Twirp : Terrorist Wahabi Islamic Republic Pakistan 2

[Guest]

Nareshji,
Mushy need shudhi, we can do it.
Actually, my interest is to return Moron Singh of India to Pakistan, he is more dangenous than Mushy. Mushy is very predicitable but Moron Singh foolishness is very difficult to predict and we had not seen bottom yet. Plus Moron Singh is Babu after destroying India, he can destroy Pakistan with same vigor.

Mushy and I came from same city, which is India's capital. <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Naresh]

<!--QuoteBegin-Mudy+Aug 15 2008, 08:19 PM-->QUOTE(Mudy @ Aug 15 2008, 08:19 PM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->Nareshji,
Mushy need shudhi, we can do it.  
Actually, my interest is to return Moron Singh of India to Pakistan, he is more dangenous than Mushy. Mushy is very predicitable but Moron Singh foolishness is very difficult to predict and we had not seen bottom yet.  Plus Moron Singh is Babu after destroying India, he can destroy Pakistan with same vigor.

Mushy and I came from same city, which is India's capital.  <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->
[right][snapback]86493[/snapback][/right]
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

<b>Mudy Ji :</b>

Mush the Tush is like the Drop of “Urine” which when added to Ganga Jal does not become “Shudh” buts converts the “Ganga Jal” to “Dilute Urine”.

With due respect if you are so enamoured with Mushy then I do suggest you kindly visit him in Pakistan! Keep that piece of excrement away from India. <!--emo&:furious--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/furious.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='furious.gif' /><!--endemo-->

By all means send Manmohan Singh to Pakistan but for sanity’s sake keep Mush away from India.

In ending Manmohan Singh is not dangerous at all. He obeys Sonia Gandhi in Words and Spirit.

He is just Sonia Gandhi’s “Factum Factotum” and, since he has no constituency of his own, he is in no way a dangerous Babu-Neta etc. He can never destroy India of his own volition as he is just not capable to do so since - I repeat - he has no constituency.

By all means send him to Pakistan - I don’t care what he does to Pakistan.

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[acharya]

<b>The Varieties of Legitimacies - By Khaled Ahmed in TFT</b>


Quote:
Because of the regular alternation between military and civilian rule in Pakistan, people often refer to legitimacy, or lack thereof, on the part of the rulers. Although the yardstick of legitimacy should be applied to all rulers, it is usually applied to the military rulers. In this case, it commonly means constitutional legitimacy; and it becomes a dominant strain in public discourse towards the end of a military interregnum. Yet, at the existential level, there is a variety of legitimacies that a ruler in Pakistan must acquire if he wants to remain in power.

There is no doubt that a military ruler has to seek legitimacy while a civilian ruler has to maintain legitimacy. In contrast to the civilian ruler, who arises to power through the legitimising process of elections, a military ruler has to acquire legitimacy piecemeal through showing allegiance to the text of the Constitution. However, when he draws near to the point of acquiring permanent power, the civilian ruler has lost much of his legitimacy through political conduct. This prepares the public mind for the transition from civilian to military rule.

Four types of legitimacy: This means that there are several types of legitimacies that are clearly or tacitly accepted as expressions of norm in Pakistan. Before we examine Musharraf’s quest for legitimacy, let us look at an approximate cluster of these legitimacies. This of course presumes that, on the basis of existential practice, constitution is not the only source of legitimacy. 1) The first condition is of course constitutional which becomes available through the interpretive agency of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and its legitimising verdicts. 2) The second condition is political support which becomes available through a political party which legitimises a military ruler indirectly by contesting elections and winning them. 3) The third condition is support of the army. Unfortunately, this has acquired the status of a category because of Pakistan’s revisionist nationalism and the status of the army as an arbiter when the civilian system challenges the ‘security of the state’. Political leaders lean on this legitimising factor for coming to power and for maintaining themselves in power. 4) The fourth condition is derived from economic management. This applies to all states big and small, but in the case of Pakistan it means breaking out of international isolation and avoiding the consequences of economic mismanagement by courting the support of the United States.

Supreme Court and the Army: General Musharraf gained legitimacy by acquiring the cluster of all the four legitimacies after coming to power in 1999. This is proved by the barometer of his personal popularity among the people and within the aggregate of Pakistan’s vested interests. He approached the Supreme Court of Pakistan for an initial tenure of legitimisation. The same Court had been physically attacked by an elected government in an act of self-delegitimisation. Musharraf himself later described the same trajectory of self-delegitimisation by brutalising the Supreme Court in 2007 when he dismissed its chief justice.

The process of legitimisation fades into delegitimisation at the end of a tenure of public acceptance. The universal rule of atrophy of incumbency applies to democratic and non-democratic governance equally and crucially determines the downturn in the popularity of the ruler. General Musharraf adhered to the rules of second legitimacy, that of being loyal to the army, to maintain its support. Apart from using administrative mechanisms within the army, which he controlled by allowing himself two offices at the same time, he kept the assent of the army behind his rule by inducting a large number of military personnel in the civilian administrative structure.

America and Army without Allah? President Musharraf used the paradigmatic event of 9/11 to reclaim American support as a legitimising factor in his government. This gave Pakistan an unprecedented period of economic growth lauded by such international organisations as the IMF and the World Bank. The two organisations are routinely used by states as politically legitimising factors in domestic politics. The army was rewarded through the revamping of its equipment and through incentives of better employment among the officers’ class. But there was a built-in contradiction in Musharraf’s courting of the army and the Americans. The two legitimacies were contradictory.

By overstaying his self-prescribed tenure in 2004, Musharraf invited the inevitable unveiling of the Pakistan Army-US contradiction in Afghanistan and the war against terrorism. His ambivalence always worried his supporters, but the clashing legitimacies of the army, that wanted retention of a position of dominance in Afghanistan, and America that wanted the Taliban isolated in Pakistan, undermined his governance. In part, his adherence to American policy, which he posited as ‘enlightenment and moderation’, also struck at the base of the legitimacy acquired through the 2002 elections. His party the PMLQ was reluctant to accept the policy as its mission statement.

The process of delegitimisation: After 2004, the process of legitimisation was clearly unfolding against Musharraf. All the four legitimacies that buoyed him up were now coming unstuck. His liberal reform which required the loosening of the laws affecting the minorities’ and women’s rights were filibustered by the PMLQ, his party in power. The madrassa reform, which would have caused a serious dent in the policy of dominating Afghanistan, was allowed to run aground. He refused to see the contradiction in promoting a liberal vision for international legitimisation while harnessed to the legitimising factor of a conservative party in government.

In 2007, Musharraf lost all the four grounds of legitimacy. General Zia had gained legitimacy through Islamisation and had to be killed after he lost it through an extension of rule beyond permissible incumbency. General Musharraf had gained legitimacy through the reverse process of liberalisation and doesn’t have to be killed after an extension of rule beyond permissible incumbency because the process of liberalisation had allowed more democratic space in Pakistan than Zia’s Islamisation did.

[acharya]

<b>‘US had abandoned Benazir’</b>

* US journalist says Benazir had become a vessel of democratic ideals
* Musharraf’s telephone warning was ‘like a Mafia threat’

Daily Times Monitor

LAHORE: Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto had become “a real vessel of democratic ideals” in the region but was abandoned by the United States because it “had chosen illegitimate power over spoken principle”, American Journalist Ron Suskind said in an interview on Saturday.

Suskind has published a telephone conversation between Benazir and President Pervez Musharraf in his new book – The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism – that raised questions about the ties between the two leaders.

The Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist told Democracy Now radio he had spent a lot of time with Benazir for six months before she died.

“I’ve been talking about these democratic values my whole life, but finally, just in the last month, I’m really starting to understand their power,” he quoted Benazir as telling him in Quetta “just before she died”. But she soon realised “she has essentially been abandoned because the US has chosen illegitimate power over spoken principle”, he said.

“Frankly, my success and his failure are now the same things. There’s not going to be coexistence. It’s putting the United States in a choice position. They’ve got to choose. And clearly, they’ve chosen Musharraf over me,” Suskind quoted Benazir, adding that she could have “turned the tide in that whole region”.

“I’ve got two enemies, of course, who have been in an unholy alliance—dictatorial power, messianic radicalism—for many years, and I have no protection. Why? Because Dick Cheney won’t make the phone call.

“Why? Explain it to me, the idea that they assured me Cheney would make the call to Musharraf simply to say, ‘You’re the dictator, make sure she is protected. She has to make it to election day. If she doesn’t, we’re going to hold you responsible.’”

‘Mafia threat’: To a question about a telephone conversation published in his book in which Musharraf told Benazir her safety “is based on the state of our relationship”, he said: “It’s all but a—like a Mafia threat. And this is something that the United States, frankly, deep down understands, too. They let this process unfold. And ultimately, folks around [Benazir] Bhutto now are saying that she was abandoned by America”.

[acharya]

EDITORIAL: Message in the charge-sheet

The charge-sheet prepared against President Pervez Musharraf is supposed to be secret but its contents have been hinted at by the coalition government as the document is passed from Information Minister Sherry Rehman to Law Minister Farooq Naek for giving it a legal form. The salient points in the roster of allegations pertaining to President Musharraf’s conduct in power are said to be seven and they reflect the bias of the two major coalition partners.

The committee that put together the charges is said to have collected over a dozen culpable actions that may or may not appear in the final draft. The gist of the charges to which the media was made privy on Friday night are as follows: (1) military coup against the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999; (2) suspension of the Constitution twice and aggression against the judiciary, on March 9, 2007 and on Nov 3, 2007; (3) indifference to the constitutional requirement of annual address to parliament; (4) making the NFC award to the provinces without consulting them; (5) military operation in Balochistan and target-killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti; (6) military operation on Lal Masjid; and (7) “missing persons” and their extradition to the United States, and the Damadola attack.

Before considering the contents of the charge-sheet, one must be clear about the process through which President Musharraf will pass if he is to be impeached. Despite the divided opinion among his legal advisers, the president must understand that impeachment is not a judicial process. The charges will be adjudged, not by a court, but a gathering of politicians who don’t want him around any more while some of them want revenge for what they think they have gone through because of him. They are the prosecutor, the judge and the jury. His defence, if it comes, will be heard pro-forma — if the joint session is quiet enough to make hearing possible — before the vote convicts him and asks him to leave.

Many people will question the wisdom of some of the charges. For instance, the ones relating to the military coup in 1999 and the two suspensions of the Constitution are supposed to be already indemnified by the verdict of the Supreme Court (the PCO of 2000 was legitimised by many of the deposed judges), which is the agency that awards constitutional legitimacy to the rulers in Pakistan. The president was acting on the basis of the jurisprudence of the constitutional history of Pakistan. Wasn’t this how General Zia-ul Haq, whose disciple is Nawaz Sharif, legitimised his rule? Didn’t he fix the judiciary so that he could get the required legal cover? General Musharraf travelled the well-trodden road of the military dictators of the past although he didn’t follow it up with martial law administrators and military courts.

Similarly, his inability or unwillingness to address the joint session is a picayune allegation although it is required by the Constitution. Despite the constitutional fiat, however, many jurists insist it is not serious enough, given the fact that the parliament has now a firm tradition of ignoring the decorum of the house and insulting the presidents when they address the joint session. A similar “ground reality” has to be considered in relation to courts when they have to deliver judgements on cases of extradition. Again and again, at the lower courts and the high courts, judges have avoided taking on the religious militias backing the terrorists after receiving threats from them.

Then there is the issue of the Lal Masjid Operation. The coalition government must be careful about how it approaches this problem because the matter has been internationalised and any reference to it will affect Pakistan’s external relations. It also involves serving officers of the Pakistan Army who carried out the Operation. Significantly, both the big parties and the JUIF of Maulana Fazlur Rehman have changed their minds about what happened last year. The clerics of Lal Masjid were carrying out vigilante action in the capital city and terrorising the population there. The drop scene came when they attacked a Chinese business in Islamabad, eliciting a firm official Chinese reaction. Since Lal Masjid became a cause celebre for Al Qaeda, the world outside will look at this charge against President Musharraf with disbelief and disdain. The same reaction will meet the charge in relation to the Damadola attack in January 2006.

Of course, the president will be able to rebut the charges against him effectively, including the one about the NFC award after the provinces had deadlocked themselves. But the problem is that whatever he says in the parliament will move neither the politicians sitting there nor the people of Pakistan. It is therefore much more important that he is enabled to resign and leave his job safely. There are moves afoot to get the government to make some kind of a deal with him so that he gets “save passage” in return for his resignation. Good. Meanwhile, the politicians who are waxing hostile on the issue should realise that when the impeachment process unfolds it is not going to be all rosy for them. The president may not win in parliament but he might just succeed in convincing significant numbers of Pakistanis and the world outside that he was hard done by the democrats. *

[acharya]

ANALYSIS: Musharraf’s options — Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

The army wants the political leaders to fully own the war on terrorism. Naturally, this will not be possible if the former sides with Musharraf and acts in a manner that weakens the political forces

Pakistan is undergoing a major political transformation from a centralised authoritarian Musharraf-dominated political order to democratically elected people-oriented governance. The resolutions of the provincial assemblies rejecting Musharraf’s presidency show that he is no longer acceptable to major political parties and groups all over the country.

President Pervez Musharraf missed an opportunity to gracefully quit when his loyalists were rejected in the February 2008 elections. He can still exercise damage control by stepping down before the joint session of the parliament takes up the impeachment resolution. This will enable him to exit with some grace and save the political process from internal strains and uncertainty.

The PMLQ’s top leaders and others who are advising Musharraf to fight impeachment are neither his well-wishers nor do they want Pakistan’s quick return to normal political life. Any confrontation on the impeachment situation will not save Musharraf from ouster but it will cause greater tension in the political system and drag him into more controversies.

The PMLQ leadership should now practice damage control. Unlike Musharraf, the PMLQ will stay on in politics. Its leaders need to articulate their role independent of Musharraf otherwise their support will further deplete.

Impeachment is the exclusive domain of the two houses of the parliament in a joint session after notice is given to the Speaker of the National Assembly or Chairman of the Senate as set out in Article 47 of the Constitution. The grounds for initiating impeachment as stated in the Constitution are physical and mental incapacity, violation of the Constitution, and gross misconduct. Those initiating impeachment charge-sheet the president, the Speaker communicates the charges to latter, and the joint session then takes them up within a timeframe determined by the Constitution. The President may personally appear before the joint session to respond to the charges or do so through his representative.

The joint session takes up the impeachment notice and the charges for discussion or seeks their investigation through any appropriate manner. It may assign the investigation task to a special committee. However, the joint session has full discretion to adopt any method. If a committee is appointed, the president has the right to be present or be represented through someone while investigations are taking place.

The two houses of parliament cannot meet separately to discuss the impeachment resolution. All impeachment proceedings take place in the joint session or in a committee. When the impeachment resolution is passed by two-thirds of the total strength of the joint session, the president ceases to hold office forthwith.

Pro-Musharraf political circles have attempted to create a misleading impression that the matter would not end with the approval of impeachment by parliament because they can go to the Supreme Court to challenge the decision. However, these proceedings cannot be challenged in any court of law because the Constitution gives impeachment powers exclusively to parliament.

Further, whatever is said or done on the floor of the parliament has immunity from judicial challenge with the exception of the superior judiciary’s power to review ordinary laws, ordinances and executive actions on constitutional grounds. Nor can the judiciary stop parliament from performing its constitutional duties.

If we assume for the sake of discussion that there is some kind of judicial interference with impeachment proceedings or the vote on the impeachment resolution, it will cause a clash between the superior judiciary and parliament which will be destabilising for the political system. Political parties and societal groups are likely to engage in popular mobilisation in defence of the parliament. Such mobilisation will be possible because of Musharraf’s unpopularity due to his suspension of the Constitution and reconstitution of the superior courts.

Musharraf is not expected to get any political support from the United States, the European Union or Great Britain — all relied heavily on him in the past for pursuing their counter-terrorism agenda. As a matter of fact, these states did lobby with Pakistani political leaders in the immediate aftermath of the February elections for working with Musharraf, thinking that his removal so soon after the installation of the political government might have negative implications for counter terrorism in and around Pakistan. They secured time for Musharraf to review the domestic political situation and decide his course of action.

Now with the failure of Musharraf to change his political ways and the decision of the ruling coalition to initiate impeachment, the US and the EU are treating this as Pakistan’s internal matter and would support any decision taken in accordance with the Constitution. The US may be inclined to seek an honourable exit for Musharraf.

The army appears non-partisan on the matter. The top brass wants this matter settled in accordance with the Constitution. They are expected to honour the decision of the parliament provided constitutional procedures are adhered to and it is done in a peaceful and orderly manner.

The army’s current disposition is an extension of General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani’s decision, on assuming command in the last week of November 2007, to pull the army back from active politics. The army top brass faces three interrelated issues which makes it imperative for it to emphasise professionalism, and avoid taking sides in politics or assuming a direct or indirect role.

First, Musharraf’s efforts to use his position as Army Chief to hold on to power undermined the army’s reputation at the common person level. However, the criticism was focused on its political role rather than on the military as an institution. General Kayani and his top brass are working hard to improve its image with the people.

Second, it is well known in political and military circles that Musharraf has lost political credibility. The army will not put its reputation at stake to rescue a discredited ruler. This will negate the army’s current image-building efforts.

Third, the military in general and the army in particular have been unhappy with the way the Musharraf government conducted counter-insurgency in the tribal areas. These operations were conducted without building any popular support. The security establishment faced two dilemmas: on the one hand they suffered heavy human losses and reverses, and on the other, they were accused by some political circles of pursuing an unjust war.

Now, the army wants the political leaders to fully own the war on terrorism. Naturally, this will not be possible if the former sides with Musharraf and acts in a manner that weakens the political forces. Therefore, the triumph of the political forces in the current confrontation serves the military’s interests, at least for the time being.

Musharraf and his associates in the presidency need to make a realistic assessment of the situation. A down-to-earth analysis shows that his support base is completely eroded. Whatever political support is still left, it will weaken further in the next week as it becomes clear that the impeachment motion will succeed. Musharraf can turn his removal into a messy affair but this will not salvage his position. He needs to make the much needed move of bowing to public opinion. His civilian and military friends, who have no personal axe to grind, need to advise him to opt for a graceful exit rather than to go through the impeachment process.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

[Naresh]

[center]<img src='http://www.nation.com.pk/uploads/news_image/original/Maxim_Cartoon_1198.jpg' border='0' alt='user posted image' />[/center]

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Naresh]

<b>'Modalities for Musharraf's ouster settled': Impeachment move deferred</b>

<b>ISLAMABAD - As the modalities for President Musharraf’s ouster have almost been settled and most likely he would be stepping down in the next couple of days, the coalition partners have also deferred putting in action the impeachment process.

Some authentic sources confirmed to The Nation that finally President Musharraf had decided to call it a day and the formal announcement in this connection will be made in the next couple of days.</b>

These sources, having inroads both in the ruling coalition and the Presidency, said that all the modalities for President Musharraf’s ouster were settled and there were both local and foreign guarantors to the deal.

And above all the Armed Forces of Pakistan, though not standing with their former chief in his present ‘pursuit’ to contest impeachment motion, would not tolerate their former chief humiliated and drummed out through impeachment and consequently facing of charges under Article 6 of the Constitution.

Some political analysts suggested that the real pressure on Musharraf to quit the office of President was coming from military top brass and he had actually caved in to that pressure and was least intimidated by the politicians’ move.

A source said that though Armed Forces of the country wanted him to leave the office of President and to that extent they were not supporting him, on the point of his impeachment and his forced ouster from the Presidency, there was strong view among the men in Khaki, who would take it as an insult to their institution.

The sources further disclosed that President Musharraf was earlier demanding to see the charge sheet before taking some final decision about his future, but after the passage of resolutions from all the four provincial assemblies demanding with overwhelming majority that he should fresh vote of confidence or quit, virtually pushed him, to the corner and he had been left with no option but to quit.

The sources in the ruling coalition informed TheNation that the chessboard readied by the political dispensation had worked and with the issue of President’s ouster as per their wishes, all the ruling coalition wanted to get rid of him without entangling into any controversy.

The sources further disclosed that the deferment of tabling impeachment resolution and charge sheet for a few days was part of that strategy, as earlier they were ready to set the impeachment process in action by Monday.

On Sunday Ms Sherry Rehman said that the charge sheet against President Musharraf was final but the same would be tabled after getting final nod on it from the coalition partners in next couple of days.

The sources privy to the developments taking place on the front said that the things would not go to that extent and President Musharraf would step down ‘very soon’.

These sources further disclosed that it was agreed upon between the stakeholders that President Musharraf would be given complete immunity and would be given a free hand to stay here or leave for abroad on his own sweet will.

Under the agreement he could not be tried in any court of law in the country likewise no question would be raised about his assets both in Pakistan and abroad.

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Naresh]

[center]<b><span style='font-size:21pt;line-height:100%'>Musharraf ‘hands over resignation’ to army chief</span></b>[/center]

<b>ISLAMABAD - <span style='color:red'>Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has handed over his resignation to the country's army chief along with a set of demands, diplomatic sources here said on Sunday.

It was learnt that Musharraf made up his mind to quit after his meeting with the former chief of an intelligence agency last week.</span></b>

While handing over a hand-written resignation, Musharraf also jotted down some conditions for his exit, which included indemnity from any prosecution, extension of all perks and privileges he is entitled to as president in retirement and full security guaranteed by the army, added the sources.

He reportedly insisted that he would stay within the country and reside at his Chak Shehzad farmhouse in the suburbs of the capital, Islamabad. The farmhouse is currently undergoing renovation.

<b><span style='color:red'>Sources also told this correspondent that the resignation is with the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, and will be handed over to the political leadership when all things are settled.

They added some top generals led by Gen. Kayani later met President Musharraf who said he would like to see the charge sheet against him and respond to it before stepping down. At one stage Musharraf is cited to have told the generals: “You have abandoned me, so I am abandoning you.”

He also warned the generals that charges against him like the massacre in Lal Masjid could also apply to some of them.

The generals told him that if the elected representatives of the people thought they were also to blame they were ready to face the charges. It was pointed out that Gen. Kayani had opposed the operation as the then intelligence chief.</span></b>

Musharraf, it is learnt, would be advised to go for Umrah to Saudi Arabia and then proceed to United States for medical check-up.

Presidential spokesman Maj-Gen. (retd) Rashid Qureshi, however, again denied all reports that Musharraf has resigned.

President of the pro-Musharraf party, Pakistan Muslim League, Quad-e-Azam (PML-Q), Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain told reporters here that Musharraf was not resigning and would confront the charge sheet. He said the ruling coalition had yet not prepared the charge sheet and was only making such claims to put pressure on the president.

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Naresh]

[center]<img src='http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/images/2008/08/18/20080818_ed03.jpg' border='0' alt='user posted image' />[/center]
[center]<b><span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>PAKISTANI RUPEE</span></b>[/center]

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Musharraf, it is learnt, would be advised to go for Umrah to Saudi Arabia and then proceed to United States for medical check-up.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
He can visit Delhi for Medical Check up and do Puja in Hanuman Temple.

[Guest]

Mushy status is somewhat clear.
Now, The Great Question What Kayani will do ?
First priority to unite Army, which means Mushy gang, Fundo gang and Army.
Second to keep west Pakistan border quiet, move them from West side to East side.
Third Islam Khatarey mei Hai.

To achieve this, create problem in J&K, make Diwali everywhere in India by making call for Islam Khaterey mei hai. He will not try Kargil type of Mushy adventure.

[Guest]

<b>Search on for Musharraf's exile home</b><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->The Saudi intelligence chief Prince Muqrim bin Abdul Aziz visited Pakistan over the weekend to negotiate a deal ''so that nobody is humiliated.'' But the whisky-swilling, dog-loving, media-crazy dictator is not the ideal guest for the fundamentalist kingdom. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
India should provide him residence, he love Golf, Golf course Bunglow for him, after all he is deliwala.

[Bodhi]

Musharraf Quits

[Guest]

Mushy missed goal post and Mango crate, now what will happen.
Left media here is saying, last week US read Riot Act to Mushy. <!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/biggrin.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='biggrin.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Pakistanis jubilant over Musharraf's resignation </b>MULTAN, Aug 18 (Reuters/AFP): Pakistanis danced in the streets on Monday after President Pervez Musharraf announced his resignation, with many ordinary people hoping his departure would bring improvement to their lives. Lawyers, who have spearheaded an anti-Musharraf campaign since he tried to sack the chief justice last year, stormed out of courts in Multan on hearing of Musharraf's resignation, shouting “Down with the American stooge.” Jaffar Shah, a retired soldier in Peshawar, said: “The root cause of all problems has gone. I wish I could fire shots to show my joy but unfortunately I can't do that.” People in Karachi handed out sweets and danced in celebration. “Thank God he's resigned. The country will do much better now. It's a victory for the people,” said a businessman. In Lahore, the sound of drums and cheers of joy echoed throughout this ancient walled city. Elsewhere, people fired Kalashnikovs in the air to celebrate. Some Pakistanis harboured what seem unrealistic expectations for the post-Musharraf outlook: “Inflation is surely going to go down now,” said one shopkeeper. Others were less optimistic as despite Musharraf's unpopularity, many Pakistanis are suspicious of the civilian politicians -- a number of whom have returned to power -- were dogged by accusations of corruption and mismanagement when they ruled in the 1990s. Some said they feared that with Musharraf gone, the coalition would be beset by infighting between them. Other Pakistanis sounded a note of caution, saying that the nation would now likely see more political chaos. “I think we should see about the state of the country. The coalition have been saying Musharraf was a big obstacle. We will see what they do now,” Ahmed, a political analyst said. (Posted @ 17:56 PST)
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->

Compare with Moron Singh, he is buying power, appointing thieives and crooks as ministers in India

[acharya]

<b>Win-win for Pak-India</b>
Seize on the opportunities provided by Parvez Musharraf's exit, exhorts N.V.Subramanian.

18 August 2008: The inevitable has happened. How should now India deal with the situation after Parvez Musharraf's departure? This writer has used the word "situation" and not reflexively considered how is it that the Manmohan Singh government should engage with the weak (though perhaps no more that) PPP-led coalition government, the natural filler of much of the "political vacuum" left by Musharraf's resignation. Keen NewsInsight.net readers will immediately connect "political vacuum" to the National Security Advisor (NSA), M.K.Narayanan's dangerous outspokenness recently (see Commentary, "Motormouth," 13 August 2008), in which he appeared a deal over-fond of Musharraf and slighted the elected government. Predictably, Narayanan raised hackles in Pakistan. With Musharraf gone, that may not be forgiven, but could be temporarily forgotten.

Musharraf is history. India will have to deal with the post-Musharraf "situation", the word appearing in the beginning of this commentary. Dealing with the "situation" will obviously mean dealing with the elected government, held together so far by the compromising brilliance of Benazir Bhutto's widower, Asif Zardari, who could well be said to have come into his own. But Pakistan's emerging "situation" contains other things and other actors. Dynamically, in proportion to their changing weight in the affairs of Pakistan, these "things" and "actors", besides the elected government, will have to be dealt with by India. Let us try to gain a grip on what this "situation" is, and what it entails. This is a preliminary analysis. More may follow in subsequent commentaries. Pakistani commentators themselves have been quick of the mark, saying that real tensions between the PPP and Nawaz Sharief's PML-N sections of the elected government will erupt now that their common enemy, Musharraf, is out of the way. Commentators also warn that the government has to deliver, with Musharraf gone, on major crises such as the collapsed economy and infrastructure and runaway inflation, spiraling terrorist violence in the north-west's tribal areas, peaking jihadi suicide bombings in urban Pakistan, and of course relations with the United States. Troubles in Jammu and Kashmir would give the elected government more uneasy moments with the Pakistan army and the ISI than, per se, with the Indian government, although angry statements may emanate from either side from time to time.

But J and K is still not a crisis issue for the elected government. Those crisis issues mentioned earlier in this paragraph are what, to repeat, Pakistani commentators expect that their government will soon have to overcome. All well said, and well taken. From India's standpoint, this is nothing unusual. Governments are elected to govern, although most times they don't, and there is the extant example of the Manmohan Singh government, the most dysfunctional government in the last ten years. Trouble for India from the elected Pakistan government can come from Nawaz Sharief's party, whose hardline elements may be tempted to play the Kashmir card to embarrass the PPP and Zardari. Both Zardari and Sharief would know that the only institution to gain from warring Pakistani politicians, or from impelling them to war against one another, is the Pakistan army, and flowing from there, the intelligence establishment. If Zardari, Sharief and the other politicians not allied with the military/ intelligence establishment go to war against one another, or hunt one another down in packs, or make the mistake Sharif did, and others before him, of allying with the army to score points against political opponents, then it will be back to military rule again, sooner or later. India, therefore, must use all its political and diplomatic skills to keep Pakistani politicians forever apprised/ advised of the limits they must place on opposing one another, and that that opposition should remain within the space afforded by democracy. This is one key long-term project of the Indian government. For this, it is necessary that all Pakistani politicians are engaged, the PPP by the Congress, say, because of the closeness of the Bhuttos to the Gandhis, Nawaz Sharief by I.K.Gujral and the Punjabiat crowd, and so on the Baluchis and the Frontiersmen. Care must be taken, in this engagement, that nothing is said or done to jeopardize Pakistan's nascent democracy. The second project flows from this engagement, which is to cajole, push and persevere with Pakistani politicians to bring the notorious ISI and other intelligence agencies under civilian control.

In this, the Americans would assist if it assists in their war against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas. Either the Pakistan army or the ISI-driven Pakistan army (this distinction is important to make) may or will act spoiler, because if democracy becomes stronger and deep-rooted in Pakistan and relations between the Pakistani and Indian democracies become solider, they would increasingly call to question the existence of such a large Pakistani military. With stable deterrence between them, pressure would grow to down-size the Pakistan military, and this could ultimately be also a long-term US aim to keep Afghanistan secure, if, that is, it does not affect the war against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. So, to spoil this, to destroy any prospect of its large size, its raison d'etre (to defend against "Hindu India") being called to question, the intelligence-driven Pakistan army will try to raise levels of terrorism in India. This has to be combated robustly, but the elected Pakistan government, this or subsequent ones, must be made to feel to be under India's debt, that it is taking punishment to preserve Pakistani democracy. At the same time as Pakistani politicians are made to feel indebted, they should also be told that any nexus between them and terrorists would affect relations between the two democracies. Once these messages are conveyed and reinforced, and there is all-party consensus on them on this and that side of the border, we can reasonably expect a new era in relations. But at no time must we lower our guard. Pakistan will undergo a long period of democratic experimentation and it could all blow up. Pakistan's democracy will remain most threatened by its military and intelligence so long the J and K dispute remains unresolved and unless Pakistan has ironclad guarantees that India won't provoke a war against it. In the 1947-48 war that Pakistan provoked in J and K, India lost the part called Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.

In the 1971 war that India set up, Pakistan was divided into two. So somebody should tell Pakistan's military-religious ideologues that it is even between the two countries. But more seriously, India should forthrightly say, and repeat it in every forum, that borders won't and cannot be redrawn. And this writer does not speak for the Indian government when he says this. But the only doable solution is to sanctify the status quo. Pakistan keeps what it has. India keeps what it has. And in a happier, prosperous future, and when political Islam also expends itself, who knows, J and K might cartography its own territory. But till that time, which may be one generation hence, or two, or one hundred years away, India and Pakistan would have to settle with the status quo. This is the best immediate and medium-term resolution of the J and K dispute possible. The conversion of LoC into a border, which almost came to be at the 1972 Simla Summit, should be made to be the objective for both Pakistani and Indian democracies to attain. This is the maximum India can concede, and Pakistani politicians should be made to feel they have achieved something in gaining this. It will need many months of convincing from the Indian side, but perseverance will pay. Finally, there is the issue of an ironclad guarantee against future Indian hostilities, which Pakistani political parties may need to downsize and defang their military. India and Pakistan's mutual deterrence is one guarantee. After the Kargil War, there was talk on the Indian side of a "limited war" fought under a nuclear overhang. The Pakistanis were naturally alarmed by this, but the fact remains that Pakistan waged exactly such a limited war (Kargil), although they acted up alarmed when India, more precisely George Fernandes, the then Indian defence minister, merely defined the possibilities.

The point is that, unless gravely provoked, as India was in 1971, democracies don't make war, and Pakistan started the chapter of wars in 1947. Yes, true, everyone knows this bit of history. But if an ironclad guarantee still helps Pakistan's politicians to keep their military under civil supremacy, then a no-war pact is always possible between India and Pakistan, but where Pakistan makes an explicit commitment to terminate all cross-border terrorism, and permits inspection of its territories as part of compliance procedure. Obviously, all these are very broad brush strokes to tell how a post-Musharraf situation may evolve, and how to sustain and preserve Pakistan's democracy. The Indian government has to do considerable thinking, filling in, and putting resultant strategies into action, but time, as they say, is of the essence. Rather than lament about the "political vacuum" that would result from Musharraf's departure, the NSA and the government should get an action plan put in place that makes this current transition in Pakistan a win-win for that country and for India. N.V.Subramanian is Editor, NewsInsight.net. Har-Anand has published his new second novel, Courtesan of Storms.

[Naresh]

<!--QuoteBegin-Mudy+Aug 18 2008, 07:52 PM-->QUOTE(Mudy @ Aug 18 2008, 07:52 PM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->
Compare with Moron Singh, he is buying power, appointing thieives and crooks as ministers in India
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<b>Mudy Ji :</b>

Here is your favourite “Pakistani” Leader :

<b>Pakistan's Musharraf resigns - YouTube</b>

May be you can invite him to India where he can take over the “Triple Posts” occupied by Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, President Patil and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

<!--QuoteBegin-Mudy+Aug 18 2008, 06:27 AM-->QUOTE(Mudy @ Aug 18 2008, 06:27 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->
He can visit Delhi for Medical Check up and do Puja in Hanuman Temple.
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Regretfully Mush the Tush’s first act on taking over in New Delhi will be to Destroy all Hindu Temples - the first batch of Temples being those dedicated to Lord Hanuman.

Cheers <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Regretfully Mush the Tush’s first act on taking over in New Delhi will be to Destroy all Hindu Temples - the first batch of Temples being those dedicated to Lord Hanuman.
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Why people are so scared of external enemy but very comfortable with enemy sittting inside Delhi, India and doing more damage and had no regrets.
So now you know. Mushy is less harmfull then some MPs of India and Moron Singh.

With Mushy keep your known enemy closer, but again Dilli is Mushy Janambhumi, his first right, Who can deny this? Same is with Moron Singh and Ayers etc Pakistan is their Janam Bhumi.

[Guest]

<b>Revealed: Musharraf's luxury retirement pad</b>