08-17-2008, 07:26 PM
EDITORIAL: Message in the charge-sheet
The charge-sheet prepared against President Pervez Musharraf is supposed to be secret but its contents have been hinted at by the coalition government as the document is passed from Information Minister Sherry Rehman to Law Minister Farooq Naek for giving it a legal form. The salient points in the roster of allegations pertaining to President Musharrafâs conduct in power are said to be seven and they reflect the bias of the two major coalition partners.
The committee that put together the charges is said to have collected over a dozen culpable actions that may or may not appear in the final draft. The gist of the charges to which the media was made privy on Friday night are as follows: (1) military coup against the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999; (2) suspension of the Constitution twice and aggression against the judiciary, on March 9, 2007 and on Nov 3, 2007; (3) indifference to the constitutional requirement of annual address to parliament; (4) making the NFC award to the provinces without consulting them; (5) military operation in Balochistan and target-killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti; (6) military operation on Lal Masjid; and (7) âmissing personsâ and their extradition to the United States, and the Damadola attack.
Before considering the contents of the charge-sheet, one must be clear about the process through which President Musharraf will pass if he is to be impeached. Despite the divided opinion among his legal advisers, the president must understand that impeachment is not a judicial process. The charges will be adjudged, not by a court, but a gathering of politicians who donât want him around any more while some of them want revenge for what they think they have gone through because of him. They are the prosecutor, the judge and the jury. His defence, if it comes, will be heard pro-forma â if the joint session is quiet enough to make hearing possible â before the vote convicts him and asks him to leave.
Many people will question the wisdom of some of the charges. For instance, the ones relating to the military coup in 1999 and the two suspensions of the Constitution are supposed to be already indemnified by the verdict of the Supreme Court (the PCO of 2000 was legitimised by many of the deposed judges), which is the agency that awards constitutional legitimacy to the rulers in Pakistan. The president was acting on the basis of the jurisprudence of the constitutional history of Pakistan. Wasnât this how General Zia-ul Haq, whose disciple is Nawaz Sharif, legitimised his rule? Didnât he fix the judiciary so that he could get the required legal cover? General Musharraf travelled the well-trodden road of the military dictators of the past although he didnât follow it up with martial law administrators and military courts.
Similarly, his inability or unwillingness to address the joint session is a picayune allegation although it is required by the Constitution. Despite the constitutional fiat, however, many jurists insist it is not serious enough, given the fact that the parliament has now a firm tradition of ignoring the decorum of the house and insulting the presidents when they address the joint session. A similar âground realityâ has to be considered in relation to courts when they have to deliver judgements on cases of extradition. Again and again, at the lower courts and the high courts, judges have avoided taking on the religious militias backing the terrorists after receiving threats from them.
Then there is the issue of the Lal Masjid Operation. The coalition government must be careful about how it approaches this problem because the matter has been internationalised and any reference to it will affect Pakistanâs external relations. It also involves serving officers of the Pakistan Army who carried out the Operation. Significantly, both the big parties and the JUIF of Maulana Fazlur Rehman have changed their minds about what happened last year. The clerics of Lal Masjid were carrying out vigilante action in the capital city and terrorising the population there. The drop scene came when they attacked a Chinese business in Islamabad, eliciting a firm official Chinese reaction. Since Lal Masjid became a cause celebre for Al Qaeda, the world outside will look at this charge against President Musharraf with disbelief and disdain. The same reaction will meet the charge in relation to the Damadola attack in January 2006.
Of course, the president will be able to rebut the charges against him effectively, including the one about the NFC award after the provinces had deadlocked themselves. But the problem is that whatever he says in the parliament will move neither the politicians sitting there nor the people of Pakistan. It is therefore much more important that he is enabled to resign and leave his job safely. There are moves afoot to get the government to make some kind of a deal with him so that he gets âsave passageâ in return for his resignation. Good. Meanwhile, the politicians who are waxing hostile on the issue should realise that when the impeachment process unfolds it is not going to be all rosy for them. The president may not win in parliament but he might just succeed in convincing significant numbers of Pakistanis and the world outside that he was hard done by the democrats. *
The charge-sheet prepared against President Pervez Musharraf is supposed to be secret but its contents have been hinted at by the coalition government as the document is passed from Information Minister Sherry Rehman to Law Minister Farooq Naek for giving it a legal form. The salient points in the roster of allegations pertaining to President Musharrafâs conduct in power are said to be seven and they reflect the bias of the two major coalition partners.
The committee that put together the charges is said to have collected over a dozen culpable actions that may or may not appear in the final draft. The gist of the charges to which the media was made privy on Friday night are as follows: (1) military coup against the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999; (2) suspension of the Constitution twice and aggression against the judiciary, on March 9, 2007 and on Nov 3, 2007; (3) indifference to the constitutional requirement of annual address to parliament; (4) making the NFC award to the provinces without consulting them; (5) military operation in Balochistan and target-killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti; (6) military operation on Lal Masjid; and (7) âmissing personsâ and their extradition to the United States, and the Damadola attack.
Before considering the contents of the charge-sheet, one must be clear about the process through which President Musharraf will pass if he is to be impeached. Despite the divided opinion among his legal advisers, the president must understand that impeachment is not a judicial process. The charges will be adjudged, not by a court, but a gathering of politicians who donât want him around any more while some of them want revenge for what they think they have gone through because of him. They are the prosecutor, the judge and the jury. His defence, if it comes, will be heard pro-forma â if the joint session is quiet enough to make hearing possible â before the vote convicts him and asks him to leave.
Many people will question the wisdom of some of the charges. For instance, the ones relating to the military coup in 1999 and the two suspensions of the Constitution are supposed to be already indemnified by the verdict of the Supreme Court (the PCO of 2000 was legitimised by many of the deposed judges), which is the agency that awards constitutional legitimacy to the rulers in Pakistan. The president was acting on the basis of the jurisprudence of the constitutional history of Pakistan. Wasnât this how General Zia-ul Haq, whose disciple is Nawaz Sharif, legitimised his rule? Didnât he fix the judiciary so that he could get the required legal cover? General Musharraf travelled the well-trodden road of the military dictators of the past although he didnât follow it up with martial law administrators and military courts.
Similarly, his inability or unwillingness to address the joint session is a picayune allegation although it is required by the Constitution. Despite the constitutional fiat, however, many jurists insist it is not serious enough, given the fact that the parliament has now a firm tradition of ignoring the decorum of the house and insulting the presidents when they address the joint session. A similar âground realityâ has to be considered in relation to courts when they have to deliver judgements on cases of extradition. Again and again, at the lower courts and the high courts, judges have avoided taking on the religious militias backing the terrorists after receiving threats from them.
Then there is the issue of the Lal Masjid Operation. The coalition government must be careful about how it approaches this problem because the matter has been internationalised and any reference to it will affect Pakistanâs external relations. It also involves serving officers of the Pakistan Army who carried out the Operation. Significantly, both the big parties and the JUIF of Maulana Fazlur Rehman have changed their minds about what happened last year. The clerics of Lal Masjid were carrying out vigilante action in the capital city and terrorising the population there. The drop scene came when they attacked a Chinese business in Islamabad, eliciting a firm official Chinese reaction. Since Lal Masjid became a cause celebre for Al Qaeda, the world outside will look at this charge against President Musharraf with disbelief and disdain. The same reaction will meet the charge in relation to the Damadola attack in January 2006.
Of course, the president will be able to rebut the charges against him effectively, including the one about the NFC award after the provinces had deadlocked themselves. But the problem is that whatever he says in the parliament will move neither the politicians sitting there nor the people of Pakistan. It is therefore much more important that he is enabled to resign and leave his job safely. There are moves afoot to get the government to make some kind of a deal with him so that he gets âsave passageâ in return for his resignation. Good. Meanwhile, the politicians who are waxing hostile on the issue should realise that when the impeachment process unfolds it is not going to be all rosy for them. The president may not win in parliament but he might just succeed in convincing significant numbers of Pakistanis and the world outside that he was hard done by the democrats. *