08-04-2008, 10:45 PM
<b>Kashmir: An analysis of the dispute and the US intervention in past and present
by Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai</b>
The Situation in Kashmir
India's occupation of Kashmir has thus been left undisturbed by the international community, even though its validity has never been accepted. At no stage, however, have the people of Kashmir shown themselves to be reconciled to it. There have been several uprisings, notably in 1953, 1964 and 1988 and even the relatively calmer interludes have witnessed continuous peaceful protest met with unrelenting force. Kashmir's record of opposition to its annexation by the Indian Union, can by no standard be reckoned as less genuinely demonstrated than that of countries of Eastern Europe under the dominance of the Soviet Union. But while the popular revolt in the countries of Eastern Europe was observed and reported by the international media, that in Kashmir has remained largely hidden from the world's view.
Kashmir could not remain untouched by the tide of freedom which rolled across the world in the late 1980's, sweeping away the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, South Africa's 70-year old rule over Namibia and unpopular establishments in Eastern Europe. Inspired by it and also encouraged by the emergence from limbo of the United Nations as a central peace-making agency, the people of Kashmir intensified their struggle against the unwanted and tyrannical Indian occupation. Their uprising entered into its current phase in July 1988. The scale of popular backing for it can be judged from the established fact that, on few occasions in 1990, virtually the entire population of Srinagar came out on the streets in an unparalleled demonstration of protest against the oppressive status quo. The further fact that they presented petitions at the office of the United Nations Military Observers Group shows the essentially peaceful nature of the aims of the uprising and its trust in justice under international law. India has tried to portray the uprising as the work of terrorists or fanatics. Terrorists do not compose an entire population, including women and children; fanatics do not look to the United Nations to achieve pacific, rational settlement.
Some of the facts of the latest situation are:
*** India maintains a large and highly visible military presence in Kashmir; the troops stationed there exceed 700,000; including para-military forces, the Central Reserve Police and the Border Security Force, all of whom are thugs in uniform and equipped with state-of-the-art torture machines.
*** There are 16 Indian secret service agencies operating ubiquitously to spy on the 8.3 million citizens.
Distinguishable Characteristics of Kashmir Dispute
There are certain characteristics of the situation in Kashmir, which distinguish it from all other deplorable human rights situations around the world.
*** It prevails in what is recognized - under international law and by the United States - as a disputed territory. According to the international agreements between India and Pakistan, negotiated by the United Nations (through a commission set up for the purpose) and endorsed by the Security Council, the territory's status is to be determined by the free vote of its people under U.N. supervision. The unresolved dispute caused two wars in the not-so-remote past between India and Pakistan.
*** It represents a Government's repression not of a secessionist or separatist movement but of an uprising against foreign occupation, an occupation that was expected to end under determinations made by the United Nations. The Kashmiris are not and cannot be called separatists because they cannot secede from a country to which they have never acceded to in the first place.
*** It has been met with studied unconcern by the United States. This has given a sense of total impunity to India. It has also created the impression that the United States is invidiously selective about the application of the principles of human rights and democracy. There was a glaring contrast between the outcry over the massacre in Tiannanman Square, on the one side, and the official silence (barring some faint murmurs of disapproval) over the killing and maiming of a vastly greater number of civilians in Kashmir and the systematic violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention.
*** It is a paradoxical case of the United Nations being deactivated and rendered unable to address a situation to which, under U.S. leadership, it had devoted a number of resolutions and in which it had established a presence, though with a limited mandate. The United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is one of the oldest peace-keeping operations of the U.N.; the force is stationed in Kashmir to observe the cease-fire between India and Pakistan.
*** All these peculiarities of the Kashmir situation become more baffling in view of the fact that the mediatory initiative, which would halt the violations of human rights and set the stage for a solution would entail no deployment of American troops, no financial outlays and no adversarial relations between U.S. and India.
Past U.S. Involvement:
In this context, the following considerations are most pertinent for an assessment of the dispute by the members of the American policy makers.
*** When the Kashmir dispute erupted in 1947-1948, the United States championed the stand that the future status of Kashmir must be ascertained in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the people of the territory. The U.S. was a principal sponsor of the resolution, which was adopted by the Security Council on 21 April 1948 and which was based on that unchallenged principle. Following the resolution, the U.S. as a leading member of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, adhered to that stand. The basic formula for settlement was incorporated in the resolutions of that Commission adopted on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
*** These are not resolutions in the routine sense of the term. Their provisions were negotiated in detail by the Commission with India and Pakistan and it was only after the consent of both Governments was explicitly obtained that they were endorsed by the Security Council. They thus constitute a binding and solemn international agreement about the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
*** The United States, Britain and France have traditionally been committed supporters of the plebiscite agreement as the only way to resolve this issue. They sponsored all of the Security Council resolutions, which called for a plebiscite. Their commitment was indicated by a personal appeal made by America's President Truman and Britain's Prime Minister Clement Atlee that differences over demilitarization be submitted to arbitration by the Plebiscite Administrator, a distinguished American war hero: Admiral Chester Nimitz. India rejected this appeal and, later on, objected to an American acting as the Plebiscite Administrator. As mentioned earlier, American Senator Frank Graham visited the Subcontinent as the United Nations Representative to negotiate the demilitarization of Kashmir prior to the plebiscite. India rejected his proposals as well.
Similarly in Britain, both Labor and Conservative governments consistently upheld the position that a plebiscite was the only way the dispute over Kashmir could be democratically and peacefully settled. When the dispute first arose, Clement Atlee launched a conciliatory effort and conveyed to the Pakistani Prime Minister the assurance of the Indian Prime Minister that India would allow Kashmir's status to be determined by the people's vote. Two years later, the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth informally proposed alternative arrangements for the demilitarization of Kashmir prior to the plebiscite. They suggested that a neutral peacekeeping force consisting either of contingents from the Commonwealth countries or composed of local troops from both sides under the control of the Plebiscite Administrator could be stationed to safeguard the state's security. India rejected all of these suggestions.
*** The part played traditionally by the U.S. Government is apparent from:
a). The appeal made by President Truman that any contentious issues between India and Pakistan relating to the implementation of the agreement must be submitted to arbitration;
b). The appointment of an eminent American, Admiral Chester Nimitz, as Plebiscite Administrator;
c). The bipartisan expressions of support for the U.S. position from statesmen as different otherwise as Adlai Stevenson and John Foster Dulles; The American position was bipartisan and maintained equally by Republicans and Democrats. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated on 5 February 1957 that: "We continue to believe that unless the parties are able to agree upon some other solution, the solution which was recommended by the Security Council should prevail, which is that there should be a plebiscite."
On 15 June 1962, the American representative to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, stated that: "...The best approach is to take for a point of departure the area of common ground which exists between the parties. I refer of course to the resolutions which were accepted by both parties and which in essence provide for demilitarization of the territory and a plebiscite whereby the population may freely decide the future status of Jammu and Kashmir. This is in full conformity with the principle of the self-determination of people which is enshrined in Article I of the Charter as one of the key purpose for which the United Nations exists."
d). The appeal personally made in 1962 by President Kennedy to the President of Ireland to the effect that Ireland sponsor a resolution in the Security Council reaffirming the resolutions of the Commission;
e). The forceful advocacy by the U.S. Delegation of points regarding the demilitarization of Kashmir preparatory to the plebiscite at countless meetings of the Security Council from the years 1947-48 to 1962 and its sponsorship of twelve substantive resolutions of the Council to that effect;
f). The protracted negotiations conducted by another distinguished American, Mr. Frank Graham, from 1951 to 1958 in the effort to bring about the demilitarization of Kashmir, making possible the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite.
g). The pronouncement made by President Clinton that Kashmir is the most dangerous place in the world.
h). The clarification made by President George W. Bush that Kashmir solution must be acceptable not only to India and Pakistan but also to "those living within Kashmirâ.
i). The assertion made by Dr. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State during Clinton Administration on Feb. 9, 2000 that the United States would continue its efforts "to ease tensions in South Asia." Kashmir is a fuse, and the region a tinderbox as a result of the Kashmir issue. "Our policy is to encourage dialogue aimed at narrowing differences and preventing violence, and we intend to remain actively engaged with both countries toward this end."
j). The declaration of General Colin Powell as Secretary of State to accept the centrality of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan.
*** All this may be regarded as history but there is no reason why, when the human, political and legal realities of the dispute have not only changed but have become more accentuated with the passage of time, it should now be regarded as irrelevant. It is no less relevant to the settlement of the dispute than the termination of the Indonesian mandate was to the question of East Timor or than the circumstances of the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the Soviet Union were to the reassertion of their independence.
Current U.S. Engagement
a). It is commonly acknowledged that, with India and Pakistan both being nuclear-weapon states directly confronting each other, this dispute is potentially the most dangerous in the world. It should, therefore, be a major interest of the U.S. to prevent this dispute from exploding into a conflict, which can be catastrophic for a large proportion of the human race. Yet, ever since the start in 1989-90 of the popular uprising in Kashmir against alien military occupation, which accentuated the character of the dispute, the U.S. has been content with playing often a passive, at times a tentatively advisory, marginal role. It has remained unmoved by the killings of anywhere between 60,000 (India's figure) and 100,000 (popular estimate) people in Kashmir, accompanied by acts of rape and torching of localities. It has declared that it will not exercise mediation unless both parties ask for it. Since India is uncompromisingly opposed to U.S. mediation and since the United Nations also has been made inactive, the result is the total absence of a guiding hand towards a just, peaceful and lasting resolution of the conflict.
b). It is symptomatic of the U.S. approach that greater emphasis is placed on the "reduction of tensions" than on the settlement of the core issue, i.e. Kashmir. This encourages giving importance to superficial moves and temporary solutions even though it is known that such moves and solutions do not soften the animosities of the parties nor allay the life-and death concerns and anxieties of the people most directly affected.
c). An indication of this misplaced focus is the wrong-headed talk about the "sanctity" of the line of control in Kashmir. It is forgotten that this line continues to exist only because the international agreement which had been concluded between India and Pakistan, with the full support of the United States. This line was originally formalized by that agreement as a temporary cease-fire line pending the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the holding of a plebiscite to determine its future. As long as it will remain clamped down on the state, it will continue to impose a heavy toll of death on the people of the land. They have had no hand in creating a line which has cut through their homes, separated families and, what is worse, served as a protecting wall for massive violations of human rights. They are not resigned to its becoming some kind of a border. To treat this line overtly or otherwise as a basis for the partition of the State is to reward obduracy, countenance iniquity, encourage tyranny and oppression and destroy the hopes for peace in accordance with justice and rationality in Kashmir. Any kind of agreement procured to that end, will not only not endure; it will invite resentment and revolt against whichever leadership in Kashmir will sponsor or subscribe to it.
d). It must be pointed out in this context that some statements from the officials of the U.S. Administration have spoken of a settlement in accordance with the "interests" of the people of Kashmir. This seems to be an unnecessary departure from the traditional stand in favor of a settlement in accordance with the "wishes" of the people. Who is competent to determine their "interests" except they themselves? It is only their wishes that reflect their interests as perceived by them.
e). The mantra has been repeated too often that the U.S. has no alternative to relying on bilateral talks between India and Pakistan to achieve a settlement. The experience of past fifty-nine years is ignored. No bilateral talks between India and Pakistan have yielded agreements without the active role of an external element. If the U.S. does not deem it prudent to get directly involved, there is no reason why the Security Council of the United Nations or, with the Council's support, the Secretary General should not be urged to play a real facilitating role.
<b>
f). United States interests in the Kashmir conflict are manifold. Avoiding nuclear and missile proliferation is foremost. Secondary are a general predisposition favoring self-determination dating from President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, obedience to international law and human rights.</b>
The cluster of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 jumped Kashmir to the forefront of the United States and United Nations agendas, but the resulting steps towards Kashmiri self-determination as prescribed by the international law have been disappointing. The policy of the
Bush Administration has been that:
i. Kashmir is a disputed territory;
ii. It is neither the integral part of India nor Pakistan;
iii. Pakistan and India must seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict, after taking into account the wishes and aspirations of the people of Kashmir;
iv. U.S. will mediate to help resolve the Kashmir issue, if both parties agree.
But United States has neglected to insist that the authentic voice of Kashmiri sentiments, the All-Parties Huniyat Conference (APHC) - be included in all Kashmir negotiations, in the same manner as IRA involvement in the Northern Ireland negotiations and PLO involvement in the Palestinian negotiations with Israel.
In this regard, the Bush Administration should realize that:
i). The bilateral India-Pakistan talks can never resolve the Kashmir conflict. That formula has proven utterly bankrupt for more than 59 years, and nothing has changed but the faces;
ii). It is implausible to believe that India and Pakistan will either cap or renounce their respective nuclear genies after they have escaped the South Asian bottle unless the chief source of antagonism Kashmir - is resolved;
iii). It should assume the position as a leader and take an active role in finding a lasting settlement on Kashmir. It is obvious that no settlement can last if it is not based on justice for the people of Kashmir and recognition of their inherent rights;
iv). The Governments of India and Pakistan should include the Kashmiri leadership - the All Parties Hurriyat Conference that represents the broader spectrum of the opinion of the people of Kashmir - with the peace process;
v). An appointment of a special envoy on Kashmir is indispensable - a person of an international standing, like Bishop Desmond Tutu or President Mandela is of an utmost importance; and
vi). The United States holds unique powers of moral suasion, economic, and other assistance in facilitating enlightened solutions to acute divisions, whether in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, East Timor, Kosovo, or Kashmir.
by Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai</b>
The Situation in Kashmir
India's occupation of Kashmir has thus been left undisturbed by the international community, even though its validity has never been accepted. At no stage, however, have the people of Kashmir shown themselves to be reconciled to it. There have been several uprisings, notably in 1953, 1964 and 1988 and even the relatively calmer interludes have witnessed continuous peaceful protest met with unrelenting force. Kashmir's record of opposition to its annexation by the Indian Union, can by no standard be reckoned as less genuinely demonstrated than that of countries of Eastern Europe under the dominance of the Soviet Union. But while the popular revolt in the countries of Eastern Europe was observed and reported by the international media, that in Kashmir has remained largely hidden from the world's view.
Kashmir could not remain untouched by the tide of freedom which rolled across the world in the late 1980's, sweeping away the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, South Africa's 70-year old rule over Namibia and unpopular establishments in Eastern Europe. Inspired by it and also encouraged by the emergence from limbo of the United Nations as a central peace-making agency, the people of Kashmir intensified their struggle against the unwanted and tyrannical Indian occupation. Their uprising entered into its current phase in July 1988. The scale of popular backing for it can be judged from the established fact that, on few occasions in 1990, virtually the entire population of Srinagar came out on the streets in an unparalleled demonstration of protest against the oppressive status quo. The further fact that they presented petitions at the office of the United Nations Military Observers Group shows the essentially peaceful nature of the aims of the uprising and its trust in justice under international law. India has tried to portray the uprising as the work of terrorists or fanatics. Terrorists do not compose an entire population, including women and children; fanatics do not look to the United Nations to achieve pacific, rational settlement.
Some of the facts of the latest situation are:
*** India maintains a large and highly visible military presence in Kashmir; the troops stationed there exceed 700,000; including para-military forces, the Central Reserve Police and the Border Security Force, all of whom are thugs in uniform and equipped with state-of-the-art torture machines.
*** There are 16 Indian secret service agencies operating ubiquitously to spy on the 8.3 million citizens.
Distinguishable Characteristics of Kashmir Dispute
There are certain characteristics of the situation in Kashmir, which distinguish it from all other deplorable human rights situations around the world.
*** It prevails in what is recognized - under international law and by the United States - as a disputed territory. According to the international agreements between India and Pakistan, negotiated by the United Nations (through a commission set up for the purpose) and endorsed by the Security Council, the territory's status is to be determined by the free vote of its people under U.N. supervision. The unresolved dispute caused two wars in the not-so-remote past between India and Pakistan.
*** It represents a Government's repression not of a secessionist or separatist movement but of an uprising against foreign occupation, an occupation that was expected to end under determinations made by the United Nations. The Kashmiris are not and cannot be called separatists because they cannot secede from a country to which they have never acceded to in the first place.
*** It has been met with studied unconcern by the United States. This has given a sense of total impunity to India. It has also created the impression that the United States is invidiously selective about the application of the principles of human rights and democracy. There was a glaring contrast between the outcry over the massacre in Tiannanman Square, on the one side, and the official silence (barring some faint murmurs of disapproval) over the killing and maiming of a vastly greater number of civilians in Kashmir and the systematic violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention.
*** It is a paradoxical case of the United Nations being deactivated and rendered unable to address a situation to which, under U.S. leadership, it had devoted a number of resolutions and in which it had established a presence, though with a limited mandate. The United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is one of the oldest peace-keeping operations of the U.N.; the force is stationed in Kashmir to observe the cease-fire between India and Pakistan.
*** All these peculiarities of the Kashmir situation become more baffling in view of the fact that the mediatory initiative, which would halt the violations of human rights and set the stage for a solution would entail no deployment of American troops, no financial outlays and no adversarial relations between U.S. and India.
Past U.S. Involvement:
In this context, the following considerations are most pertinent for an assessment of the dispute by the members of the American policy makers.
*** When the Kashmir dispute erupted in 1947-1948, the United States championed the stand that the future status of Kashmir must be ascertained in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the people of the territory. The U.S. was a principal sponsor of the resolution, which was adopted by the Security Council on 21 April 1948 and which was based on that unchallenged principle. Following the resolution, the U.S. as a leading member of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, adhered to that stand. The basic formula for settlement was incorporated in the resolutions of that Commission adopted on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
*** These are not resolutions in the routine sense of the term. Their provisions were negotiated in detail by the Commission with India and Pakistan and it was only after the consent of both Governments was explicitly obtained that they were endorsed by the Security Council. They thus constitute a binding and solemn international agreement about the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
*** The United States, Britain and France have traditionally been committed supporters of the plebiscite agreement as the only way to resolve this issue. They sponsored all of the Security Council resolutions, which called for a plebiscite. Their commitment was indicated by a personal appeal made by America's President Truman and Britain's Prime Minister Clement Atlee that differences over demilitarization be submitted to arbitration by the Plebiscite Administrator, a distinguished American war hero: Admiral Chester Nimitz. India rejected this appeal and, later on, objected to an American acting as the Plebiscite Administrator. As mentioned earlier, American Senator Frank Graham visited the Subcontinent as the United Nations Representative to negotiate the demilitarization of Kashmir prior to the plebiscite. India rejected his proposals as well.
Similarly in Britain, both Labor and Conservative governments consistently upheld the position that a plebiscite was the only way the dispute over Kashmir could be democratically and peacefully settled. When the dispute first arose, Clement Atlee launched a conciliatory effort and conveyed to the Pakistani Prime Minister the assurance of the Indian Prime Minister that India would allow Kashmir's status to be determined by the people's vote. Two years later, the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth informally proposed alternative arrangements for the demilitarization of Kashmir prior to the plebiscite. They suggested that a neutral peacekeeping force consisting either of contingents from the Commonwealth countries or composed of local troops from both sides under the control of the Plebiscite Administrator could be stationed to safeguard the state's security. India rejected all of these suggestions.
*** The part played traditionally by the U.S. Government is apparent from:
a). The appeal made by President Truman that any contentious issues between India and Pakistan relating to the implementation of the agreement must be submitted to arbitration;
b). The appointment of an eminent American, Admiral Chester Nimitz, as Plebiscite Administrator;
c). The bipartisan expressions of support for the U.S. position from statesmen as different otherwise as Adlai Stevenson and John Foster Dulles; The American position was bipartisan and maintained equally by Republicans and Democrats. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated on 5 February 1957 that: "We continue to believe that unless the parties are able to agree upon some other solution, the solution which was recommended by the Security Council should prevail, which is that there should be a plebiscite."
On 15 June 1962, the American representative to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, stated that: "...The best approach is to take for a point of departure the area of common ground which exists between the parties. I refer of course to the resolutions which were accepted by both parties and which in essence provide for demilitarization of the territory and a plebiscite whereby the population may freely decide the future status of Jammu and Kashmir. This is in full conformity with the principle of the self-determination of people which is enshrined in Article I of the Charter as one of the key purpose for which the United Nations exists."
d). The appeal personally made in 1962 by President Kennedy to the President of Ireland to the effect that Ireland sponsor a resolution in the Security Council reaffirming the resolutions of the Commission;
e). The forceful advocacy by the U.S. Delegation of points regarding the demilitarization of Kashmir preparatory to the plebiscite at countless meetings of the Security Council from the years 1947-48 to 1962 and its sponsorship of twelve substantive resolutions of the Council to that effect;
f). The protracted negotiations conducted by another distinguished American, Mr. Frank Graham, from 1951 to 1958 in the effort to bring about the demilitarization of Kashmir, making possible the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite.
g). The pronouncement made by President Clinton that Kashmir is the most dangerous place in the world.
h). The clarification made by President George W. Bush that Kashmir solution must be acceptable not only to India and Pakistan but also to "those living within Kashmirâ.
i). The assertion made by Dr. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State during Clinton Administration on Feb. 9, 2000 that the United States would continue its efforts "to ease tensions in South Asia." Kashmir is a fuse, and the region a tinderbox as a result of the Kashmir issue. "Our policy is to encourage dialogue aimed at narrowing differences and preventing violence, and we intend to remain actively engaged with both countries toward this end."
j). The declaration of General Colin Powell as Secretary of State to accept the centrality of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan.
*** All this may be regarded as history but there is no reason why, when the human, political and legal realities of the dispute have not only changed but have become more accentuated with the passage of time, it should now be regarded as irrelevant. It is no less relevant to the settlement of the dispute than the termination of the Indonesian mandate was to the question of East Timor or than the circumstances of the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the Soviet Union were to the reassertion of their independence.
Current U.S. Engagement
a). It is commonly acknowledged that, with India and Pakistan both being nuclear-weapon states directly confronting each other, this dispute is potentially the most dangerous in the world. It should, therefore, be a major interest of the U.S. to prevent this dispute from exploding into a conflict, which can be catastrophic for a large proportion of the human race. Yet, ever since the start in 1989-90 of the popular uprising in Kashmir against alien military occupation, which accentuated the character of the dispute, the U.S. has been content with playing often a passive, at times a tentatively advisory, marginal role. It has remained unmoved by the killings of anywhere between 60,000 (India's figure) and 100,000 (popular estimate) people in Kashmir, accompanied by acts of rape and torching of localities. It has declared that it will not exercise mediation unless both parties ask for it. Since India is uncompromisingly opposed to U.S. mediation and since the United Nations also has been made inactive, the result is the total absence of a guiding hand towards a just, peaceful and lasting resolution of the conflict.
b). It is symptomatic of the U.S. approach that greater emphasis is placed on the "reduction of tensions" than on the settlement of the core issue, i.e. Kashmir. This encourages giving importance to superficial moves and temporary solutions even though it is known that such moves and solutions do not soften the animosities of the parties nor allay the life-and death concerns and anxieties of the people most directly affected.
c). An indication of this misplaced focus is the wrong-headed talk about the "sanctity" of the line of control in Kashmir. It is forgotten that this line continues to exist only because the international agreement which had been concluded between India and Pakistan, with the full support of the United States. This line was originally formalized by that agreement as a temporary cease-fire line pending the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the holding of a plebiscite to determine its future. As long as it will remain clamped down on the state, it will continue to impose a heavy toll of death on the people of the land. They have had no hand in creating a line which has cut through their homes, separated families and, what is worse, served as a protecting wall for massive violations of human rights. They are not resigned to its becoming some kind of a border. To treat this line overtly or otherwise as a basis for the partition of the State is to reward obduracy, countenance iniquity, encourage tyranny and oppression and destroy the hopes for peace in accordance with justice and rationality in Kashmir. Any kind of agreement procured to that end, will not only not endure; it will invite resentment and revolt against whichever leadership in Kashmir will sponsor or subscribe to it.
d). It must be pointed out in this context that some statements from the officials of the U.S. Administration have spoken of a settlement in accordance with the "interests" of the people of Kashmir. This seems to be an unnecessary departure from the traditional stand in favor of a settlement in accordance with the "wishes" of the people. Who is competent to determine their "interests" except they themselves? It is only their wishes that reflect their interests as perceived by them.
e). The mantra has been repeated too often that the U.S. has no alternative to relying on bilateral talks between India and Pakistan to achieve a settlement. The experience of past fifty-nine years is ignored. No bilateral talks between India and Pakistan have yielded agreements without the active role of an external element. If the U.S. does not deem it prudent to get directly involved, there is no reason why the Security Council of the United Nations or, with the Council's support, the Secretary General should not be urged to play a real facilitating role.
<b>
f). United States interests in the Kashmir conflict are manifold. Avoiding nuclear and missile proliferation is foremost. Secondary are a general predisposition favoring self-determination dating from President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, obedience to international law and human rights.</b>
The cluster of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 jumped Kashmir to the forefront of the United States and United Nations agendas, but the resulting steps towards Kashmiri self-determination as prescribed by the international law have been disappointing. The policy of the
Bush Administration has been that:
i. Kashmir is a disputed territory;
ii. It is neither the integral part of India nor Pakistan;
iii. Pakistan and India must seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict, after taking into account the wishes and aspirations of the people of Kashmir;
iv. U.S. will mediate to help resolve the Kashmir issue, if both parties agree.
But United States has neglected to insist that the authentic voice of Kashmiri sentiments, the All-Parties Huniyat Conference (APHC) - be included in all Kashmir negotiations, in the same manner as IRA involvement in the Northern Ireland negotiations and PLO involvement in the Palestinian negotiations with Israel.
In this regard, the Bush Administration should realize that:
i). The bilateral India-Pakistan talks can never resolve the Kashmir conflict. That formula has proven utterly bankrupt for more than 59 years, and nothing has changed but the faces;
ii). It is implausible to believe that India and Pakistan will either cap or renounce their respective nuclear genies after they have escaped the South Asian bottle unless the chief source of antagonism Kashmir - is resolved;
iii). It should assume the position as a leader and take an active role in finding a lasting settlement on Kashmir. It is obvious that no settlement can last if it is not based on justice for the people of Kashmir and recognition of their inherent rights;
iv). The Governments of India and Pakistan should include the Kashmiri leadership - the All Parties Hurriyat Conference that represents the broader spectrum of the opinion of the people of Kashmir - with the peace process;
v). An appointment of a special envoy on Kashmir is indispensable - a person of an international standing, like Bishop Desmond Tutu or President Mandela is of an utmost importance; and
vi). The United States holds unique powers of moral suasion, economic, and other assistance in facilitating enlightened solutions to acute divisions, whether in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, East Timor, Kosovo, or Kashmir.