.
(39) Hist. papers - 439, 470, 476, Dil. Raj. I-176, M.D. II-116, 124.
(40) Dil. Raj. I-162, 176, Jaypur Draft Kharitas 18-159.
(41) Ibid - 163.
(42) Hist. Papers - 476.
(43) Jodhpur letters - 2.
(44) Hist. Papers - 476.
(45) Dil. Raj. I-165.
(46) Dil. Raj. I-161, Hist. Papers - 476, Jaypur Draft Kharitas 20 (B) 11,17.
(47) 'Holkar Shahi' I-172, Dil. Raj. I-168 and 169, 'Satara Hist. Papers II-244.
(48)  Dil. Raj. I-220, 'Holkar Shahi' I-186, P.R.C. I-86, Per. Records - p. 153.
(49) P.R.C. I-71, 82.
(50) Dil. Raj. I-173, Per. Records I-153.
(51)  P.R.C. 1-71 and 82, Dil. Raj. I-173, 199 and 211, Per. Records - p. 153.
(52) Dil. Raj. I-163. 199, 201, 213, 220, 'Hist. Papers - 446, 'Satara Hist. Papers' I-118, P.R.C. I-99.
(53) While marching on Jaypur, Mahadaji uttered that he would vacate Jaypur as he had vacated Gohad (March 1786), Dil. Raj I-210.
(54) It is quite clear that the cause of Mansing was lost by now.
(55) After his former success against the Sikhs and the capture of Agra fort (February-March 1785 A.D.) Mahadaji became confident. He neither cared for the Emperor nor informed about his plans to Poona Darbar. On the contrary he felt irritated at the question of Nana Fadnis. Gradually he began to talk loosely in open Darbar where all were not his friends. Sadashio Dinkar. Nana's envoy, pointed out the folly by saying that "If the Rangdas know all about this, It will be a dangerous thing. You are neglected them, as they seem to you docile and devoid of any valour. But if they know your differences with Shrimant, they will hardly listen to you" - Hist. Papers -395.
(56) Jodhpur letters - S. 1 and 2
(57) Per. Records I - 155.
(58) "Sindia was not hasty but cautious. He had always to think to the menace of the English at hand. His difficulties were more numerous…" 'James Anderson, P.R.C. I-43.
(59) Dil. Raj. I-128, 131, 133, 134, 137, 199, M.D. I-143.
(60) Dil. Raj. I-205m M.D. II-72, Hist. Papers - 445, 459, 'Holkar Shahi' I-177, 186, 188, 'Satara Hist. Papers' II-245, M.D. I-126.
(61) Dil. Raj. I-206, 208.

(62) Jadunath Sarkar States (Fall III, p. 250) "Rana Khan and Rayaji Patil pressed him (Mahadaji) to accept a moderate tribute by way of compromise and to return immediately from Rajputana so as to avoid the increasing summer heat and to over come his many secret enemies.. But the Rao Raja and Khushaliram appealed to Mahadaji's vanity by pointing out that after coming to the gates of Jaypur in person, he could not consistently with his dignity, retire with only the small tribute which had been offered to his servants before. Faced by these two rival counsels in his inner circle, Mahadaji's political vision and sense of reality seem to have been clouded…"

Not only Rao Raja, but even Mahadaji and all his Chiefs must have felt the humiliation in accepting such a proposal. But it will be wrong appreciation of Mahadaji to regard him vain at a stage when he was in danger of losing all that he and gained. From March 1787 A.D. when he was forced to take the decision of Marching into Jaypur, till he returned to the South in 1792 A.D., Marhadaji was his ownself - shrewd, ever-alert to his interests, calculating and ruthless in striking a blow inspite of the reverses he suffered. He was subject to errors of judgment more in prospritythan in adversity. He finally had to accept the Rajput challenge, as the Rajputs themselves did not desire his escape. Grant Duff (V. III-p. 15) clearly states, "On approaching Jeypoor, Sindia endeavoured to negotiate but his overtures were disregarded." W. Kirkpatrick in his report to Earl Cornwallis (P.R.C. I) Dated 20-4-1787 A.D. is more  clear when he states "Negotiations between Sindia and Rajputs languish exceedingly. Desirous as the former secretly is of concluding a speedy accommodation, the very low and restricted offers of the latter, in which they persist with remarkable steadiness, offer him no opportunity of dislodging himself from his embarrassments with any advantage or reputation."

Had the Rajputs left him, having thus cornered him, they very well knew that he would return again in better circumstances, Mahadaji knew that a refused to fight meant his political end. No Rao Raja or Khusaliram could play upon his vanity when he was himself facing the question of the survival of his political life.

(63) 'Hist. Papers' -511.
(64) Dil. Raj. I-201, 211, P.R.C. I, p. 169, 'Per Records' I-p. 155, M.D. I-114.
(65) Dil. Raj. I-200, 220, 221, P.R.C. I, pp. 180 to 186, 'Per Records' I-p. 155.
(66) P.R.C. I-115, 118 and 119, 'per. Records' I-p.156
(67)  'Per Records' I-156.
(68) 'Hist. Papers' - 500.
(69) Jodhpur letters - S.I.
(70) 'Per. Records' I-p. 155.
(71) Fall III-p. 256.

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