08-16-2008, 10:47 AM
<b>The Varieties of Legitimacies - By Khaled Ahmed in TFT</b>
Quote:
Because of the regular alternation between military and civilian rule in Pakistan, people often refer to legitimacy, or lack thereof, on the part of the rulers. Although the yardstick of legitimacy should be applied to all rulers, it is usually applied to the military rulers. In this case, it commonly means constitutional legitimacy; and it becomes a dominant strain in public discourse towards the end of a military interregnum. Yet, at the existential level, there is a variety of legitimacies that a ruler in Pakistan must acquire if he wants to remain in power.
There is no doubt that a military ruler has to seek legitimacy while a civilian ruler has to maintain legitimacy. In contrast to the civilian ruler, who arises to power through the legitimising process of elections, a military ruler has to acquire legitimacy piecemeal through showing allegiance to the text of the Constitution. However, when he draws near to the point of acquiring permanent power, the civilian ruler has lost much of his legitimacy through political conduct. This prepares the public mind for the transition from civilian to military rule.
Four types of legitimacy: This means that there are several types of legitimacies that are clearly or tacitly accepted as expressions of norm in Pakistan. Before we examine Musharrafâs quest for legitimacy, let us look at an approximate cluster of these legitimacies. This of course presumes that, on the basis of existential practice, constitution is not the only source of legitimacy. 1) The first condition is of course constitutional which becomes available through the interpretive agency of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and its legitimising verdicts. 2) The second condition is political support which becomes available through a political party which legitimises a military ruler indirectly by contesting elections and winning them. 3) The third condition is support of the army. Unfortunately, this has acquired the status of a category because of Pakistanâs revisionist nationalism and the status of the army as an arbiter when the civilian system challenges the âsecurity of the stateâ. Political leaders lean on this legitimising factor for coming to power and for maintaining themselves in power. 4) The fourth condition is derived from economic management. This applies to all states big and small, but in the case of Pakistan it means breaking out of international isolation and avoiding the consequences of economic mismanagement by courting the support of the United States.
Supreme Court and the Army: General Musharraf gained legitimacy by acquiring the cluster of all the four legitimacies after coming to power in 1999. This is proved by the barometer of his personal popularity among the people and within the aggregate of Pakistanâs vested interests. He approached the Supreme Court of Pakistan for an initial tenure of legitimisation. The same Court had been physically attacked by an elected government in an act of self-delegitimisation. Musharraf himself later described the same trajectory of self-delegitimisation by brutalising the Supreme Court in 2007 when he dismissed its chief justice.
The process of legitimisation fades into delegitimisation at the end of a tenure of public acceptance. The universal rule of atrophy of incumbency applies to democratic and non-democratic governance equally and crucially determines the downturn in the popularity of the ruler. General Musharraf adhered to the rules of second legitimacy, that of being loyal to the army, to maintain its support. Apart from using administrative mechanisms within the army, which he controlled by allowing himself two offices at the same time, he kept the assent of the army behind his rule by inducting a large number of military personnel in the civilian administrative structure.
America and Army without Allah? President Musharraf used the paradigmatic event of 9/11 to reclaim American support as a legitimising factor in his government. This gave Pakistan an unprecedented period of economic growth lauded by such international organisations as the IMF and the World Bank. The two organisations are routinely used by states as politically legitimising factors in domestic politics. The army was rewarded through the revamping of its equipment and through incentives of better employment among the officersâ class. But there was a built-in contradiction in Musharrafâs courting of the army and the Americans. The two legitimacies were contradictory.
By overstaying his self-prescribed tenure in 2004, Musharraf invited the inevitable unveiling of the Pakistan Army-US contradiction in Afghanistan and the war against terrorism. His ambivalence always worried his supporters, but the clashing legitimacies of the army, that wanted retention of a position of dominance in Afghanistan, and America that wanted the Taliban isolated in Pakistan, undermined his governance. In part, his adherence to American policy, which he posited as âenlightenment and moderationâ, also struck at the base of the legitimacy acquired through the 2002 elections. His party the PMLQ was reluctant to accept the policy as its mission statement.
The process of delegitimisation: After 2004, the process of legitimisation was clearly unfolding against Musharraf. All the four legitimacies that buoyed him up were now coming unstuck. His liberal reform which required the loosening of the laws affecting the minoritiesâ and womenâs rights were filibustered by the PMLQ, his party in power. The madrassa reform, which would have caused a serious dent in the policy of dominating Afghanistan, was allowed to run aground. He refused to see the contradiction in promoting a liberal vision for international legitimisation while harnessed to the legitimising factor of a conservative party in government.
In 2007, Musharraf lost all the four grounds of legitimacy. General Zia had gained legitimacy through Islamisation and had to be killed after he lost it through an extension of rule beyond permissible incumbency. General Musharraf had gained legitimacy through the reverse process of liberalisation and doesnât have to be killed after an extension of rule beyond permissible incumbency because the process of liberalisation had allowed more democratic space in Pakistan than Ziaâs Islamisation did.
Quote:
Because of the regular alternation between military and civilian rule in Pakistan, people often refer to legitimacy, or lack thereof, on the part of the rulers. Although the yardstick of legitimacy should be applied to all rulers, it is usually applied to the military rulers. In this case, it commonly means constitutional legitimacy; and it becomes a dominant strain in public discourse towards the end of a military interregnum. Yet, at the existential level, there is a variety of legitimacies that a ruler in Pakistan must acquire if he wants to remain in power.
There is no doubt that a military ruler has to seek legitimacy while a civilian ruler has to maintain legitimacy. In contrast to the civilian ruler, who arises to power through the legitimising process of elections, a military ruler has to acquire legitimacy piecemeal through showing allegiance to the text of the Constitution. However, when he draws near to the point of acquiring permanent power, the civilian ruler has lost much of his legitimacy through political conduct. This prepares the public mind for the transition from civilian to military rule.
Four types of legitimacy: This means that there are several types of legitimacies that are clearly or tacitly accepted as expressions of norm in Pakistan. Before we examine Musharrafâs quest for legitimacy, let us look at an approximate cluster of these legitimacies. This of course presumes that, on the basis of existential practice, constitution is not the only source of legitimacy. 1) The first condition is of course constitutional which becomes available through the interpretive agency of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and its legitimising verdicts. 2) The second condition is political support which becomes available through a political party which legitimises a military ruler indirectly by contesting elections and winning them. 3) The third condition is support of the army. Unfortunately, this has acquired the status of a category because of Pakistanâs revisionist nationalism and the status of the army as an arbiter when the civilian system challenges the âsecurity of the stateâ. Political leaders lean on this legitimising factor for coming to power and for maintaining themselves in power. 4) The fourth condition is derived from economic management. This applies to all states big and small, but in the case of Pakistan it means breaking out of international isolation and avoiding the consequences of economic mismanagement by courting the support of the United States.
Supreme Court and the Army: General Musharraf gained legitimacy by acquiring the cluster of all the four legitimacies after coming to power in 1999. This is proved by the barometer of his personal popularity among the people and within the aggregate of Pakistanâs vested interests. He approached the Supreme Court of Pakistan for an initial tenure of legitimisation. The same Court had been physically attacked by an elected government in an act of self-delegitimisation. Musharraf himself later described the same trajectory of self-delegitimisation by brutalising the Supreme Court in 2007 when he dismissed its chief justice.
The process of legitimisation fades into delegitimisation at the end of a tenure of public acceptance. The universal rule of atrophy of incumbency applies to democratic and non-democratic governance equally and crucially determines the downturn in the popularity of the ruler. General Musharraf adhered to the rules of second legitimacy, that of being loyal to the army, to maintain its support. Apart from using administrative mechanisms within the army, which he controlled by allowing himself two offices at the same time, he kept the assent of the army behind his rule by inducting a large number of military personnel in the civilian administrative structure.
America and Army without Allah? President Musharraf used the paradigmatic event of 9/11 to reclaim American support as a legitimising factor in his government. This gave Pakistan an unprecedented period of economic growth lauded by such international organisations as the IMF and the World Bank. The two organisations are routinely used by states as politically legitimising factors in domestic politics. The army was rewarded through the revamping of its equipment and through incentives of better employment among the officersâ class. But there was a built-in contradiction in Musharrafâs courting of the army and the Americans. The two legitimacies were contradictory.
By overstaying his self-prescribed tenure in 2004, Musharraf invited the inevitable unveiling of the Pakistan Army-US contradiction in Afghanistan and the war against terrorism. His ambivalence always worried his supporters, but the clashing legitimacies of the army, that wanted retention of a position of dominance in Afghanistan, and America that wanted the Taliban isolated in Pakistan, undermined his governance. In part, his adherence to American policy, which he posited as âenlightenment and moderationâ, also struck at the base of the legitimacy acquired through the 2002 elections. His party the PMLQ was reluctant to accept the policy as its mission statement.
The process of delegitimisation: After 2004, the process of legitimisation was clearly unfolding against Musharraf. All the four legitimacies that buoyed him up were now coming unstuck. His liberal reform which required the loosening of the laws affecting the minoritiesâ and womenâs rights were filibustered by the PMLQ, his party in power. The madrassa reform, which would have caused a serious dent in the policy of dominating Afghanistan, was allowed to run aground. He refused to see the contradiction in promoting a liberal vision for international legitimisation while harnessed to the legitimising factor of a conservative party in government.
In 2007, Musharraf lost all the four grounds of legitimacy. General Zia had gained legitimacy through Islamisation and had to be killed after he lost it through an extension of rule beyond permissible incumbency. General Musharraf had gained legitimacy through the reverse process of liberalisation and doesnât have to be killed after an extension of rule beyond permissible incumbency because the process of liberalisation had allowed more democratic space in Pakistan than Ziaâs Islamisation did.