08-18-2008, 11:14 PM
<b>Win-win for Pak-India</b>
Seize on the opportunities provided by Parvez Musharraf's exit, exhorts N.V.Subramanian.
18 August 2008: The inevitable has happened. How should now India deal with the situation after Parvez Musharraf's departure? This writer has used the word "situation" and not reflexively considered how is it that the Manmohan Singh government should engage with the weak (though perhaps no more that) PPP-led coalition government, the natural filler of much of the "political vacuum" left by Musharraf's resignation. Keen NewsInsight.net readers will immediately connect "political vacuum" to the National Security Advisor (NSA), M.K.Narayanan's dangerous outspokenness recently (see Commentary, "Motormouth," 13 August 2008), in which he appeared a deal over-fond of Musharraf and slighted the elected government. Predictably, Narayanan raised hackles in Pakistan. With Musharraf gone, that may not be forgiven, but could be temporarily forgotten.
Musharraf is history. India will have to deal with the post-Musharraf "situation", the word appearing in the beginning of this commentary. Dealing with the "situation" will obviously mean dealing with the elected government, held together so far by the compromising brilliance of Benazir Bhutto's widower, Asif Zardari, who could well be said to have come into his own. But Pakistan's emerging "situation" contains other things and other actors. Dynamically, in proportion to their changing weight in the affairs of Pakistan, these "things" and "actors", besides the elected government, will have to be dealt with by India. Let us try to gain a grip on what this "situation" is, and what it entails. This is a preliminary analysis. More may follow in subsequent commentaries. Pakistani commentators themselves have been quick of the mark, saying that real tensions between the PPP and Nawaz Sharief's PML-N sections of the elected government will erupt now that their common enemy, Musharraf, is out of the way. Commentators also warn that the government has to deliver, with Musharraf gone, on major crises such as the collapsed economy and infrastructure and runaway inflation, spiraling terrorist violence in the north-west's tribal areas, peaking jihadi suicide bombings in urban Pakistan, and of course relations with the United States. Troubles in Jammu and Kashmir would give the elected government more uneasy moments with the Pakistan army and the ISI than, per se, with the Indian government, although angry statements may emanate from either side from time to time.
But J and K is still not a crisis issue for the elected government. Those crisis issues mentioned earlier in this paragraph are what, to repeat, Pakistani commentators expect that their government will soon have to overcome. All well said, and well taken. From India's standpoint, this is nothing unusual. Governments are elected to govern, although most times they don't, and there is the extant example of the Manmohan Singh government, the most dysfunctional government in the last ten years. Trouble for India from the elected Pakistan government can come from Nawaz Sharief's party, whose hardline elements may be tempted to play the Kashmir card to embarrass the PPP and Zardari. Both Zardari and Sharief would know that the only institution to gain from warring Pakistani politicians, or from impelling them to war against one another, is the Pakistan army, and flowing from there, the intelligence establishment. If Zardari, Sharief and the other politicians not allied with the military/ intelligence establishment go to war against one another, or hunt one another down in packs, or make the mistake Sharif did, and others before him, of allying with the army to score points against political opponents, then it will be back to military rule again, sooner or later. India, therefore, must use all its political and diplomatic skills to keep Pakistani politicians forever apprised/ advised of the limits they must place on opposing one another, and that that opposition should remain within the space afforded by democracy. This is one key long-term project of the Indian government. For this, it is necessary that all Pakistani politicians are engaged, the PPP by the Congress, say, because of the closeness of the Bhuttos to the Gandhis, Nawaz Sharief by I.K.Gujral and the Punjabiat crowd, and so on the Baluchis and the Frontiersmen. Care must be taken, in this engagement, that nothing is said or done to jeopardize Pakistan's nascent democracy. The second project flows from this engagement, which is to cajole, push and persevere with Pakistani politicians to bring the notorious ISI and other intelligence agencies under civilian control.
In this, the Americans would assist if it assists in their war against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas. Either the Pakistan army or the ISI-driven Pakistan army (this distinction is important to make) may or will act spoiler, because if democracy becomes stronger and deep-rooted in Pakistan and relations between the Pakistani and Indian democracies become solider, they would increasingly call to question the existence of such a large Pakistani military. With stable deterrence between them, pressure would grow to down-size the Pakistan military, and this could ultimately be also a long-term US aim to keep Afghanistan secure, if, that is, it does not affect the war against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. So, to spoil this, to destroy any prospect of its large size, its raison d'etre (to defend against "Hindu India") being called to question, the intelligence-driven Pakistan army will try to raise levels of terrorism in India. This has to be combated robustly, but the elected Pakistan government, this or subsequent ones, must be made to feel to be under India's debt, that it is taking punishment to preserve Pakistani democracy. At the same time as Pakistani politicians are made to feel indebted, they should also be told that any nexus between them and terrorists would affect relations between the two democracies. Once these messages are conveyed and reinforced, and there is all-party consensus on them on this and that side of the border, we can reasonably expect a new era in relations. But at no time must we lower our guard. Pakistan will undergo a long period of democratic experimentation and it could all blow up. Pakistan's democracy will remain most threatened by its military and intelligence so long the J and K dispute remains unresolved and unless Pakistan has ironclad guarantees that India won't provoke a war against it. In the 1947-48 war that Pakistan provoked in J and K, India lost the part called Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.
In the 1971 war that India set up, Pakistan was divided into two. So somebody should tell Pakistan's military-religious ideologues that it is even between the two countries. But more seriously, India should forthrightly say, and repeat it in every forum, that borders won't and cannot be redrawn. And this writer does not speak for the Indian government when he says this. But the only doable solution is to sanctify the status quo. Pakistan keeps what it has. India keeps what it has. And in a happier, prosperous future, and when political Islam also expends itself, who knows, J and K might cartography its own territory. But till that time, which may be one generation hence, or two, or one hundred years away, India and Pakistan would have to settle with the status quo. This is the best immediate and medium-term resolution of the J and K dispute possible. The conversion of LoC into a border, which almost came to be at the 1972 Simla Summit, should be made to be the objective for both Pakistani and Indian democracies to attain. This is the maximum India can concede, and Pakistani politicians should be made to feel they have achieved something in gaining this. It will need many months of convincing from the Indian side, but perseverance will pay. Finally, there is the issue of an ironclad guarantee against future Indian hostilities, which Pakistani political parties may need to downsize and defang their military. India and Pakistan's mutual deterrence is one guarantee. After the Kargil War, there was talk on the Indian side of a "limited war" fought under a nuclear overhang. The Pakistanis were naturally alarmed by this, but the fact remains that Pakistan waged exactly such a limited war (Kargil), although they acted up alarmed when India, more precisely George Fernandes, the then Indian defence minister, merely defined the possibilities.
The point is that, unless gravely provoked, as India was in 1971, democracies don't make war, and Pakistan started the chapter of wars in 1947. Yes, true, everyone knows this bit of history. But if an ironclad guarantee still helps Pakistan's politicians to keep their military under civil supremacy, then a no-war pact is always possible between India and Pakistan, but where Pakistan makes an explicit commitment to terminate all cross-border terrorism, and permits inspection of its territories as part of compliance procedure. Obviously, all these are very broad brush strokes to tell how a post-Musharraf situation may evolve, and how to sustain and preserve Pakistan's democracy. The Indian government has to do considerable thinking, filling in, and putting resultant strategies into action, but time, as they say, is of the essence. Rather than lament about the "political vacuum" that would result from Musharraf's departure, the NSA and the government should get an action plan put in place that makes this current transition in Pakistan a win-win for that country and for India. N.V.Subramanian is Editor, NewsInsight.net. Har-Anand has published his new second novel, Courtesan of Storms.
Seize on the opportunities provided by Parvez Musharraf's exit, exhorts N.V.Subramanian.
18 August 2008: The inevitable has happened. How should now India deal with the situation after Parvez Musharraf's departure? This writer has used the word "situation" and not reflexively considered how is it that the Manmohan Singh government should engage with the weak (though perhaps no more that) PPP-led coalition government, the natural filler of much of the "political vacuum" left by Musharraf's resignation. Keen NewsInsight.net readers will immediately connect "political vacuum" to the National Security Advisor (NSA), M.K.Narayanan's dangerous outspokenness recently (see Commentary, "Motormouth," 13 August 2008), in which he appeared a deal over-fond of Musharraf and slighted the elected government. Predictably, Narayanan raised hackles in Pakistan. With Musharraf gone, that may not be forgiven, but could be temporarily forgotten.
Musharraf is history. India will have to deal with the post-Musharraf "situation", the word appearing in the beginning of this commentary. Dealing with the "situation" will obviously mean dealing with the elected government, held together so far by the compromising brilliance of Benazir Bhutto's widower, Asif Zardari, who could well be said to have come into his own. But Pakistan's emerging "situation" contains other things and other actors. Dynamically, in proportion to their changing weight in the affairs of Pakistan, these "things" and "actors", besides the elected government, will have to be dealt with by India. Let us try to gain a grip on what this "situation" is, and what it entails. This is a preliminary analysis. More may follow in subsequent commentaries. Pakistani commentators themselves have been quick of the mark, saying that real tensions between the PPP and Nawaz Sharief's PML-N sections of the elected government will erupt now that their common enemy, Musharraf, is out of the way. Commentators also warn that the government has to deliver, with Musharraf gone, on major crises such as the collapsed economy and infrastructure and runaway inflation, spiraling terrorist violence in the north-west's tribal areas, peaking jihadi suicide bombings in urban Pakistan, and of course relations with the United States. Troubles in Jammu and Kashmir would give the elected government more uneasy moments with the Pakistan army and the ISI than, per se, with the Indian government, although angry statements may emanate from either side from time to time.
But J and K is still not a crisis issue for the elected government. Those crisis issues mentioned earlier in this paragraph are what, to repeat, Pakistani commentators expect that their government will soon have to overcome. All well said, and well taken. From India's standpoint, this is nothing unusual. Governments are elected to govern, although most times they don't, and there is the extant example of the Manmohan Singh government, the most dysfunctional government in the last ten years. Trouble for India from the elected Pakistan government can come from Nawaz Sharief's party, whose hardline elements may be tempted to play the Kashmir card to embarrass the PPP and Zardari. Both Zardari and Sharief would know that the only institution to gain from warring Pakistani politicians, or from impelling them to war against one another, is the Pakistan army, and flowing from there, the intelligence establishment. If Zardari, Sharief and the other politicians not allied with the military/ intelligence establishment go to war against one another, or hunt one another down in packs, or make the mistake Sharif did, and others before him, of allying with the army to score points against political opponents, then it will be back to military rule again, sooner or later. India, therefore, must use all its political and diplomatic skills to keep Pakistani politicians forever apprised/ advised of the limits they must place on opposing one another, and that that opposition should remain within the space afforded by democracy. This is one key long-term project of the Indian government. For this, it is necessary that all Pakistani politicians are engaged, the PPP by the Congress, say, because of the closeness of the Bhuttos to the Gandhis, Nawaz Sharief by I.K.Gujral and the Punjabiat crowd, and so on the Baluchis and the Frontiersmen. Care must be taken, in this engagement, that nothing is said or done to jeopardize Pakistan's nascent democracy. The second project flows from this engagement, which is to cajole, push and persevere with Pakistani politicians to bring the notorious ISI and other intelligence agencies under civilian control.
In this, the Americans would assist if it assists in their war against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas. Either the Pakistan army or the ISI-driven Pakistan army (this distinction is important to make) may or will act spoiler, because if democracy becomes stronger and deep-rooted in Pakistan and relations between the Pakistani and Indian democracies become solider, they would increasingly call to question the existence of such a large Pakistani military. With stable deterrence between them, pressure would grow to down-size the Pakistan military, and this could ultimately be also a long-term US aim to keep Afghanistan secure, if, that is, it does not affect the war against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. So, to spoil this, to destroy any prospect of its large size, its raison d'etre (to defend against "Hindu India") being called to question, the intelligence-driven Pakistan army will try to raise levels of terrorism in India. This has to be combated robustly, but the elected Pakistan government, this or subsequent ones, must be made to feel to be under India's debt, that it is taking punishment to preserve Pakistani democracy. At the same time as Pakistani politicians are made to feel indebted, they should also be told that any nexus between them and terrorists would affect relations between the two democracies. Once these messages are conveyed and reinforced, and there is all-party consensus on them on this and that side of the border, we can reasonably expect a new era in relations. But at no time must we lower our guard. Pakistan will undergo a long period of democratic experimentation and it could all blow up. Pakistan's democracy will remain most threatened by its military and intelligence so long the J and K dispute remains unresolved and unless Pakistan has ironclad guarantees that India won't provoke a war against it. In the 1947-48 war that Pakistan provoked in J and K, India lost the part called Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.
In the 1971 war that India set up, Pakistan was divided into two. So somebody should tell Pakistan's military-religious ideologues that it is even between the two countries. But more seriously, India should forthrightly say, and repeat it in every forum, that borders won't and cannot be redrawn. And this writer does not speak for the Indian government when he says this. But the only doable solution is to sanctify the status quo. Pakistan keeps what it has. India keeps what it has. And in a happier, prosperous future, and when political Islam also expends itself, who knows, J and K might cartography its own territory. But till that time, which may be one generation hence, or two, or one hundred years away, India and Pakistan would have to settle with the status quo. This is the best immediate and medium-term resolution of the J and K dispute possible. The conversion of LoC into a border, which almost came to be at the 1972 Simla Summit, should be made to be the objective for both Pakistani and Indian democracies to attain. This is the maximum India can concede, and Pakistani politicians should be made to feel they have achieved something in gaining this. It will need many months of convincing from the Indian side, but perseverance will pay. Finally, there is the issue of an ironclad guarantee against future Indian hostilities, which Pakistani political parties may need to downsize and defang their military. India and Pakistan's mutual deterrence is one guarantee. After the Kargil War, there was talk on the Indian side of a "limited war" fought under a nuclear overhang. The Pakistanis were naturally alarmed by this, but the fact remains that Pakistan waged exactly such a limited war (Kargil), although they acted up alarmed when India, more precisely George Fernandes, the then Indian defence minister, merely defined the possibilities.
The point is that, unless gravely provoked, as India was in 1971, democracies don't make war, and Pakistan started the chapter of wars in 1947. Yes, true, everyone knows this bit of history. But if an ironclad guarantee still helps Pakistan's politicians to keep their military under civil supremacy, then a no-war pact is always possible between India and Pakistan, but where Pakistan makes an explicit commitment to terminate all cross-border terrorism, and permits inspection of its territories as part of compliance procedure. Obviously, all these are very broad brush strokes to tell how a post-Musharraf situation may evolve, and how to sustain and preserve Pakistan's democracy. The Indian government has to do considerable thinking, filling in, and putting resultant strategies into action, but time, as they say, is of the essence. Rather than lament about the "political vacuum" that would result from Musharraf's departure, the NSA and the government should get an action plan put in place that makes this current transition in Pakistan a win-win for that country and for India. N.V.Subramanian is Editor, NewsInsight.net. Har-Anand has published his new second novel, Courtesan of Storms.