10-21-2004, 12:10 AM
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Night of nine generals
Abhijit Bhattacharyya
Navami stands for nine, and nine generals (both retired and serving) of the Indian Army will formally meet to discuss issues facing the Defence forces. This will be a first in the 57-year history of free India. Significantly, these nine men meet at Delhi on the last day of "Navratri", on October 22, 2004. From the point of view of seniority and protocol (on which all armies operate), Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw (Infantry) at 90 leads the team.
Following him are generals OP Malhotra (Artillery), KVK Rao (Infantry), SF Rodrigues (Artillery), VN Sharma (Armoured Corps), S Roy Choudhuri (Armoured Corps), VP Malik (Infantry), S Padmanabhan (Artillery) and the serving chief NC Vij (Infantry).
All the predecessors of the present Army General were commissioned before the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the most illustrious of them all is certainly the flamboyant, blunt and yet the most successful Indian Army chief SHFJ Manekshaw, the victor of the 1971 war. But the question is what is so special about this meeting of the generals? Is it a reunion or is it a group for pressure tactics? What would they say to each other when they meet? Exchange pleasantries or insist on following protocol based on seniority? How would it be taken by the (civilian) powers-that-be which, unlike Pakistan, are superior in rank, protocol and status to the Indian Army?
In my perception, the meeting of the nine generals, though unprecedented, is long overdue and one has nothing to fear and every reason to be pleased to see them together. Why does one say so? Because the Indian generals (except in the case of late Lt General BN Kaul) have never been known to harbour political ambitions. In fact, it has been quite the opposite: They have always been professionals par excellence and played a subservient role to the political boss. SHFJ Manekshaw is universally acknowledged to have given and stuck to his professional advice to late Indira Gandhi on the timing of mobilisation and deployment of the Army for the 1971 war. Lt General SK Sinha (who almost became the Army chief in 1983) was found to be an "adamant professional" rather than a "malleable politician".
Hence he missed the top professional slot. None, till date, could raise a finger at Lt General Sinha for not being professional. He could, however, be "faulted" for not playing ball with politics. Similarly, former General Vishwa Nath Sharma was also well known for his strict professional outlook and attitude. General S Padmanabhan never had a Delhi posting before becoming Army chief and General Shankar Roy Choudhuri silently bore the pain of not getting an operational command and stoically got himself registered to his fate of a possible retirement in 1995.
Since life moves on comparison and contrast, the nature, worth and character of independent India's generals can be appreciated in light of the history of the coup-ridden "general rule" in Pakistan and Bangladesh, arguably the nearest and yet the farthest in habit, taste and culture of violence, bloodshed and fundamentalism. The meeting of the generals, therefore, will surely address the contemporary problems of the Army, narration of the experience of the past generals and the future role and deployment of India's million strong standing Army.
An important recent concern for the Army (and the nation) appears to have cropped up with increased threat perception in the East and Northeast India. Understandably, the recent security meeting in Delhi, which decided to mobilise a brigade strength force in the Northeast is a pointer. Question is, will this be enough? Should there be more than what is being deployed at present? Especially since Bangladesh is ceaselessly increasing the strength of its Army with the intention of flooding India with its uncounted and unwanted people and sabotaging Indian state through the insurgents?
Doubtless, the sudden developments in the East are bound to affect the Indian Army's deployment and operational readiness. After a long time the Army will have to prepare a contingency plan for three front disposition as was done in 1971 - that is, (West) Pakistan, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and China.
Though recent diplomatic thaw in Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak relations is welcome, there is virtually no possibility of force reduction in places like Leh, Srinagar, Nagrota, Bhatinda, Jalandhar and Jodhpur in the North and West and Tezpur, Siliguri and Dimapur in the Northeast and East. In fact, the Bangladesh factor (infiltration, Islamism, sabotage, etc.) may (perhaps) compel the Indian Army to raise another corps if not a "command" in the near future.
Post-Kargil, the Indian Army upgraded its Leh's Infantry Division to Corps Headquarters. Post-2004, India is bound to reorient its threat perception and "upgrade the east" with modernisation and expansion of its forces. The wisdom of the generals may also make them take a fresh look at the morale of the soldiers on the ground, along with the welfare of the families of those dying in action. This twin pillar of morale and welfare have always been the barometre of success or failure of every army in the world.
The generals may also look at the quality of recruitment of the soldiers, the shortage of junior level commissioned officers and, above all, the occasional demand for the creation of Bengal, Gujarat, Manipur and Yadav Regiments in the Indian Army. Come what may, it would be in the fitness of things if the nine generals unanimously put a stamp of their approval for not raising any more regiments (in the Indian Army) based on State, language, race, caste or religion.
Although the Indian Army regiments have had the distinct flavour of state (Punjab, Bihar, Assam, Madras Regiment), race (Gurkha, Naga Regiment), caste (Mahar, Jat, Rajput, Maratha Regiment), language (Garhwal, Dogra Regiment), and religion (Sikh Regiment), they have successfully stood the test of time. In fact, though state, race, caste language and religion are all "dirty" words to be used for political mudslinging and non-professional one upmanship by the aristocrats of the great Indian democracy, ironically these have proved to be the positive side of the so-called "fractured" society of India.
Today, one needs to remember that though the British did not rule over Indians as friends, they certainly put in the best of their intentions and efforts to raise an Army which would fight cohesively. Post-1857, the British could not afford to have mutiny-infested regiments jeopardising their global economic imperialism. The Indian Army had to be a professional force wherein merit had to be the sole criterion for recruitment, deployment and reward.
Fortunately, however, the days of a possible Bengal, Gujarat, Manipur or Yadav Regiments are no more possible because of the attitude and action of a section of the political oligarchy of India, which is likely to turn these regiments' recruitment into a non-professional pastime and sadistic individual pleasure, thereby jeopardising the interests of a glorious institution of India. It is the duty of the nine generals to stand up to save their men serving the nation professionally.
(The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College of India and the views are his own)<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Night of nine generals
Abhijit Bhattacharyya
Navami stands for nine, and nine generals (both retired and serving) of the Indian Army will formally meet to discuss issues facing the Defence forces. This will be a first in the 57-year history of free India. Significantly, these nine men meet at Delhi on the last day of "Navratri", on October 22, 2004. From the point of view of seniority and protocol (on which all armies operate), Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw (Infantry) at 90 leads the team.
Following him are generals OP Malhotra (Artillery), KVK Rao (Infantry), SF Rodrigues (Artillery), VN Sharma (Armoured Corps), S Roy Choudhuri (Armoured Corps), VP Malik (Infantry), S Padmanabhan (Artillery) and the serving chief NC Vij (Infantry).
All the predecessors of the present Army General were commissioned before the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the most illustrious of them all is certainly the flamboyant, blunt and yet the most successful Indian Army chief SHFJ Manekshaw, the victor of the 1971 war. But the question is what is so special about this meeting of the generals? Is it a reunion or is it a group for pressure tactics? What would they say to each other when they meet? Exchange pleasantries or insist on following protocol based on seniority? How would it be taken by the (civilian) powers-that-be which, unlike Pakistan, are superior in rank, protocol and status to the Indian Army?
In my perception, the meeting of the nine generals, though unprecedented, is long overdue and one has nothing to fear and every reason to be pleased to see them together. Why does one say so? Because the Indian generals (except in the case of late Lt General BN Kaul) have never been known to harbour political ambitions. In fact, it has been quite the opposite: They have always been professionals par excellence and played a subservient role to the political boss. SHFJ Manekshaw is universally acknowledged to have given and stuck to his professional advice to late Indira Gandhi on the timing of mobilisation and deployment of the Army for the 1971 war. Lt General SK Sinha (who almost became the Army chief in 1983) was found to be an "adamant professional" rather than a "malleable politician".
Hence he missed the top professional slot. None, till date, could raise a finger at Lt General Sinha for not being professional. He could, however, be "faulted" for not playing ball with politics. Similarly, former General Vishwa Nath Sharma was also well known for his strict professional outlook and attitude. General S Padmanabhan never had a Delhi posting before becoming Army chief and General Shankar Roy Choudhuri silently bore the pain of not getting an operational command and stoically got himself registered to his fate of a possible retirement in 1995.
Since life moves on comparison and contrast, the nature, worth and character of independent India's generals can be appreciated in light of the history of the coup-ridden "general rule" in Pakistan and Bangladesh, arguably the nearest and yet the farthest in habit, taste and culture of violence, bloodshed and fundamentalism. The meeting of the generals, therefore, will surely address the contemporary problems of the Army, narration of the experience of the past generals and the future role and deployment of India's million strong standing Army.
An important recent concern for the Army (and the nation) appears to have cropped up with increased threat perception in the East and Northeast India. Understandably, the recent security meeting in Delhi, which decided to mobilise a brigade strength force in the Northeast is a pointer. Question is, will this be enough? Should there be more than what is being deployed at present? Especially since Bangladesh is ceaselessly increasing the strength of its Army with the intention of flooding India with its uncounted and unwanted people and sabotaging Indian state through the insurgents?
Doubtless, the sudden developments in the East are bound to affect the Indian Army's deployment and operational readiness. After a long time the Army will have to prepare a contingency plan for three front disposition as was done in 1971 - that is, (West) Pakistan, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and China.
Though recent diplomatic thaw in Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak relations is welcome, there is virtually no possibility of force reduction in places like Leh, Srinagar, Nagrota, Bhatinda, Jalandhar and Jodhpur in the North and West and Tezpur, Siliguri and Dimapur in the Northeast and East. In fact, the Bangladesh factor (infiltration, Islamism, sabotage, etc.) may (perhaps) compel the Indian Army to raise another corps if not a "command" in the near future.
Post-Kargil, the Indian Army upgraded its Leh's Infantry Division to Corps Headquarters. Post-2004, India is bound to reorient its threat perception and "upgrade the east" with modernisation and expansion of its forces. The wisdom of the generals may also make them take a fresh look at the morale of the soldiers on the ground, along with the welfare of the families of those dying in action. This twin pillar of morale and welfare have always been the barometre of success or failure of every army in the world.
The generals may also look at the quality of recruitment of the soldiers, the shortage of junior level commissioned officers and, above all, the occasional demand for the creation of Bengal, Gujarat, Manipur and Yadav Regiments in the Indian Army. Come what may, it would be in the fitness of things if the nine generals unanimously put a stamp of their approval for not raising any more regiments (in the Indian Army) based on State, language, race, caste or religion.
Although the Indian Army regiments have had the distinct flavour of state (Punjab, Bihar, Assam, Madras Regiment), race (Gurkha, Naga Regiment), caste (Mahar, Jat, Rajput, Maratha Regiment), language (Garhwal, Dogra Regiment), and religion (Sikh Regiment), they have successfully stood the test of time. In fact, though state, race, caste language and religion are all "dirty" words to be used for political mudslinging and non-professional one upmanship by the aristocrats of the great Indian democracy, ironically these have proved to be the positive side of the so-called "fractured" society of India.
Today, one needs to remember that though the British did not rule over Indians as friends, they certainly put in the best of their intentions and efforts to raise an Army which would fight cohesively. Post-1857, the British could not afford to have mutiny-infested regiments jeopardising their global economic imperialism. The Indian Army had to be a professional force wherein merit had to be the sole criterion for recruitment, deployment and reward.
Fortunately, however, the days of a possible Bengal, Gujarat, Manipur or Yadav Regiments are no more possible because of the attitude and action of a section of the political oligarchy of India, which is likely to turn these regiments' recruitment into a non-professional pastime and sadistic individual pleasure, thereby jeopardising the interests of a glorious institution of India. It is the duty of the nine generals to stand up to save their men serving the nation professionally.
(The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College of India and the views are his own)<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->