How Hindus Fought To Keep India Hindu Againt Islam

09-07-2006, 08:06 AM

QUOTEOther than rajputs, are there recrds of any other Hindu princes giving their daughters in marriage to Muslims?

There was Ala-ud-din Khalji who is said to have made a matrimonial aliance with the Yadavas of Devagiri (Maharashtra), then there is Firuz Tughlaq who had a Jat mother, etc. Aurangzeb married off captive Maratha princesses to his Muslim underlings.

Even besides Mewar there were states like Kota and Bundi in Rajasthan that had no matrimonial alliance with the Mughals...but they were hardly more powerful than Jaipur or Jodhpur.

Secondly Rajput states in Himachal, Uttaranchal, Gujarat, Malwa, Bundelkhand, also did not have any marriages with the Mughals...but they were definitely weaker than the Rajasthan states. So this coercion into marriage needs to be properly investigated (Bikaner and Jaisalmer were allies of Akbar, there was no war with them, but they still married princesses to him late in his reign).

About Mughal princesses marrying Rajput Kings, only pureborn Rajputs can head a Rajput clan, and a Mughal emperor would have moved heaven and earth to make his (muslim) grandson the ruler of a Rajput state. Apart from this a Mughal princess in a Rajput household would have converted her husband and children to Islam.

There was a Hindu historian of that time named Ishwardas Nagar who said that Akbar offered to marry his daughters to the Rajput cheifs but they refused (because of the above reasons) but to save his face they said that we are your generals and servants, therefore we cannot presume to claim superiority to you (in North India girl's father is socially inferior to boy's father). for this reason Akbar made a rule that Mughal princesses will not be married to ANYONE...this was contrary to Islam and therefore Aurangzeb later changed this rule.

Before that Mughal princesses lived and died as virgins (ideally <!--emo& Big Grin

--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /> )

Bharatvarsh · 09-07-2006, 09:30 PM

Ok here is some info about the whole Hindu-Muslim marriage thing I found:
QUOTEInter-communal marriages would have encouraged equality but these were partially banned in the medieval period, partially insofar as that while Muslims married Hindu women freely, the rulers would not permit Muslim girls to marry Hindus. Contrary to general belief, Hindus have had no inhibitions about marrying women of other nationalities and religions. There is the well-known instance of Chandragupta Maurya marrying the daughter of Seleucus Nikotor. Of course, Chandragupta was a king and kings used to contract such alliances. But throughout the medieval period, Hindus used to marry non-Hindus and foreigners without prejudice in Southeast Asia or countries to which they migrated. Even today Hindus marry in America, Britain, Germany and other countries which they visit or to which they migrate. Similarly, they had no hesitation in marrying Muslim women in the medieval period. As has been pointed out on many occasions earlier, handsome women captives were kept mainly for sex. They were known as kanchanis, kanizes and concubines. Their exchange among Muslim nobles too was common. Even Hindu nobles were glad to take Muslim women. According to The Delhi Sultanate, quoting Nizamuddin Ahmad, Musalman women were taken by the Rajputs and sometimes taught the art of dancing and singing and were made to join the akharas.44 Muslim women from the palace of Malwa Sultan entered, between 1512-1518, the household of his nayak or captain Medini Rai. Sultan Mahmud Sharqi (1436-58) was accused of handing over Muslim women to his kafir captains. Similarly, the Muslim ruler of Kalpi and Chanderi, shortly after 1443, had made over Muslim women to some of his Hindu captains. âClearly Malwa was not an exception.â In Kashmir, according to Jonraj, Shah Mir had gone to the extent of marrying his daughters to his Brahman chiefs.44 This shared pleasure cemented the bonds of friendship.

But Muslim rulers were more strongly entrenched, and they, from the very beginning, discouraged Hindus from taking Muslim women. Even Sher Shah, who is considered to be a liberal king, broke his promise with Puran Mal of Raisen because of the latterâs âgravest of all offences against Islamâ in keeping some Muslim women in his harem.45 The Mughals freely married Hindu princesses, but there is not a single instance of a Mughal princess being married to a Rajput prince, although so many Mughal princesses died as spinsters. Akbar discouraged all types of inter-communal marriages.46 When Jahangir learnt that the Hindus and Muslims intermarried freely in Kashmir, âand both give and take girls, (he ordered that) taking them is good but giving them, God forbidâ. And any violation of this order was to be visited with capital punishment.47 Shahjahanâs orders in this regard were that the Hindus could keep their Muslim wives only if they converted to Islam. Consequently, during his reign, 4,000 to 5,000 Hindus converted in Bhadnor alone. 70 such cases were found in Gujarat and 400 in the Punjab.48

Sometimes Hindus took back Hindu girls forcibly married to Muslims.49 Many Hindu Rajas and elite kept Muslim women in their seraglios, sometimes as a reprisal as it were. Hindus continued to take Muslim women wherever they felt strong. Such were the Marathas. Khafi Khan and Manucci both affirm that the Marathas used to capture Muslim women because, according to them, âthe Mahomedans had interfered with Hindu women in (their) territoriesâ.50 So did the Sikhs. But marriages are not made this way. The dominance of the Muslims kept matrimonial engagements a one-way traffic. There was no option for the Hindus but to scruplously avoid marrying Muslim women. How long could they go on suffering humiliation on this account? With all their weaknesses, the Hindus have after all been a proud people.51 Centuries of Muslim rulersâ policy brought rigidity in Hindu behaviour also. He stopped marrying Muslim women and shut his door to reentry of Muslim converts. Today it is observed that the Hindu has a closed mind. He does not marry a Muslim woman for even if he does so, she would not be welcome in his family. The genesis of this situation is the result of centuries of Muslim rulersâ practice of prohibiting Hindus from marrying Muslim girls.

http://voi.org/books/tlmr/ch8.htm

Bharatvarsh · 09-07-2006, 09:38 PM

QUOTECommunal Riots

One of the immediate causes of Partition was the Direct Action or the unleashing of widespread communal violence in the country. But there was nothing new or unique about it. The history of communal riots is synchronous with the advent of Muslims in India. For the next hundreds of years invaders and rulers committed all sorts of atrocities on the people and the atmosphere was surcharged with aggression and violence. But one day the Hindus struck back. The opportunity came when Nasiruddin Khusrau Shah ascended the throne of Delhi (1320). Khusrau Shah was a Hindu convert. He belonged to the Barwari class of Gujarat and they were known for their bravery.64 Qutbuddin was very much âenamouredâ of him. It was customary in those days, says Ibn Battuta, that when a Hindu accepted Islam, the sultan used to present him with a robe of honour and a gold bangle.65 Khusrau Khan pleaded with the sultan that some of his relations wanted to embrace Islam and in this way collected about 40,000 Barwaris in the capital.66 One day they killed Qutbuddin Khalji and started rioting and killing.67 Copies of the Quran were tom to pieces and used as seats for idols which were placed in the niches (mehrabs) of the mosques. A later but otherwise reliable chronicler, Nizamuddin Ahmad, says that some mosques were also broken.68 The Barwaris had known the Muslims breaking temples and destroying religious books of the Hindus. This they had done on a large scale in Gujarat itself about twenty years ago.69 In the Delhi rioting, they paid the Muslims back in the same coin. Their King Khusrau Shah even forbade cow-slaughter.70 But in the end this rioting was brought under control by Gazi Malik.

It is often asserted that unlike during British rule, there were no communal riots under Muslim rule. This is only partially true; firstly, because the Hindus could not always respond to Muslim violence with symmetrical force in the medieval period; and secondly, details given by chroniclers about communal conflicts cannot be easily separated from those of perennial political strife and resistance during Muslim rule. Persian chroniclers repeatedly aver that Muslims were dominant and domineering during the medieval period while the Hindus were kept systematically suppressed.71 But just because of this, because of the treatment accorded to non-Muslims and sometimes their reaction to it, there were Hindu-Muslim riots. And this situation is understandable. But why were there Shia-Sunni riots under Muslim rule just as they have always been there.72 It is for the reason that a psyche geared to aggression and violence cannot rest in peace without fighting. When non-Muslims are not there to fight, Sunnis and Shias call each other Kafir and attack each other.

But ultimately the brunt of all such riots was borne by the Hindus. For instance, this is how Pelsaert describes the situation prevalent in the time of Jahangir (1605-27) during Muharram. âThe outcry (of mourning) lasts till the first quarter of the day; the coffins (Tazias) are brought to the river, and if the two parties meet carrying their biers (it is worse on that day), and one will not give place to the other, then if they are evenly matched, they may kill each other as if they were enemies at open war, for they run with naked swords like madmen. No Hindu can venture into the streets before midday, for even if they should escape with their life, at the least their arms and legs would be broken to piecesâ¦â73

Jafar Sharifâs description of the Muharram scene for the eighteenth-nineteenth century is still more detailed. Writes he: âWhenever the Muharramâ¦ chances to coincide with Hindu festivals, such as the Ramnavmi or the birth of Rama, the Charakhpuja, or swing festival, or the Dasahra, serious riots have occurred as the processions meet in front of a mosque or Hindu temple, or when an attempt is made to cut the branches of some sacred fig-tree which impedes the passage of the cenotaphs. Such riots, for instance occurred at Cuddapa in Madras in 1821, at Bhiwandi in the Thana District, Bombay, in 1837. In the case of some disturbances at Hyderabad, it is said that Hindus, who act as Muharram Faqirs (who erect them, Tazias, themselves and become Faqirs during Muharram), sometimes take the part of Mussulmans against their coreligionists.â74

According to a contemporary Sufi, Shaikh Abdur Rahman Chishti, the âthe subservience of the Hindus to Islamâ under Shahjahan was thorough and complete.75 However, communal riots had become common from the time of Aurangzeb because of his religious policy. Rioting went on for days together in Varanasi when Vishvanath and other temples were destroyed there in 1669.Â Here is the description of the communal riots as narrated in a contemporary work:

âThe infidels demolished a mosque,â writes the author of the Ganj-i-Arshadi, âthat was under construction and wounded the artisans. When the news reached Shah Yasin, he came to Banaras from Mandyawa and collecting the Muslim weavers, demolished the big temple. A Sayyid who was an artisan by profession agreed with one Abdul Rasul to build a mosque at Banaras and accordingly the foundation was laid. Near the place there was a temple and many houses belonging to it were in the occupation of the Rajputs. The infidels decided that the construction of a mosque in the locality was not proper and that it should be razed to the ground. At night the walls of the mosque were found demolished.Â Next day the wall was rebuilt but it was again destroyed. This happened three or four times. At last the Sayyid hid himself in a corner. With the advent of night the infidels came to achieve their nefarious purpose. When Abdul Rasul gave the alarm, the infidels began to fight and the Sayyid was wounded by the Rajputs. In the meantime, the Mussulman residents of the neighbourhood arrived at the spot and the infidels took to their heels. The wounded Muslims were taken to Shah Yasin who, determined to vindicate the cause of Islam. When he came to the mosque, people collected from the neighbourhood. The civil officers were outwardly inclined to side with the saint but in reality they were afraid of the royal displeasure on account of the Raja, who was a courtier of the Emperor and had built the temple (near which the mosque was under construction). Shah Yasin, however, took up the sword and started for Jihad. The civil officers sent him a message that such a grave step should not be taken without the Emperorâs permission. Shah Yasin, paying no heed, sallied forth till he reached Bazar Chau Khamba through a fusillade of stonesâ¦ The doors (of temples) were forced open and the idols thrown down. The weavers and other Mussulmans demolished about 500 temples. They desired to destroy the temple of Beni Madho, but as lanes were barricaded, they desisted from going further.â76

Temple destruction in Mathura, Ujjain, Rajasthan and many other parts of the country was always followed by communal rioting. âIn March, 1671, it was reported that a Muslim officer who had been sent to demolish Hindu temples in and around Ujjain was killed with many of his followers in the riot that had followed his attempts at destroying the temples there. He had succeeded in destroying some of the temples, but in one place, a Rajput chief had opposed this wanton destruction of his religious places. He overpowered the Mughal forces and destroyed its leader and many of his men. In Gujarat somewhere near Ahmedabad, Kolis seem to have taken possession of a mosque probably built on the site of a temple and prevented reading of Friday prayers there. Imperial orders were thereupon issued to the provincial officers in Gujarat to secure the use of the mosque for Friday prayersâ.77 So, as a measure of retaliation sometimes mosques were destroyed by Hindus and Sikhs when their shrines were desecrated and razed. This was done as seen earlier by the Satnamis and by the Sikhs when they rose against the fanatical policy of Aurangzeb.78 Hindus had learnt to do it in imitation of their Muslim rulers since the days of Sultan Nasiruddin Khusrau Shah.

Attack on Hindu honour and religion were common, evoking, naturally, violent response. Jadunath Sarkar writes: âThe prime ministerâs grandson, Mirza Tafakhkhur used to sally forth from his mansion in Delhi with his ruffians, plunder the shops in the bazar, kidnap Hindu women passing through the public streets in litters or going to the river, and dishonour them; and yet there was no judge strong enough to punish him, no police to prevent such crimes.â79 Such ruffians were dealt with directly by the Hindu public, resulting in communal rioting. The king was busy in suppression of Hindu religion, and the Hindus in fighting for their rights. In brief, as noted by Sharma, "The Holi ceased to be celebrated by imperial orders issued on 20 November, 1665. It was not a police order alone, promulgated for the purpose of keeping peace and order during the Holi days as Sir Jadunath Sarkar has suggested. Raja Bhim of Banera and Kishen Singh while serving in south India in 1692, made arrangements for the celebration of the Holi. The censor tried to stop the celebration (but failed). He reported the matter to the emperor by whose orders the celebrations were stopped. In 1704, 200 soldiers were placed at the disposal of the censor for the purpose of preventing the celebration of the Holi. Of course the emperor was not always able to stop the celebrationsâ as the people had learnt to fight back in the streets. And their resistance was not always easy to crush. âIn the South where he spent the last twenty-seven years of his reign, Aurangzeb was usually content with leaving many Hindu temples standing as he was afraid of arousing the feelings of his Hindu subjects in the Deccan where the suppression of rebellions was not an easy matter. An idol in a niche in the fort of Golkunda is said to have been spared by Aurangzeb. But the discontent occasioned by his orders could not thus be brought to an end.â80

From then on to this day Hindu-Muslim communal riots have gone on and on. The occasions are the same. Coincidence of a Hindu and a Muslim festival falling on the same day, music before mosque, chance sprinkling of coloured-water on a Muslim even by a child, coming out of the mosque on Friday after hearing a hot sermon, and now political sabre-rattling of direct action. During the early years of the twentieth century communal riots were a common feature in one or the other part of the country. Pakistan was created as much by the ambition of the Muslim politicians as by the violence of their Direct Action. After that there was some respite. But from 1970 onwards communal riots in India have again become an yearly feature. The riots in 1970 in Aligarh and in 1971 in Moradabad were trend-setters as it were.

http://voi.org/books/tlmr/ch8.htm

09-07-2006, 09:46 PM

Friends,
When Akbar won Delhi and was able to win a few more provinces he realised that in order to rule in peace he should have friendly relations with Rajputs. To realise this he sent feelers to Amber for a matrimonial alliance. King of Amber, Bharmall was definetely awed by Akbar's growing power and found it difficult to say no and he accepted Akbar's offer for his sister. This in turn brought Kunwar Maan Singh as a general in Akbar's army.

After this point Maan Singh was single handedly responsible for brainwashing other rajput kingdoms. To give one example: When Akbar set out with a big force to Ranasthambpur (Ranathambore) which was ruled by Surjan Hada as a vassal of Mewar's Maharana Pratap, the fight started and Surjan was defending the fort quite well. Maan Singh was also in this army. Maan Singh sent a message to the fort that he would like to come and meet Surjan Hada. Being a rajput, Hada's trusted another rajput and allowed him to come inside the fort. Akbar also came along on the word of Man Singh that Hada's would not harm him. Surjan met them and was reluctant to give in but Man Singh using all his powers of persuasion convinced the Hada. Hada set forth lot of conditions for an alliance like they would not be asked to give a daughter to Mughals, they would not allow there horses to be branded by the mughal seal etc.

Surjan's son, Bhoja, had an interesting altercation with Akbar:

On the death of the queen Maan Kunwar, Akbar commanded a court mourning; and that all might testify a participation in their master's affliction, an ordinance was issued that all the Rajput chiefs, as well as the Moslem leaders, should shave the moustache and the beard. To secure compliance, the royal barbers had the execution of the mandate. But when they came to quarters of the Hadas, in order to remove these tokens of manhood, they were repulsed with buffets and contumely. Then enemies of Rao Bhoj Hada aggravated the crime of this resistance and insinuated to the royal ear that the outrage upon the barbers was accompanied with expressions insulting to memory of the departed princess, who it will be remembered was a rajputani of Amber. Akbar, forgetting his vassal's gallant services, commanded that Rao Bhoj should be pinioned and forcibly deprived of his moustache. He might as well have commanded the operation on a tiger. The Hadas flew to there arms, the camp was thrown into tumult, and would have soon presented a wide scene of blood-shed, had not the emperor, seasonably repenting of his folly repaired to the Boondi quarters in person. He expressed his admiration (he might have said his fear) of Hada valour, alighted from his elephant to expostulate with the Rao...

This was the darkest period in the history of rajputs when they decided to not use there swords to save there honour. Maharana Pratap was so disgusted by this behavior of rajputs that he banned all marriages between his band of rajputs and other rajputs who had given there daughters.

-Digvijay

09-07-2006, 11:27 PM

QUOTE(Bharatvarsh @ Sep 7 2006, 09:30 PM)Ok here is some info about the whole Hindu-Muslim marriage thing I found:
<div class='quotetop'>QUOTEInter-communal marriages would have encouraged equality but these were partially banned in the medieval period, partially insofar as that while Muslims married Hindu women freely, the rulers would not permit Muslim girls to marry Hindus. Contrary to general belief, Hindus have had no inhibitions about marrying women of other nationalities and religions. There is the well-known instance of Chandragupta Maurya marrying the daughter of Seleucus Nikotor. Of course, Chandragupta was a king and kings used to contract such alliances. But throughout the medieval period, Hindus used to marry non-Hindus and foreigners without prejudice in Southeast Asia or countries to which they migrated. Even today Hindus marry in America, Britain, Germany and other countries which they visit or to which they migrate. Similarly, they had no hesitation in marrying Muslim women in the medieval period. As has been pointed out on many occasions earlier, handsome women captives were kept mainly for sex. They were known as kanchanis, kanizes and concubines. Their exchange among Muslim nobles too was common. Even Hindu nobles were glad to take Muslim women. According to The Delhi Sultanate, quoting Nizamuddin Ahmad, Musalman women were taken by the Rajputs and sometimes taught the art of dancing and singing and were made to join the akharas.44 Muslim women from the palace of Malwa Sultan entered, between 1512-1518, the household of his nayak or captain Medini Rai. Sultan Mahmud Sharqi (1436-58) was accused of handing over Muslim women to his kafir captains. Similarly, the Muslim ruler of Kalpi and Chanderi, shortly after 1443, had made over Muslim women to some of his Hindu captains. âClearly Malwa was not an exception.â In Kashmir, according to Jonraj, Shah Mir had gone to the extent of marrying his daughters to his Brahman chiefs.44 This shared pleasure cemented the bonds of friendship.

But Muslim rulers were more strongly entrenched, and they, from the very beginning, discouraged Hindus from taking Muslim women. Even Sher Shah, who is considered to be a liberal king, broke his promise with Puran Mal of Raisen because of the latterâs âgravest of all offences against Islamâ in keeping some Muslim women in his harem.45 The Mughals freely married Hindu princesses, but there is not a single instance of a Mughal princess being married to a Rajput prince, although so many Mughal princesses died as spinsters. Akbar discouraged all types of inter-communal marriages.46 When Jahangir learnt that the Hindus and Muslims intermarried freely in Kashmir, âand both give and take girls, (he ordered that) taking them is good but giving them, God forbidâ. And any violation of this order was to be visited with capital punishment.47 Shahjahanâs orders in this regard were that the Hindus could keep their Muslim wives only if they converted to Islam. Consequently, during his reign, 4,000 to 5,000 Hindus converted in Bhadnor alone. 70 such cases were found in Gujarat and 400 in the Punjab.48

Sometimes Hindus took back Hindu girls forcibly married to Muslims.49 Many Hindu Rajas and elite kept Muslim women in their seraglios, sometimes as a reprisal as it were. Hindus continued to take Muslim women wherever they felt strong. Such were the Marathas. Khafi Khan and Manucci both affirm that the Marathas used to capture Muslim women because, according to them, âthe Mahomedans had interfered with Hindu women in (their) territoriesâ.50 So did the Sikhs. But marriages are not made this way. The dominance of the Muslims kept matrimonial engagements a one-way traffic. There was no option for the Hindus but to scruplously avoid marrying Muslim women. How long could they go on suffering humiliation on this account? With all their weaknesses, the Hindus have after all been a proud people.51 Centuries of Muslim rulersâ policy brought rigidity in Hindu behaviour also. He stopped marrying Muslim women and shut his door to reentry of Muslim converts. Today it is observed that the Hindu has a closed mind. He does not marry a Muslim woman for even if he does so, she would not be welcome in his family. The genesis of this situation is the result of centuries of Muslim rulersâ practice of prohibiting Hindus from marrying Muslim girls.

http://voi.org/books/tlmr/ch8.htm
[right][snapback]56950[/snapback][/right]
</div>

Bharatvarsh,
This is not entirely true. Rajputs deliberately did not marry muslim women. They could have easily if they wanted to. This was so because this union could not poduce a heir for the throne. Though there were enough muslim concubines.

Secondly in the state of Kashmir during the reign of Jahangir and ShahJahan, Hindu pandits freely married muslim women and these women (whose parents were hindus converted to islam) converted socially to Hinduism (not by Hindu priests). This practice was so prevalent that Shah Jahan, at the behest of mullahs who were aghast by these marriages and social conversion, passed many firmans but these had little effect.
(This is recorded in Jahanara's memoirs: She was ShahJahan's daughter and has a very interesting biography).

-Digvijay

Bharatvarsh · 09-07-2006, 11:58 PM

QUOTESecondly in the state of Kashmir during the reign of Jahangir and ShahJahan, Hindu pandits freely married muslim women and these women (whose parents were hindus converted to islam) converted socially to Hinduism (not by Hindu priests). This practice was so prevalent that Shah Jahan, at the behest of mullahs who were aghast by these marriages and social conversion, passed many firmans but these had little effect.
Yes I am aware of this, the mullahs complained so at last Shah Jahan passed an order that such marriages were only married if the Hindu converted and in violation the punishment was death.

09-08-2006, 12:29 AM

QUOTE(digvijay @ Sep 7 2006, 01:57 PM)This is not entirely true. Rajputs deliberately did not marry muslim women. They could have easily if they wanted to.Â This was so because this union could not poduce a heir for the throne.
[right][snapback]56955[/snapback][/right]


Digvijay, but what about Rajputs not in princely fold (say underlings, army captains, others not in candidature for throne anyways)?

09-08-2006, 06:24 AM

Question for Digvijay.

Shekhawats are a branch of the Kachawas of Jaipur...their lands were very near Delhi and they were also part of the Mughal army. So why didn't they have any matrimonial alliance with the Mughals??

They were obviously weaker than Jaipur and should have been easier to coerce?

History of Shekhawati

Bharatvarsh · (This post was last modified: 09-08-2006, 07:14 AM by Bharatvarsh.)

As a sidenote, an interesting aspect of history is that some of the greatest Hindu warriors all came from communities that are today classified as backward or were considered as backward in their own times. Some of these include Shivaji (Kunbi jati), Sri Krishna Deva Raya, Harihara Raya and Bukka Raya (Kuruba community, classified as backward today and another word for the Yadav community in the South), Ranoji Shinde (I am not exactly sure what the position of the jati was but he was supposed to have been a slipper carrier of Baji Rao I), Malharrao Holkar (was a goatherd before he rose up the ranks through his own abilities), Mahadji Shinde (son of Ranoji Shinde).

Bodhi · (This post was last modified: 09-08-2006, 04:52 PM by Bodhi.)

Bharat, regarding the resistence when Ahmed Shah Abdali invaded...on the Maratha army's side, were there Rajputs, Jats etc? (I know Sikhs had faught long drawn gurilla warfare against Abdali, which had greatly frustrated his army, and after Abdali, resulted in the rise of mighty Sikh empire in north west) Also what was the position of Europeans in these wars...

09-08-2006, 10:11 AM

Bodhi/PC,
Rajputs who were not kings usually did not give there daughters in marriages to the muslims. The king on becoming friends with mughal court invited less hostility from muslims but such considerations were not important for an ordinary rajput.

Rajputs tilled land as a fief of the rajput king they served. As a consequence even if they did not like the decision of the king so long they lived on his land they had to honour the bad decisions of the king.

Though rajputs across all shakhas (like rathore, kachwaha, chauhan etc) left there paternal fiefs and fought under Maharana Pratap.

-Digvijay

09-08-2006, 10:15 AM

QUOTE(Bharatvarsh @ Sep 8 2006, 07:13 AM)As a sidenote, an interesting aspect of history is that some of the greatest Hindu warriors all came from communities that are today classified as backward or were considered as backward in their own times. Some of these include Shivaji (Kunbi jati), Sri Krishna Deva Raya, Harihara Raya and Bukka Raya (Kuruba community, classified as backward today and another word for the Yadav community in the South), Ranoji Shinde (I am not exactly sure what the position of the jati was but he was supposed to have been a slipper carrier of Baji Rao I), Malharrao Holkar (was a goatherd before he rose up the ranks through his own abilities), Mahadji Shinde (son of Ranoji Shinde).
[right][snapback]56983[/snapback][/right]


Bharat,
Marathas have shown the world what good organization and leadership can achieve. It also shows how true William Wilson Hunter is in his assesment of Hindu India during the time of Islamic onslaught.

For those who might have gleamed over it here is hunter's analysis:

http://hindurajput.blogspot.com/#Rajputs_a...asions_of_India

-Digvijay

Bodhi · (This post was last modified: 09-08-2006, 06:02 PM by Bodhi.)

An artistic perspective, quoting from Nirad C Choudhury's 'The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian'.

Poem is about lamentation over muslim depredations on and around the sacred Pushkar lake. Represents the disappointment of common Hindus at the loss of Hindu domination in Rajasthan.

Pushkar, once the abode of Brahma, is now home of great fear of mleccha...;
Brahma bathed there after concluding his Yagya, now mlechha removes in its waters the fatigue of demolishing sacred temples...;
Once the lake was the repository of the tears of joy of Vishnu, now a bin for the waste of Mleccha's meals...;
Once warmed up by the fire of the eyes of 11 Rudras, now steaming with the hot tears of persecuted brahmins...;
Apsaras were forbidden to enter its waters, and even if Indrani bathed in it it was not proper, now it becomes the wallowing pool of abominable Turki women during their periods...;
Once gods drank from it, now it has to supply to barbarians who even cut the throats of their horses after desert journey and drink blood to quench thirsts.

Nirad C Chaudhury writes it is from a 12th century sanskrit book about Prithviraj Chauhan. Anyone knows exactly which book is this and author? He cann't probably be referring to Prithviraj Raso...By the way what is Chaudhary's standing as an Indian historian?

Bharatvarsh · (This post was last modified: 09-08-2006, 07:26 PM by Bharatvarsh.)

QUOTEBharat, regarding the resistence when Ahmed Shah Abdali invaded...on the Maratha army's side, were there Rajputs, Jats etc? (I know Sikhs had faught long drawn gurilla warfare against Abdali, which had greatly frustrated his army, and after Abdali, resulted in the rise of mighty Sikh empire in north west) Also what was the position of Europeans in these wars... 
On the Maratha side there were some Jats but no Rajputs, most of North India was thoroughly alienated by the Maratha plundering and didn't help them at all (that is why I say that Baji Rao I was the last great statesman among Marathas, as long as he was at the helm he controlled such excesses). Here is some info:
QUOTE(i) Invasion of Abdali : (1757 A.D.) :

With the Maratha armies in the South, Abdali descended on Delhi on 22nd of January 1757 A.D. (1), at the call of Najib Khan Rohilla, who joined him before he reached Delhi. Najib Khan was too ambitious (2) and aimed a pathan Empire at Delhi. Madhaosing and Vijaysing had joined him in this enterprise, in order to relive themselves from the clutches of the detested Marathas.

Nobody (3) could withstand Abdali. Even Wazir Gaziuddin was forced to see him personally (16th of January 1757 A.D.). With the Jat sympathy on his side, Antaji Mankeshwar (4), a Maratha Sardar; with insufficient force dared to give him stand single-handedly, but he too was over-powered.

Meanwhile, Raghunathrao, who had been deputed to the North by the Peshwa, had reached Indor on 14th of February 1757 A.D. Abdali was then looting Delhi (5). Peshwa, himself, had gone to the south, on Shrirang Pattan (6), and he could not provide Raghunathrao, with adequate force. He had only 15 thousand men with him, and contingent (7) of Samsher Bahadur, Naro Shankar, and Antaji had not yet joined him. Hence it was natural for Raghunathrao to wait till sufficient army was assembled. Antaji (8) pressed Raghunathrao from Mathura again and again to move towards Delhi, to bring pressure on Abdali, leaving the (in-significant) job of capturing petty fortresses in Jaypur territory. Even though (9) his letters revealed a confident tone of his determination to annihilate Abdali, Raghunathrao showed no sign of moving on and facing Abadali, with his insufficient force. Consequently with Raghunathrao near at hand in Jaypur territory, Abdali committed atrocities in Delhi and its vicinity, uninterrupted by any one. It was felt that the Pathans (10) had grown too powerful even for the Marathas. This affected adversely the prestige of the Maratha rule in the North in general and Doab (11) in particular. But the Jats (12) in Agra Subha, leaving the enmity with the Marathas, sympathized with them and made a common cause against Abdali. They held firm for (13) a considerable time but at last were over-powered and were obliged to take shelter in their forts.

(ii) The Rajput Attitude :

A curious fact to note is that the real cause of the Jat and Rajput opposition to the Marathas was the same, namely the question of territorial acquiring by the Marathas in the Subhas of Agra and Ajmer respectively. The Jat Chief was afraid of the stand that would be taken by the Marathas and the Wazir after departure of Abdali. Even then he co-operated with the Marathas mainly on the ground of religion. The Jats always distinguished religion from politics and never sided with the Rohilla Pathas against the Marathas but strangely enough whenever the Rohillas stood against the Marathas after 1752 A.D., they had the Rajputs on their side.

For no reason, not even for facing the Maratha aggression of Rajputana, can be Rajput stand to ally with Abdali be justified. On calling Abdali to their aid, the Indian Pathans (14) aimed at dominating Delhi. Being bigoted Sunnis, they had no reason to feel for the loss of Hindu lives and culture at the ravages of Abdali. But what could the Rajputs gain by destroying the Marathas at the hands of Abdali? It would only lead to the replacement of one foreign master by another foreigner, medieval in outlook and barbarous in actions, alien to their religion and culture (15). The Rajput policy towards the Marathas during the time of Abdaliâs invasions (1757 to 1761 A.D.) of India, depicts a clear lack of any foresight.

No convincible justification is ever possible for any imperialism, neither of Alexander the great nor of Akabar. There is nothing wrong, hence, if Maratha imperialism is criticizedÂ mercilessly by the historian like Sir Jadhunath in his âFall of the Mughal Empireâ at length. But it will be unbecoming of a worthy historian to deny facts and observe sarcastically (16) thus, âTrue, the Marathas, after sucking the Delhi-Agra region and the Doab on the other bank dry for three years, had fled away. Not a single Maratha bled in defense of the holiest of Vaishnave Shrines; their Pan-Indian suzerainty (Hindupad Padshahi) did not involve the duty to protect.â

There are innumerable proofs available in Marathi sources that give the religious (17) centered activities of the Peshwa and his Sardars. In a way, the object of Maratha Raj was the release of the Hindu (18) religious centre in general and Kashi, Prayag, Mathura and Gaya in particular from the clutches of the Yawanas. It was the unfulfilled desire of the Peshwa from Bajirao to Madhaorao. Upheaval (19) of the Hindu religion was the main aim behind the incessant activities of the Marathas. Ali believed that it was the only power to check Abdali and save Hindusthan.

The harrowing accounts of Abdaliâs attrocities (20) at Mathura, Varundawan and the rest of places within about a hundred miles radius from Delhi, in the lines of Changiz Khan and Taimulang, are even today most painful to read. But the terrible wail of grief and cries of the sufferers, were unable to move the Rajput sympathy to action against Abdali like this Jats. Far from it, not a finger was raised nor a word was spoken.

The racial bitterness against the Deccani Marathas, over looking the common bond of religion that had served once the strongest link between the two, had so completely cptured the hearts of Madhaosing and Vijaysing that forgetting the Rajput stand of defending their religion and culture for which their fore-fathers had shed ample blood, they were busy in inviting Abdali and were blind to his barbarous acts. And all this was done within less than ten to fifteen years from the deaths of Abhaysing and Sawai Jaysing who could have never acted on these lines, not even for driving away the Maratha aggressors. Sacrificing the innocent people of Delhi, Agra, Mathuran and Vrundavan for saving Rajasthan from the clutches of the Maratha was a queer solution indeed!

http://maratharajputrelations.com/5sp.html
Maharaja Surajmal agreed to join Bhau but then when he adviced Bhau that he should put all his camp followers (women, children and other civilians that came along) in a secure fort and use guerilla tactics against Abdali he was insulted along with Holkar, so Surajmal left the alliance, he would later shelter many of the Maratha refugees and spend his own money taking care of them after the war.

The Maratha loss can easily be put down to the fact that they had forgotten that the great Shivaji never allowed women and other civilians in his camp, also Marathas had no allies and lastly their foolish military tactics.

Another interesting fact is that Abdali had some Naga Sanyasins fighting for him, I wonder how these so called Sanyasins dared to call themselves that while fighting for a man who massacred hundreds of thousands of Hindus and desecrated hundreds of mandirs.

About the role of the European powers I am not aware, well only the English could have done anything because the other European powers were mainly confined to the South, but I am not aware what their stand was but they must have hoped that the Marathas lost because Panipat was the beginning of the end of Marathas and would eventually help the English replace the weakened Maratha power.

Bodhi · (This post was last modified: 09-08-2006, 09:59 PM by Bodhi.)

QUOTE(Bharatvarsh @ Sep 8 2006, 09:52 AM)Najib Khan was too ambitious (2) and aimed a pathan Empire at Delhi. Madhaosing and Vijaysing had joined him in this enterprise, in order to relive themselves from the clutches of the detested Marathas.

The harrowing accounts of Abdaliâs attrocities (20) at Mathura, Varundawan and the rest of places within about a hundred miles radius from Delhi, in the lines of Changiz Khan and Taimulang, are even today most painful to read. But the terrible wail of grief and cries of the sufferers, were unable to move the Rajput sympathy to action against Abdali like this Jats. Far from it, not a finger was raised nor a word was spoken.
[right][snapback]57005[/snapback][/right]


Individual dignity was dearer than greater Hindu and national dignity? Collaborate with a foreigner bigot against your own co-religionaist and nationalists of a different caste and region? (One curious thought. and I am really really sorry to type this. Importing Wahabi University from Arab to India, working overtime to divide and weaken Hindu soceity, contributing to maligning history of Hindus ...this is being heralderd by lead Rajputs of politics today - Arjun Singh, VP Singh. Is this some reflection of that past?) About this feeling of mine, I am not happy about. If above is accurate, then a neutral observer would have difficulty with claims of Rajputs as the 'Hindu-protecting-mighty-sword'? Or we are missing something?

I guess by the time of Abdali, Mughals were weakened forever, so an opportunity for Rajputs to have collaborated with Marathas, Sikhs, Jats and overthrow the remaining traces Muslim imperial rule, and even provide leadership in doing that?

Digvijay, do you have some insights about Rajput princes' stand on Abdali's series of invasions? What do Rajput records say about Abdali's period?

Bharat, about Europeans, I had read somewhere that Peshwa who was in south at the time when intelligence about Afghan invasion reached him. He had approached British regarding procuring arms and ammunitions. (British were also taking Maratha and Nizam help in fight against Hyder-Ali/Tipu some time around that period). However British cunningly delayed the supply of ammunitions etc until it was too late. Not sure how much of this is true.

Bharatvarsh · 09-08-2006, 10:45 PM

About Vijayanagara military policy:
QUOTE104. MILITARY POLICY,

The successive defeats at the hands of the Pathans
in spite of many (of the Hindus) having fought and died,
made the Raya discover the need for a cavalry here;
and towards this end he subdued the Tulu country, and
o-arrisoned the sea ports of Honavar, Bhattakkaja, Bakanur,
MaiitfalapiTraiu, etc., with horses imported from abroad. As
trainers and troopers he enlisted on handsome salary candi-
dates from anywhere irrespective of caste or creed. The Raya's
men believed that having regard to the affairs at Calicut,
the Portuguese help would be an asset to them in the matter of
fighting the Mussalmans, To good fighters the Raya presented
beautiful maidens, etc. If any quarrels arose among the
warriors, they had to settle them by fighting with swords in the
presence of the Raya. The disputes among the goldsmiths,
etc., had also to be settled likewise. Thus a warlike spirit was
infused into all. Fear of death was held in contempt, and women
would drink poison and die to save their honour. On the death
of the ting, his wives and maidens, about 700 in all, would
perform sail on his funeral pyre. Men also would accompany
their departed royal master by killing themselves. Thus every-
body took delight in military exercises. And to fight against
the Mussalmans three or four lakhs of people would gather.

Mid*

Further Sources Of Vijayanagara History, K.A.Nilakanta Sastry, Pg 100.

http://dli.iiit.ac.in/cgi-bin/Browse/scrip...e=2020010027355

09-08-2006, 11:45 PM

QUOTE(Bodhi @ Sep 8 2006, 09:58 PM)<div class='quotetop'>QUOTE(Bharatvarsh @ Sep 8 2006, 09:52 AM)Najib Khan was too ambitious (2) and aimed a pathan Empire at Delhi. Madhaosing and Vijaysing had joined him in this enterprise, in order to relive themselves from the clutches of the detested Marathas.

The harrowing accounts of Abdaliâs attrocities (20) at Mathura, Varundawan and the rest of places within about a hundred miles radius from Delhi, in the lines of Changiz Khan and Taimulang, are even today most painful to read. But the terrible wail of grief and cries of the sufferers, were unable to move the Rajput sympathy to action against Abdali like this Jats. Far from it, not a finger was raised nor a word was spoken.
[right][snapback]57005[/snapback][/right]


I guess by the time of Abdali, Mughals were weakened forever, so an opportunity for Rajputs to have collaborated with Marathas, Sikhs, Jats and overthrow the remaining traces Muslim imperial rule, and even provide leadership in doing that?

Digvijay, do you have some insights about Rajput princes' stand on Abdali's series of invasions? What do Rajput records say about Abdali's period?

[right][snapback]57015[/snapback][/right]
</div>

The site maratharajputrelations fails to mention that during Abdali's invasion of 1757, and his sack of Mathura Vrindavan (defended by the Naga Sannyasis) etc, a Maratha army under Raghunath Rao was fighting against Raja Madho Singh of Jaipur.

It was only after Abdali's departure that the Marathas moved into Delhi.

QUOTESo Abdali entered India again, harassed by marauding Sikhs; but this time the Afghans plundered Delhi in January 1757. Punjab, Kashmir, Sind, and Sirhind were ceded to him; but after raiding the Jat country south of Delhi, Abdali departed, leaving Najib Khan in Delhi and his son Timur Shah as viceroy at Lahore with his general Jahan Khan as vizier. Sikhs rebelled, but Jahan Khan defeated them at Amritsar and desecrated their shrine. The Marathas ousted Najib and made a treaty with Imad-ul-Mulk in June 1757 that doubled their share to half of all the revenues they collected in Mughal dominions. <b>Marathas led by Raghunath Rao invaded Rajputana and plundered old Delhi in August, making peace with the Rohillas the next month.</b> Then 50,000 Maratha troops entered the Punjab in 1758, driving the Afghans out of Sirhind and Lahore.

http://san.beck.org/2-10-Marathas1707-1818.html

QUOTE<b>Maratha Polity:</b>

As seen above the raids of the Marathas spilled over into Gujarat, Malwa, and Bundelkhand. The alliance with Berads, Nayaks and Gonds in the south became an alliance with Rajput and Afghan landlords, and with Bhil and Koli tribesmen, in the north. The provinces of Malwa and Bundelkhand became the gateways to Delhi for the Marathas. To an extent the same story was repeated in Bengal, Bihar, and Orrisa but here the temporary alliances with local powers (indigenous Rajas and Afghan rebels) were more opportunistic than political in nature. In Delhi and Rajputana the Marathas came as conquerors and not as allies of the indigenous powers, while in Ruhelkhand, Agra, and Punjab they were actually allies of the Mughals!

The Maratha domination of the Mughal Empire was inefficient and wavering. The reason for that ironically was the successful guerrilla war they had fought against the Mughal invaders in the Deccan! The numerous Maratha armies operated under their own chiefs, who sometimes cooperated with their King and his ministers, but more often went out to raid on their own and only sent a portion of their earnings to the King. This system of government could not be reformed by Raja Shahu, since he had lived as a royal prisoner for 18 years and had no contact with the Maratha nobles and no standing among the common soldiers.

In fact Raja Shahu and his successors were Kings only in name and the real power had passed into the hands of hereditary Brahman Prime Ministers, the Peshwas. Balaji Vishwanath, the first Peshwa, was engrossed in securing Raja Shahu's position against his Maratha enemies and in gaining recognition for his rights[45] at the Mughal court---he had no time to bring the numerous Maratha armies to heel. His son Baji Rao I, despite his famous victories over Mughals and Rajputs in North India, and over the Nizam[46] and the Portuguese in the south, could not curb the raiding activities of individual Maratha chiefs. Baji Rao even fought battles against chiefs like Trimbak Rao Dhabade and Raghuj Bhonsle and ultimately had to agree to divide the Mughal provinces with his rivals---each dominating and raiding his assigned region[47].

[45] <i>These included the right to collect rent and taxes from the Mughal provinces in the Deccan.

[46] Firuz Jang's son was entitled Nizam-ul-mulk, regulator of the state, and was made governor of the Deccan but with his base in the former Golconda city of Haidarabad. The Mughal part of the Deccan was annexed back to Maharashtra.

[47] The administration of these regions was continued undisturbed with only minor changes made by the new rulers. For example in 1755 the Mughal Emperor abolished taxes on Hindu pilgrims at Gaya and Kurukshetra, which places had been transferred to the Peshwa. Balaji Rao, the third Peshwa, posted Damodar Hingane at these places to collect those taxes and send them now to the Pune treasury!</i>

But even such division of territory, sanctioned by Raja Shahu himself, could not prevent clashes between Maratha chiefs, whether for financial or political reasons. Thus Raghuji Bhonsle was beaten out of Bengal by the third Peshwa, Balaji Rao, who made a settlement with the Mughals about the tribute of that province in 1743. But Raghuji complained to Raja Shahu and the latter made a fresh partition of the eastern provinces between the two chiefs---without telling the administrators of those regions about it! Thus the Nawab of Bengal when threatened again by the Bhonsle army complained, "<i>When terms have been settled with Raja Shahu, why is Raghuji coming here? He is the Raja's servant and a friendly agreement has been made about this province; now call him back and restrain him</i>!"

In another example, a dispute arose over the succession to the throne of the Kingdom of Jaipur in 1743 between the stepbrothers Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh. The Peshwa and Raja Shahu supported Ishwari Singh, but Malhar Holkar the Peshwa's general supported Madho Singh and even sent a contingent of cavalry under his own son to support him against the forces of Ishwari Singh! In 1747 the Peshwa proposed to divide the Jaipur Kingdom between the two brothers saying, "Thus both princes would be preserved and our interests would be served." This proposal was angrily rejected by Ishwari Singh for ancestral kingdoms could not be divided between brothers; such divisions repeated in other kingdoms would only create anarchy all around. The Peshwa's other officer Sindhia also disagreed with this somersault of policy; his Diwan Ramchandra Baba said, "<i>We shall get no money out of it. Our King (Raja Shahu) took up Ishwari Singh's cause and by his order I went and helped him. If you now turn against Ishwari Singh, we shall lose all credit among the public</i>."

But in 1755 the Sindhia family itself was guilty of what we would today call insubordination. That year the Peshwa sent a large army under his brother Raghunath Rao to collect tribute and subsidies from Rajputana, from the Jats of Bharatpur, and from the Delhi Empire (a thin sliver of land along the Yamuna River covering the cities of Delhi, Aligarh and Agra)[48]. Jayapa Sindhia decided to place Ram Singh on the throne of Jodhpur by ousting his cousin Raja Bijay Singh and thus hoped to gain a large sum from that place. But after several months of campaigning he failed to realize this objective and was repeatedly ordered by Raghunath Rao to join him in Jaipur and from there move on to complete their mission in Delhi. Even the Peshwa wrote to him to make friends with Raja Bijay Singh and pacify Ram Singh with a small estate but Jayapa would not obey his master!

[48] <i>After performing these duties this force was also supposed to swerve east into Awadh and obtain the Hindu holy cities and a large succession fee from Nawab Shuja-ud-daulah. </i>

The result was that while the grand army under Raghunath lay scattered across Rajputana Ahmad Shah Abdali invaded the Delhi Empire in 1757, sacked the cities of Delhi, Mathura, Vrindavan, and Agra, and as quickly returned home. Thus when Raghunath eventually recovered the Maratha position in Delhi there was no money left to sustain his forces and he had to invade Punjab in 1758 to extract whatever wealth could be found there---this brought the Marathas into direct conflict with the Afghans and led eventually to the Third Battle of Panipat between the two sides in 1761 (see RMA-II).



http://www.airavat.com/guerrila_warfare2.htm

Bharatvarsh · (This post was last modified: 09-09-2006, 01:22 AM by Bharatvarsh.)

The following is an interesting extract which shows that Hindus were aware of the differences between the way battles were fought by Hindus and Muslims but they failed to adopt it:
QUOTEWhen (Ayyana Malaka) had related what he had known,
Ankusa Ravu and Jagadeva Ravu said.......''What the Musslaman
Ravu(?) had said is correct. The Muhammadans never compare
their strength with that of the enemy, when they meet him on
the battle-field. If the enemy breaks, unable to resist their
fierce onset, they cut him to pieces pursuing him wherever he
may go. On the other hand, if the opponents face them boldly,
they beseech them afterwards. When the nobles and ministers
at the palace who know these affairs ask them to retire (from
the battle-field) they do so at once; and do not face (the enemy)
having no regard for the loss of prestige to the government
which their retirement from the battle-field without showing
fight might involve. Therefore, when a battle is unavoidable,
the Karnatakas who are skilful in fight, discriminate between
good and evil, and offering battle, cut (the enemy) to pieces.
They have prabhusakti $, and so the foot-soldiers and attendants
are useful".

Further Sources Of Vijayanagara History, K.A.Nilakanta Sastry, Pg 130.

http://dli.iiit.ac.in/cgi-bin/Browse/scrip...e=2020010027355
The character of Bahmanis as described by a contemporary Hindu:
QUOTEThe great ministers, Dondo Pandit, Miiddo Pandit and
Dado Pandit understood the meaning (of Brahmayya). As
they served under masters who were given to drunkenness and
cow-slaughter and had no faith in the Gods and the Brahmans,
they spoke us becoming the servants of such masters with pride
and want of foresight. They felt that Brahma Pandit
had spoken the truth.

Further Sources Of Vijayanagara History, K.A.Nilakanta Sastry, Pg 131-132.

http://dli.iiit.ac.in/cgi-bin/Browse/scrip...e=2020010027355

Bodhi · (This post was last modified: 09-09-2006, 08:08 AM by Bodhi.)

ok, here is one reference that Jats and Rajput both contributed to the grand army which was assembled under Bhau.
QUOTEAhmad Khan (known as "the Abdali"), whom we are now to recognise as Ahmad Shah, the Daurani emperor, returned to Hindustan (as stated in the last chapter) late in the summer, and marched to Dehli, when he heard of the murder of Alamgir II. The execrable Shahabuddin (or Ghazi-ud-din the younger) fled at his approach, taking refuge with the Jats. Mahratta troops, who had occupied some places of strength in the Panjab, were defeated and driven in. The capital was again occupied and plundered, after which the Shah retired to the territory of his ally Najib, and summoned to his standard the chiefs of the Rohillas. On the other hand the <span style='color:red'>Mahrattas, inviting to their aid the leaders of the Rajputs and Jats, moved up from the South</span>. They possessed themselves of the capital in December 1759.

The main force of the Mahrattas that left the Deccan consisted of 20,000 chosen horse, under the immediate command of the minister, Sadasheo, whom for convenience we may in future call by his title of "the Bhao." He also took with him a powerful disciplined corps of 10,000 men, infantry and artillery, under a Mohamadan soldier of fortune, named Ibrahim Khan. This general had learned French discipline as commandant de la qarde to Bussy, and bore the title, or nickname, of "gardi," a souvenir of his professional origin.

<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>The Bhao's progress was joined by Mahratta forces under Holkar, Sindhia, the Gaikwar, Gobind Pant, and others. Many of the Rajput States contributed, and Suraj Mal brought a contingent of 20,000 hardy Jats. Hinduism was uniting for a grand effort; Islam was rallied into cohesion by the necessity of resistance.</span> Each party was earnestly longing for the alliance of the Shias under Shujaa, Viceroy of Audh, whose antecedents led men on both sides to look upon them as neutral.

The Fall of the Moghul Empire of Hindustan by H. G. Keene

Bharatvarsh · 09-09-2006, 10:02 PM

The Battle of Raichur can be considered as the greatest triumph of Hindus under Vijayanagara:
QUOTEBOOK 1
CHAPTER 11

The Siege and Battle of Raichur, and Close of Krishna's Reign (A.D. 1520 to 1530)

The date of the siege -- Evidence of Castanheda, Correa, Barros, Faria y Souza, Osorio, Lafitau, Firishtah -- Ruy de Mello and the mainlands of Goa -- Immense numbers engaged -- Firishtah's story of the fight -- Portuguese present -- Christovao de Figueiredo -- Political effects of the Hindu victory, and the events that followed it -- The mainlands of Goa.

I shall ask my readers to turn for an account of the great battle and siege of Raichur to the narrative of Nuniz,[214] whose description is so full and so vivid that it may well be allowed to stand by itself. It is only necessary for me to add a few notes.

The following is a short summary of the story: --

Krishna Deva Raya, having determine to attack the Adil Shah and once for all to capture the disputed fortress of Raichur, collected all his forces, and marched with an immense host from Vijayanagar in a north-easterly direction. It was the dry season, and he probably set out in February or March. The weather must have been intensely hot during his advance, and still more so during the campaign; but the cotton plains that lay on his route out and home were then in the best condition for the passage of his troops, guns, and baggage. His enormous army consisted of about a million of men, if the camp-followers be included; for the fighting men alone, according to Nuniz, numbered about 736,000, with 550 elephants. The troops advanced in eleven great divisions or army corps, and other troops joined him before Raichur.

He pitched his camp on the eastern side of that citadel, invested the place, and began a regular siege. After an interval he received intelligence of the arrival of the Adil Shah from Bijapur, on the north side of the Krishna, with an army of 140,000 horse and foot to oppose him.

Having for a few days rested his troops, the Sultan crossed the river, advanced (according to Nuniz) to within nine miles of Raichur, and there entrenched himself, leaving the river about five miles in his rear.[215] Firishtah, however, differs, and says that the Muhammadan forces crossed directly in face of the Hindu army encamped on the opposite bank.

On Saturday morning, May 19, in the year A.D. 1520, according to my deductions, the forces became engaged, and a decisive pitched battle was fought. Krishna Deva, making no attempt to outflank his adversary, ordered an advance to his immediate front of his two forward divisions. Their attack was so far successful that they drove the Muhammadans back to their trenches. The Sultan had apparently deployed his force over too wide an area, expecting that the Raya would do the same; but finding himself weak in the centre he opened fire from the guns that he had previously held in reserve, and by this means caused great loss in the close ranks of the Hindus. The Raya's troops fell back in face of this formidable bombardment, and at once their enemies charged them. The retreat was changed to a rout, and for a mile and a half to their direct front the Mussulman cavalry chased the flying forces belonging to Krishna Deva's first line. The king himself, who commanded the second line, began to despair of victory, but rallied his troops, collected about him a number of his nobles, and determined to face death with the bravery that had always characterised him. Mounting his horse, he ordered a forward movement of the whole of his remaining divisions, and charged the now disordered ranks of the Mussulmans. This resulted in complete success, for the enemy, scattered and unable to form, fled before his impetuous onslaught. He drove them the whole way back to, and into, the river, where terrific slaughter took place, and their entire army was put to flight.

The Raya then crossed the river and seized the Shah's camp, while the Shah himself, by the counsel and help of Asada Khan, a man who afterwards became very famous, escaped only with his life, and fled from the field on an elephant.

While being driven back towards the river, Salabat Khan, the Shah's general, made a valiant attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the day. He had for his bodyguard 500 Portuguese "renegades," and with him these men threw themselves into the advancing ranks of the Hindus, where they "did such wonderful deeds" that ever after they were remembered. They penetrated the king's host, and cut their way forwards till they almost reached his person. Here Salabat Khan lost his horse, but at once mounted another and pressed on. The little force was, however, surrounded and annihilated, and the general, being a second time overthrown, horse and all, was made prisoner.

The spoil was great and the result decisive. For years afterwards the "Moors" cherished a wholesome dread of Krishna Raya and his valiant troops, and the Sultan, panic-stricken, never again during his enemy's lifetime ventured to attack the dominions of Vijayanagar. Krishna Deva, flushed with victory, returned at once to the attack of Raichur, and the fortress was after a short time captured.

Its fall was due in great measure to the assistance rendered by some Portuguese, headed by Christovao de Figueiredo, who with their arquebusses picked off the defenders from the walls, and thus enabled the besiegers to approach close to the lines of fortification and pull down the stones of which they were formed. Driven to desperation, and their governor being slain, the garrison surrendered.

Date of the Battle.

Now as to the date of this battle.

I am bold enough to believe, and defend my belief, that when Nuniz fixed the day of the great fight as the new moon day of the month of May, A.D. 1522, he made a mistake in the year, and should have written "1520."

The chronicler states that Krishna Deva was prepared to give battle on a Friday, but was persuaded by his councillors to postpone his attack till the following day, Friday being unlucky. The battle accordingly took place on the Saturday, which was the new moon day.

Before proceeding to examine the month and day, let us consider the year A.D. of the battle.

Paes describes two grand festivals at the capital of which he was an eye-witness, and at which Christovao de Figueiredo was present. He fixes definitely the days on which these occurred. The first was the nine-days MAHANAVAMI festival, and the second was the festival of the New Year's Day. Paes states that on the occasion when he was present the MAHANAVAMI began on September 12 ("ESTAS FESTAS SE COMECAO A DOSE DÃµAS DE SETEBRO E DURAO NOVE DIAS"[216]), and the latter began on October 12 ("ENTRAMDO O MES D OUTUBRO A OMZE DIAS AMDADOS D ELE ... NESTE DIU COMECAO O ANNO, E DIA D ANNO BOM ... COMECAO O ANNO NESTE MES COM A LUA NOVA, E ELLES NAO CONTAO O MES SE NAO DE LUA A LUA").[217] Previously to this, when writing about Raichur, Paes has described that place[218] as a city "that formerly belonged to the king of Narsymga (I.E. Vijayanagar); there has been much war over it, and THIS KING took it from the Ydallcao" (Adil Shah). The chronicler, therefore, was present at these feasts on an occasion subsequent to the date of Krishna Deva's conquest of Raichur.

Now the MAHANAVAMI festival begins in these tracts on the 1st of the month of Asvina, and the New Year's Day in the time of Paes was evidently celebrated on the 1st of the month Karttika, as was often the case in former years both days being the days following the moment of new moon. In what year, then, during the reign of Krishna Deva Raya, did the 1st of Asvina and the 1st of Karttika fall respectively on September 12 and on October 12? I have worked these dates out for all the years of the reign, and I find that in no year except A.D. 1520 did this occur. In 1521 the MAHANAVAMI fell on September 2, and the New Year's Day on October 1; in 1522 the former fell on September 20, and the latter on October 20. This shows that Paes assisted at the festivals of A.D. 1520, and that therefore the battle and capture of Raichur must have taken place before the month of September in that year.

This again throws fresh light on the magnificent reception accorded to Christovao de Figueiredo by the king, and the latter's exceptional kindness to the Portuguese at the time of these feasts.[219] Krishna Raya cherished an especial fondness for Christovao on account of his invaluable aid at the siege of the city, and for the fact that but for him the war might have lasted much longer.

Let us now turn to the other Portuguese writers, and see whether they confirm our date, 1520, for the fall of Raichur.

The decision of this question turns mainly on the date when the Portuguese obtained the mainlands opposite the island of Goa, consisting of the tracts called Salsette, Ponda, and Bardes. It seems certain that this capture of the mainlands took place by Krishna Deva's connivance shortly after the fall of Raichur, at a time when Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, the governor-general, was away at the Red Sea, and when Ruy de Mello was governor of Goa. Now Sequeira left Goa for the Red Sea on February 13, A.D. 1520, and arrived again before Diu in India on February 9, 1521.

Castanheda tells us (and he is a good authority, since he was in India in 1529) that while Sequeira was absent at the Red Sea war broke out between the king of Vijayanagar and the Adil Shah,[220] at the close of which the latter was defeated and put to flight, while the Hindus took Raichur and other places

"so that many of the TANADARIS[221] near Goa on the mainland were left undefended. And since the king of Narsinga was very rich, and had no need of these lands, and wanted that all the horses that came to Goa should come to him and none to the HIDALCAO, he sent to say to Ruy de Mello, captain of Goa, that he had taken Belgaum by force of arms from the Hidalcao, with all the land appertaining to it as far as the sea, in which were TANADARIS yielding more than 500,000 gold pardaos, of which he desired to make a present to the king of Portugal ... and that he wanted all the horses that came to Goa. He therefore said that the captain of Goa could enter and take possession of the TANADARIS."

This was immediately done, and Ruy de Mello took possession of the mainland of Goa, including Salsette, in ten days.

Correa, who was in India at the time, having gone thither in 1512 or 1514, mentions[222] that de Sequeira left Goa for the Red Sea in January 1520, and that "at that time" (NESTE TEMPO -- the expression is unfortunately vague) war broke out between Vijayanagar and Bijapur. After its close the Hindu king sent a message to "Ruy de Mello, captain of Goa," in the absence of the governor-general, regarding the mainlands of Goa. Correa does not mention distinctly the year in which this occurred, but the edition of 1860 at the head of the page has the date "1521." This, however, must be an error on the part of the editor, for in May 1521 Sequeira was not absent, and therefore the year referred to cannot be 1521; while in May 1522 Dom Duarte de Menezes, and not Sequeira, was governor-general.[223] Sequeira sailed for Portugal January 22, A.D. 1522.

Barros relates the departure of de Sequeira from India for the Red Sea on February 13, 1520, and states that in his absence Ruy de Mello was governor of Goa, under Sequeira's lieutenant, Aleixo de Menezes. Ruy de Mello seized the mainland of Goa after the battle of Raichur,[224] and at that time de Sequeira was absent at the Red Sea. His description of the siege of Raichur and the great battle in the vicinity clearly seems to have been taken from the chronicle of Nuniz. It follows the latter blindly, even in the misspelling of names, and therefore is really of no greater value. When, however, Barros comes to deal with the acquisition of the mainlands of Goa,[225] he is dependent on other information, and gives a much more detailed account. The time is clearly fixed. After the battle and flight of the Adil Shah the feeling between the two adversaries was naturally highly strained, and this "enabled Ruy de Mello, captain of Goa, to take the mainlands of Goa." Sequeira was at the Red Sea and Menezes at Cochin. A very important passage for my present purpose occurs a little later on in Barros's work:[226] --

"Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, AS soon as he arrived at Goa (from the Red Sea), all necessary arrangements having been made for the government of the city, AND PRINCIPALLY OF THE MAINLANDS, WHICH HE FOUND THAT RUY DE MELLO HAD TAKEN ... went to Cochin;"

and thence to Diu, where he arrived on February 9, 1521.[227] Another passage farther on in the narrative of Barros also establishes the fact that Ruy de Mello took the lands during Sequeira's absence at the Red Sea.[228]

Faria y Souza, a Spanish writer, whose work was first published a century after these events, confirms the period, February 1520 to February 1521, as that of Sequeira's absence at the Red Sea, and he writes: --

"While the governor[229] was in the Red Sea, the King Crisnao Rao of Bisnaga covered the plains and hills and stopped the flow of the rivers[230] with an army of thirty-five thousand horse, seven hundred and thirty-three thousand foot, and five hundred and eighty-six elephants carrying castles with four men in each, and twelve thousand watermen ... and baggage in such quantities that the courtesans alone numbered more than twenty thousand."[231]

Souza also states, as does Nuniz, that after the defeat of the Adil Shah, Krishna Deva Raya demanded that, as the price of peace, the former should visit him and kiss his foot; and that, taking advantage of the Adil Shah's difficulties, Ruy de Mello seized the mainlands of Goa.[232] It is clear, therefore, that both authors are writing of the same event.

Osorio, a later writer, confirms the story in most of its details, stating that after the defeat of the Adil Shah, Krishna Raya sent to Ruy de Mello ("Roderigo Melos"), captain of Goa, offering the mainlands, and promising after the return of Sequeira to send a regular embassy to conclude a solemn treaty. De Mello accordingly took the mainlands.

Lafitau[233] also states that the war took place during Sequeira's absence at the Red Sea, and that the mainlands were taken after the Adil Shah's defeat.[234]

Turning to Firishtah, I find a difference. He states that the battle of Raichur took place in Hijra 927 (December 22, 1520, to December 1, 1521, A.D.), which, if it was fought in May, as Nuniz declares, makes the date May 1521. That he is speaking of the same affair is obvious from the details given. He mentions, for instance, the vast host constituting the Hindu army, the Shah's force advancing to the river Krishna, the too hasty crossing of the river, the gallant fight of the Muhammadans, their defeat and rout, the fact of the Adil Shah's forces being driven to the river and perishing in large numbers while attempting to re-cross it, the Shah's narrow escape, and his dependence on Asada Khan. All this leaves no room for doubt. The only difference is that, whereas we learn from the other authorities that the fortress of Raichur was in the hands of the Muhammadans, Firishtah states that the war arose because the Adil Shah "made preparations for marching to recover Mudkul and Roijore from the Roy of Beejanuggur," as if the latter were then in possession of those places. As to Firishtah's date, I believe it to be wrong by one year, for the reasons given above. It must be remembered that he wrote many years after the event.

Having thus, I hope satisfactorily, established the fact that the date given by Nuniz for the battle of Raichur is wrong by two years, and should be 1520, I turn to examine the day and month. It was the new moon day of May, according to Nuniz, and a Saturday. Krishna Deva Raya was ready for battle on the Friday, but postponed his attack to the next day since Friday was considered an unlucky day.

The moment of the occurrence of new moon in May 120 was 2.27 A.M. on the morning of Thursday, May 17. We do not know whether Nuniz ascertained his facts from native almanacks or the calculations of the astrologers, or whether he spoke from observations made by himself or by some one who was present; but Nuniz was an ordinary person, not a skilled astronomer, so far as we can tell, and he may well have called the day on which the crescent of the new moon first made its appearance just after sunset the "new moon day." This first appearance actually took place on the Saturday following. The first day of the Muhammadan month Jamada' l akhir, corresponding to the heliacal rising of the moon on that occasion, was Saturday, May 19.

I therefore believe that this great battle took place on Saturday, May 19, A.D. 1520,[235] a date almost synchronous with the of the "Field of the Cloth of Gold."

The Number of Troops Engaged.

When we total up the list given by Nuniz of the columns that marched from Vijayanagar for the campaign, the amount is so huge that we pause in natural doubt as to whether the story could by any possibility be true: 703,000 foot, 32,600 horse, and 551 elephants, BESIDES the camp followers, merchants, &c., and "an infinitude of people" who joined him at a place close to Raichur! It certainly demands a large strain on our credulity.

Let every one form his own opinion. I can only call attention to the fact that large armies seem to have always been the rule in India, and that certainly Krishna Raya had the power to raise immense numbers of troops,[236] though whether so many as is stated is another question. His power to do so lay in his mode of government. Allusion has already been made to this, and Nuniz gives us interesting details. The whole empire was divided into provinces and estates, held by chiefs bound to keep up masses of troops fit for immediate service. It is, of course, natural to suppose that in this great war the king would have put forth all his strength.

To prove that immense armies were often employed by Indian kings, we have only to refer to a succession of writers. Barros notes the great power of the sovereign of Vijayanagar and his almost incredible richness, and is at pains to give an account of how these enormous forces were raised, "lest his tale should not be believed."

In the second volume of Scott's "History of the Dekhan," a translation is given of a journal kept by a Bondela officer in the reign of Aurangzib, an officer who served under "Dulput Roy" in A.D. 1690. Writing about Vijayanagar in former days, at the height of its grandeur and importance, he says, "They kept an army of 30,000 horse, a million of infantry, and their wealth was beyond enumeration."

Conti, who was in India about a century earlier than the war in question, told Bracciolini that the Vijayanagar army consisted of "a million of men and upwards."

Abdur Razzak (1442 A.D.) tells the same story, putting the number at 1,100,000 with 1000 elephants.

Twenty years later Nikitin states that the Kulbarga forces marching to attack the Hindus amounted to 900,000 foot, 190,000 horse, and 575 elephants.

The Sultan himself, independently of his nobles, took the field with 300,000 men, and even when he only went out on a hunting expedition he took with him a train of 10,000 horse, 500,000 foot, and 200 elephants. He states that the Malik ul Tujar alone had an army of 200,000 employed in the siege of one city. The Hindus fought almost nude, and were armed with shield and sword.

Even so far back as the time of Alexander the Great (about B.C. 320) the army of Magadha was computed by the Greeks as consisting of 600,000 foot. 30,000 cavalry, and 9000 elephants, though Quintus Curtius makes a much more modest estimate.

Lord Egerton of Tatton states[237] that an army of Hindu confederated states, mustered for the defence of Northern indict against the Muhammadan invasion in 1192 A.D., amounted, "according to the most moderate estimate," to 300,000 horse, 3000 elephants, and a great number of infantry.

In A.D. 1259 a Mogul embassy was received at Delhi by an escort of 50,000 horse, and was led past lines of infantry numbering as many as 200,000 in their ranks.

It will be remembered how Muhammad Taghlaq of Delhi[238] raised, according to Firishtah, an army of 370,000 men for the conquest of Persia, and when he wanted to destroy the inhabitants of a certain tract of country, he "ordered out his army as if he were going hunting," surrounded the tract, and then, pressing inwards towards the centre, slaughtered all the inhabitants therein. This implies that he took, when merely hunting, immense numbers of men with him. Shahab-ud-Din, indeed, declared that Muhammad Taghlaq had an army of 900,000 horse;[239] and Nuniz, on the opening page of his chronicle, says that this Sultan invaded the Balaghat with 800,000 horse.[240] This estimate was, of course, only according to the tradition extant in 1535.

Faria y Souza, writing in the seventeenth century, estimated the forces of Bahadur, king of Cambay, in 1534, as 100,000 horse, 415,000 foot, and 600 elephants.

As late as 1762 the Mahrattas are said to have had an army of 100,000 horse.

Nuniz[241] gives details of the provincial forces of Vijayanagar, compulsorily maintained by eleven out of a total of two hundred nobles amongst whom the empire was divided, and the total of the forces of these eleven amounts to 19,000 horse, 171,700 foot, and 633 elephants.

Castanheda confirms other writers in this matter, stating that the infantry of Vijayanagar were countless, the country being of large extent and thickly populated, so that the king could call upon a million, or even two millions, of men at will.[242] This writer visited India just at the close of the reign of Krishna Deva Raya. He states that the king kept up at his own cost an establishment of 100,000 horses and 4000 elephants.

As to all this, I repeat that every one is at liberty to form his own opinion; but at least it seems certain that all the chroniclers believed that the king of Vijayanagar could, if he so desired, put into the field immense masses of armed men. They were probably not all well armed, or well trained, or well disciplined, but as to large numbers there can be little reasonable doubt. A relic of this may be seen every year at modern Haidarabad, the capital city of H.H. the Nizam, where, at the annual festival known as the "Langar," armed irregulars in very large numbers file through the principal streets. They are for the most part a mere mob of men with weapons, and are not maintained as State troops, but they are brought up by the various nobles in separate bodies, each chief mustering for the occasion all his hereditary retainers and forming them into rough regiments and brigades.

As to the description given by Nuniz of the offensive armour of the elephants, which are stated to have gone into battle with long swords like scythes attached to their trunks, the story is confirmed by many other writers.

Firishtah's Narrative.

Firishtah's account of the battle of Raichur is interesting, as it gives a description of the affair from the enemy's point of view. Ismail Adil Shah marched

"to recover Mudkul and Roijore from the roy of Beejanugger, who, gaining early intelligence of his designs, moved with a great force, and stationed his camp on the bank of the Kistnah, where he was joined by many of his tributaries; so that the army amounted at least to 50,000 horse, besides a vast host of foot. The sultan would now have delayed his expedition, as the enemy possessed all the ferries of the Kistnah, but that his tents were pitched, and it would have been disgraceful to retract from his declarations He therefore marched with 7000 horse, all foreign, and encamped on the bank of the river opposite to the enemy, waiting to prepare floats to cross and attack them.

"Some days after his arrival, as he was reposing in his tent, he heard one of the courtiers without the skreens reciting this verse: -- 'Rise and fill the golden goblet with the wine of mirth before the cup itself shall be laid in dust.' The sultan, inspired by the verse, called his favourites before him, and spreading the carpet of pleasure, amused himself with music and wine. When the banquet had lasted longer than was reasonable, and the fumes of the wine had exercised their power, a fancy seized the sultan to pass the river and attack the enemy.... Warm with wine he resolved to cross immediately, and mounting his elephant, without making his intentions known, proceeded to the river, as if to reconnoitre, but suddenly gave orders for as many of his troops as could to go upon the rafts, and others to follow him on elephants through the river. The officers represented the folly and danger of precipitation; but the sultan, without reply, plunged his own elephant into the stream, and was followed involuntarily by the amras and their followers; on about 250 elephants.

"By great good fortune, all reached the opposite shore in safety, and as many troops as could cross on the floats at two embarkations had time to arrive, when the enemy advanced to battle in so great force as excluded every probable hope of escape to the sultan, who had not more than 2000 men ready to oppose 30,000. The heroes of Islaam, animated with one soul, made so gallant a resistance that about a thousand of the infidels fell, among whom was Sunjeet Roy, the chief general of Beejanuggur; but at last, harassed beyond all power of opposition by cannon-shot, musquetry, and rockets, which destroyed near half their numbers, the survivors threw themselves into the river in hopes of escaping, and Nursoo Bahadur and Ibrahim Bey, who rode on the same elephant with Ismaeel Adil Shaw, drove the animal across the stream, but so great was the current, that except the royal elephant and seven soldiers, all the rest were drowned. The sultan's rashness was heavily punished by so great a loss. He took a solemn vow never to indulge in wine till he had revenged his defeat; and then, throwing away despair, busied his mind in repairing this unfortunate miscarriage.

"As Mirza Jehangeer had fallen in the action, the sultan consulted with Assud Khan on what measures would be best to take in the present crisis of his affairs. Assud Khan replied, that as his loss was great and the troops dispirited, it would be better for the present to retreat to Beejapore. The sultan approving the advice, marched from the Kistnah to Beejapore, and conferring the dignity of Sippeh Sallar[243] on Assud Khan, added several districts to his jaghire, and made him his principal adviser in all important affairs."

Comparison of Accounts.

Comparing this account with that given by Nuniz, there can, I think, be little doubt that both stories refer to the same event, though there are of course several discrepancies. The origin of the war is related differently. Firishtah states that on the arrival of the Sultan at the river-bank he found the Hindu army encamped on the opposite side; he crossed, after a few days' delay, with a small force, and was driven into the river. Nuniz says that Krishna Deva Raya heard of Ismail Adil's arrival on the river-bank while he himself was in camp at Raichur, fifteen miles away; and that he advanced and gave battle nine miles from the river, in the end driving the enemy across. But taking the two narratives as a whole, there are too many points of coincidence to leave any doubt in the mind that each chronicler is writing of the same event.

As to which of the two is more accurate it is impossible now to decide. But considering that Nuniz wrote only fifteen years afterwards, and that there were Portuguese present at the battle, some of whom Nuniz may have personally consulted as to what took place, it would seem more reasonable to trust in him rather than in a Muhammadan historian who did not compile his work till after an interval of sixty years. Moreover, there are some inherent improbabilities in Firishtah's narrative.

It is worthy of notice, too, that throughout the story of Nuniz at this part of his chronicle there is much that impels the belief that either himself or his informant was present at the Hindu camp while these events were taking place. The narrative of the campaign, in complete contrast to that of the remainder of the history, reads like the account of an eye-witness; especially in the passages describing the fortress of Raichur[244] and the camp -- where the supplies were so great that "you could find everything that you wanted,"[245] where "you saw"[246] the goldsmiths and artisans at work as if in a city, where "you will find"[247] all kinds of precious stones offered for sale, and where "no one who did not understand the meaning of what he saw would ever dream that a war was going on, but would think that he was in a prosperous city." Note also the description given of the extraordinary noise made by the drums, trumpets, and shouts of the men; so that even the birds fell down into the soldiers' hands stricken with terror and "it seemed as if the sky would fall to the earth," and "if you asked anything, you could not hear yourself speak, and you had to ask by signs." Many such instances might be given, but not to be tedious I will invite attention to only three more, viz., the account given by Nuniz of how; when receiving the men of the city after its surrender, the king, "casting his eye on Christovao de Figueiredo, nodded his head, and turned to the people telling them to observe what great things could be effected by one good man;"[248] his description of the behaviour of the defeated citizens when Krishna Deva made his triumphant entry into the city; and his narrative of the ambassador's reception at Vijayanagar by the king after the conclusion of the campaign.[249] It may be remembered that our other chronicler Domingo Paes, was at Vijayanagar with Christovao de Figueiredo some months after the battle, even if he were not personally present in the fighting at Raichur.

The great interest of Nuniz's narrative lies in the fact that it is the only detailed account extant. Barros related the events in historical fashion, taking his facts from this very chronicle; but he was never in India, and his brief summary is altogether wanting in the power and force contained in the graphic story of Nuniz. The other Portuguese writers pass over the war very lightly. It appears as if it hardly concerned then;, further than that at its close Ruy de Mello seized the mainlands near Goa.

Political Effects of the Battle.

And yet it had far-reaching effects. The Hindu victory so weakened the power and prestige of the Adil Shah that he ceased altogether to dream of any present conquest in the south, and turned his attention to cementing alliances with the other Muhammadan sovereigns, his neighbours. The victory also caused all the other Muhammadan Powers in the Dakhan seriously to consider the political condition of the country; and this eventually led to a combination without which nothing was possible, but by the aid of which the Vijayanagar Empire was finally overthrown and the way to the south opened. It furthermore greatly affected the Hindus by raising in them a spirit of pride and arrogance, which added fuel to the fire, caused them to become positively intolerable to their neighbours, and accelerated their own downfall.

It equally affected the fortunes of the Portuguese on the coast. Goa rose and fell simultaneously with the rise and fall of the second Vijayanagar dynasty; and necessarily so, considering that its entire trade depended on Hindu support; for the king of Portugal was never well disposed towards his hereditary enemies, the "Moors." This is a point frequently left unnoticed by writers, on Portuguese colonial history. The two most recent authors of works on the subject, Mr. Danvers ("The Portuguese in India") and Mr. Whiteway ("The Rise of Portuguese Power in India"), pay very little attention to the internal politics of the great country on the fringe alone of which the Portuguese settled, and on the coast of which their vessels came and went. Mr. Danvers devotes one short paragraph to the battle of Raichur,[250] and another[251] to the destruction of Vijayanagar. Mr. Whiteway does not even allude to the former event, and concludes his history before arriving at the date of the latter. Yet surely it is easy to see that the success or failure of maritime trade on any given coast must depend on the conditions prevailing in the empire for the supply of which that trade was established. When Vijayanagar, with its grandeur, luxury, and love of display, its great wealth and its enormous armies, was at the height of its power, the foreign traders were eminently successful: when Vijayanagar fell, and the city became desolate and depopulated, the foreign traders had no market for their goods, and trade decayed. So that this great Hindu victory at Raichur deserved a better fate than to be passed over by the historians as if it had been an event of small importance.

The Events that followed the Battle.

Nuniz gives us in detail an account of the events that followed the victory of Krishna Deva Raya, and considering that he wrote only about fifteen years after their occurrence, we should do well to receive his account as probably true in the main. Firishtah, perhaps naturally, preserves a complete silence on the subject.

Nuniz tells us that when the city of Raichur surrendered, the Hindu king made a triumphal entry into it, and treated the garrison with kindness and consideration; while the other Muhammadan kings sent envoys to Krishna Deva Raya on hearing of his success, and received a haughty and irritating reply. Krishna Deva then returned to Vijayanagar and held high festival. Shortly afterwards an ambassador arrived from the defeated Shah, and was treated with scant courtesy for more than a month, after which he was received in audience; when the king sent answer by him to his enemy, that if the Adil Shah would come to him, do obeisance, and kiss his foot, his lands and fortresses should be restored to him. No attention being paid to this, the Raya set out to search for the Shah, hoping, that he would be induced to do homage in the manner demanded and appearing to ignore altogether the effect which would necessarily be produced on the minds of the other kings of the Dakhan by this contemplated supreme humiliation of one of their number. The submission never took place. Krishna led his army as far north as Bijapur, the Adil Shah's capital, which for a time he occupied and left sadly injured. Then Asada Khan, the Shah's wily courtier, successfully brought about the death of his personal enemy, Salabat Khan, by inducing the Raya to order his execution; an act to, which the king was led by the machinations of the arch-intriguer, who subordinated his chief's interests to his own selfish ends.

King Krishna had, in the city of Bijapur, taken prisoner three sons of a former king of the Bahmani dynasty, who had been held captive by the Adil Shahs, and he proclaimed the eldest as king of the Dakhan.[252] This abortive attempt to subvert the rule of the five kings who had established themselves on the ruins of the single Dakhan sovereignty naturally fell flat, and only resulted in stiffening the hostility which these sovereigns felt towards their common foe.

A little later Krishna Raya's son, a young prince on whom he desired to confer his crown, and in whose favour he had even gone so far as openly to abdicate, died suddenly of poison, and the king, then himself in a dying condition, arrested and imprisoned his own minister, Saluva Timma, and his family. In this he was aided by some Portuguese who happened to be present at the Durbar. On Saluva Timma's son escaping to a "mountain range" -- perhaps Sandur, on the south of the capital, where there are still to be seen the remains of a strong fortress built of cyclopean masonry on the summit of the highest hill, now known as Ramandrug -- the king summoned Timma and his brother and son, and had their eyes put out.

About this time the Adil Shah advanced again to retrieve his broken fortunes, but fled incontinently on hearing the news that Krishna Deva was advancing in person to meet him. That the king, though sorely ill, did indeed move in the manner stated, seems to be confirmed by the statement of Nuniz that on the way he bought six hundred horses from the Portuguese. Krishna began to make preparations for an attack on Belgaum, then in the Adil Shah's possession, and sent an envoy to invite the assistance in this enterprise of the Portuguese at Goa; but he fell too seriously ill to carry out his project, and died shortly afterwards at the age of from forty-two to forty-five years. It was then the year 1530 A.D.

He was succeeded by Achyuta.

So far Nuniz. We learn something more from other writers. Barros states that about the year 1523 Saluva Timma, the king's minister, invaded the mainlands near Goa, which had been recently acquired by the Portuguese under Ruy de Mello; that he advanced towards Ponda with a small force, but that he was attacked and driven back.[253] Shortly after this, viz., in April 1524, the Muhammadans of Bijapur attacked these same mainlands with success, during the viceroyalty of Dom Duarte de Menezes. On October 31 of that year the Chamber of Goa wrote a report to the king of Portugal in which occurs the following passage: --

"The mainland which Ruy de Mello, who was captain of this city, conquered, was entered by the Moors, who used to possess it, in the month of April of five hundred and twenty-four, and they hold it as theirs, and the first Thanadar's district which they took was that of Perna, which is by the seaside. There they captured two Portuguese, and one of them was the Thanadar; these are prisoners in the fortress of Bylgan (Belgaum), of which the Suffilarim is captain."[254]

It is evident, therefore, that "the Moors" were successful, and yet it is curious that very little mention is made of this circumstance by other historians. Firishtah does not mention it; and it may therefore be reasonably inferred that the "Moors" in question were not the royal troops acting under the orders of the Sultan, but belonged to the local levies of Asada Khan, then chief of Belgaum.

According to Firishtah, the defeat at Raichur was followed by Ismail Adil Shah's marrying his sister to Burhan Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar; quarrelling and fighting with him (A.D. 1523); again fighting with him (1528); marrying another sister to Ala-ud-Din Ummad of Birar; and fighting with and entirely defeating Sultan Amir Barid of Bidar, then an old man, whom he captured. On the death of Krishna Deva, Ismail took advantage of the confusion of the Hindus to retake possession of Mudkal and Raichur.

Firishtah gives no dates for the two last of the event above noted, but the submission of Amir Barid to the Adil Shah apparently did not take place till 1529, for Barros[255] implies that it occurred after an event which cannot have happened earlier than 1529 -- namely, an attack on Ponda by three Hindu chiefs, which led to the inhabitants appealing for help to the then governor of Goa, Nuno da Cunha. Da Cunha was not governor till 1529. "AT THIS TIME," writes the historian, "Melique Verido[256] submitted to the Hidalchan, by advice of Madre Maluco and Cota Maluco, and came to his camp in poor clothes, and flung himself at his feet." This evidently refers to what occurred after the Barid's capture by the Adil Shah, if Firishtah's story is true.[257]

Let it be remembered, though the fact has no bearing on the history of Vijayanagar at this date, that in 1526 the Emperor Babar captured Delhi, and established himself as the first monarch of the great Moghul dynasty. He was succeeded in 1530 by Humayun, and on the latter's death in 1556 the great Akbar attained the throne.

http://www.nalanda.nitc.ac.in/resources/en....chapter12.html

Login




Remember me Lost Password?