11-17-2009, 04:11 AM
<b>Ignoring Smoke Signals
</b>
<b>The arrest of Pakistan-born suspected Islamist jihadi David Headley and the unravelling of the plot to strike high profile targets in India have revealed startling details. In hindsight it appears security agencies missed out on crucial clues linked to the terror bombings in our cities</b>
As the Lashkar Chicago conspiracy unravels further, many details of David Headleyâs travel and stay in India are beginning to raise troubling questions on how he may have aided and abetted not just the deadly 26/11 Mumbai attacks but the series of mass terror attacks in multiple cities over the last three years.
In this multi-part series we attempt to connect the dots to take a hard look at how India may have missed many smoke signals on the wave of mass terror unleashed by Islamist jihadis between 2005 and 2009.
It was a strange coincidence that on November 26, 2008 the Indian Express took note of a report that had earlier appeared in a Pakistani newspaper on November 24 on how Kashmir jihadis had shifted base to Waziristan. A prominent name that appeared in either story was Ilyas Kashmiri alleged to be the leader of the terror outfit Harkat-ul-Mujahideen who had since moved to operate in Waziristan. It is a reflection on how dated and anachronistic the popular narrative is on the shifting loyalties within the jihadi landscape that the Indian media continued to refer to Ilyas Kashmiriâs affiliations with a defunct HuJI operating as a stand-alone terror outfit.
In the weeks following the November 26, 2008 attacks in a piece that appeared in the Asian Times, its Pakistan bureau chief Syed Saleem Shahzad made three important revelations, two of which are of consequence to this series.
Shahzad revealed that the 26/11 plot was originally conceived as a low key operation by the ISI targeting Kashmir, but was hijacked by Al Qaeda to unleash terror on Mumbai. While the Lashkar angle has been the obsessive focus of the Indian establishment, Al Qaeda command and control of the attack was practically ignored in the immediate aftermath of 26/11. A significant revelation by Shahzad that was also ignored was that Al Qaeda had been using India as a safe route from the Arabian Sea into Gujarat and then on to Mumbai and then either by air or overland to the United Arab Emirates.
That was back in December 2, 2008, but itâs only now 11 months later that we are seeing the tip of the iceberg of how India may have been used as a safe route with details trickling in of how a visa agency operated by David Headley in Mumbai may have ferreted out the many Indian Mujahideen activists absconding from law, including the top guns Abdul Subhan Qureshi alias Tauqeer and Riaz Bhatkal. The most damning pointer to such a David Headley-facilitated safe passage to the Indian Mujahideen fugitives comes from a cell phone that was retrieved by the Uttar Pradesh ATS after the Batla House encounter with call records to the cellular phone used by David Headley.
In the same article Shahzad also alludes to how the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and HuJI fell out of favor with the ISI to shift their loyalties to Al Qaeda with Ilyas Kashmiri moving to Waziristan. Many months later, on October 15 this year, Ilyas Kashmiri came back from the dead to grant an interview once again to Shahzad in which we learn of the role played by his â313 Brigadeâ in the Mumbai 26/11 attacks and subsequently in many fidayeen attacks in Pakistan.
In a reflection on how yet another smoke signal was ignored we are now told that the Indian security agencies had indeed stumbled on references to the â313 Brigadeâ during the phone intercepts of conversations between the 26/11 terrorists and their Pakistan-based handlers. It was reported back in February 2009 that the Indian authorities were confused on whether â313 Brigadeâ referred to a brigade within the Pakistani military establishment.
While not much is known of the composition of â313 Brigadeâ in the public domain, we must trace back to a botched Ilyas Kashmiri plot from 2008 to assassinate Pakistanâs Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani for a glimpse into the anti-establishment fervour that drives the organisation. That plot was botched after Al Qaeda elders prevailed on Ilyas Kashmiri against destabilising the Pakistani establishment.
Recent events in Pakistan, including the GHQ attack in Rawalpindi, which have been traced back to Ilyas Kashmiri once again expose the tension marked by this anti-establishment faultline, the roots of which trace back to the philosophy of a 13th century Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah that gave rise to foot soldiers also called Takfiris.
It was back in September 2007 before the wave of Indian Mujahideen attacks started in India in Uttar Pradesh, that Al Qaedaâs Takfiri faultline was revealed with news that Ilyas Kashmiri had assumed the leadership of the Pakistani jihadi groups operating in Waziristan. While Kashmiri remained off the radar for Indian security agencies, little did we realise that Al Qaedaâs Takfiri impulses would unleash a wave of attacks of mass terror across multiple Indian cities.
</b>
<b>The arrest of Pakistan-born suspected Islamist jihadi David Headley and the unravelling of the plot to strike high profile targets in India have revealed startling details. In hindsight it appears security agencies missed out on crucial clues linked to the terror bombings in our cities</b>
As the Lashkar Chicago conspiracy unravels further, many details of David Headleyâs travel and stay in India are beginning to raise troubling questions on how he may have aided and abetted not just the deadly 26/11 Mumbai attacks but the series of mass terror attacks in multiple cities over the last three years.
In this multi-part series we attempt to connect the dots to take a hard look at how India may have missed many smoke signals on the wave of mass terror unleashed by Islamist jihadis between 2005 and 2009.
It was a strange coincidence that on November 26, 2008 the Indian Express took note of a report that had earlier appeared in a Pakistani newspaper on November 24 on how Kashmir jihadis had shifted base to Waziristan. A prominent name that appeared in either story was Ilyas Kashmiri alleged to be the leader of the terror outfit Harkat-ul-Mujahideen who had since moved to operate in Waziristan. It is a reflection on how dated and anachronistic the popular narrative is on the shifting loyalties within the jihadi landscape that the Indian media continued to refer to Ilyas Kashmiriâs affiliations with a defunct HuJI operating as a stand-alone terror outfit.
In the weeks following the November 26, 2008 attacks in a piece that appeared in the Asian Times, its Pakistan bureau chief Syed Saleem Shahzad made three important revelations, two of which are of consequence to this series.
Shahzad revealed that the 26/11 plot was originally conceived as a low key operation by the ISI targeting Kashmir, but was hijacked by Al Qaeda to unleash terror on Mumbai. While the Lashkar angle has been the obsessive focus of the Indian establishment, Al Qaeda command and control of the attack was practically ignored in the immediate aftermath of 26/11. A significant revelation by Shahzad that was also ignored was that Al Qaeda had been using India as a safe route from the Arabian Sea into Gujarat and then on to Mumbai and then either by air or overland to the United Arab Emirates.
That was back in December 2, 2008, but itâs only now 11 months later that we are seeing the tip of the iceberg of how India may have been used as a safe route with details trickling in of how a visa agency operated by David Headley in Mumbai may have ferreted out the many Indian Mujahideen activists absconding from law, including the top guns Abdul Subhan Qureshi alias Tauqeer and Riaz Bhatkal. The most damning pointer to such a David Headley-facilitated safe passage to the Indian Mujahideen fugitives comes from a cell phone that was retrieved by the Uttar Pradesh ATS after the Batla House encounter with call records to the cellular phone used by David Headley.
In the same article Shahzad also alludes to how the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and HuJI fell out of favor with the ISI to shift their loyalties to Al Qaeda with Ilyas Kashmiri moving to Waziristan. Many months later, on October 15 this year, Ilyas Kashmiri came back from the dead to grant an interview once again to Shahzad in which we learn of the role played by his â313 Brigadeâ in the Mumbai 26/11 attacks and subsequently in many fidayeen attacks in Pakistan.
In a reflection on how yet another smoke signal was ignored we are now told that the Indian security agencies had indeed stumbled on references to the â313 Brigadeâ during the phone intercepts of conversations between the 26/11 terrorists and their Pakistan-based handlers. It was reported back in February 2009 that the Indian authorities were confused on whether â313 Brigadeâ referred to a brigade within the Pakistani military establishment.
While not much is known of the composition of â313 Brigadeâ in the public domain, we must trace back to a botched Ilyas Kashmiri plot from 2008 to assassinate Pakistanâs Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani for a glimpse into the anti-establishment fervour that drives the organisation. That plot was botched after Al Qaeda elders prevailed on Ilyas Kashmiri against destabilising the Pakistani establishment.
Recent events in Pakistan, including the GHQ attack in Rawalpindi, which have been traced back to Ilyas Kashmiri once again expose the tension marked by this anti-establishment faultline, the roots of which trace back to the philosophy of a 13th century Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah that gave rise to foot soldiers also called Takfiris.
It was back in September 2007 before the wave of Indian Mujahideen attacks started in India in Uttar Pradesh, that Al Qaedaâs Takfiri faultline was revealed with news that Ilyas Kashmiri had assumed the leadership of the Pakistani jihadi groups operating in Waziristan. While Kashmiri remained off the radar for Indian security agencies, little did we realise that Al Qaedaâs Takfiri impulses would unleash a wave of attacks of mass terror across multiple Indian cities.